THE GREAT SOCIETY AT THE GRASS ROOTS

LOCAL ADAPTATION TO FEDERAL INITIATIVES OF THE 1960s — CHAMPAIGN-URBANA

ROZANN ROTHMAN
Center for the Study of Federalism

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INTRODUCTION

Daniel J. Elazar

The generation that embraced the years between the end of World War II and the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as president encompassed the heyday of the metropolitan-technological frontier, the third stage in America's continuing frontier experience. During the course of that generation, the American landscape was transformed from one consisting of a number of discrete urban centers surrounded by a rural, agriculturally oriented population that still comprised a substantial percentage of the American total, into one marked by numerous low density metropolitan areas and regions, whose development was based upon the transportation possibilities created by the automobile and the airplane, the communications possibilities created by the new forms of telecommunications, and the new technologies of the second or third generation of the industrial revolution. The new metropolitan landscape bred new forms of social organization and behavior as well. Needless to say, all of these found their echo in the political process and to some extent were shaped by that process. To an even greater extent, the American people used the political process to control the impact of the new frontier and to direct it in ways that would serve their chosen ends.

Not the least of these chosen ends was the desire to preserve traditional ways of community-building and governance insofar as possible. Much of the process of political adaptation to the new frontier involves the ways in which this desire found expression in local governance. For Americans, these traditional patterns had already become patterns of civil community rather than organic community, that is to say, it was not the organic ties between family and neighborhood forged over generations that created local community in the United States but rather the more limited association of individuals for essentially civic purposes. Thus, the major political task confronting Americans as they adapted to the metropolitan frontier was how to preserve the forms of civil community which they wished to preserve, while at the same time directing the activities of their civil communities toward coping with the problems generated by the new frontier.
Thus it became possible to study long-term trends in American development through the study of these metropolitan areas, out of which emerged this writer's work on American political culture and its subcultures, an elaboration of the frontier thesis, a further study of the impacts of the processes of American federalism, and a number of models regarding the workings of American republicanism, democracy, and sectionalism. The results of the first study were published in several places, but most particularly in Cities of the Prairie.\(^3\)

It also became apparent very early in the original study that most studies of local political systems in the United States, to that point, suffered from a lack of a comparative dimension in two ways. First, there was a lack of comparison of the same phenomenon at the same time in more than one local political system, the kind of problem that gave rise to the then-prominent controversy between Floyd Hunter's "power elite" theory and Robert Dahl's theory of local pluralism, each of which was derived from a single case study.\(^4\) Beyond that, there was a further lack of longitudinal comparison, that is to say, of studies of the same system over time. Each study was, in essence, a snapshot of a particular moment in an unfolding process and generalizations derived from that snapshot often suffered from being confined, as any snapshot is, to the moment at which it is taken.

The very breadth of the first study which covered seventeen cities in ten metropolitan regions or areas located in five different states did much to deal with the first problem. The second was dealt with, partially, by studying historical trends as well as immediate conditions in those cities and defining "immediate" as embracing the first fifteen postwar years. However, this writer also promised himself at the time that, were it to be at all possible, he would continue this project at least over a full generation so that a proper longitudinal dimension could be developed systematically.

The first phase of the study was completed by the summer of 1963, just at the point where the first half of the postwar generation was coming to an end—after the restoration of the Democrats to power in Washington with a mandate to respond to the problems generated by the metropolitan frontier, but before the Great Society emerged as their response. Thus, it
appropriately encapsulated the years during which the foundations were laid for those subsequent developments, which were to so significantly affect all aspects of the American polity. In the interim, the first results of the project were published and the project itself was moved to the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University. It was decided to resume field work for the second stage of the study in 1969, a decade after it was first initiated. Drawing upon the resources of the Center to return to the cities of the prairie, it was decided not only to re-map them but to study various aspects of the polities which the first study had determined to be worthy of special consideration, and to expand the study to other parts of the United States and even beyond.

Dr. Rothman’s study of the politics of Champaign and Urbana, Illinois during the years of the “Great Society” and the “New Federalism” represents a signal contribution to our understanding of the political process of the crucial decade of the 1960s, processes which continue to shape contemporary American politics. Her study is particularly significant in that it examines the consequences of the Great Society at a turning point in its fortunes, just as it was about to give way to a trend which, from the perspective of liberalism, seemed drastically different yet, with regard to federalism, offered far more continuity than the authors of either program or the larger public understood.

The people and politics of Champaign County weathered those years with a minimum of upset, often surprisingly little. The way they managed to do so is, inductive of the continued strength of localistic forces in the United States, especially those of political tradition and culture, even in an era of strong nationalizing tendencies. Dr. Rothman’s study documents this continued ability of localities to tailor outside interventions to local needs and requirements, and helps explain why this continues to be so.

Some Points of Theory

I would like to suggest to the reader some points of theory, awareness of which will enhance the appreciation of Dr. Rothman’s work. The first is the way in which Champaign-Urbana constitute a twinned civil community. As a civil community, Champaign-Urbana is an integral part of the federal system in every respect, the second thesis of the study. The third is the question of Champaign-Urbana changing geo-historical location. The fourth thesis relates to the place of the civil community on America’s continuing frontier and the fifth to the political subculture which informs that civil community. A sixth thesis dealt with in this study documents development in one civil community in line with the rhythm of political generations. All of these themes are discussed at length in Cities of the Prairie, the first book in this series of studies, and brought up to date for them all in its sequel, Cities of the Prairie: Rounding Out the Postwar Generation. 5 Here I will only summarize the main points which link the overall theoretical approach of the project and this study.

The Civil Community

The central thesis of the “Cities of the Prairie” studies is that the American urban community is not necessarily defined politically by the boundaries of either its SMSA or the particular central city after which it is named. Even the area included in the municipal boundaries of the latter is, in most cases, organized politically in a more complex manner than that. In fact, we can understand the American urban place as a community only when we view it as a “civil community,” a term developed by this author to better describe the way in which an urbanized area, which frequently extends beyond the formal city limits of most central cities, is bound together as a meaningful political system. 6

A civil community may be defined as the organized sum of the political institutions functioning in a given locality to provide the bundle of governmental services and activities that can be manipulated locally to serve local needs in light of the local value system. Every civil community is composed of at least six elements: (1) the formally established local governments serving it, such as the municipal governments, the county, and the school and special districts; (2) the local agencies of the state and federal governments, insofar as they are adjuncts of the local community, existing primarily to serve it, such as the local branches of the state employment office and the post office; (3) the public nongovernmental bodies serving local governmental or quasi-governmental purposes, such as the chamber of commerce.
and the community welfare council; (4) the political parties and factions functioning within the civil community to organize political competition; (5) the system of interest groups functioning in the local political arena to represent the various local interests; and (6) the body of written constitutional material and unwritten tradition, serving as a framework within which sanctioned political action must take place and as a check against unsanctioned political behavior. The civil community and its components are schematically portrayed in Figure 1.

In truth, there are few civil communities which match the ideal model. Champaign-Urbana represents one variant: twin civil communities built around two essentially equal cities which, despite their jealously-guarded municipal independence, are nevertheless part of a common civil community. Municipal independence and civil community in this case are not self-contradictory. Each city has its own "personality" and, accordingly, offers its citizens a particular kind of local political expression. Nevertheless, they are tied together around the University of Illinois, as the major socioeconomic force locally, and in various other ways which Dr. Rothman explains. Size is not the criterion here. Rantoul, for example, only seventeen miles to the north and considerably smaller than either city, is a separate civil community which developed around another major institution, Chanute Air Force Base. What counts are measures of interaction and shared institutions beyond the city governments themselves. Champaign and Urbana, as the twin anchors of a single civil community, have consistently had to work out a modus vivendi which preserves sufficient independence for each while maintaining sufficient cooperation.

Federalism

Also underlying this book is the conceptualization of the American federal system which this writer and his colleagues have presented elsewhere, and which is applied to the urban scene in Chapter 9 of Cities of the Prairie. Running through the picture of Champaign-Urbana which is presented in the following pages is the idea that the civil community is inextricably woven into the federal-state-local private partnership, which is American federalism, and that both its autonomy and its dependence are contingent on its place within the federal system.

This, indeed, is the central theme of Dr. Rothman's examination of Champaign-Urbana in the last half of the postwar generation, as indicated in its title, The Great Society at the Grass Roots. Whereas, in my initial study, I was still involved in demonstrating the close integration between the civil community and the federal system, Dr. Rothman's task is to demonstrate how the civil community maintains its integrity in the face of expanded federal and state activity and intensification of federal and state involvement locally, as was the case in the years of the Great Society. It is significant that what emerges is a federal system that remained intact from the local perspective, with the civil community adapting to change without surrendering its integrity.

The Question of "Location"

Third, civil community is located at some point in space and in a particular segment of time. At the risk of seeming pedantic or restating the obvious, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of location in both space and time in the study of the civil community or any other social phenomena. The importance of geo-historical location becomes particularly evident when the "external" or "objective" influences on urban political systems are considered as limiting and directing factors, shaping the range of possibilities for what is known as "local decision making."

A central premise of this study is that it is neither possible nor desirable to study local political systems apart from their larger setting in time and space, because of the very intimate nature of their relationship to the larger universe of which they are part. Consequently, while the limitations of research and the dictates of research strategy make it necessary to study segments of a humanly unattainable spatial and temporal whole, the choice of the segments must be dictated by some perception of the whole.

Space and time should be considered as two dimensions of the same phenomenon of location. When Champaign-Urbana, for example, is "located" by the reader, it is not enough for him to perceive its spatial location as a mapmaker might—in the state of Illinois on the Illinois Central Railroad mainline 130 miles southwest of Chicago, 165 miles northeast of St. Louis, 90 miles east of Springfield, and 40 miles west of the Indiana border, in the heart of the corn
belt. The reader's perception of that metropolitan area's location must include an implicit understanding of such geo-historical factors as:

1. The relationship of both cities to the settlement of central Illinois in the third through sixth decades of the nineteenth century, and the nature of frontier settlement in that place and period

2. The differences between the two cities that stem from their founding at different points in that period, for quite different reasons, at the spatial and temporal meeting point of the old "preindustrial" frontier of subsistence farmers and crossroads villages and the new frontier of railroads, urban centers, commercial farming, and a clearly national (even international) economy

3. The course of metropolitanization as it has developed in central Illinois, moving in from the east since the end of World War II.

The reader concerned with politics must further consider Urbana's political development in light of the developing tension between the city's traditional position as the seat of an agricultural county with secondary commercial characteristics "ruled" by a local "oligarchy," and its recently developed concern with industrial and commercial development, which has brought with it certain demands for fundamental political change. Similarly, Champaign's political development has to be considered in relation to its origins as the direct product of the new industrial frontier, which also coincided with the rise and continued dominance of the Republican party as the area's voice, and as the political spokesman for its particular commercial interests.

What this suggests is that the cumulative effects of each local community's evolving location in time and space on its political system must be considered as fundamental elements in determining community patterns. Particularly in the modern age, the simple passage of time alters every community's relative spatial location to the point where its overall geo-historical setting is affected. There is a commonsense perception of this on the part of most Americans, often sharpened upon return to the "hometown" after many years' absence. Thomas Wolfe's phrase, "You can't go home again," has become part of the language, in implicit recognition of one aspect of this kind of change. Change in this sense does not necessarily mean progress. Communities that "stand still" also change, because their relationship to the larger setting changes. Communities that have avoided such changes—which are manifested physically as well as in other ways—are invariably small villages tucked away in eddies of the national current. They are often referred to in the popular literature as "towns that time forgot," an expression that perfectly illustrates the idea of changing temporal location.

As the temporal aspects of communication location are altered, the patterns of its previous history accumulate "geologically" to influence subsequent patterns and events in myriad ways, some easily visible but many imperceptible to the casual observer. All contribute to the limitation, direction, and shaping of local decisions in any period, regardless of who ostensibly holds the power of decisionmaking. Two consequences of this must be emphasized here. The first is this "geo-historical" limitation on the independence of action of any particular generation of community powerholders. The layers of culture and experience subjected to the folding, fracturing, and erosion of time and events combine to create a structure for every community that is far less malleable under normal conditions than its surface manifestations alone might indicate. Proper understanding of those surface manifestations—what is usually called the "community power structure"—necessarily means an understanding of how those manifestations reflect the community's social geology. The second consequence is the expansion of possibilities for community development and change through the local impact of nationwide changes in temporal location. The social geology of every community is most easily loosened by changes that occur in the nation as a whole, whose repercussions often reverberate in earthquake-like fashion to upset "fixed" local patterns, sometimes to local advantage and sometimes not.

It should be stressed that while the cumulative effects of geo-historical location are limiting in many ways, the very passage of time in a civilization oriented to change, such as our own, also represents the opening of new opportunities. In one sense, at least, this is a new phenomenon. The opening of the modern age in the seventeenth century, which coincided
with the settlement of English-speaking North America and the foundation of American civilization, not only initiated an epoch of change but also initiated a chain reaction that has accelerated the process of change continuously since. The result has been the virtual institutionalization of change in all modern societies and most particularly in the United States. As change became institutionalized, time lost its pre-modern character as a factor whose impact was well-nigh imperceptible from generation to generation, to become an almost visible force, opening new frontiers for human development in every generation.

Brought down to the community level, the dynamics of geo-historical location change every community's location, virtually every generation. Changes in location make it necessary for American communities to perpetually reconstitute themselves politically, much as they must reconstruct themselves economically and physically. Indeed, such changes can transform previously prosperous communities into depressed ones through no apparent fault of their own. It can also make it possible for benighted local communities to transcend the limits of past location by capitalizing on the potentialities of future location. Implicit in all this is the understanding that each generation adds its mite to the record and, in doing so, contributes to the determination of the contributions of future generations.

The "historical geology" of social phenomena is such that there is some "beginning" in every social order, at the point where space and time are first linked in the life of a particular social system. The bedrock upon which the subsequent strata of human activity are deposited is located at the point where particular men first began to function in systematic relationship to one another in a particular territory. The continued effects of that first linkage and their modification by the deposits of later human activity, the upheavals of subsequent events, and the simple erosion of time provide the framework within which social systems develop and, as such, constitute basic matter for social investigation.

Every political system has its own particular location in space and time. Consequently, every system rests upon its own "geological" base. The geology of each system plays a fundamental role in dictating the context in which the system must operate, the broad limits of its discretion, the structuring of its political concerns, and the continuing character of the political interaction within it.

Fortunately, the United States provides one of the very best settings available for the study of social and political systems from the foregoing point of view because of its "New World" qualities. It is one of the few countries in which the interaction between space-time, political systems, and political processes can be traced "from the beginning" with reasonable accuracy and within a manageable time span. We possess detailed information about the development of this country from the days of the first settlers, and the entire process has taken place within a span of less than four centuries (or less than twelve generations). Scholars and scientists who study social phenomena in the United States are thus given an unparalleled opportunity to develop a multidimensional analysis of a society from its first foundation with a thoroughness that can be duplicated in few other parts of our planet. This opportunity is increased when much younger political systems west of the Appalachians are studied.

Closely linked to the question of geo-historical location is the influence of sectionalism on American urbanization and, most specifically, the way in which the country is divided into three great spheres: the greater Northeast, the greater South, and the greater West, which establish the framework for rural, urban, and metropolitan development in the United States. Champaign-Urbana is located at the point where the three spheres overlap, and has been substantially influenced by all three. Sectionalism, as such, remains a minor chord in this book, though not an insignificant one.

The Continuing Frontier

The fourth important thesis advanced in this study holds that American historical development is best reflected in the national response to three successive frontiers, each of which has demanded that Americans come to grips with an untamed element of nature and, by taming it, reorganize their society. Since the opening of settlement in 1607, the American frontier has passed through three stages. First came the rural-land frontier--the classic American frontier
described by the historians—lasting roughly from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. It was characterized by the westward movement of a basically rural population interested in settling and exploiting the land, and by the development of a socioeconomic system based on agricultural and extractive pursuits in both its urban and rural components.

Early in the nineteenth century, the rural-land frontier gave birth to the urban-industrial frontier, which began in the Northeast and spread westward, in the course of which it transformed the nation into an industrial society settled in cities and dedicated to the spread of a new technology as the primary source of the nation's economic and social forms. The dominant characteristic of this frontier was the transformation of cities from service centers or workshops for the rural areas into independent centers of opportunity, producers of new wealth, and social innovators, possessing internally generated reasons for existence and growth. At first overlapping the land frontier, the urban-industrial frontier became dominant by the last third of the century.

By the mid-twentieth century, the urban-industrial frontier had given birth, in turn, to the metropolitan-technological frontier, characterized by the radical reordering of an industrial society through rapidly changing technologies, and a settlement pattern that encourages the diffusion of an urbanized population within large metropolitan regions. These radically new technologies, ranging from atomic energy and automation to synthetics and cybernetics, and the accompanying suburbanization of the population, have generated further changes in the nation's social and economic forms in accord with their new demands. Like the first two frontier stages, the metropolitan-technological frontier also moved from east to west from the 1920s onward, becoming dominant nationally and in the Grand Prairie after World War II.

The metropolitan-technological frontier reached its apogee at the beginning of the 1960s, and ceased to be the cutting edge of American society by the early 1970s. After a period of quiescence, dominated by pessimistic forecasts on the part of many regarding the limits of growth, the U.S. appeared to be moving into a new frontier stage. The new "urban-cybernetic" frontier is characterized by the continued decline of large and even some medium-sized cities, and the growth of smaller ones in citybelts interspersed with settlement in rural areas. These areas are really part of the larger urban metropolitan environment for all social and economic purposes, tied together by the new cybernetic technologies of the computer age. This new frontier is only in its beginning stages. Its opening came after the completion of Dr. Rothman's study, which focuses on the civil community response to the metropolitan-technological frontier. We will have to await the next stage of the Cities of the Prairie study in order to determine its effect on Champaign-Urbana.

Each successive frontier stage has opened new vistas and new avenues of opportunity for the American people, in the development of new economic activities, the creation of new settlement patterns, and the mastery of new social problems growing out of the collision of old patterns and new demands. Consequently, each has generated new political concerns revolving around the accommodation of the challenges and opportunities within the civil society.

Like most American civil communities, Champaign-Urbana has experienced all three frontier stages, adapting to each its own way, but generally following classic lines in each case. Its land frontier stage was relatively brief. Urbana was founded as a service center for the surrounding agricultural area while Champaign was established by the Illinois Central Railroad as a division point. The two cities developed as modest agricultural service and railroad centers and were transformed as a result of the location of the University of Illinois between them in 1867. Since then, the university has been their link with the successive frontier stages and increasingly the reason why those two cities have managed to keep pace with the continuing American frontier—unlike most of the sisters in central Illinois and the greater Northeast as a whole. The university was closely tied to the completion of the land frontier but was not more than an adjunct of the urban frontier. It really came into its own after World War II, as the gateway to the metropolitan frontier for tens of thousands of the sons and daughters of Illinois. No doubt it is now in the process of making the transition to the urban-cybernetic frontier. Indeed, the university was one of the pioneers of that frontier over thirty years ago as the
home of the Illiac, one of the world's first computers, which was named for it.

The other factor promoting the adjustment of Champaign-Urbana to new frontiers has been Champaign's ability to attract appropriate transportation links. As noted above, the city was founded as part of the coming of the railroad, which opened up the Grand Prairie to intensive agriculture settlement. While the civil community did not gain any special advantage when the paved roads movement brought it into the state and national highway network, the railroad, as modernized after the turn of the century, continued to be an appropriate transportation system for the urban frontier. With the opening of the metropolitan frontier immediately after World War II, the construction of an airport by the University of Illinois gave the two cities commercial air service, first to Chicago and St. Louis as connecting points, and then directly to New York. At the height of the metropolitan frontier, Champaign gave the civil community a new position as a gateway to the west, something which it had never had in previous frontiers. In a real sense, this book deals with Champaign-Urbana's political responses to the metropolitan-technological frontier, focusing on the last half of the postwar generation, when that frontier reached its climax.

Political Culture and the Cultural Streams

The fifth major thesis advanced in this study deals with the influence on local political systems of cultural streams developed on the eastern seaboard during the colonial period, or brought from the Old World to settle the United States west of the Appalachians. In their new places of settlement, the various ethnic and religious groups aggregated with one another on the basis of their common socio-cultural characteristics. In some cases, these aggregations embraced entire ethnic or "nationality" groups, but in many cases they reflected cultural differences that cut across such groups even in the "Old Country." Since these groups moved as streams across the continent, they may be called "cultural streams" and their subdivisions, "cultural currents."

Fifteen such streams can be identified in the United States, divided into three general groupings. Three native streams developed in the course of the colonial period in American history: the Yankee stream, emerging out of the Puritan settlement of New England; the Middle stream, developing out of the commercially based pluralism of the Middle States; and the Southern stream, emerging out of the plantation and slaveholding South. These were supplemented in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by nine non-active streams that integrated with them. The North Sea stream (consisting of those people from Calvinist Britain and Europe plus Scandinavia), the Jewish stream, and the Anglo-Canadian stream (essentially the North Sea streams filtered through English Canada) all integrated with the Yankee stream. The English stream (consisting of non-Puritan English and Welsh), the Continental stream (essentially Western and Middle European), and the Irish streams integrated with the Middle stream. The Mediterranean stream (principally Italians and Greeks), the Eastern European stream, and the French-Canadian stream shared the same characteristics as the Southern stream although, because they settled in different places, they did not integrate with it.

Finally, three streams developed entirely outside of the mainstream of American life: the Afro-American stream, whose origins are fully as native as those of the first three streams; the Hispanic stream (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans); and the Oriental stream (Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos) that have begun to integrate only in our own time.
Part and parcel of each cultural stream is a particular pattern of orientation to political action: a political culture which can be understood as a separate variable in the life of the local community. The basic political styles, demands, and values which shape the political processes, and the handling of political issues in the civil community are, in large measure, determined by the local political culture as it has developed and become manifest over time. Consequently, an understanding of the factors which give the same objective phenomena a unique local meaning—the crucial factors in understanding a particular local political system—rests upon identification of the local political cultural patterns and their concrete political manifestations.

In the United States, three basic political subcultures have emerged: the moralistic, out of the Yankee stream and those allied with it; the individualistic, out of the Middle stream and those allied with it; and the traditionalistic, out of the Southern stream and those which share its basic characteristics. The character of each of these subcultures has been described elsewhere by this writer. Here it is sufficient to note that Champaign-Urbana's political culture is principally the product of the individualistic subculture. In line with the individualistic political culture, the local population emphasizes the conception of the democratic order as a marketplace. In their view, government is instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons, to handle only those functions directly demanded by the people it is created to serve. A government need not have any direct concern with questions of the "good society" except insofar as it may be used to advance some common conception of the good society formulated outside the political arena, just as it serves other functions. Since the local political culture emphasizes the centrality of private concerns, it places a premium on limiting community intervention—whether governmental or non-governmental—into private activities, to keep the marketplace in proper working order. In general, government action is to be restricted to those areas, primarily in the economic realm, that encourage private initiatives and widespread access to the marketplace for those within the civil community.

The character of political participation in Champaign-Urbana reflects the individualistic political subculture. Electoral politics and office holding are viewed, in the individualistic manner, as just another means by which individuals may improve themselves socially and economically. In this sense, politics is a "business" like any other that competes for talent and offers rewards to those who take it up as a career. Those individuals who choose political careers may rise by providing the governmental services demanded of them and, in turn, may expect to be adequately compensated for their efforts. Interpretations of officeholders' obligations under this arrangement vary among individuals within the local political system. Where the norms are high, such people are expected to provide high-quality government services for the general public in the best possible manner, in return for the status and economic rewards considered their due. Some who choose political careers clearly commit themselves to such norms; others believe that an officeholder's primary responsibility is to serve himself and those who have supported him directly, favoring them even at the expense of others. In many respects, the postwar struggle for reform in Champaign and Urbana described in this book was a struggle between those who held the former and latter views.

Political life in the civil community is based on a system of mutual obligations rooted in personal relationships. While this system of mutual obligations is harnessed, to some extent, through the political parties which serve as "business corporations" dedicated to providing the organization necessary to maintain it, there are aspects of the local political culture, drawn from those members of the university community who came from moralistic backgrounds, which function to weaken the role of party within local politics. This is not to suggest that all or even a majority of political activists from the university community were of the moralistic political subculture. Quite to the contrary, most were also from the individualistic subculture, only they had higher expectations of what the marketplace should produce, in the way of public service, as an honest return for being elected or appointed to a government office. Most important, many had programmatic goals, with regard to what they expected of a "modern, efficient" city government, that motivated them.

This had led to an important distinction locally. Political regularity is indispensable because it is the means for coordinating individual enterprise in
the political arena, and it is the one way of preventing individualism in politics from running wild. Particularly in Urbana, the ordinary politician can succeed politically, not by dealing with issues in some exceptional way or by accepting some concept of good government and then striving to implement it, but by maintaining his place in the system of mutual obligations. He can do this only by operating according to the norms of his particular party or faction, to the exclusion of other political considerations. Members of the other elites, however, are less bound by party considerations as long as they confine their political interests to the civil community. The local culture encourages the maintenance of a party system that is competitive, but not overly so, in the pursuit of office. Its politicians are interested in office as a means of controlling the distribution of the favors of rewards of government, rather than as a means of exercising governmental power for programmatic ends.

Since their political culture eschews ideological concerns in its "business-like" conception of politics, both politicians and those citizens, not part of the university community, look upon normal political activity as a specialized field, essentially the province of professionals and those "entitled" to speak for the community, of minimum and passing concern to laymen, and no place for amateurs to play an active role. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency among all sectors of the public to believe that party politics is a tainted—if necessary—business, better left to those who are willing to compromise themselves by engaging in it. In part, this explains why there is likely to be an easy attitude toward the limits of the politicians' requisites. Since a fair amount of violation of legal restrictions or limitations is expected in the normal course of things, there is relatively little popular excitement when any is found, unless it is of an extraordinary character. It is as if the public is willing to pay a surcharge for services rendered and rebels only when it feels the surcharge has become too heavy. This, too, can be seen in the stances of the reform movements in the civil community over the past generation.

In accordance with the local political culture, its public officials are committed to "giving the public what it wants," and are normally not willing to initiate new programs or open up new areas of government activity on their own recognition. They will do so when they perceive an overwhelming public demand for them to act, but only then. In a sense, their willingness to expand the functions of government is based on an extension of the quid pro quo "favor" system which serves as the central core of their political relationships, with new services being the reward they give the public for placing them in office.

The Rhythm of Generations

Finally, this book is predicated upon a generational theory of political behavior which the author has described more in Toward a Generational Theory of American Politics. This theory holds that there is a pattern of social challenges and political responses that is reenacted in every polity over the course of every generation. A particular polity's pattern of challenge and response is so fixed by its historical beginnings that more or less discrete political generations develop to create a progression of events in a visible (though obviously not rigid) pattern over time.

The United States is no exception. In fact, it offers one of the most spectacular examples of the progression of generations because its beginnings were so decisive, and its history has been so well documented from the very first. In the first third of the seventeenth century, groups of young adults settled virgin territory at key points and in that way initiated the series of generational progressions with what was, for all intents and purposes, a free hand. As they grew older, they passed from the scene of activity at roughly the same time, allowing their sons (or newcomers of their sons' generation) to occupy the vital positions in their societies' social, economic, cultural, religious, and political life, and initiating a process of transition that has persisted into the present eleventh generation of American history. At the same time, those same men continued to contribute in their retirement by shaping the ideas and outlook of their sons' sons; hence the forging of the three-generational "package" which continues to be renewed.

Within each generational time span, there is a more or less regular progression of political events revolving around the development of that generation's challenge and its response to that challenge.

In accordance with the local political culture, its public officials are committed to "giving the public what it wants," and are normally not willing to initiate new programs or open up new areas of govern-
Nationally, the "border" between the old and new generations is marked by one or more decisive political actions, whose characteristic feature is the simultaneous completion of the major responses of the old generation and the opening of opportunity for the new one. The first half of the new generation is a time for recognizing the generational challenge and developing and testing proposals for political action to meet that challenge. At the same time, it is a period of population change as old voters and leaders pass from the scene of political activity and new ones come onto it. During that period, there occur the generation's "critical elections" that either change the majority party by breaking up its coalition or reaffirm its majority status by reintegrating that coalition. After the second of the critical elections, the second half of the generation begins with a great spurt of governmental innovation on the national plane designed to respond to the now-recognized challenge that lasts for three to five years. The remainder of the generation is then occupied with digesting the results of that spurt, modifying the new programs so that they will achieve great success, and, at the same time, integrating them into the overall political framework. The end of the generation is marked by political acts that ratify and codify its accomplishments. By that time, there are already voices being heard, calling for political responses to new challenges.

Urbana was founded in the climactic years of the seventh generation of American history, the first generation of the nineteenth century, and Champaign was founded in the formative years of the eighth. Both were part of the era of the consolidation of the United States as a continental nation. Consequently, the pattern of challenge and response in their civil community parallels that of the country as a whole to a remarkable extent, offering a good example of the pattern of the generations on the local plane.

The convergence of a new generation and the opening of a new frontier stage at the end of World War II make the postwar period examined here particularly important for understanding the influence of the generational progression on American politics. The impact of this generational progression in the history of Champaign-Urbana is treated extensively by Dr. Rothman.

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The foregoing theses with their corollaries are the themes of this book, which represents an effort to work these themes out in a particular community and to view the interplay among them at a particular moment in its history. The effort is not simply an ideal exercise but, rather, part of our larger attempt to raise the discussion of community power to a new plane, one of which takes into consideration a community's larger geo-historical setting, as well as its immediate political behavior, in assessing the system of power that makes it operative politically.

xxix
FOOTNOTES

1 For an elaboration of this theme, see Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie (New York: Basic Books, 1970), chap. 1.

2 Ibid., chap. 6.


6 For further elaboration of the civil community thesis, see Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, intro.; and idem, Studying the Civil Community (Philadelphia: Center for the Study of Federalism, 1970).


8 Fuller delineation of the spheres and discussion of sectionalism in general can be found in Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, chap. 3.

9 The frontier thesis sketched here is discussed in greater detail in Ibid., chaps. 1 and 2.

10 See Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, chaps. 4 and 5; and idem, Cities of the Prairie, pts. 2 and 3.

11 For a more detailed discussion of the thesis presented here, see Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, pt. II and app. B.

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND: CULTURE AND CHANGE

A local political system can be identified as the organized sum of the political institutions which function in a given locality to provide it with the bundle of governmental services and activities that can be manipulated locally to serve local needs in light of local values. Hence a locality becomes a community insofar as its existence is defined by its organization for political—or civil—purposes. Such a community can properly be called a civil community, inputting to it neither more nor less of a communal character than that which stems from its existence for political or public purposes.¹

Urbana and Champaign, Illinois, founded respectively in 1833 and 1854 are pristine examples of political systems which "function in a given locality to provide it with the bundle of governmental services and activities that can be manipulated locally to serve local needs in light of local values." Neither Champaign nor Urbana are microcosms of a larger universe, rather politics in these civil communities present a collection of contradictory and idiosyncratic responses to pressing contemporary problems. The contradictions arise from the pervasiveness of individualistic culture which coexists with extreme dependence on state and federal governments for continued prosperity in the area. The idiosyncratic aspects of behavior are generated by the limited local awareness of the extent of local dependence on state and federal governments and the resulting neglect of the myriad relations spawned by this dependence.

No claim of representativeness can be made for the political process in Champaign and Urbana, but the cities reflect and refract the problem of the larger American polity. For example, what is the role of government and how much communal intervention in the lives of citizens is acceptable. The sharpness of local conflict on these questions offers insight and
clarification of the dilemmas of the federal system. In Champaign and Urbana, the opposing imperatives were still expressed with fervor and intensity. Certain defenders of the old ways seek to ignore the import of forty years of expanding national activity while some advocates of energetic, positive government advance their position with the enthusiasm of the many crusaders in American history.

The strength of the civil community and its capacity to contain action within established boundaries is determined by the community's location in time and space and the importance of this location in determining community patterns. The location of Champaign and Urbana was determined by such geo-historical factors as:

1. The relationship of both cities to the settlement of central Illinois in the third through sixth decades of the nineteenth century and the nature of frontier settlement in that place and period

2. The differences between the two cities that stem from their founding at different points in that period, for quite different reasons, at the spatial and temporal meeting point of the old "pre-industrial" frontier of subsistence farmers and crossroads villages, and the new frontiers of railroads, urban centers, commercial farming, and a clearly national (even international) economy

3. The course of metropolitanization as it has developed in central Illinois, moving in from the east since the end of World War II.2

The cities are situated in the "Grand Prairie" of central Illinois, a rich fertile agricultural area. Agricultural promise provided the original impetus for settlement but the continuing history of the cities is a tale of separation from the prairie. The decision to locate the University of Illinois in Urbana in 1867 and the growth of the university reinforced separation, which is vividly illustrated by the physical appearance of the cities. In summer they arise abruptly out of a sea of corn. In winter, the land waits for the crop; the vista stretches for miles and the buildings of the cities appear as interruptions of the landscape. Figure 1 conveys some of the physical aspects of separation.

The founding of Urbana was circumstantial. If there was a reason to locate Urbana on this site rather than some other, it has more to do with the whims of the original settlers than rational or utopian designs for the future. Champaign's founding was more rational but equally dependent on external decision, rather than any intrinsic attraction of the particular site. In the 1850s, the Illinois Central Railroad was laying the track that was to become "The Mainline of Mid-America," and chose a location two miles west of Urbana. The future site of Champaign was designated a division point on the line and the resulting commercial prospects attracted settlers. From the beginning, Champaign's development was related to the new industrial frontier and coincided with the rise of the Republican party and its emergence as the political spokesman for local commercial interests.3

Neither city was founded to preserve a traditional past nor sought its raison d'être in communal or ideological purposes. The communities adopted the tenets of individualistic political culture which emphasized the conception of the democratic order as a marketplace. In its view, government is instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons, to handle those functions demanded by the people it is created to serve. Since the individualistic culture emphasized the centrality of private concerns, it places a premium on limiting community intervention—whether governmental or nongovernmental—into private activities to the minimum necessary to keep the marketplace in working order.4

Individualistic tenets were intertwined with the evolving location in time and space of the communities, and shaped perceptions of who should govern and for what purposes. Although the normal cement of community was absent, Champaign and Urbana developed into
distinct civil communities. Each community devised distinctive political structures to furnish that bundle of government services to provide for local needs in light of local values. Urbana was and continues to be the more cohesive community; it has had a stronger and more rooted local elite. Champaign turned to the development of professional administration to provide the cement for a heterogeneous population.

As the cities evolved, they were increasingly affected by the growing physical presence of the university as well as the humanistic and technological imperatives it represented. The university is one guarantor of prosperity in the area, but officially and in reality it remains aloof from local politics. However, its presence affects the direction and strengthens the momentum of continuing urbanization of the area. A steady influx of students, faculty and staff spilled over academic confines to provide the raw material of political action and the energy to challenge the status quo. Such efforts gained intensity and momentum in the 1960s against the background of the Great Society programs, student demonstrations in opposition to the Vietnam war, and sporadic local black protest. During this period, "academics" made many efforts to change the style and tone of local politics, and one measure of the strength of the respective civil communities was the ability to contain and channel this continuing pressure.

The controversies reflected the complex tensions which arose from the continuing interjection of new population into an established community. Allegiance to individualistic values and the new demands of an urbanized present added to these tensions. Individualistic beliefs shape attitudes and the perception of options while the needs of an urbanized present and future seem to dictate communal intervention. One result was intensified political conflict with the opposing positions represented by local Republicans and Democrats. Republicans espoused strongly the tenets of individualistic culture while Democrats, in their role as reformers, championed government action as the corrective of social and economic inequities. Until the late 1960s, the Republican party dominated local politics while the Democratic party existed largely on paper. However, in the early 1960s a group of "emigre" Democrats who were committed to national Democratic objectives, and isolated from the local party, began the work of resurrecting the local party. The party conflict gave the controversies of the late 1960s and early 1970s the aspect of a conservative-liberal conflict over policy, but the controversy had deeper roots and was influenced by the argument concerning the proper scope of communal intervention.

Manifestations of the conservative-liberal conflict are plentiful. Government in the county and the cities was for many years the preserve of the natives; business was and remains locally owned. Successful citizens believed that their success was attributable to individual initiative and the absence of governmental interference, and opposed any form of regulation on principle. Antipathy to government remains widespread, for example, zoning is accepted in the abstract, but resisted when attempts are made to enforce regulations consistently. Federal grant programs, such as urban renewal, are viewed with suspicion and private enterprise is lauded as more efficient and attuned to local needs. There is widespread opposition to the expansion of government into areas such as affirmative action or regulation of the individual's use of property. More professional city administration seems to be accepted as an ideal, but attempts to approximate the ideal stir up complaints about cost and red tape. The News Gazette, published in Urbana, summed up conservative dissatisfaction with an expanded role for government. Discussing the budgets of Champaign and Urbana for the fiscal year 1976-1977, the newspaper editorialized.

Bureaucracies have overflowed both city halls, but tangible results decline while costs go up.

Mostly, what Champaign and Urbana are getting for their rising tax rates is nitpicking regulation. City councils have regulated such things as signs, smoking and employment practices of private businesses, and they spent much of their time in search of new fields to regulate. There are continual calls to spend more for social programs, while basic city services deteriorate.
Five days later, a second editorial urged citizens to contact their elected representatives.

We won't get our streets repaired, street lights in working order, a sensible system of trash pickups, railroad crossings improved, intelligent zoning and planning, or solution of serious traffic problems unless taxpayers put the heat on. ... It shouldn't be necessary, but seemingly our city governments are affected by malady which is apparent also in Springfield and Washington. That is to enact a lot of superficial, and often as not conflicting and nonsensical laws, while losing sight of the rights and needs of people.

These outbursts were provoked by a veritable revolution in local government in the 1970s. New people came to power in both cities and in the county and new programs were initiated. Federal dollars as the basis of prosperity remained largely unrecognized by local elites and the public, but assumed increasing importance in present endeavors and future plans. The importance of federal assistance was recognized by the Regional Planning Commission. The March 1976 issue of the Champaign County Planning Report criticized the budget policies of the Ford administration and assumed that the county and the cities needed expanded and improved federal services.

In summary, the decision to pass responsibilities for certain services on to local government without passing on the financial wherewithal been no more, no less than a decision to forego these services altogether or to cut them to the bone.

It is ironic to officially assume a need for federal support of local governmental services in the Republican heartland. The passage of time and the gradual acceptance of the expanded role of the federal government has subtly modified and reshaped local political responses, yet the ingrained habits of the civil community generate resistance to each new governmental initiative. Champaign and Urbana are not new towns; they have comparatively long experience as civil communities, and the demands for change which erupted in the 1960s did not race freely through unorganized collections of individuals. The rock of belief in individualistic values and the organized existence of the civil community were the base of the community's response to the challenges of the late 1960s and 1970s.

The interaction of challenge and response in Champaign and Urbana provides the material for a study of the potential and complexities of innovation. Most of the visible political change experienced in the cities and the county was not the result of indigenous processes. For example, reapportionment, city and regional planning, and school integration were spurred by new directions in national policy. Such changes, although easily introduced, had limited effect on the routines of the civil community. County reapportionment meant the election of more urban representatives to the county board, but there is a natural limit to their number. Regional planning needs political sanction to be effective and if there is a lack of local support for planning objectives, the plans may be conveniently filed and forgotten. Local politicians also determine the scope of the planning function by financial support or its absence. The examples multiply and suggest the need for a modus vivendi linking new and old, which functions to limit the impact of the new while reshaping the established perspective. The process is continuous and may well accelerate as new generations come to maturity.

The contrasts and the accommodations are particularly sharp in Champaign County because the tenets of individualistic culture appear diametrically opposed to the urgency of new urban needs. County government was the last of the governments in the area to recognize the needs and expectations of an urbanized present, and the resulting tension has become a significant denominator of county politics.

Champaign and Urbana both opened to change before the county, but neither city has resolved the question of how much communal intervention is required to provide for present or future needs. The analysis of various conflicts in these civil communities suggests that commitment to either the old ways or the new opportunities is avoided. Conflicts typically produce stalemate or incremental amelioration of the most
urgent problems, and the politics of transition become institutionalized.

This study focuses on the conflicts and tensions generated by the juxtaposition of individualistic political culture and the expectations of new or newly active citizens in the county and the civil communities of Champaign and Urbana. The first chapter provides the reader with background information, i.e., a scorecard to identify the players. The chapter includes a brief description of the University of Illinois, its impact on and contribution to economic resources of the area; census data on the population; brief descriptions of the respective city governments and some explanation of their separate existence. The conclusion of the chapter poses the question of whether the attitudes and political routines so characteristic of central Illinois can cope with the problems of the 1970s and beyond.

The remainder of the study is devoted to answering this question. Chapter 2 describes Champaign County because it is the framework for action in the cities. If county government assumes a more active role or if federal incentives for regional cooperation attract local support, county decisions will assume more importance and have more impact on the politics of the respective cities. Champaign County was slow in adapting to the new imperatives of the 1960s and the chapter chronicles the shift of its politics from its small town, rural past to its urban metropolitan present. Most immediately, it focuses on reapportionment which changed the structure of county government and produced a new type of county board member. Under the prodding of these new representatives, the county assumed new tasks, but these changes did not displace traditional attitudes. There is the same juxtaposition of the attitudes of individualistic culture with new expectations and demands on government, as is found in the cities.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss politics in Urbana in detail and trace the conflicts and changes in personnel and style which occurred between 1960 and 1978. The Democrats, after years of minority status, captured the Urbana city council and the mayor's office in 1973, and were confronted with the problems of downtown redevelopment, conflicts about educational policy, and plans to build a new community swimming pool. Official and citizen responses to these issues illuminate the conflicting imperatives of obtaining power and satisfying constituents, and suggest the ways in which individualistic attitudes function as obstacles to change.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine politics in Champaign, the shift to modified district representation, the experience with urban renewal, and the efforts to deal with the problems of race in employment and schools. Champaign also faces the problems of adaptation to economic change, downtown redevelopment and the growth of shopping centers on its periphery. Again the juxtaposition of the assumptions of individualistic culture and new expectations is obvious, and the import for policy and implementation is analyzed.

Chapter 9 concludes the study and offers an assessment of the strength of traditional attitudes and the pressures of different expectations on the functioning of government and the bases of community. The growing demands for increased cooperation between the cities serve to illustrate the recurrent problem of implementing new responsibilities in an apathetic if not hostile environment. To summarize, the study offers a political map of two cities, Champaign and Urbana, located in a rich, agricultural but increasingly urbanized Champaign County during the second half of the postwar generation. Significant historical, political and socioeconomic variables are identified and the study focuses on the consequences of interaction between the attitudes of individualistic culture and the expanded, new responsibilities of local government.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1

2 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
7 Regional Planning Commission, Champaign County Planning Report, March 1976, p. 2.

CHAPTER 2

CHAMPAIGN AND URBANA: TWIN CIVIL COMMUNITIES

The phenomenal growth of Champaign and Urbana is attributable largely to the presence of the University of Illinois. The university was established under the Morrill Land Grant College Act of 1862 and opened in 1868 with three faculty members and fifty students. By the 1970s, the campus comprised 172 major buildings and student enrollment averaged around 34,000. The presence of the university differentiates Champaign and Urbana from communities like Tolono or Villa Grove or Paxton which are also located in east central Illinois. The university provides the basis for economic prosperity in Champaign County and is the largest employer in the twin communities. Table 2.1 gives figures on university employment from 1950 to 1972.

TABLE 2.1 UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Non-Academic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>3,285</td>
<td>2,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>3,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>5,399</td>
<td>5,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>5,305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Information, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

The university not only attracted population to the cities, its major construction projects in the 1960s boosted the skilled trades, and non-academic employment provided opportunities for white collar and unskilled labor. A local market of 34,000 students seemed to promise "permanent" prosperity for the retail and service sectors of the economy and "good times" obscured the need for local efforts to attract new kinds of economic development. Local business was
dependent on university expansion to provide an ever-expanding market but the extent of this dependence became visible only when university expansion was drawing to a close.

The university does not participate in local politics but university affiliated persons provided the raw material for challenges to local habits and values. In the 1960s, faculty and students participated in protest demonstrations and joined the political parties, infusing local politics with a new spirit of party competitiveness. The results of these endeavors, including the ability of the respective civil communities to adapt external pressures to their own purposes, are discussed in the chapters on Champaign and Urbana.

Champaign and Urbana appear as the very model of a college town; industrial development in the area is minimal and employment is primarily white collar sales and services and construction. The Area Manpower Review notes that the civilian work force in Champaign County averaged about 69,000 in 1969 with over 60,000 wage and salary workers. More than half of these workers were employed in government occupations, primarily because of employment at the university and Chanute Air Force Base in Rantoul. Only 9 percent were employed in manufacturing. In contrast, nationally, government workers compose approximately 16 percent of the wage and salary force and manufacturing accounts for about 28 percent. The review concludes that Champaign and Urbana are atypical "with problems unique to it and a few others." Table 2.2 presents the pattern of employment in the 1960s.

The cities have enjoyed sustained growth since 1900, but their real growth is difficult to determine because census figures since 1950 include students. It has been estimated that since 1950, 65 to 75 percent of population growth in the county is related directly or indirectly to university expansion, and includes the ripple effect of university expansion, i.e. the growth of population due to the creation of additional jobs to provide services for the increased student population. Table 2.3 gives population increase and university enrollment from 1870 to 1970.

University enrollment increased by 67 percent between 1940 and 1950, exacerbating the housing crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.2</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total Civilian Labor Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural Wage and Salary Workers (except domestic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals and Machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Non-manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Non-agricultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The figures for employed and unemployed do not equal the total civilian labor force in the original table.
of the early postwar era. Between 1960 and 1970 enrollment increased by 55 percent and the result was the proliferation of apartment housing. The objective importance of the university, however, is not a measure of its significance in the local matrix. The relationship between town and gown has overtones of antagonism; on the whole it is correct but limited. The most applicable generalization for the pattern of university participation is "neutral" and a little play with the word produces "neutralized." The respective civil communities have the means to contain or channel the threat they perceive from the technological and humanistic imperatives of the university. Local elites showed little understanding of their dependence on the university and during the 1960s perceived it primarily as a threat to local mores and values. When students and faculty entered politics "en masse," they created their own organizations to advance their causes. In the one case where a local organization--the Champaign County Democratic Party--was successfully infiltrated, the party was not "radicalized." Instead an assimilative process developed within the party; faculty and student activists challenged local preconceptions but eventually they conformed to local political norms in order to enhance their effectiveness. The high point of faculty and student activity occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1972, it was clear that the era of university expansion was over and that changed circumstances were likely to accelerate the assimilative process, further reducing the effectiveness of university affiliated persons as a force for change.

Local leadership lacked the resources to cope with population growth. The sustained growth of the cities was not a function of local initiative, rather the decisions which determined the size of the university were made by the state legislature, the governor and the Board of Higher Education. In addition, students are a transient population and until 1972, obstacles such as age and residence requirements hindered their participation in local elections. Both factors limited their ability to influence local decision makers. The sheer increase in population, however, presented local government with the formidable task of providing facilities: the streets, lighting, sanitation, storm sewers, and public educational and recreational facilities. The fragmented structure of local government--two cities, two park districts, two school districts as well as a sanitary
district meant that action on these problems would be piecemeal—and it was. The respective school and park districts had sufficient public support to pass the referenda needed for expansion. In the 1960s Champaign and Urbana sought to ignore the needs of an expanding population, for example, zoning enforcement was minimal, developers were in their element and public services were neglected. No politician was in position to impose unpopular assessments for such amenities as sidewalks. These civil communities stressed the centrality of private concerns and opportunities for communal intervention were minimized.

Although federal money was available, the cities were not prepared to take advantage of the opportunities, for the following pragmatic and ideological reasons:

1. The municipalities, while troubled by a plethora of problems related to population growth, were not desperately hurting, nor was the local, highly developed retail merchandising trade. In the absence of any acute unemployment situation, visible pockets of substandard housing, or other crises, the municipalities were not motivated to reach out for federal assistance.

2. A general dislike of federal intervention in any form, with the subsequent threat to local autonomy and control which ensues, prompted local leaders to hold out as long as possible against participation in federal programs.

3. Many physical developments, such as housing for the elderly, which are purchased with federal money, cannot be taxed by the city government. Local leaders hoped to do as much as possible through privately owned property and private capital in order not to lose potential sources of municipal revenue.

By the 1970s, needs could no longer be ignored and new people promising changed policies won power in both cities. However the Nixon and Ford administrations reduced the opportunities to obtain federal funds and the cities did not have the personnel to compete for such funds. To further complicate the local task, the status of the university as a tax-exempt institution remained a constant and the cities were forced to seek a broader tax base to maintain, let alone expand, services. The irony of the need for economic development to provide the taxes for increased governmental services is that in a number of instances, the search obstructed efforts to implement communal objectives. The strengths of the respective civil communities were displayed even when the public mood seemed to favor change, and the politics of the 1970s offers additional evidence for the civil community's evolution in time and space.

Census Data

The Census offers evidence of the similarities of the cities—the composition of the population, socioeconomic status, educational attainment and percentage of blacks. The median income in the cities in 1970 was $10,816, 7.5 percent of the population fell below the poverty level, and 27.3 percent earned $15,000 or more. The median age in Champaign was 23.4 years, while the median age in Urbana was 23.2 years. In Champaign, the median of school years completed was 12.8, and 72.7 percent of the population graduated high school. In Urbana, the median of school years completed was 13.7, and 76.1 percent of the population completed high school. In Champaign, there are 2.77 persons per household; in Urbana, there are 2.63 persons per household. Blacks compose 10.2 percent of Champaign's population and 10.9 percent of Urbana's population. In 1970, unemployment in the cities was 3.6 percent of the work force.

The statistics describe one city rather than two, but census data since 1950 include students, which gives an impression of sameness and obscures the differences of nuance which might distinguish the cities. The appearance of oneness is heightened by the absence of a natural boundary between the cities. Wright Street, the official boundary, is a street similar to other streets except for signs on the major perpendicular thoroughfares that announce the existence of the respective cities.
The similarities extend to the problems confronting the cities and includes the cultural baggage carried by the respective local elites. The tenets of individualistic culture pervade the area and in both communities, the rhetoric stresses individual initiative and the centrality of private concerns. Attitudes are antipathetic to communal intervention. In addition, there are few deeply rooted political, religious, or social cleavages to disturb the political calm in either Champaign or Urbana. Ethnic tension is minimal; either the local citizenry is indifferent, tolerant, or resigned to the fact that the presence of the university means diversity. The rabbi of the only Jewish congregation would have a full schedule if he accepted all the invitations to speak before local church groups; the Catholic community is established and well accepted and the annual Greek supper to support the local Greek Orthodox Church is always overcrowded. The Annual International Fair sponsored by the Foreign Students Association is enthusiastically received and volunteers assist foreign students to feel at home in central Illinois.

Although approximately 10 percent of the population of each city is black and there are grievances which have some potential for disturbing the calm, the black community was passive until the early 1960s. Some blacks became more militant during the 1960s, but the black impact on local politics has been sporadic. The black community has not been sufficiently organized nor has it possessed the leadership to consistently press local officials for the achievement of specific goals. In both cities, school integration, open housing ordinances, and the establishment of human relations commissions can be attributed as much to the efforts of white liberals as to the effort of the black community. However, conflict in the Urbana schools aroused and mobilized the black community to a greater extent than any previous issue. The election of an activist black to the Champaign city council, after the introduction of modified district representation, has given the more militant members of the community greater legitimacy and more exposure than previously. There are signs that the black community will become more of a factor in the politics of each city in the next ten years than they were in the past.

Similar population profiles, similar culture, economic integration and similar problems—the list of affinities multiply—yet the cities have remained distinct civil communities. Despite sporadic pressures for merger, and more recently for some form of functional cooperation, political integration seems as far from realization as when the cities started. The reasons for separation were historical (the decision of the Illinois Central Railroad to lay its track two miles to the west of Urbana) but the founding of each city encompassed different principles and the cities have maintained separate existences for more than 100 years. Urbana was the "seat of an agricultural county with secondary commercial characteristics 'ruled' by a local 'oligarchy'. . . ." Champaign was the product of the new industrial frontier. Its population, from the beginning, was more heterogeneous, more focused on the new business economy, and more transient. The differences persisted, at least in local folklore. In the 1950s, university expansion resulted in wave of new "immigrants," academic families tended to settle in Urbana rather than Champaign, insisting that the latter was too business oriented. As will be discussed below, the settlement of academic families in Urbana provided the base for Democratic success in the 1960s and 1970s and offered support for a "new" kind of politics.

The nuances of differentiation have their own momentum; each civil community has evolved according to its own location in time and space. The federal government has recognized their separateness—Urbana and Champaign each have a main post office and the zip codes are respectively 61801 and 61820, a wider gap than between the neighborhoods of a city of 100,000. The rivalry between the respective high school teams is intense and such rivalries are the stuff of enduring loyalties. The examples may seem trivial, but they are threads in the warp and woof of separation.

Radically different political structures also reinforce separation. Urbana has partisan elections and a mayor-council government; Champaign has nonpartisan elections and a council-manager government. The respective structures offer different opportunities for political organization and citizen participation. The political activists in each city have adapted their strategies to fit the respective structures and their chances to effect successful innovation are shaped by the opportunities inherent in these structures.
The early rivalries of the cities were reinforced as the cities developed and resistance to merger endures to the present. Separation is buttressed by the passionate dedication of "older" citizens, the interests of newer residents and the realistic assessment of the resources of the respective communities. Urbana feared the domination of Champaign and this fear remains a factor in local calculations. Champaign might hesitate at assuming the financial problems of Urbana, seek to protect the prerogatives of its city manager, or cherish its autonomy. Downtown redevelopment is a problem for both cities, but Urbana has made a larger public commitment to its downtown than Champaign. Champaign has a better record of affirmative action in city employment than Urbana. Examples of differences multiply and the remainder of this chapter sketches the historical background of resistance to merger as well as the continuing props of separation.

Early History

The efforts of Representative J. S. Vance, who named the county and the county seat for his place of origin in Ohio, led to the formation of Champaign County. Urbana became the center of justice for the county on June 21, 1833. Population grew slowly until 1853, when the Illinois Central Railroad, which was constructing a line between Chicago and Cairo, Illinois, was persuaded to build the line through Urbana instead of Danville. The railroad chose an eight acre site, two miles to the west of the settlement for the station. Although there is a story that Urbana rejected the railroad because it was too noisy and created too much smoke, other sources claim that...

... economy in the construction of the line was of much greater importance to the company (the Illinois Central Railroad) than was the running of the line nearby a ready made town--especially so unimportant a town as was Urbana. ... This question of economy in road-building decided the location of the road and nothing else.

The decision of the railroad led to the creation of Champaign. Some Urbana residents moved to the "Depot," and a house and hotel were built in the winter of 1853-54. In 1856, "West Urbana" acquired its own grocery store and in April, 1860, "West Urbana" became the city of Champaign. The separation of the towns was created by the separation of the railroad center and county seat, but as the towns grew, the rivalry between them became more intense.

Urbana had the advantage of being the county seat,

... but gradually and imperceptibly the advantage of buying his supplies where he marketed his products, won the farmer, which together with a desire on the part of the newly arrived citizens to be near to a railroad station, gradually sapped and finally arrested the growth and business of Urbana, and gave life and strength to its rival.

The residents of Urbana, however, did not quietly fold their tents and submerge their identity. They tried to obtain a branch railroad line; they secured private contributions and on August 3, 1863, the one car of the Urbana Railroad Company began its daily run. Although the operation of the Urbana Railroad was not a challenge to Champaign's commercial supremacy, it helped to maintain a viable community in Urbana. The city's cause was further strengthened by the support of members of the County Board, who "bent their aid, as far as official acts and influence would go, in aid of the older town." For example the location of county roads made it necessary to pass through Urbana if one wanted to approach Champaign by road from the north. A more important official prop to Urbana's separate existence proved to be the construction of a new "modern" courthouse, which laid to rest any possibility of removal of county facilities to Champaign. Champaign residents, resentful about these maneuvers, counterattacked during the state legislative session in 1869. A bill was introduced to annex land in Urbana including the site of the University of Illinois to Champaign. The move failed, and Urbana, lacking in commercial strength, retained the courthouse and the university, and insured its separate existence.

With the passage of time, the physical distance between Champaign and Urbana was spanned. Their eco-
nomies became integrated but Champaign continued to dominate commercially and Urbana stubbornly maintained its separate identity.

Merger Attempts

The separate and antagonistic origins of the cities generated a controversy which has continued to the present. The most organized and concerted attack on separation occurred in the early 1950s, spawned in part by university personnel. The university expanded rapidly after World War II and an influx of new staff generated new demands and claims for public attention. The growth of the population, the need for services, and above all the seeming irrationality and expense of duplicate municipal services, schools and recreational facilities increased the attractiveness of merger.

A campaign for a referendum to merge the cities and form a new municipal unit was sparked by the Urbana Civic Committee. This group had no ties with either political party or the business and civic organizations otherwise active in local affairs; its members were drawn largely from the university academic staff. Merger petitions were printed and circulated and drew an immediate critical response from, among others, the Urbana Chamber of Commerce. An Anti-Merger Committee, based on strongly felt and widespread opposition to merger, was quickly created and included most of the influential citizens of Urbana.

Legal objections to the referendum petition were raised, and for a half years the case was in the courts. The Illinois Supreme Court eventually upheld the pro-merger group and the political battle resumed. However, delay cost the pro-merger forces whatever political momentum they had and they faced insurmountable obstacles in the attempt to win an election campaign. The university's academic staff and their spouses were the pro-merger leaders. The activists had energy and technical virtuosity and mobilized discontent with local habits and politics.

The Anti-Merger Committee had broad support including the leading figures of Urbana politics. Activists and opponents in Champaign remained outside the battle, even advocates of merger assumed that Champaign was likely to approve and that the battle had to be won in Urbana. It was feared that active advocacy in Champaign would make the task of advocates in Urbana more difficult.

Although pro-merger forces made a brave effort to garner public support, the anti-merger group was able to gain support from existing community institutions and groups by emphasizing the danger to their existence implicit in merger. The vote against merger was almost three to one in each of the cities.

Traditional community ties had far more support than had been anticipated by either side. Possibly, there was an abstract identification with the city government of Urbana which was not appreciated by the more cosmopolitan and mobile group which sponsored the merger vote. If such identification existed, however, the merger opponents also underestimated its strength, for they did not count on identification with the city government as enough to insure their cause. The literature of the Anti-Merger Committee never failed to spell out why "We Love Urbana," but they always added some economic, social, or political reason for such love. In brief, the Anti-Merger Committee worked effectively to dramatize the threat and the risks to the interests of any and all groups in upsetting the established order.

The overwhelming defeat of the referendum, 9,339 against merger to 3,759 in favor suggests the strength of the commitment to the respective communities. Champaign and Urbana may be physically contiguous, they may be economically intertwined in their reliance on the university but they are separate political entities. Citizens in both communities used the belief that competition promoted more rapid progress in each city to justify anti-merger votes. Whether or not the contention was valid, there are observable differences in the character of the cities.

A study prepared in 1968 noted that Urbana was a residential community with a high degree of association between residents on a neighborhood level. The "power elite" was fairly well defined, it showed a
fairly good consensus on issues and means and some tendency to act in concert.

On the other hand, Champaign was described as more heterogeneous in composition and more cosmopolitan in outlook. Real estate expansion in Champaign was more rapid and distinctions between rich and poor, particularly in housing were more visible. The city faced the problem of providing facilities for major subdivisions, built outside the city limits and then annexed. However, action on these problems was not forthcoming; the city lacked leadership, community spirit, and unity in neighborhoods. In summary, Champaign had more conflicts, more vocal interest groups, more calls for change and less possibility for consensus than Urbana. 12

Political separation has been reinforced by the establishment and maintenance of different political structures in each city. Urbana has been governed by aldermen since the 1860s, while Champaign has experimented with different governmental structures, adopting the council-manager plan in 1959, with at-large representation on the council. In 1972, at-large representation was modified so that five council members are elected from districts, with three members elected at large.

Urbana's mayor is elected at large on a partisan ballot for a four-year term. The city council is composed of fourteen alderman elected for four-year terms on party tickets, two from each of seven wards. The mayor is half-time, he is the executive officer of the city, and presides over the city council but votes only in cases of a tie. This sketch of the mayor's official authority does not convey its full potential. Urbana has modernized municipal administration; the staff came under civil service, and during the administration of Charles Zipprodt (1969-1973) the full-time position of administrative officer was created. The administrative officer is responsible to the mayor, he compiles and analyzes the information from the departments, and has an overview of the day-to-day operation of government which is invaluable for policy making. This information is at the disposal of the mayor; the council does not have comparable staff and some advantage accrues to the mayor in any conflict with the council.

A strong executive is also a legacy from the past. Urbana's government has been classified as oligarchic with periods of autocracy such as during the life of H. I. Green, who was "boss" of Champaign County. 13 Then city council meetings were short, decisions were quickly taken, the majority of the citizens were not involved or were touched only peripherally by the acts of government. Decisions concerned private undertakings rather than public affairs; if the public good was served by a decision which promoted private objectives, it was an incidental by-product of an individual effort to maximize particular objectives. Until the middle 1960s, municipal government provided minimum services to maintain community functioning. It maintained a low profile and served only limited purposes. There was little interest in improving the environment or in altering the status quo. There was neither foresight nor authority to deal with the problems of expansion--adequate sewers, streets and lights.

Champaign's mayor and councilmen are elected on a non-partisan ballot for four-year terms, and terms are staggered. The council determines general policy, enacts the ordinances which govern the city, and is responsible for levying taxes and for appointment of the city manager, city clerk and city treasurer. The city manager, within the limits set by the council, makes all administrative decisions, hires and fires all city employees, except the city clerk and treasurer, and prepares the city budget. When Warren Browning served as city manager (1963-1975), he established an easy working relationship with a majority of the city council and for most purposes, was the major decision maker. The composition of the city council was altered by the introduction of modified district representation, and a new city manager, Eugene Miller, introduced a more open administration.

Partisan elections in Urbana and non-partisan elections in Champaign call for different strategies for organizing and mobilizing the electorate. Aldermanic government in Urbana and a city manager in Champaign provide different options for organizing administrative tasks and for making policy decisions. Whatever the similarities in political culture, the

* Urbana voted to reduce the number of alderman to 7, one from each of 7 wards, on April 3, 1979. The election of April, 1981 implemented the change.
way each community organized to furnish that bundle of governmental services and activities has magnified and reinforced the distinctive characteristics of each city. The tenets of individualistic political culture are manifested differently and the complementary and contradictory manifestations can be viewed as variations on a cultural theme.

On the other hand, there are strong and perhaps—given the financial stringencies of local government in the 1970s—increasing pressures to cooperate. A variety of joint ventures have been undertaken ranging from an agreement (after much discussion, disagreement and the refusal of the county to take part) to operate a joint landfill to joint meetings of the respective city councils, and of the respective human relations commissions to discuss common problems. There was pressure for a merger of the respective chambers of commerce, but the members of the Urbana chamber feared the domination of Champaign members and rejected combination. A joint Boneyard Commission has been established, albeit with many misgivings, to study and make recommendations for the renovation of the stream which meanders through both cities.

The climax or perhaps the anti-climax of these efforts to achieve greater coordination, was the establishment of the Study Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation created by joint resolution of the city councils on April 5 and 6, 1976. The commission was chaired by Professor Samuel Gove of the Institute of Government of the University of Illinois, with representation from the cities, the university and the various autonomous special districts. At the first meeting, the need for increased coordination as well as liaison between governmental bodies was discussed. The representatives of the autonomous districts avowed their recognition of the need for cooperation and affirmed their determination to maintain their independence. The commission got off to a slow start, taking time to appoint the members. It has moved with caution since there is much to study before recommendations can be made. Commission members are susceptible to numerous conflicting pressures; on the one hand there is support for more "rational," efficient government and the reduction of waste, duplication and confusion. On the other hand, autonomy has its own attraction and the interests of special districts such as school and park districts may coincide with the interests of constituents.

The commission divided into seven subcommittees, six to research the problems and investigate cooperative possibilities and one executive committee, consisting of Gove and the six subcommittee heads, to set general commission policy and screen material for presentation to the full commission. The administration and structure subcommittee compiled a list of eight types of possible consolidation or cooperation, including administrative consolidation, consolidation of special districts and services, consolidation of city and county functions, and more cooperation between existing units of government. Professor Gove has minimized the possibility of merger and cautioned that "the problems of merger are very real." The commission also faces the problem of public indifference and Gove has worked to increase local newspaper coverage of commission meetings. The lack of citizen interest, according to Gove, means that the commission has been "operating in a vacuum." Given the political considerations, it seems safe to predict that the commission will focus on ways to further functional cooperation rather than supply the impetus for political integration.

**Summary and Implications**

Although Champaign and Urbana share the same political culture, the communities are structured in different ways and each has evolved according to its own pattern. Power in both communities is diffused and multiple opportunities for the maximization of individual interests are legitimized by individualistic political culture. However, each community compensates for the diffusion of power in its own way. Urbana remains the more cohesive community. The power of the oligarchy that once ruled Urbana has been diminished by the increasing strength of the Democratic party but the Democrats were successful because they built their own network of activites. However, Democratic successes opened the political process and it has become increasingly difficult to obtain the consensus needed to introduce or implement new programs.

Power in Champaign has been more diffuse, in part because its elites were more heterogenous and less rooted. Champaign, however, was the first community to adopt the norms of professional administration and administrative competence provided one kind of cement
for the community. Despite significant change in the orientation of the city council, professional competence remains the basic ingredient in any plan to expand services or implement new programs.

Until the 1970s growth and prosperity in the communities were not affected by political fragmentation. Business and professional interests in both communities relied, consciously or unconsciously, on the university to generate economic expansion and progress. Although some politicians in each city were aware of the problems of downtown redevelopment, there was--with one exception--little agreement on how to proceed. The one exception was the ability of the "oligarchy" in Urbana in the early 1960s to propose and develop Lincoln Square without significant public input. Those days are "gone with the wind" as shown by the continuing difficulties of downtown redevelopment in Urbana.

Fragmentation of power, diffuse political structures and dispersed resources imply the necessity of bargains and compromises before decisions are made and action taken. Whether the result is a rough approximation of equity, a pork barrel, a stalemate, or leads to citizen apathy and the neglect of communal purposes, depends on the resources, political structure and leadership of the civil community. Expectations are shaped by culture and demands, and responses are shaped by the political structure in which they arise. The distinctive political structures of Champaign and Urbana offer the possibility of analyzing the responses of comparable communities to similar problems. The differences in response suggest that the "cumulative effects of each local community's evolving location in time and space on its political system must be considered as fundamental elements in determining community patterns."

Champaign and Urbana appear to be quiet, prosperous cities, far removed from the upheavals which disturbed many large metropolitan areas in the 1960s. Despite this appearance, Champaign and Urbana have their share of urban problems such as an increased crime rate, drugs, delinquency, integration and even a few hints of corruption or at least "honest graft." In addition, local leadership has become more aware of the need to respond to the more marginal groups in the community and more concerned with the provision of services, such as recreational facilities, and intangible, such as a quality environment. Citizens have new and more diffuse expectations about communal purposes and expect more from local government. Given the resources of local government and the constraints under which local politicians operate, there is a real question as to whether these expectations are realistic and whether they can be met to any degree by local government. On the other hand, it is necessary to ask whether local leaders use the real constraints on decision making as rationalizations to avoid the hard political decisions that are demanded in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, are there sufficient resources and leadership in the cities to contain demands, satisfy new expectations, and maintain the civil community? The chapters on Champaign and Urbana describe the difficulties--the contradictory impulses and the sometimes erratic consequences. Yet more basic than the ups and downs of specific decisions is the evidence of the continuing viability of the civil community.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 2


6 Ibid., p. 762.

7 Ibid., p. 763.

8 Ibid., p. 764.

9 Ibid., p. 765.


11 Ibid., pp. 278-279.


13 Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, pp. 208-209.


15 Ibid.


19 Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, p. 8.
CHAPTER 3
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

Introduction

Champaign and Urbana are civil communities that possess a measure of autonomy, but they are not self-contained entities. They are located in Champaign County in the State of Illinois in the United States of America. The cities are integral parts of a complex layered system of government, and the policies of larger units as well as the relationship between units influence and shape local decisions. For this reason, a sketch of changes in the county--governmental structure, party allegiance and attitudes concerning the proper role of government--is needed to understand the role of the county as a vital link in a network of interdependence. Decisions of county government have affected politics in the cities. For example, Urbana's status as the county seat is one prop of its separate existence. More recently, discussions over whether to locate a new courthouse-jail complex in downtown Urbana testify to the continuing significance of county support.

Both Democrats and Republicans are organized as county parties. Each party reflects the competing and complementary interests in the county, whose conciliation is necessary if the party is to be effective electorally. When H. I. Green was "boss" of Champaign County, his control extended to the cities, and there were few problems of conciliation. The county was important as a link, but county power was primarily negative, i.e., it was the power of "non-decision" making.1 County government, until the 1960s, could be described as a "holding company." It was there, it provided a crucial framework, but it was passive.

The events of the 1960s jarred county government from passive to active interdependence. The county has been pushed to assume a more active role in a variety of issues. The word "pushed" accurately describes the process since, in most instances, a more active role cannot be attributed to local initiative and foresight. Rather, federal decisions, such as the federal demand for coordination before grant submission, the designation of the Regional Planning
Commission as coordinator, and the Supreme Court decision extending the requirements of one-man, one-vote to county government, were catalysts for the shifts. Democrats, who as a result of reapportionment, assumed more of a role in county politics, have fought to modernize and energize county government, but as yet have failed to achieve far-reaching results. For the moment, their role is more educational than consequential and time is needed before demands for reform affect the perception of policy options.

There is, however, a new style of cooperation between officials when there is a concrete objective with obvious utility to be attained. The campaign to locate a federal district court in Champaign County furnishes as example of the new forms of cooperation. In May 1976, to further the campaign, a delegation from the chambers of commerce of Champaign, Urbana and Rantoul, including representatives of business, the professions and labor, flew to Washington to win the support of Senators Charles Percy and Adlai Stevenson III and Representative Edward Madigan for the project. In July, a second group, including Hiram Paley, the mayor of Urbana; the president of the Urbana Chamber of Commerce; William Bland, the mayor of Champaign; Wesley Schwenge1, the chairman of the County Board; and Robert Rice, the director of the Illinois Development Corporation made the trip. These trips were a first in county history and the bi-partisan, multi-governmental composition of the second group suggests a new awareness of the advantages of cooperation. A united front was created in order to secure a federal "plum" and the venture illustrates the increasing scope and extent of local endeavors as well as the complex interrelationship of formal units of government.

Although the major impetus for active cooperation between local governments derived from the federal government's interest in coordination, the county, on its own initiative and for its own reasons, created a Regional Planning Commission (RPC) in the 1960s. Creation of the commission was an ambivalent response to the increasingly obvious need to do something about haphazard growth. It was ambivalent in the sense that the commission was accorded neither a generous mandate nor adequate funding. In 1967, the Bureau of the Budget designated the RPC as the Areawide Clearinghouse, making it responsible for reviews of proposed grants which had potential effect on the plans and programs of local units of government. The Bureau of the Budget promulgated Circular A-95 in 1969 as a means to achieve some order in the proliferation of grants and applicants that occurred during the Johnson administration and was intended to coordinate local applications for certain state or federally funded projects. The Bureau of the Budget was replaced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) which expanded the scope of the review in 1971.

The designation of the RPC as the review agency and the expansion of coverage meant that the commission had the potential to influence local decision making. The potential is best illustrated by the increase in the number of A-95 reviews performed by the RPC. Between 1965, and September 1975, 173 reviews were undertaken; 19 were conducted between 1965 and 1970. In 1970, 6 reviews were instituted, but from January to September 1975, 53 were undertaken.

The "power" of the planners, however, may be more apparent than real. Establishment of the commission and its expansion is one aspect of a new "professionalism" in county administration, but legitimacy from the past and cultural sanction for "planning" is lacking. All too often, local elites see planners as the vanguard of government encroachment on individual liberty and opposition to their works is easily activated. In addition, the general administrative style in the county, particularly the absence of civil service, points up the anomalous position of planners. County jobs are allocated by elected officials, according to the discretion of the respective officeholders. Republicans dominated the county offices, but recent changes in the composition of the county board have produced challenges to the autonomy of elected officials. These challenges, which will be discussed below, have as yet yielded few results and county officials remain secure in their strongholds.

There is limited local support for planning. The Regional Planning Commission was created by the County Board before reapportionment changed its composition and increased urban representation. It is widely assumed that a more professional administration is necessary for progress and, in some quarters, increased professionalization is an overriding political objective. However, if incumbent officials perceive the campaign for increased professionalization as an
attack on their political bases, the push for more professional values is impeded.

Competing values are apparent in recent conflict, and conflicting purposes and objectives must be reconciled if action is to be undertaken. Resolution typically does not mean victory for either side; the process appears to be one of adaptation of the mandates of professional administration to the values of individualistic culture. This chapter assesses the changes in county government by focusing on how the resources and values of contending partisans shape decision making.

The Background of Change

Champaign County retains the overall appearance of a rural area, but it has become urbanized in the last decades. The 1970 census classified three fourths of the county's population as urban with less than one fourth of the non-urban population living on farms. The two major employers in the county are the University of Illinois and Chanute Air Force Base, located in the city of Rantoul, approximately twenty miles north of Urbana. Although the statistics show a decline in the percentage of the population that is rural, the politics of the county are still affected by rural sentiments and ideology. The outlook is conservative and governmental action such as zoning is easily perceived as a diminution of liberty. These attitudes can be obstacles to innovative governmental efforts to alleviate the problems of urban society.

The spirit of the "old days" contrasts sharply with the facts of the present. Twenty-five percent of the county's population is transient, and resides in the area in order to receive (or have a spouse or a parent receive) educational services. In 1970, slightly more than 17 percent of the population of Champaign and Urbana resided in college dormitories while more than 20 percent of Rantoul's population lived in military barracks. The general economic and social characteristics of the population reflect the high proportion of transients. The average age of Champaign County residents, the percentage of persons who live with their families, and the average income are slightly below normal. The mobility of the population and the level of educational attainment is higher than normal.

Ideological reservations color attitudes about government but governmental activities provide half of the earnings of county residents. The University of Illinois and Chanute Air Force Base are major employers in the county, but the nature of the services they provide obscures perception of the connection between jobs and government. There is a relative shortage of career opportunities for certain types of skilled and semi-skilled workers, but generally unemployment is not a serious problem in the county, except for youths (aged 16-20) and for blacks. The 1970 census showed that 15.2 percent of the black population was unemployed and 25 percent of all black families had incomes below the poverty level.

Ideological preconceptions also obstruct recognition of the dependence of the economy on federal money. A typical native of Champaign County speaks enthusiastically of the value of individual enterprise, of independence and of making it on one's own. In contrast, the Federal Information Exchange System County Program Summary for fiscal year 1968 showed that the county received a total of $212,717,960 from the federal government. The figure received for 1971 was $220,092,509. Much of the federal expenditure was neither highly visible nor required the exercise of discretion by federal officials; for example, in 1971 more than $13,000,000 was disbursed for social security payments and another $5,000,000 was disbursed for military retirement pay. However, federal expenditures provide both the base and a cushion for the county's economy.

The statistics suggest the magnitude of the changes that have occurred in the county's population and its economic base, while the qualifications suggest the strength of customary assumptions. Until recently, little interest in accommodating to change was displayed by county politicians. Whether political stability was attributable to citizen satisfaction or to citizen apathy is an open question, but much of the recent impetus for change is attributable to decisions taken outside the county and not to local initiatives.

A Survey of Changes in County Government

The 1960s were crowded years on the national scene--anti-war demonstrations, riots in the ghetto, Great Society programs and Supreme Court decisions--
resulting in the expansion of federal services and bringing new people and interests to the fore. Champaign County, for the most part, was affected only marginally by the expanded activities of the federal government. The county, for example, did not participate in many of the Great Society programs and largely ignored federal incentives to encourage regional initiatives. The decision which most affected the contours of county politics was the Supreme Court's decision to extend the principle of one-man, one-vote to county governments. The need to reapportion led to changes in the structure of county government and the new electoral rules produced a new type of county board member, an urban, activist Democrat. Until 1972, the County Board of Supervisors was the formal governing body of the county. As its name implies, the board had fifty members, including the township supervisor from each of thirty townships plus representation from the cities of Champaign, Urbana and Rantoul. The supervisors from the townships were the majority, and the size and lack of cohesiveness of the board contributed to the lethargy of county government. In addition, cultural preferences emphasizing the priority of individual over communal purposes reinforced passivity and limited county involvement in matters such as zoning or other regulatory activity. County government was a holding operation and few politicians in the county were willing to suggest an alternative modus operandi.

Although reapportionment had the potential to change the shape of county politics there was neither resistance to nor widespread public interest in the prospective change. The alteration of county government was accomplished without much public notice. The name of the governing body of the county was changed from the County Board of Supervisors to the County Board; its membership was reduced to twenty-seven and nine new districts were drawn, each composed of approximately 18,000 inhabitants. Each district elects three members; three of the districts represent Champaign; two represent Urbana; and four represent the rural areas of the county. In 1972, the first election under the new electoral system was held and the new twenty-seven member board had a majority of members from the urbanized areas of the county.

Additional representation of urban areas increased the number of Democrats on the County Board. The first board after reapportionment was composed of sixteen Republicans and eleven Democrats, but two Democrats from rural areas voted with the Republicans. The Democrats focused on a reorganization of the board's committee structure; the number of committees was reduced from twenty-four to eleven and the once powerful Ways and Means Committee was abolished. The new committees were composed of four Republicans and three Democrats, a dramatic illustration of increased Democratic influence on the County Board. The Republicans retained the chairmanship of each committee but reform oriented Democrats secured a forum in which to advocate a new, more activist county government and a more professional administration. They advocated changing the chairman of the County Board from full to half-time; and hiring a full-time, professional administrative assistant (modeled on the Urbana position), schooled in public administration with knowledge in the areas of budget and finance, who would bring professional expertise to county government.

The Democrats stressed the inadequacy and inactivity of county administration and made it a campaign issue in the months before the 1974 elections. The question of whether the chairman of the County Board should be half or full-time, and how much and what kind of help the chairman needed, depended on the definition of the chairman's task. Wesley Schwengel, a veteran of the old board and chairman of the new board described the job as follows: The chairmanship is a full-time position. The chairman functions as a public relations officer, "attempting to make the citizens of this county appreciate what county government and other segments of county government; he must be up to date on changes in state and federal laws affecting county government and he serves as coordinator for the various governments and special districts in the county." He gives advice to township and other segments of county government; he must be up to date on changes in state and federal laws affecting county government and he serves as coordinator for the various governments and special districts in the county. In other words, county government was a kind of holding company.

Schwengel's understanding of his position and the purposes of county government (at least for the Democrats) raised more problems than it resolved. The Democrats believed that election to the county board was a part-time position and demanded research assistance and other services from the chairman's office. Schwengel argued that the county lacked office space for regular purposes and said no to research services.
I don't believe we need someone to whom board members can come and say I want thus and so—someone to do their homework for them. I feel that as board members we should do our own share of the homework and not have somebody do it for us.

The Democrats were not deterred and continued to press for change. Laurel Prussing, an Urbana Democrat, and member of the Personnel and Public Officials Committee reported that the committee approved a $16,000 budget item to hire a professional administrator for the fiscal year beginning December 1, 1974. Schwengel continued to deny the need for an administrative assistant and the board's Budget and Finance Committee and the Policies and Procedures Committee, meeting jointly, delayed a decision on the budget proposal, and ordered further study of the question.

In September, the Policy, Procedures and Appointment Committee overruled the Personnel and Public Officials Committee, voting to disregard the proposal for an administrative assistant and creating instead the position of executive secretary to the county board chairman. Two Democratic members of the committee explained their votes, "they were philosophically in favor of the administrative assistant but had decided it might be impractical to hire one at this time." Schwengel's opposition helped defeat the proposal for an administrative assistant. Inasmuch as partisan opponents advocated more professional administration, the county board chairman opposed the proposal as a challenge to his prerogatives.

Nevertheless, a new model of county government is beginning to take shape. In 1973, the state passed a law allowing consolidation of elections, and the County Board, citing cost, changed the date of county elections to coincide with the general election. The first consolidated election took place in November, 1974, and showed that urban interest was not transitory. Hotly contested state legislative races produced a large turnout for an off-year election, and 54.9 percent of the registered voters in Champaign County cast ballots. Republicans retained control of all the county offices at stake,* but the Democrats increased their strength on the County Board, defeating two Republican incumbents. The Democratic contingent was boosted to thirteen but the Republicans retained a one-vote majority, and Republicans could count on the support of two rural Democrats.12

The losses led to strategy discussions among the Republicans and rumors of a challenge to Wesley Schwengel in the Republican caucus. The caucus decided to support Schwengel who was elected as chairman. However, Schwengel promised to retire from both the chairmanship and board.

This decision minimized Republican dissenion and challenges to Schwengel's leadership, but it did not stop the Democratic push for a more professional county administration. County jobs are not covered by Civil Service classifications, and the personnel and Public Officials Committee of the board drew up a personnel code establishing a uniform job classification system for county employees.13 However, problems arose when attempts were made to implement the code; semi-autonomous officeholders saw attempts at implementation as usurpations of their responsibility.

In February 1976, a board decision to set aside money for merit pay raises sparked conflict. The elected official would ask the Personnel and Public Officials Committee for the money for a raise for the employee, assuming that the committee would exercise oversight. County Treasurer John Skelton and County Sheriff Everett Hedrick both wrote critical letters to the committee. Skelton argued that in the future, he would submit his budget as a lump sum line item without any breakdown by individuals, thus removing any possibility of coordinating job classification and pay. Skelton claimed that opinions of the State's Attorney of Champaign County and the State Attorney General supported his contention that county elected officials were solely responsible for determining the pay of their employees.14

Tensions in county government are exacerbated

* County officials hold four-year terms but not all county officials run at the same time. County officials were Republicans except the State's Attorney; a Democrat was elected in 1972.
periodically by incidents such as the Democratic attempt to remove electioneering from the County Court House. As noted above, elected county officials were Republicans except for the State's Attorney. James Skelton who was county treasurer was also the chairman of the Champaign County Republican party. Employees of the Circuit Clerk were encouraged to wear buttons during working hours, promoting the incumbent Circuit Clerk for reelection. Needless to say, Democrats on the County Board were less than happy with such blatant electioneering, and a motion to prohibit county employees from wearing campaign buttons was introduced. The County Board rejected the measure and employees of the Circuit Clerk continued to wear buttons during work hours.

The above incidents illustrate the conflicting pressures in county government. The push for more professional procedures and behavior contradicts customary modes of operation. Innovation generates a reaction which forces the innovators to the defensive to preserve what they have achieved. The old ways are no longer viable and probably cannot be resurrected due to the increasing demand for more data, more analysis, and more standardization in government operation. But county officials cannot be said to be eagerly moving towards a new model of government. The attitudes which fostered the old days retain their political effectiveness and serve to slow change, to limit its impact, and perhaps to make the new ways acceptable or at least tolerable to the more conservative citizens of the county. The pattern is apparent in various county undertakings and the remainder of this chapter examines the pattern as it surfaced in the creation and operation of the Regional Planning Commission, county zoning, revenue sharing, and the proposed jail-courthouse complex.

The Regional Planning Commission

New approaches to the problems of planning, zoning, and regulation illustrate changes in the role and purposes of county government. County zoning, an issue since 1966, was adopted in September 1973. A full time administration and a zoning board of appeals was created.

The first landmark on the road to county zoning was the creation of the Champaign County Planning Commission which was approved by the rural dominated County Board in September 1964. In 1966, the organization became the Regional Planning Commission and through the first half of the 1970s, both the staff and the importance of the RPC increased. The commission was composed of eight members, serving two-year terms including the chairman of the County Board, two representatives from Champaign and two from Urbana, two additional representatives from the County Board and one minority group member. Rantoul did not participate originally, but by 1974, it showed interest and sent a representative to meetings. The duties of the commission included appointment of the salaried planning staff, approval or rejection of the plans prepared by the staff, and finally transmission of approved plans to the County Board or the city councils.

A salaried professional planning staff appears somewhat anomalous in a conservative community, where spot zoning was usual practice and informal relationships had greater relevance for zoning decisions than rational decisions on land use. The original proposal for a Champaign County Planning Commission, contrary to expectations, aroused minimal conflict. County planning was an idea whose time had come, but neither the idea nor the time was indigenous to the county.

Several favorable preconditions smoothed the way for county planning. In the early 1960s, federal grants became available to counties which created a review board to oversee county needs. The chairman of the County Board showed interest in complying and a committee was appointed to study the problem and make recommendations. Henry I. Green, Jr. an advocate of county planning, was appointed to the committee, and became an enthusiastic spokesman for regional planning. Champaign and Urbana also showed interest in a County Planning Commission. Champaign had had a professional planner on the city staff but he resigned in the early 1960s and a replacement was needed. Urbana was severely criticized for its backdoor approach to the development of Lincoln Square, and city officials were interested in deflecting this criticism. For the cities, county planning meant professional expertise at reduced cost; professional planners hired by the county could work for the cities and were less expensive than if each city hired its own planner.

A county planning agency also made political sense; its creation lessened criticism concerning the
The county's apathy towards and failure to seek federal grants to tackle the problems of increased urbanization. Conservative members of the board were reassured about county planning when planning commissions operating in Sangamon and Lake counties were suggested as the model for the proposed commission. The rural-dominated County Board easily approved a planning commission because they were not staking out a new path; the experience of comparable counties made regional planning politically acceptable in Champaign County.18

Regional planning has the potential to radically change decision making in a county dominated by the individualistic political culture. By 1973, the Regional Planning Commission had realized some part of this potential. Staff was increased in the early 1970s, and the professional caliber of planning studies as well as demands from other governments for facts increased the RPC's strategic importance to elected officials in the cities and the county.

However, an undercurrent of opposition to the RPC and its operation had also developed. A brief review of the commission's legally defined functions suggests reasons for the indispensability of the commission and for the developing opposition. Regional planning commissions are intended to provide nonaffluent local governments with the staff for community planning; to coordinate land use among adjacent counties or communities, and to provide the counties and communities with the specialized staff necessary for acquiring grants from the federal government.

The RPC spent 81 percent of its budget for planning projects and 19 percent on salaries. The work of the RPC in 1973 is represented by the list of project expenditures found in Table 3.1.19

The commission's work is done in the county, but its funds are derived from many sources, including the federal government. The commission's budget in 1973 was $351,803, and the major contributors are listed in Table 3.1.20

As Table 3.2 indicates, federal funds provided incentives for planning in Champaign County, and were a necessary prop for the RPC. Local attitudes are ambivalent; the RPC was created by the county but it did not command widespread support and enthusiasm.
Continuing budgetary support from HUD, the ever growing need for data to support grant applications, and the coordinating responsibilities devolved on the RPC by the requirements of Circular A-95 are more relevant factors in RPC expansion than equivocal local support.

The RPC is established and the planners are unlikely to fold their tents and silently steal away. The staff has grown and the planning projects have become more comprehensive, but the honeymoon is over, and the increasing scope of RPC operation has generated the opposition that was missing at its creation. Staff and program expansion is not attributable to the support of local elites but to a HUD grant to develop a comprehensive land use plan for the country. The cutback in federal grants (the RPC suffered a 25 percent reduction for the 1974-75 fiscal year) generates fears that the county and the cities will be forced to pick up the tab for RPC services that some citizens would rather do without.

A comprehensive land use plan would pinpoint the services and the infrastructure to assure rational development in the future. Master plans, however, are likely to conflict with the development projects of influential citizens; the resulting tensions increase criticism of the RPC. The opposition is fed not only by specific decisions of the commission but by a generalized antipathy to governmental power. A real estate broker claimed that the RPC made rezoning impossible and "the Commission is very restrictive and almost a bureaucracy." A businessman felt that too much emphasis was placed on the environment. Both felt that commission expansion meant that "the federal government had gained 'too much control' and had become 'more socialistic' by taking power away from the people."22

The formality of dealings with professional planners contrasts sharply with the informal relations of 15 years ago and raises the spectre of bureaucracy and impersonal government. To those who were satisfied with or benefitted from the old ways, the RPC at times takes on the appearance of a "Frankenstein," an instrumentality intended to further county development but which impedes it by rigidity and regulations. The staff of the RPC is aware of the hostility; the work of the RPC reduces the business sector's control of land and businessmen do not understand how the commission operates.23 The business community recognizes the need for planning but prefers docile to aggressive planners, and tends to oppose further expansion of the RPC's role.

The issue of regulation vs. nonregulation was never debated or resolved publicly. In the 1970s, budgetary constraints, as surplus funds evaporated made RPC allocations vulnerable to reduction, and the director of the RPC fought a losing battle to maintain budget levels. To further complicate the RPC's position, Robert Pinkerton, who was well known in the community, resigned as executive director in March 1975. James Friedlander became the new director in May 1975.24 At this time, Champaign began to express dissatisfaction with the RPC's emphasis on regional concerns and its limited priority for city planning, and reduced its 1975-1976 budget allocation approximately 24 percent in order to hire an RPC staffer as city planning coordinator.25 Budget pressures increased in 1976; further reductions in federal funding were anticipated; Champaign was becoming more interested in hiring its own planner and the County Board was reluctant to increase its allocation for RPC operating expenses.26 The pressures on the RPC budget may be attributable to latent hostility, to Champaign's need for more services, or the increasing need to set priorities when money is tight. In any case, RPC operations are carefully scrutinized by local governments and budget constraints restrict further expansion of its role and significance.

County Zoning

The same kinds of responses to planning appear in the debates over county zoning and its implementation. As noted above, county zoning was adopted by the populace as a model zoning ordinance and the adoption of county zoning in neighboring Ford, Piatt, and McLean counties lessened opposition in the rural community. The RPC solicited participation from all segments of the community in preparing for zoning, but participation did not allay opposition. In those segments of the community that believe that industrial development is necessary, criticism of zoning was intense and affected willingness to comply with the ordinance. Each time a decision based on the zoning code was presented as an obstacle to industrial development or to a real estate promotion, passive
antipathy became active and the disputes delayed acceptance and implementation of a rational land use policy. Professional decision making does not eliminate the conflicts that cluster around zoning questions because any decision confers benefits on some and losses on others.

The RPC attempted to present or ameliorate conflicts over zoning and land use by building a consensus on planning decisions, and has solicited the participation of different interest groups and of the general public. Task forces were created to survey the county's needs and prospects in areas such as land use, housing and human resources. However, efforts to increase participation had mixed results for the following reasons. In the first place, participation did not always lessen opposition. Members of a task force were not automatically bound to abide by the decisions of the majority. Second, there were problems in obtaining the participation of the public. Public hearings are attended by those with an immediate stake in a decision, and hearings to discuss long-range plans do not generate the quality nor quantity of participation that a hearing to rezone land from R-1 to R-4 generates in the affected neighborhoods. Conversely, the anger of a developer because his proposal has been rejected does not result in continuous feedback to or pressure on decision makers. Although a developer may deride the RPC in private conversations or with interviewers, insisting that the planners are destroying individual liberty and retarding progress with zoning decisions, he soon becomes interested in a different project. If planning does not evoke the wholehearted support of local elites neither does it arouse enough opposition to cause these elites to reorganize and systematically attempt to block the trend to long-term planning or change its direction.

The apathy of the public and the selective interest of the public and interested elites creates a vacuum, especially about long-range planning, which strengthens professional "control" over the decisions that will shape the future of Champaign County. "Control" may be an empty victory if implementation is delayed or diluted. The county has entered the twentieth century. It can no longer do without the services of professional planners, but the interaction of professionals and the public is best described as complex, ambiguous, and at times undercut by conflicts.

The sporadic opposition of interested elites as well as apathy and selective interest in the community may result in a modus vivendi between the planners and the community or in increasingly disruptive conflicts.

A Landlord Tenant Ordinance and A Fair Housing Ordinance

The kinds of tension that inhere in a transitional relationship are illustrated in the controversy over the regulation of rental property. As noted above, Champaign County has a larger than normal percentage of population living in rented dwellings. The national average is 30 percent while Champaign County's average is more than 50 percent. Table 3.3 gives the distribution and the percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Champaign</th>
<th>Urbana</th>
<th>Rantoul</th>
<th>Champaign County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Occupied Dwelling Units</td>
<td>16,954</td>
<td>9,456</td>
<td>5,804</td>
<td>47,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Occupied</td>
<td>8,938</td>
<td>4,293</td>
<td>2,248</td>
<td>24,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Owner Occupied</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter Occuped</td>
<td>8,016</td>
<td>5,163</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td>21,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Renter Occupied</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Excludes dormitory rooms

Source: 1970 Census of Population and Housing, PHC (1)-38.

Students especially have felt themselves to be at the mercy of landlords and the Champaign-Urbana Tenants Union was created by students in the early 1970s to afford some protection to renters. The RPC housing Task Force recognized the unique problems created for Champaign County by the high percentage of renters and established a committee to look into the problems of rental housing.

TABLE 3.3 HOUSING TENURE IN CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
The committee was composed of representatives from the C-U Tenants Union, the legal aid office, a landlord, a property manager and a local realtor. It met throughout 1973, and drafted seven model ordinances to provide protection for tenants and landlords and a specification of their rights and responsibilities. The committee planned to hold public hearings to obtain community reaction to the ordinances, to amend them accordingly and finally to submit them to the city councils of Champaign and Urbana for adoption under home rule powers.28

The Illinois Constitution ratified in 1970 gave home rule to municipalities with a population of more than 25,000 and offered home rule powers to county governments, if voters approved the reorganization of county government and the establishment of an elected county executive officer. Home rule freed the cities and would free the county board of most state legislative control; home rule units could do anything that the legislature or the constitution did not specifically forbid. However, most officials of Champaign County were not interested or were opposed to becoming a home rule county. Ordinances governing landlord-tenant relationships therefore could be applied only in cities with the home rule power. The deliberations of the Tenant Landlord Relations Committee were shaped by this limitation. When the ordinances were finally written, the RPC deviated from customary procedure and transmitted the ordinances without endorsement to the three largest cities in the county. The cities received the package on August 1, 1974, along with the suggestion that Champaign and Urbana work together to adopt identical ordinances.29

The cities established a Champaign-Urbana Joint Committee on Model Lessor-Lessee Relations Ordinances, and named four members; one opponent, two proponents and one moderate. Public hearings were held throughout 1975 and a model ordinance was drawn up in late 1975. Before the ordinance was submitted to the Champaign City Council, the city's legal staff reviewed the measure and declared that "the City does not have the power, as a home rule unit, to pass such an ordinance."30 The respective city councils were deterred from further consideration of the model ordinance.

A similar fate met the Housing Task Force's attempt to bar discrimination in housing in the county. Champaign and Urbana have fair housing ordinances which will be discussed in the chapters on the cities. Rantoul does not have an ordinance but the Chanute Housing Authority investigates complaints. The RPC also defined fair housing as a priority problem and the task force asked the County Board for a commitment to end housing discrimination in the county by establishing a fair housing ordinance and a mechanism for enforcement.31 A draft of a fair housing ordinance was prepared and delivered to County Board Chairman Wesley Schwengel, who angrily announced that the RPC had wasted its time. According to the opinion of Illinois Attorney General William J. Scott, Champaign County was legally incapable of enacting a fair housing ordinance. Scott ruled that only home rule counties have authority to enact fair housing ordinances.32

Schwegel's response to RPC efforts to prepare fair housing legislation is indicative of the opposition that leads local leaders to undercut the RPC. But to Democrats, Schwegel's attitudes are a red flag. The board's inability to enact fair housing ordinances generates demands for home rule and renewed efforts to bring a professional administrator into county government.33 Scott's ruling suggests a different kind of problem for county government; legal interpretations may delay expansion of the county's power to regulate or to act to promote the general welfare. This lack of authority confounded efforts to use revenue sharing funds to support social services in the county.

Revenue Sharing

Legal restrictions also limited county discretion in allocating revenue sharing funds. Reapportionment resulted in the election of county board members who were willing to see government play a more active role in promoting the welfare of citizens. Revenue sharing seemed to provide the resources to accomplish their purposes. President Nixon proposed revenue sharing as "a gesture of faith in America's states and localities and in the principle of democratic self-government."

Congress, in 1972, established a five-year general revenue sharing program at an initial level of 5.3 billion dollars.34 In 1972, Champaign County's allotment of revenue sharing funds was $362,000 and the county expected to receive approximately $415,000 in 1973, but the county's financial position was
bleak. A provision of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 prohibited the county from charging fees from other government units for collecting their taxes, and the provision cost the county about $800,000 in revenue a year. Two years of deficit budgets erased previous surpluses and greatly reduced the county's options concerning the disposition of revenue sharing funds. Nevertheless, the county board made an effort to obtain public input regarding the appropriation of such funds and social welfare programs were the primary candidates. The board heard the proposals of various groups, including the Francis Nelson Health Center, a neighborhood medical facility, started with federal funds, to serve the needs of the poor and the black community. The health center was seeking new funding sources to compensate for a cutback in federal funds.35

The county also faced the prospect of picking up the tab for two programs originally financed by the federal government. The Emergency Employment Act had enabled the county to hire employees not included in the regular budget, but termination of these funds necessitated additional county expenditures of $120,000 to continue the employment of essential individuals. A federal grant for $240,000 for a program at the Champaign County Youth Home was due to expire, and if the county wanted to continue the program, they would have to provide funding. Assumption of these obligations placed financial constraints on the board's new interest in promoting the welfare of disadvantaged citizens.

In addition, disposition of legal questions concerning the expenditure of revenue sharing funds for social welfare projects limited the county's discretion. Illinois law prohibits a county which is not a home rule unit from funding public health services without a referendum. In April 1973, Illinois Attorney General William J. Scott delivered an official opinion on the subject, which stated explicitly that the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 does not authorize units of local government to expend revenue sharing funds for purposes which are not already authorized by State Law... If support for the programs of the aforementioned agencies (the case in point concerned the Community Action

Agency for Stephenson County and the Stephenson Council for the Aged) are not within the statutory powers of a county board, the county board correspondingly is not authorized to expend its own revenue funds... and is not authorized to use funds derived from the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, supra, in furtherance of these programs.

The impact of this opinion was felt when revenue sharing allocations were discussed in the spring of 1975. Champaign County State's Attorney James R. Burgess ruled that neither the Francis Nelson Health Center nor the Champaign County Drug Rehabilitation Center qualified for county revenue sharing money. Burgess noted that the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act did not confer additional authority on county government; Champaign County is not a home rule unit and can do only those things that are specifically authorized by the state, and those that arise by implication from powers specifically granted.36 The interpretation effectively limited expanded funding for social services through the use of revenue sharing money. Although there were efforts to ease the constraints imposed by these rulings, several more agencies were declared ineligible for revenue sharing funds during the discussion of allocation of funds in 1976.37

Revenue sharing was criticized by some congressmen, who argued that without federal strings, the money was unlikely to be used to raise the level of services for the poor and disadvantaged. Champaign County showed an interest in using revenue sharing funds for social programs, and public hearings were held to obtain citizen participation. However, obstacles to this type of expenditure--the reduction of federal grant money, the prospect of budget deficits, and the less than generous legal interpretations of county power--effectively restrained county government from taking the initiative. There may have been the will, at least there was an interest in using revenue sharing funds for disadvantaged groups, but the potential was not realized due in part to state and federal decisions which blocked the way. In consequence, the hope that revenue sharing would result in strengthened, more responsive local government was diminished.
The Jail-Court House Complex

A brief sketch of the slow progress towards construction of a new jail and/or courthouse rounds off this portrayal of the politics of county government. There is widespread local recognition of the need for a new jail, and even some enthusiasm for the project. However, the different objectives of politicians, citizens, and experts, as well as the complexities which inhere in any large undertaking, have delayed initiation of the project.

Discussion about the need for a new jail has been going on for at least twenty years, but in 1972, a concerted effort to start a project was begun. Dilapidated, inadequate prison facilities were criticized by grand juries and the State Department of Corrections, and complaints of prisoners about overcrowding, food, recreational facilities, and the depredations of other prisoners began to appear regularly in the newspapers. Recognition of the need, however, did not automatically produce the financial resources to solve the problem. Should a new jail to be funded by a referendum or the creation of a public building commission? Was the proposed construction to be a jail or a jail-courthouse complex? The cost of the jail was estimated at between $6,000,000 and $8,000,000; the cost of a jail with a few hearing rooms was estimated at $8,000,000 to $9,000,000, while a jail-courthouse complex including space for county offices was estimated at $13,000,000. Should the project be located in downtown Urbana? Urbana officials strongly supported this outcome; it fitted with redevelopment plans. However, a downtown location might prove more expensive than a location further out in the county. The County Board began to study these questions in 1973, but by 1976, very few decisions had been made.

In early 1974, some board members advocated a referendum, but other members feared that the voters, worried about tax increases, would reject the project. In December 1974, the board received a preliminary report on a jail-courthouse complex from staff members of the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, and again there was talk of a referendum to be held the following summer. By the summer of 1975, the County Board was ready to move, and authorized "one of its commit-tees to appoint another committee to study means of financing and constructing a new county jail." A month later the board allocated more than $500,000 from revenue sharing funds for the project.

Major financial questions however, remained open, as the committee composed of County Board members began to study the need for a new jail, new courthouse or both. A jail-courthouse complex was recommended but the committee was reluctant to advocate a referendum. The county would still have to build the jail. The committee also investigated alternative methods, particularly the possibility of creating a public building commission, which is authorized by state law to issue bonds. The county board can raise the tax rate to finance payment of the bonds without a referendum. There was just one hitch, only one commission can exist in any municipality and Urbana established a public building commission in the summer of 1973.

The county did not participate in the Urbana commission due to fears that Urbana would dominate its deliberations, and county officials wanted the existing commission dissolved before they made any commitment to finance the jail-courthouse complex this way. Mayor Paley of Urbana appeared willing to dissolve the commission, he wanted the complex built in or near downtown Urbana, and "sacrifices" to obtain the plum were in order. The uncertainties of funding and location were ignored as the County Board hired the architectural firm of Phillips, Swager and Associates to begin preliminary design work.

The tempo of activity increased in the spring and summer of 1976. The County Board approved a resolution on June 14, 1976, to purchase a site in downtown Urbana for construction of a jail and/or courthouse facility if funds were available. The resolution formally "committed" the board to a downtown Urbana location but did not specify funding arrangements nor whether the facility was to be a jail or a jail-courthouse complex. In late June, receipt of a federal planning grant of $158,130 from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) with the stipulation that the money be allocated by September 30, 1976, further increased the project's momentum, but major decisions were avoided.
The difficulties which delayed the decision on and construction of a jail and/or courthouse complex were described because they illustrate the interdependence of the units of the federal system as well as the complexity of action which results from interdependence. There is a local consensus on the need for a jail and probably on the need for a new courthouse, and a bi-partisan coalition of elected officials supports the project. In addition, Urbana officials need the new complex in downtown Urbana to provide a peg for their plans to revitalize downtown. If the new courthouse is built, some historian, one hundred years from now might join the historian who described Champaign County's early days in declaring that the new courthouse was an important factor in maintaining Urbana's separate existence.

Despite public recognition of the need and the support of local officials, action on the jail/courthouse complex was delayed for years. Financial and other kinds of support was needed from different governments, and constraints and delays resulted from the expanding need for consultation and assistance. Such constraints, as well as citizen indifference or antipathy, further slow the transformation of county government from a holding operation to a new model of government.

**Conclusion**

This brief sketch of the politics of Champaign County shows a county in transition. The county will never return to the "good old days" and increasing Democratic strength is one sign that some percentage of the population has little desire to return to those days. But the past, even if it is largely mythological, has left an attitudinal and ideological legacy. The individualistic political culture still pervades the county, and since culture shapes perception (particularly perception of alternatives), judgment, and actions, the county's shift to a more activist concept of government will be slow with considerable backtracking. A reapportioned urban oriented County Board wants county government to take a more active role in providing a better life for the citizens, but faces constraints imposed by the decisions of others. County government will play a more active role in the future but the kinds of action it can take at any given time will be shaped and determined by a mix of imperatives of individualistic culture, the desires of activists, and the resources at hand.

The relationship between the cities and the county is complex and not susceptible to easy generalization. In various respects, the cities assumed a more active role before the county, and their initiatives paved the way for change in the county. For example, Democratic successes in Urbana provided the organization, the manpower, and the enthusiasm for Democrats to move into county politics after reapportionment. Democratic intervention produced a variety of pressures for a more professional and more active government. On the other hand, Urbana remains dependent on county support, in that the success of downtown redevelopment is related to county decisions about whether to build and where to locate a courthouse-jail complex. Champaign's dependence on the county is less obvious than Urbana's, partly because Champaign has greater resources and more professional administration. However, federal incentives for regional cooperation as well as the hesitant shift to greater activism in the county may result in greater cooperation between Champaign and the county. The relationships are transitional, just as the politics of the county are transitional, and as the chapters on the cities will suggest, the complementary and conflicting pulls which affect the one, affect the other.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 3


5 RPC Master List of A-95 Review.


12 News Gazette, 6 November 1974.

13 News Gazette, 9 September 1976.


17 The development of Lincoln Square will be discussed in Chapter 4.

58


20 Ibid.


22 Deborah Wright, "Regionalism and Local Government, A Case Study," (unpublished manuscript), pp. 16-17.

23 Ibid., pp. 16-18.


26 News Gazette, 29 April 1976.

27 For example, The News Gazette covered the RPC public hearings to obtain community input on the comprehensive plan for Champaign County and reported minimal attendance. See News Gazette, 17, 21, 22 and 24 August 1974.


29 News Gazette, 1 August 1974.

30 Opinion rendered by Champaign Legal Staff, January 6, 1976.

31 News Gazette, 2 October, and 6 November 1973.


34 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, VXXXI (December 15, 1973), No. 50, pp. 3302-3303.

CHAPTER 4

URBANA: THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATS

Introduction

Urbana, the smaller of the cities, experienced what amounts to a political revolution in the fifteen years between 1961 and 1976. A brief list of some visible indicators of political change suggests the scope and direction of the new policy orientations. Control of major city offices and the city council shifted from a small group of local, predominantly Republican businessmen and lawyers to a loose coalition of Democrats, many of whom came from other places to work or study at the university. The Urbana Democrats were "amateurs" in local politics. They tended to be uninterested in career possibilities in politics and entered politics because they believed that political life needed to be upgraded. The most important motivation, perhaps, was that local politics offered an arena where individuals could make a difference. The "amateurs" built networks of friends and neighbors, resurrected a moribund party and in fourteen years achieved majority status.

In the process, "new faces" came to public attention. There was extensive volunteerism; members of the League of Women Voters no longer merely studied urban problems, they ran for the school board or the city council or were appointed to city committees. The Democrats formulated and pushed alternatives to Republican hegemony and policies and stimulated awareness of local problems and options. Party competitiveness brought fun and excitement to local government as well as a new emphasis on the satisfactions of political involvement. Democrats promised a new kind of politics—an energetic government that would be responsive to the needs of citizens and an active force for solving the problems of urban life. Three years after the Democrats won control of the city council and elected a mayor, real changes were made in city administration, but some of excitement dissipated and the question of whether the Democrats altered the fundamental conditions of local politics remained open.
Party competitiveness and the shift in party control brought new faces into city government, but more important for long range prospects, the city began a program of administrative reorganization. In 1962, the League of Women Voters of Champaign County studied financial sources and services of Urbana. The introduction of their report states the following:

When this study began, there was not available a comprehensive report on Urbana's government activities or its financial operations. Offices of the many city officials are in a number of widely separated localities; there are numerous committees within the city council, each of which functions separately to a great extent; service departments initially submit budgets to individual council committees; ... some advisory boards for service within the city have no councilmen as members; audit reports, officially available for public inspection, are prepared, as is proper, by several auditors and no one office or official or auditing firm has a complete set of the reports. In short, it is difficult to get any kind of complete, over-all picture of activities within the city.

Charles Zipprodt, Republican mayor from 1969 to 1973 initiated the turnaround of Urbana's administration by hiring a part-time administrative assistant. During his administration, the position was increased to full-time and the cities of the office were expanded. Richard Franks became Mayor Zipprodt's administrative assistant and he continued to hold the position after the election of Hiram Paley, a Democrat, in 1973. During Paley's administration, Franks' status was upgraded to Administrative Officer. Although the administrative officer serves at the pleasure of the mayor, the new emphasis on professional administration is illustrated by the retention of Franks.

Government style has changed dramatically as the import of administrative reorganization began to be felt. Formal recognition of the change came in 1975 when Urbana was accepted as a member of the International City Management Association (ICMA). A citizen also notices the difference. In contrast to the problems faced by the League of Women Voters in obtaining information; in 1976, a phone call to the administrative officer usually is sufficient to obtain information about budget and services.

Implementation of new administrative norms and standards are visible throughout city hall. Until the 1970s, patronage considerations determined the disposition of jobs. Tentative efforts toward more professional job classifications were begun under Mayor Zipprodt; under the Democrats, a job study was prepared and made operative. Civil service regulations also were reintroduced. Higher echelon positions are advertised in professional journals and new personnel is sought outside city boundaries. The shift has been so complete that city employees sought and won the right to unionize. There are now forty-four members in a local of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

Perhaps the most obvious difference between 1962 and 1976 is the size and cost of city government. Estimated expenditures for the fiscal year, May, 1962 to April 30, 1963, including expenditures for police and fire departments, totaled $586,500. In June 1976, the city council debated the budget for fiscal year, 1977, estimated at $3,730,000, a 7.4 percent increase from the 1976 fiscal year. Inflation is a factor in the increase, but its magnitude suggests the enlarged scope of government activity. Budget management has become a necessity. City staff has expanded. New responsibilities have been accepted; a human relations officer and an arborist have joined the municipal work force. There is more stringent enforcement of city codes and zoning ordinances. In sum, Urbana appears to have entered the twentieth century of municipal administration in a few short, hectic years.

However, as conservatives noted long ago, the more things change, the more they remain the same. The changes in Urbana are extensive, but there are indications that they are surface changes. Administrative reorganization provides tools, the prerequisites for an energetic government. However, better tools may be used to upgrade existing services rather than as the wedge to expand services and undertake new responsibilities. In Urbana, despite Democratic promises and the expectations of their constituents,
increased administrative competence did not alter dramatically the outputs of government. An examination of the constraints which slowed and modified proposed policy reorientations will be presented in order to obtain a fuller understanding of the complexities of Urbana politics.

In the first place, the formal structure of Urbana's government has not been altered since the 1860s. In contrast, Champaign has experimented with its form of government: in 1958, the city manager form was adopted and in 1972, the representative structure was modified from at large to three council members elected at large and five members elected from districts. Champaign, however, did not tamper with non-partisan elections. Although attempts were made to change Urbana's mayor from a half to full-time position, the mayor remains half-time. The city council was composed of fourteen aldermen, two from each of seven wards, and seven were elected every two years by partisan ballot. In theory, Urbana has a weak mayor form of government; in practice, Urbana has had strong mayors who assumed effective control of city government. In addition, creation of an administrative officer and greater centralization of city administration has enhanced the mayor's power.

Although Democratic council members strongly supported administrative reorganization, the mayor provided the main impetus and received the most benefit. Mayor Paley may have decided that the support of a competent municipal staff would be the substitute for the consensus of the past, and the authority that Republican mayors once possessed or a professional administration may have appeared to be the necessary prerequisite for achieving Democratic objectives. Whatever the reasons, the mayor has provided the main push, and administrative innovation rests on a shaky foundation--the support of the incumbent mayor. Given the increased costs of government and the prospect of budget deficits, a different incumbent could stress different priorities, and reduce the role of administrative reorganization in expanding the scope and activities of government.

A more important constraint on innovation is financial. Raising taxes is always politically difficult and Urbana is primarily a residential community. It has a smaller tax base and commercial base than Champaign, and because its population is under 50,000, it receives less state aid for schools. The largest employer in Champaign-Urbana is the university, a non-taxable institution. Magnavox had a plant in Urbana, which in 1968, employed 1,500 persons. The plant was closed in the early 1970s and no operation of comparable size has taken its place. During the 1940s and 1950s Champaign developed its commercial base, as Urbana's development lagged. In the early 1960s, it was estimated that only between 10 and 20 percent of the area's business was done in Urbana. The construction of an enclosed shopping mall, Lincoln Square, dramatically changed the face and the tax collections of Urbana. Two years after Lincoln Square opened, a study showed that sales tax revenues allocated to the city of Urbana had risen between 30 and 48 percent.

The construction of Lincoln Square temporarily eased the problem of an adequate tax base for Urbana. It did not resolve the problem because further development in the area surrounding Lincoln Square did not take place. In 1975, the lack of a strong downtown and of an adequate tax base again became of central concern to city officials. A new shopping center, Market Place, just north of Champaign but annexed to the city, was expected to draw off approximately 20 percent of the business of Lincoln Square. Commercial development in Champaign and the pressure from Market Place increased the need for Urbana officials to find some means to offset the potential loss of revenue.

Lack of money is a major obstacle to increased government activity as well as the source of a continuing debate over how the city's limited resources should be allocated. Population has grown steadily since the 1940s and the city was faced with the tremendous task of providing streets, roads, lighting, sanitation, storm sewers, schools and recreational facilities, without sufficient tax money to support development. Inadequate city supervision of the provision of facilities such as sewers and sidewalks in the housing developments built in the 1950s and early 1960s added to the problems of maintenance in the 1970s. Past governmental inaction and contemporary inflation have drastically increased the costs of pro-

* In 1981, Urbana changed to one alderman per ward.
viding an urban infrastructure. Yet citizens expect such amenities and the increased cost of providing them is likely to reduce the options of present and future city governments.

There are also cultural constraints which reduce the options of officials. Urbana politics offer many illustrations of the pervasiveness of the norms of individualistic culture.

Public officials in the individualistic political culture, committed to 'giving the public what it wants,' are not normally willing to initiate new programs or open up new government activity on their own initiative. They will do so when they perceive an overwhelming demand for them to act, but only then.

Democratic officeholders were willing to take the initiative and to push for an expanded role for government, but the push for programs aimed at the betterment of diverse components of the community generated conflict and alienated some segments of the public. Some citizens were afraid of higher taxes, others feared the effects of increased government regulation on economic growth, while others genuinely feared that government activity would adversely affect individual liberty. Democratic proposals met resistance (especially apparent in the conflict over the construction of a new swimming pool), which was based on and drew support from the norms of individualistic culture, but was not confined to Urbana old-timers. A percentage of the nominally Democratic constituency rejected the need for a new pool as well as the reliance on city planners and urban experts. Chapters 4 and 5 will examine in detail this interplay between cultural norms and political response in connection with the issues that faced the Democrats after they became the majority party in 1973.

This chapter examines the rise of the Democrats and the decline in Republican fortunes. Democratic success was built on the enthusiasm of amateurs who intensively canvassed neighborhoods and stressed local concerns. The task of mobilizing the public was easier in Urbana than Champaign because the ward structure of representation made intensive campaigning feasible and profitable. Local election results have only too often demonstrated the apathy of citizens, but the years of party competitiveness in Urbana (1965 to 1973) produced record turnouts of voters every two years, regardless of whether there was a mayoral contest. The presentation of alternatives, the attention to local concerns, and the ringing of doorbells made politics important to more citizens and increased participation. But the opportunities of opposition are different from the responsibilities of government. Whether and to what extent the values developed in opposition, and introduced into local politics by relative newcomers, were useful in shaping new political norms is examined in this chapter. The three chapters on Urbana seek to determine whether and in what ways the contours of politics were shaped and altered by the interjection of new people, values, and purposes into an ongoing political process.

The Rise of the Democrats

The magnitude of political change in Urbana is conveyed by a sketch of the fortunes of the Democratic party. H. I. Green, a Republican lawyer, exercised a high level of control in Champaign, Urbana and the county from the mid-1920s to 1953. Green combined his local interests, connections with the railroads, and statewide political ties to create a fiefdom. He co-opted the business oligarchy, the leading local bank and a bipartisan coalition of downtown merchants and lawyers, and literally ran Urbana from his hip pocket. When Green died, the long standing association of lawyers, local bankers and businessmen resumed their "overlordship" in Urbana. However, in the late 1950s, the university expanded rapidly and a group of new residents with strong national Democratic leanings began to seek means to revive the local Democratic party.

In 1959, the Democrats were a "permanent minority" with all the attributes of the status. The county Democratic chairman, Leo Pfeffer, who was also the lone Democratic representative from the district in the state legislature, was known neither for his leadership abilities nor for his devotion to national Democratic leaders or policies. In effect, he was the caretaker of a moribund party in a predominantly Republican county. At that time, minority representation at the state level was assured by the peculiarities of election in Illinois. Each district elected three representatives to the Illinois General Assembly
(the lower house of the legislature). The majority party traditionally ran two candidates and the minority ran one. Since a voter could give three votes to one candidate, and since only three candidates ran for three offices, there was always minority representative from the district. In Champaign County, the lone Democrat was as likely as not to reflect predominant Republican attitudes and support Republican policies rather than to offer alternatives.9

On the municipal level, the Democrats were also at a distinct disadvantage. In partisan elections in Urbana, they were unable to field a full slate of candidates in the primaries, and depended on write-in campaigns to obtain candidates for the general elections. The lack of money and organization in the primaries was also apparent in the general elections; volunteers activated by the candidates did the work. Democrats won local office in the 1930s, but by the 1940s, Republican "normalcy" had been reestablished. In 1947, one Democratic alderman was elected; in 1955, a Democrat was elected, but he was a graduate student who left the area before his term was completed. By 1956, there were no Democratic officeholders in Urbana.9

Before 1960, Democratic strength came primarily from "old residents" generally concentrated in small towns and rural areas and a few Urbana precincts. The "recent arrivals" were connected with the university and lived in transient housing areas near the university and in medium-priced subdivisions which developed to accommodate the influx of students and faculty during the 1950s.10 Pfeffer, the representative of the "old residents," reached a modus vivendi with his Republican counterparts and his "empire" was based on patronage.

The "recent arrivals" brought Democratic affiliations from other from other parts of the country and their political orientation tended to be "liberal." The new Democrats were aware of the organizational deficiencies of the local party and concentrated on rebuilding the party. In the early 1960s their goals were pragmatic: two candidates for the Illinois General Assembly and a regular slate of candidates in the Urbana elections.

A nucleus of "recent arrivals" began the work of reviving the party in January 1959, and agreed on a slate of write-in candidates for the February primary. They worked together through one general election campaign and one Democratic alderman was elected by five votes.11 The cohesion of the nucleus was reinforced during the 1960 presidential campaign and by the appointment of C. G. Pelekoudas as chairman of the Cunningham Township Democratic Committee. The appointment of a Democratic activist to a leadership position gave the insurgents the opportunity to prod the regular Democrats and to generate interest and enthusiasm between election campaigns. The insurgents also began to hold regular meetings and two weeks after the 1960 presidential election, the Urbana committeemen met to prepare for the 1961 municipal elections. An all-out effort to field a full slate of candidates in the primary instead of nominating candidates by write-in votes would demonstrate commitment, organization, strength and momentum. Candidates were found for every municipal office except City Treasurer and Police Magistrate, but one aldermanic candidate who did not meet residence requirements, was removed from the ballot.12

After the primary, candidates and committeemen agreed on a party platform, a symbol of a new cohesiveness. The platform was a group effort which emphasized local issues: adequate zoning, the introduction of professional administration, better maintenance, lights and sewers, and more publicity for municipal government in order to insure a more knowledgeable citizenry.13

The insurgents collected $400.00 to fund the 1961 campaign. Although this sum appears barely adequate to run seven aldermanic campaigns and a mayoral campaign, it was many times larger than the $30.00 they had collected for the 1959 campaign.14 Two Democratic aldermen were elected in 1961, to make a total of three Democrats on the city council. It appeared to be a great victory.

From this beginning, the Democrats became the majority party in Urbana. In 1965, three more Democrats were elected and the Democrats had a total of four aldermen and one alderwoman on the council.15 In 1965, although Republican Stanley Weaver was elected to an unprecedented third term as mayor, Paul Hursey, a Democrat, became the first black to be

* In 1981, Illinois began to use single member districts in the General Assembly.
elected to the city council. Grass roots activity, the ringing of doorbells and candidate efforts to personally reach the voters produced a record turnout of 5,239 citizens or 50 percent of registered voters at the polls. However, the composition of the city council remained unchanged at nine Republicans and five Democrats. In 1967, Jeanne Marie Wyld achieved the first Democratic win in the Seventh Ward and the composition of the council was six Democrats and eight Republicans. In the 1969 mayoral and council elections, a record total vote of 6,185 ballots were cast. Charles Zipprodt, the Republican, defeated Jeanne Marie Wyld in a close contest for mayor and the composition of the council remained at eight Republicans and six Democrats. In 1971, 42 percent of 11,472 registered voters cast ballots, a record in a non-mayoral year. In the Sixth Ward, 922 voters cast ballots and set a new record, 61 percent of 1,507 registered voters. The composition of the new council was seven Republicans and seven Democrats, and the Republicans were disturbed. Joe Phebus, Republican alderman from the Fifth Ward attributed Republican losses to deficiencies in the party organization and leadership. He advocated the removal of 90 percent of the incumbent Republican committeemen, who, he claimed, were of no help in the election campaign.

The 1973 election crowned Democratic efforts with success. Again the turnout was high, 7,083 persons or 41 percent of the registered voters cast ballots, and the Democrats elected a mayor, a city treasurer and won four of the seven council seats. One Independent was elected and the Republicans won two seats. The composition of the new city council was eight Democrats, one Independent and five Republicans.

Democratic dominance was confirmed in the 1975 election when the Republicans, for the first time in the history of Urbana, failed to field a full slate of candidates. However, the turnout for this election was small and only 3,000 voters, or 18 percent of the registered voters, cast ballots. The end of the era of genuine party competitiveness was marked by a significant decline in citizen interest and participation.

The composition of the new council was eight Democrats, two Independents and four Republicans. The figures suggest a dominant Democratic party but there were signs of Democratic difficulties, for example, the party became less cohesive, and low turnouts usually work against Democratic candidates. The election in the Seventh Ward was very close and the losing Republican claimed that his strong run, despite a minimal campaign, was due to dissatisfaction with the Democrats.

Democratic success was attributable in large measure to the grass roots activity of candidates and their supporters, who intensively worked the precincts and convinced record numbers of voters to cast ballots. Democratic strength increased in the county when the County Board was reapportioned to conform with the principle of one-man, one-vote because the new population was concentrated primarily in the urban areas. In Urbana, the switch to the Democrats occurred in the middle 1960s as more academic families settled in Urbana, and it became increasingly respectable to vote Democratic in the primaries and general elections.

The Democrats, from small beginnings, developed a viable organization with regular meetings and yearly fund raising events. In 1962, reform Democrats for the first time openly challenged Leo Pfeffer, the incumbent county chairman. They concentrated on precinct work and the primary elections. The primary of 1962 was hotly contested; candidates filed for committeemen in all but one Cunningham Township (Cunningham Township is contiguous with the city of Urbana) precinct, and in all but two city of Champaign precincts. Candidates for committeemen also filed in all precincts outside the city. The challenge to Pfeffer and the heightened political activity it represented signaled the birth of a Democratic party which could present alternatives to Republican dominance. The tactics of intensively working the precincts and campaigning on issues of local concern became the trademark of a resurgent party.

After the primary, the insurgents prepared for the coming county convention. The reformers decided to introduce party-strengthening resolutions such as a call for frequent party meetings and regular procedures for awarding patronage, instead of directly challenging Pfeffer, who was in firm control of the convention that convened on April 23, 1962. Pfeffer agreed to the resolution concerning frequent party meetings, and it was passed by a voice vote. On the patronage resolution, when a voice vote was taken, it
appeared that the ayes had it, but Pfeffer ruled for the nays. Nevertheless, the reformers were well satisfied; Pfeffer had made a maximum effort to ward off the suspected challenge, and his ineptness had been demonstrated to the uncommitted. The Democratic party was a minority; it was weak and split, but it was split between two recognizable factions. The reformers had made their point, they had cohesion and momentum and the incentive to persist in challenging the regulars.

Pfeffer remained as state representative and county chairman until 1966, when two Democrats, Pfeffer and Paul Stone, ran for state representative. It was assumed that Stone would be defeated and Pfeffer would remain in control. However, Stone won the seat and Pfeffer's control of the local party organization was shaken. In 1968, Pfeffer did not file for precinct committeeman, which automatically eliminated him from consideration as county chairman. John J. McHale ran as the regular candidate against Arthur Slade, the reform candidate, and won by a small margin. In 1970, Harry Tiebout, a professor and long-time reform activist ran against McHale and won. In 1972, the remnants of the regulars mounted a challenge to Tiebout but he won handily. By 1974, the metamorphosis of the Democrats was complete; Tiebout was the unanimous choice for county chairman.

Student Activism

The success of the Democratic reformers in the 1960s is a vivid contrast to the efforts of the student left to effect reform in local politics in the 1970s. Although the University of Illinois was not at the hub of student upheavals, there were stirrings in the late 1960s and student demonstrations in 1970 and 1971. Student activists turned to local politics and conditions seemed especially propitious in Champaign and Urbana. Students were split between the cities, they were concentrated in housing near the university and their numbers could translate into representatives on each city council. In Urbana, the student vote appeared especially significant since aldermen were elected in wards and two wards had heavy student concentrations. Champaign's at-large elections did not provide the same opportunities, but after Champaign adopted a modified district plan of representation, a student representative was elected to the city council.

The first objective of the student movement was to register the new voters locally, but local officials were reluctant to accommodate the students. Dennis Bing, Champaign County Clerk and a Republican, failed to provide a mobile registration unit in the campus area and when long lines formed at the court house, he refused to hire deputy registrars.

A Coalition for Voter Registration, composed of members of the student left and political moderates from such groups as the League of Women Voters, was quickly formed to lead the fight to register students locally. By January 13, 1973, the last day to register to vote in the municipal primary, 7,000 university students were registered.

The figures confirmed the fears of some local politicians and raised the hopes of others. Student votes helped Democratic candidates in the 1972 general election but turnout in a presidential election is always larger than in local elections. In early 1973, the impact of the student vote was a matter for speculation. The local Republican organization maintained an attitude of cautious hostility to student voters; Democrats were cautiously hopeful of winning the support of the newly enfranchised students.

Democrats sought student candidates for the First and Second Wards in Urbana and the student movement also sought candidates to run in these wards. The sheer mechanics of qualifying as a candidate discouraged some potential student candidates, and in the 1973 primary, Susan Bekenstein was the only full-time undergraduate to run the gauntlet. She was unopposed for the Democratic nomination in the First Ward. Ronald Knecht, a part-time graduate student, ran unopposed in the Second Ward for the Democratic nomination. The First and Second Wards were conceded by all to be student wards; if the student movement was to establish itself as a force for social change in Urbana, these wards had to serve as the base.

The primary turnout was light, and only 124 voters came to the polls in the First and Second Wards. In the general election, Bekenstein won a close race, 216 to 200 with the Republican candidate coming in third with 176 votes. In the Second Ward, Independent John Peterson, defeated Democrat Ronald Knecht. With a turnout of 36 percent, Peterson won a
close race, 236 to 224, and the Republican was a poor third with 65 votes.27

The student candidates stressed social issues, allocation of revenue sharing funds, housing codes and health insurance. An Independent candidate wanted to use revenue sharing money to construct a recycling plant for glass and metal. Democrat Bekenstein wanted revenue sharing money applied to social programs. Canvassing was a tactic used by both candidates, but as the Independent complained, "when you actually talk to them, you see that people don't have a lot of definite ideas of what they really want."28 There in a nutshell was the weak underside of democratic politics, the difficulting of defining and articulating what people want from government. In the campaign the student candidates made a conscientious effort to educate and mobilize the electorate. The response was not encouraging; the light turnout in the student wards suggests student apathy towards local problems. The inability to mobilize large numbers of new constituents in support of programs directed at effecting social change remains a major obstacle to achievement of the objectives of the student movement.

Bekenstein and Peterson, elected to the city council in 1973, were committed to social change, but lacked the political resources to attack the problems head-on. Peterson strongly attacked the priorities in the city budget, objecting for example to the use of revenue sharing funds to purchase a new aerial fire truck. He suggested financing the truck by a tax on the corporations that owned the small number of high-rise buildings in the area, but received little support from other council members. Peterson prodded the council to allocate $10,000 from revenue sharing funds to community organizations and worked for the adoption of a proposal to require the inspection of all rental housing for city code violations,29 an issue of obvious concern to his constituents. The proposal must have seemed ironic to city officials; the code enforcement department has had the largest personnel increase in the past seven years and a concerted effort has been made to apply city codes more stringently. In fact, the tighter controls have resulted in some citizen resentment of the department and perhaps of the Democratic majority.

Susan Bekenstein ran and won as a Democrat but was viewed as sympathetic by the student left. Bekenstein was a conscientious council member, but she played a moderate role and did not dramatize the proposals dear to activists' hearts. The election of students to the city council had less impact than was originally feared or anticipated. One student put it this way "the current community superstructure, bureaucracy, minority representation, and an inability to legislate traditionally have caused the strategy (entrance into local politics) to produce only token and short-range changes."30

This assessment of the potential for change is somewhat overdrawn but the constraints on innovation are real and as the activists discovered, it is unrealistic to expect social change overnight. In theory, aldermen have decision making-power; in practice they are limited by their tangential involvement with the day to day operation of city government. Some council members complained that the administration failed to provide adequate information on proposals. The inference was that it was an administration ploy to limit council power. The perception may be correct, but it hides a genuine problem, how much information and of what type should be prepared by the administration. The council obviously neither needs nor wants trivia, such as duplicate engineering plans illustrating single lots that are the subject of volunteer annexation petitions. If all available information was presented to the council, it could be as effectively neutralized as by the withholding of information. To protect itself, the council could specify what kinds of information it needed, but this strategy implies knowledge of the specific problem, before the council has received information. The strategy also requires a degree of council cohesiveness which has not been apparent. For these and other reasons which will be discussed below, the individual council member often finds that office merely provides a forum to publicize and dramatize particular issues and concerns. The individual council member can delay council action or, in coalition with others, can obstruct administration proposals, but the opportunity to realize innovative policies remains strictly limited.

One example of the pattern is the conflict in 1975 over whether Urbana should accept federal funding available from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) for a Computer Aided Dispatch System for the police. In order to qualify for the grant, the cooperation of the three police forces in the area,
Champaign, Urbana and the University of Illinois was required. When the project was discussed at an Urbana council meeting, John Peterson raised questions as to the kinds, amount, and availability of the collected information as well as the potential abuse of information. The police forces of Champaign and the University of Illinois had obtained the authority to participate, but the Urbana City Council, on May 20, deferred action on the proposal. On June 2, though Peterson continued to oppose the project, Urbana agreed to participate. Mayor Paley, however, instructed the council’s Public Safety Commission to oversee the system’s operation in an effort to minimize the possibility of abuse. Peterson, in this instance, served as a gadfly to the council, and found sufficient support to delay and modify results. But the role is easily stereotyped, i.e. the activist has his say, and it is discounted by other council members who then dispose of the issue in predictable fashion.

Reform Democrats on the City Council in the 1960s often acted as gadflies to the Republicans but their activity was part of the strategy to become the majority party in Urbana. The activists of the 1970s could have no such expectations. Peterson was joined by a second independent, elected in 1975 from the Second Ward. However the activists who received the greatest boost from the election in 1975 of Bernadine Stake, a Democrat. Stake advocated neighborhood preservation and stringent environmental controls and became a formidable opponent of some of Mayor Paley’s policies.

The elections of 1975 seemed to give the Democrats a secure majority on the City Council, but policy conflicts and personal resentments shattered the cohesiveness of the Democrats. Council meetings, which had been long and argumentative when the Democrats and Republicans were evenly balanced, became if possible, longer and more argumentative. Individual Democrats as well as Independents insisted on the correctness of their policy orientations and the four Republicans joined in the fracas. One major disagreement between the administration and some council members centered on the lack of information furnished council members by the administration.

The faint outlines of an opposition coalition, composed of the Independents, one or two Republicans and one or two Democrats emerged. The coalition was tentative and transitory in nature, but it was able at times to embarrass the mayor. A major flare-up occurred during the discussion of the budget for fiscal 1977. During several study sessions, seventeen amendments, ranging from the allocation of additional revenue sharing funds to social service agencies, to reducing the allocations for two police programs, were rejected by the council majority. When the budget came to the council for approval, although a majority were in support, there wasn’t a sufficient majority for passage. Eight votes were needed; three council members were absent and two Independents, one Republican and two Democrats, including Bernadine Stake voted no. The administration had only seven votes. The dissidents justified their votes by claiming that they had had no input. Stake declared that the budget did not set “the kind of policy I want set for the coming year.” Peterson claimed that “this is the first time that the city council—in my three years here—has taken an effective stand against the administration.”

The feeling of effectiveness did not endure for long. Two days later, at a special council meeting the budget was approved by an eight to four vote. The two dissident Democrats remained firm and each read a statement defending the negative vote. The absence of one independent reduced the negative votes from 5 to 4, but once Mayor Paley had the additional vote, the dissidents were powerless to stop passage. Again the limitations on activist ability to make policy are apparent; they can raise questions, prolong the length of council meetings and delay action. They have a kind of of veto power in that they can raise the cost of decision making, but their ability to act positively remains limited.

Student interests and activity focused on improving the community and strengthened the shift to the “moralistic political culture” which the reform Democrats sought to introduce into Urbana politics. "Politics, to the moralistic political culture, is considered one of the great activities of man in his search for a good society—a struggle for power, it is true, but also an effort to exercise power for the pursuit of justice in public affairs for the betterment of the commonwealth." Reform Democrats rose to majority status by stressing the traditional issues of good government; they were committed to improve city services and to making Urbana a better place to live.
They stressed the importance of government exercise of power in order to secure a more equitable share for all segments of the community. But the cost of proposed reforms was high; street improvement and sewer replacements cost money as does urban renewal. When Urbana was ready politically to tap the federal government for funds for such projects, federal funds were drying up. City officials, seeking to honor their promises, felt compelled to re-emphasize local resources as the primary source of funds for new governmental activities. Downtown redevelopment and the attraction of new industrial and commercial ventures again appeared to be the key to future development. The official assessment of the most pressing problems facing Urbana has diminished the possibility of an alliance between the mayor and his supporters on the City Council, and student activists and Democratic dissidents.

The significance of student voters as a force in Urbana politics, in fact, may be less than this analysis suggests. Student indifference to local politics makes it unlikely that the Democratic administration and council majority will make great efforts to attract student voters. The students are concentrated in the First and Second Wards and the First Ward has continued to elect Democrats. In the 1975 non-mayoral election, 38 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots in contrast to the 42 percent that voted in the previous non-mayoral election in 1971. In the student wards turnout was exceptionally light. In the First Ward, a Democrat was elected by 106 to 84 votes. In the Second Ward, an Independent was elected with 64 votes. The Democrat had 44 votes and the Republican, Myron Rose, had 37 votes.

Student indifference seems likely to further blunt the activist push for social change. In some respects, the concerns pushed by the dissidents appear esoteric in the heartland of America. The activists may be correct; government ought not to subsidize business and commercial interests; it ought to promote the interest of consumers and so on. But Urbana officials face more immediate problems and tend to see the solutions of these problems in terms of stimulating economic expansion to enlarge the tax base and increase city revenues. The difference in perspective hinders communication and lessens the opportunities for moderate Democrats and student activists to work together for social change.

The thrust for change is also burdened by the transitoriness of student participation. For example, local politicians have often and publicly stated their fears that student participation in referendums would commit the city to extravagant projects to be paid for by the more permanent residents. Such an eventuality has not come to pass, students have not voted in local referendums in large numbers, but local politicians continue to deplore the prospect. The result is to increase the stereotyping of activist proposals and to make it easier for the public to dismiss such proposals as irresponsible.

However, the greatest obstacle to student effectiveness remains the lack of a solid organizational base. The student movement never developed an institutional base in Champaign-Urbana, in part because it denigrated the need for such a base. In contrast, the reform Democrats in the early 1960s concentrated on establishing an institutional base which provided regular interaction and a forum from which to expound on their positions. The base nurtured and strengthened a committed nucleus which had the kind of enthusiasm that can take incremental gains and transform them into springboards for the next gain. The Democrats worked to gain control of their party, and they achieved this goal over a period of ten years by small incremental steps. In 1962, the reformers, if judged by the usual standards of politics, lost. Pfeffer demonstrated his complete control of the party convention. But the reformers had an organization; a nucleus of committed persons plus a resolution which mandated regular meetings gave the reformers the wedge they needed to transform the Democratic party. To field a full slate of candidates in the Urbana primary and general elections and two candidates for state representative may appear as inconsequential goals, but such goals had practical as well as symbolic consequences. Practically, they increased Democratic activity; Democrats were suddenly ringing doorbells that had not been rung before. Activity generated enthusiasm and enthusiasm generated more activity. The reformers livened up the political process with their concern and the voters responded by increased participation in municipal elections. The meaning of reform activity was also clear: a viable alternative to Republican domination was offered. The reformers could be content with small victories; time and momentum were on their side. Democratic candidates were
doing well in Urbana and prospects were improving in the county.

The reformers gained control of the county chairmanship in 1970. Some regulars moved to the Republicans, some dropped political activity but most remained within the party. The slow growth of reform strength appeared at first to enhance the cohesiveness of Democratic officeholders. When the Democrats were a minority on the City Council, Democratic aldermen caucused regularly to debate and discuss issues before the council. Party interest and activity was also high in this period. The Champaign County Democratic Central Committee sent a monthly newsletter to registered Democrats, it also met regularly and attendance ranged from 30 to 50 people.

It is ironic that at present, when the seeds of party factionalism are sprouting again, the party organization continues to flourish. Attendance at central committee meetings remains relatively high, even in non-election years, regular fund raising events have become a tradition and the newsletter continues to be sent every month. In 1975 and 1976, a period when the public opinion polls showed a marked decline in party allegiance, the Democrats ambitiously embarked on plans to strengthen the local organization. A permanent office was opened, to be run by a permanent, paid, full-time staff person, supported at least in theory, by regular contributions from registered party members. Whether this buttressing of the party organization can offset the increasing disarray of Democratic officeholders remains an open question.

Republican Decline

As the Democrats slowly edged their way to majority status in Urbana, the Republicans adhered to traditional practices and preconceptions about local politics. However, the election of 1969 shook Republican complacency; Charles Zipprodt was elected mayor in a record turnout (6,185 votes) but the Republicans held only eight of the fourteen council seats. Republicans began to criticize the leadership or lack thereof furnished by Republican County Chairman Jack Martin. Martin was an old-timer, he was secretary of the central committee from 1936 to 1946 and then held the office of county chairman. During his tenure, there were few opportunities for rank and file participation; meetings were held once in two years to elect the county chairman; the financial resources of the central committee were a closely guarded secret; individual candidates sought funds for their campaigns on their own and campaign financing was a whimsical, hit and miss type of transaction. This one-man organization had been the model of Republican politics throughout the years of Henry I. Green's rule and was quite satisfactory during those years. The Republican nomination was a gift to the candidate which guaranteed election.

Although Republican dissatisfaction with their competitive position vis-à-vis the Democrats surfaced after the 1969 election, Martin's leadership was not challenged openly until the period immediately preceding the primary in March 1974. Republican prospects looked especially bleak. The Democrats controlled city hall. News about Watergate filled the papers and there was speculation about the effect of the Nixon scandals on the fortunes of local Republicans. Representative Charles W. Clabaugh of Champaign, active in county and state politics since 1937, and a powerful Republican in the Illinois General Assembly, announced his retirement. John Hirschfeld, the other Republican representative, had demonstrated his independence from and indifference toward the local Republican organization, and State Senator Stanley Weaver, three-time mayor of Urbana, faced an exceptionally strong challenge from Joseph Piscotti in his bid for reelection. Candidate prospects were further diminished by the demoralization of the local organization. In the primary election no candidate filed for GOP precinct committeeman in 47 of the county's 126 precincts.

Jack Martin was defeated in the primary in his bid for precinct committeeman and the conflict over his successor reflected the split in the Republican party. Party committeemen were determined to have a vigorous chairman and they won. County Treasurer James M. Skelton was elected to the post.

Revitalization of the party was Skelton's primary objective; he announced that the full central committee of 127 precinct committeemen would meet again in thirty days. An executive committee for "broad geographic and political representation" in party affairs and a "recruitment" committee to seek active workers would be appointed. A full-time party office to be
continually at the service of workers and party members would be established. For the first time in modern history, precinct committeemen would be given information about the financial affairs of the Republican organization. Openness, a flurry of activity, activation of old workers, recruitment of new party members, each was to be an important component of Republican revitalization.

The first election after the change in leadership produced mixed omens for the Republicans. The Republican party appeared to be the biggest loser in the Urbana primary in February 1975; it was unable to field candidates in four of the eight races. Republicans even failed to organize write-in campaigns in these wards and one result was the victory to Myron Rose, 74 years old, an election judge in the Second Ward. Only one vote had been cast in the Republican primary as the 6 p.m. closing time drew near. Rose, at this point wrote his own name in on his ballot. He tied the other write-in candidate, Mrs. Elmer Martin, who declined to run for the council seat. "Let Myron Rose have it," she said. And Myron Rose had it--a Republican nomination to run in the April 1 general election. Only a few years earlier, it meant certain victory. As Myron Rose summed up his nomination, "It wasn't what you would call a whale of a turnout."

The turnout in the primary was light, only about six percent of the registered voters (986 out of 16,499 eligible voters) cast ballots. Turnout for the municipal election was slightly better, 18 percent of the registered voters cast ballots. The 1975 results did little to boost Republican hopes; they held on to two seats in the Fifth and Sixth Wards, generally assumed to be Republican, and ran a close race in the Seventh Ward, 451 to 442, which had been considered Democratic territory. Tales of continuing party disorganization during the campaign were rife.

On the other hand, Timothy Johnson, former Fifth Ward alderman and then vice chairman of the County Republican Committee, believed that the Republicans could again become the majority party in Urbana if they emphasized the mechanics of campaigning: "Hard work, ringing doorbells and dispersing campaign literature as well as the recruitment of attractive candidates were the warp and woof of local political success. Johnson noted the low turnout in the 1975 election and claimed that the Republicans were in a better position than their representation on the Urbana City Council (four aldermen) suggested.

According to Johnson, "If only 29 votes had been taken from Democrats and switched to Republicans in three wards, we would have elected three more aldermen." The city-wide total vote of Republican candidates for alderman was only 125 behind the Democrats and there were no Republican candidates in the Third Ward.

A theory of Republican resurgence in Urbana may or may not be realistic but Democratic prospects for the future are equally uncertain. Attaining majority status has not diminished the problematic status of being Democratic in a traditionally Republican county. Democrats came to office by stressing the need for improvement of the services of local government and by focusing on citizen concerns. They insisted that government had to act as a positive force to correct or ameliorate past inequities. From 1965 to 1973, each election showed a record turnout of voters, as citizens responded to the appeals of energetic candidates and the competition between the parties. After Democrats gained control and Republicans appeared unable to field competitive candidates, voter interest and participation in the 1975 elections dropped dramatically. Although Democrats appeared to have a firm grip on Urbana's government, wielding power takes different skills than seeking power. There is now a question as to whether Democratic accommodation to the responsibilities of power has blunted the reform Democratic objective of changing the contours and content of local politics.

As if in response to this perceived change in motivation, internal Democratic conflict has increased, attributable at least in part to dissatisfaction with the new priorities of governance. The Democrats were less than cohesive when they were the minority party, but they were united in opposition. After the election of a Democratic mayor, the inherent conflict between executive and legislature exacerbated other latent conflicts. Divisions deepened, personality conflicts and divergent perceptions of what was needed to improve the quality of life in Urbana contributed to the estrangement. Constraints on innovation, such as taken-for-granted perceptions and engrained political habits, appeared more formidable to some Democrats than to others and added to the
division. The ineffectiveness of the student move-
ment, and its failure to persuade citizens of the need
to alter either the processes or the priorities of
local politics, has further separated advocates of a
more activist government from their fellow citizens.

The inability of Republicans to modernize, their
long adherence to an oligarchic party structure, as
well as their failure to organize the precincts, were
as significant components in Democratic success as the
changing population of Urbana or the enthusiasm and
activity of reform Democrats. Therefore, the depth
and durability of the shift in party allegiance is an
open question. The answer is dependent on the success
of the new Republican initiatives and on citizen per-
ception of the character and quality of Democratic
performance.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1 Champaign County League of Women Voters,
Urbana Government: Financial Structure and Service

2 Ibid., pp. 23-24.


4 Sheldon J. Plager and Joel F. Handler, "The
Politics of Planning for Urban Redevelopment: Strate-
gies in the Manipulation of Public Law." Wisconsin

5 Marilyn Flynn and A. Alexander, "Preliminary
Report on The Indigenous Social Change Process in
Champaign County, Illinois" (unpublished manuscript),

6 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

7 Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie,
p. 261.

8 Ibid., pp. 208-209.

9 Lois Pelekoudas, "Minority Party Activity in a
Central Illinois Political Community: Champaign-
Urbana, 1956-1962" (unpublished manuscript),

10 Ibid., p. 45.

11 Ibid., p. 27.

12 Ibid., p. 29.

13 Ibid., pp. 29-31.

14 Ibid., pp. 27, 32.

15 News Gazette, 3 April 1963.

16 News Gazette, 7 April 1965.

17 News Gazette, 5 April 1967.
18 News Gazette, 2 April 1969.
19 News Gazette, 7 April 1971.
20 News Gazette, 4 April 1973
21 News Gazette, 2 April 1975.
23 Ibid., p. 35.
24 Ibid., pp. 61-63.
26 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
30 Ibid., p. 35.
31 News Gazette, 19 May, 21 May and 3 June 1975.
35 Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, p. 262.
36 News Gazette, 2 April 1975.
37 News Gazette, 2 April 1969.
38 News Gazette, 2 April 1974.
41 News Gazette, 2 April 1975.
42 News Gazette, 6 April 1975.
CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

Introduction

During the years of opposition, the Democrats advocated an enlarged role for government, more attention to minority needs, and more adequate city services for the citizens of Urbana. When the Democrats gained control of city government expectations were high; an enlightened city government, adhering to liberal precepts, would put professionals to work on the problems of Urbana. The realities of Democratic governance blighted some of these expectations. The problems of the city were more complex; the constraints, especially financial, on innovative action were more severe; and the bias against concerted government action generated by the norms of "individualistic political culture" was more pervasive than anticipated.

This chapter surveys the costs of the new professionalism in municipal administration and presents a brief sketch of the city's financial resources, including federal allocations as an illustration of the constraints on action. Governmental effectiveness is dependent in large measure on an administration's ability to provide needed services, yet professionalization of administration is an important factor in increased municipal costs. Rising costs are part of the gap between citizens' expectations and the ability of government to devise innovative remedies for urban problems. In addition, in Urbana, democratic divisiveness and the difficulty of welding diverse perceptions of urban needs and problems into a viable, comprehensive list of priorities for future development further constrained the impetus for change. The interplay between these factors as well as their relationship to governmental effectiveness is discussed in conjunction with a survey of some major redevelopment undertakings.

The civil service system, where employees are chosen by merit and are secure from the vagaries of politics or the need to demonstrate political allegiance, has long been a tenet of reform movements. Institution of civil service procedures has often been
presented as the core achievement of reform, but as will be shown below, the implementation of civil service procedure in Urbana inhibited the latitude of city officials by fixing the overhead costs of city services. The relationship of cost and benefit became visible as the Democrats took office, and it became the task of the Democratic administration to adjust not only to the consequences of civil service but also to unionization.

Professionalization of Municipal Administration

The citizens of Urbana, in a referendum in April 1932, voted to implement a civil service personnel system. Over the years, except for fire and police personnel, the existence of the regulations gradually were forgotten, and city employment was primarily a matter of patronage. However, from 1932 until the 1970s the stakes were small; in 1968, the city employed only eighty-eight people including fire and police personnel. During Mayor Zipprodt's term, 1969 to 1973, an enterprising reporter for the News Gazette discovered the "lost" civil service regulations and published a story. The Civil Service Commission then adopted a set of procedures which would apply civil service rules uniformly to all city employees, and requested a classification plan to establish job descriptions for all employees. Between 1971 and July 1973, twelve job descriptions were adopted by the commission, and attempts were made to modify the longevity pay plan for city employees and to introduce a merit pay plan. The longevity plan, which was adopted in 1967, reduced salaries of new workers in order to pay older workers ever increasing salaries. In 1972, a proposal to limit longevity pay was considered but no action was taken.

In July 1973, the new Democratic administration formally undertook the task of preparing current job descriptions and a comprehensive classification and pay plan. They hired Charles Maxey, a graduate student and personnel analyst, to prepare the plan. Maxey's report was completed in November 1973. It provided a comprehensive classification plan and a new pay scale, which put a ceiling on longevity pay, and introduced a merit pay plan.

The Maxey Report was adopted by the city council but was not well received by city employees, especially fire department personnel. Adoption probably added impetus to the drive for unionization, and the firemen were at the head of the line asking for recognition. On February 18, 1974, the City Council unanimously approved a resolution granting city employees collective bargaining rights. The resolution contained particulars as to the composition of the bargaining unit, which generated further conflict, and negotiations deadlocked over who should be included in the bargaining unit. The deadlock continued during the months of April and May 1974 and the firemen threatened a strike. Some twenty firemen engaged in informational picketing and the mayor announced that he was going to seek a labor mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. On May 22, tentative agreement was reached on the composition of the bargaining unit.1

The drama was over; the local TV news would focus on other problems but the costs of city government and the constraints on the options of elected officials would increase. Costs increased by the greater expense of individual salaries and by the increase in the number of city personnel; city employees increased from 88 in 1968 to 190 in 1975. The operating budget for fiscal 1976 included raises for union personnel averaging 12 percent, while non-union personnel received about 10 percent. Salaries alone were estimated at approximately 70 percent of a record budget of $3,246,207. During the debates over the fiscal 1977 budget, union employees demanded large increases and better benefits to offset increases in the cost of living and to maintain a competitive position vis-a-vis Champaign.2 The administration held the line at raises of approximately 5 percent, and union members engaged in information picketing. There was speculation about increased defection of patrolmen to the Champaign police force and a mediator was requested.3 Union pressure on an administration that claimed it had no leeway to increase salaries was evidence of the new problems of municipal government. One high-ranking city official claimed that the new facts of city employment (the costs, the application of affirmative action guidelines, the consequences of the Maxey Report and the unionization of city employees) have reduced administration flexibility and ability to deal innovatively with urban problems.

The other side of the coin is the prospect of securing more competent municipal staff. Various municipal reform movements have worked for the employ-
ment of competent personnel, regardless of political affiliation and changes in the affiliation of elected superiors. The Democratic mayor retained the services of the previous administration's City Attorney and administrative assistant and devolved new responsibilities on the latter. The administration utilized its options with regard to other appointed positions. The Director of Public Works, head of the largest city department with a budget of $860,405 in 1975-1976, was dismissed in June 1975, and a new set of guidelines and evaluation procedures to improve the productivity of city workers was instituted. The move signifies a commitment to merit but the push to secure increased productivity may lead to increased report making and additional pressure on the time of supervisory personnel, and may become obstacle to improved services. The transformation of Urbana personnel policies is a continuing process whose outcomes will be shaped by the complex of factors described above.

Resources--Local and Federal

The major constraint on local action is financial and the question is, how--given the rising costs of city government--can city services be maintained, let alone improved or extended. Urbana has lagged for years behind Champaign in sales tax receipts. The study, cited above, conducted by the League of Women Voters, indicated that despite a population increase in Urbana, retail sales tax receipts declined from 1960 to 1962. The conclusion "that residents were doing an increased proportion of their shopping outside of Urbana" was inevitable. The study also compared Champaign and Urbana's revenue from sales tax with that of cities of comparable size.

Their data for Urbana are reproduced as Table 5.1.

The study claimed that "Urbana has not approached the potential shopping volume possible in cities under 30,000, Champaign in contrast, received sales tax revenue in 1960 in an amount comparable with that received by other municipalities of similar size, although not in the maximum range." The data became part of the case for the construction of Lincoln Square which was begun in 1962. Although Lincoln Square increased sales tax revenue, Urbana did not catch up with Champaign. Table 5.2 gives sales tax revenue for Urbana for the years 1962 to 1975. The increase was steady but is partly accounted for by inflation and an increase in the amount returned from the state, from 1/2 percent to 3/4 percent in 1968-1969 and 3/4 to 1 percent in 1970-1971.

### TABLE 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Assessed Valuation</th>
<th>Sales Tax Revenue</th>
<th>Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matton</td>
<td>19,088</td>
<td>$45,037,372</td>
<td>$161,578</td>
<td>$ 8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>19,408</td>
<td>49,558,752</td>
<td>162,583</td>
<td>8.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon</td>
<td>19,565</td>
<td>55,088,968</td>
<td>117,969</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeport</td>
<td>26,628</td>
<td>77,949,409</td>
<td>203,205</td>
<td>7.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kankakee</td>
<td>27,666</td>
<td>83,760,632</td>
<td>289,479</td>
<td>10.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbana</td>
<td>27,294</td>
<td>58,235,536</td>
<td>124,391</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>177,082</td>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>$648,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>395,782c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Lincoln Square opened  
b Return from state increased to 1/2 percent  
c Return increased to 3/4 percent  
d Return increased to 1 percent

Champaign continues to receive the lion's share of sales tax receipts as the figures for 1974, $2,031,976, and for 1975, $2,196,520, have indicated.
The financial trend is unlikely to change since the 1974 and 1975 figures do not include Market Place, the new mall in Champaign, which opened in 1976.

The figures sketch the magnitude of Urbana's problem. Other cities faced with comparable prospects sought federal grants for specific projects that they might not otherwise have been able to contemplate. Urbana, in the 1960s and early 1970s was not consciously in the federal grant market, yet during the period, Urbana received significant amounts of federal money. However, receipt of this money made little impression on either political elites or the general public and they blithely continued to affirm their independence of the federal government.

As noted above, until recently, neither Champaign nor Urbana opted to apply for federal funds for health and welfare services. The communities were not in desperate straits and a general dislike of federal intervention inspired by the fear that federal funds were a threat to local autonomy and control "prompted local leaders to hold out as long as possible against participation in federal programs."9

Cultural norms and political habits hindered a concerted effort to seek federal funds to ameliorate local problems, yet the Federal Information Exchange notes that in 1968, Urbana received $66,764,975 from the federal government.10 When I queried a former alderman as to how much money he thought Urbana received from the federal government in 1968, he estimated approximately $750,000. When I asked Urbana's Administrative Officer about federal money, he responded that in the 1960s, Urbana received money for traffic safety through the state. In 1972, a small grant to finance the gathering of data for the Neighborhood Development Program was received, but in 1973, as Urbana was preparing an application for a HUD grant, the Nixon administration froze funds in preparation for the shift to revenue sharing and block grants. It thus appears that the Democrats came to power too late to put their advocacy of federal funds as an important source of community improvement into practice.

On the other hand, the Federal Information Exchange System--Cities Summary records that in 1971, Urbana received $57,136,236, and in 1972, the city received $49,308,607 in federal funds.11 The question is why were city officials so unaware of the magnitude of the federal contribution to the economy of Urbana. The answer lies in the nature of the civil community, its cultural bias and in the fragmentary character of federal allocations. A culture that emphasizes the centrality of private concerns and a community whose vision is defined by its purpose—the local manipulation of government services and activities to serve local needs in light of local values—seems uniquely unsuited to grasp or understand the extent of federal intervention. Perception is selective and cultural bias says government is unimportant, except as a threat, adding that what needs to be accomplished is better accomplished by individual initiatives. This indifference is reinforced by the fragmented structure of federal allocation, for example, money is granted to the public schools by the Department of Agriculture for the milk program and is accepted as routine. But, the public schools are run autonomously by the School Board and it is unreasonable to expect a city official to be aware of the funds received by the school district.

The university received grants from the National Science Foundation and the Department of Agriculture. Again the university is an autonomous institution and few city officials could be expected to know of these allocations. Finally, a significant percentage of money went to individuals, who collect social security, military pensions and railroad retirement. Pension payments are accepted as routine and the source of the funds and their contribution to the economy is easily overlooked.

The minimal visibility of federal allocation was reinforced by the small amounts earmarked for specifically urban problems. In 1971, HUD granted $133,503 for Open Space programs. The money was allocated to the Park District, which again is autonomous and did not figure in city accounts. In 1972, Urbana received no money from HUD.12 In 1971, the Office of Economic Opportunity allocated $144,162 for community action programs, but the money was divided between a variety of nongovernmental agencies and of course did not appear in city calculations. In 1972, The Office of Economic Opportunity allocated $17,000 for "concentrated community development" and $49,032 for community action programs.13 The difficulty of initiating or conducting programs under conditions of financial uncertainty has been well documented, but more to the
point for Urbana is the question: "What can be accomplished with such small and fragmented allocations?" The projects are scattered, the focus is on amelioration at the fringes, and there is minimal impact on attitudes and behavior since, for the most part, there is neither elite nor public awareness that the projects exist.

Fragmentary allocations also work against efforts to provide concerted governmental action on urban problems in that the creation of effective local leaders is hindered. The problem of leadership in individualistic culture will be a recurring theme in the chapters that follow, but here, I want to suggest that a lack of leadership is a major factor inhibiting efforts to ameliorate local problems such as improved housing in the north end. Undertaking after undertaking in Champaign and Urbana seems to founder somewhere between plan and implementation, because no political actor either has the power or is willing to use his power to provide the ultimate push for successful project implementation. Local leaders typically lack charisma, local issues are not usually of the type that generate charismatic leaders, and the norms of individualistic culture, particularly the emphasis on a political marketplace, foster self-interest rather than a communal outlook. Place the fragmentary character of federal allocations in the case of Urbana, alongside a fledgling professional administration, aldermen with district rather than area-wide constituencies and a democratic mayor who was elected with few ties to local leaders, and the result is drift, delay, obstruction and a gap between the expectations of opposition and the realities of power.

For a further note on the fragmentary nature of federal allocations as well as further support for the thesis that local officials are not aware of the importance of these allocations, I offer now the results of my efforts to discover how much federal money the county and the cities received from 1965 to 1975. I quickly discovered that no one knows. When I called the Office of the Chairman of the County Board, I was informed that it was a good question and they would like the answer. They referred me to the Office of the County Auditor where I was informed that county funds were not categorized as to origin. The auditor's office thought that the Illinois Bureau of the Budget might have a record of federal funds in the county. They do, but it is a recent undertaking, agencies do not always report, and the records are incomplete and consequently inaccurate. In addition, the records are of specific grants and do not take into account federal money transmitted through state departments for local undertakings. When I queried the RPC, the story was the same. They are keeping records of the grants, but it is a recent undertaking. The records are spotty and collecting data is as difficult for the RPC as for the Illinois Bureau of the Budget.

Public awareness of the federal contribution to state and local projects is as negligible as elite awareness. There is good reason for the lack of a comprehensive overview; record keeping is a rather new innovation in many small cities and counties and probably is occasioned by federal insistence. Habits are changing slowly as the Office of Management and Budget insists on more adequate records, but as yet results in Champaign County are skimpy. No local official has found it worthwhile to seek a comprehensive outline or understanding of federal involvement.

Local indifference to the cumulative effect of federal funding is one manifestation of the subtle interdependencies of the American system. Morton Grodzius described the federal system as a marble cake and the metaphor retains its validity despite attempts to rationalize the relationships. Such efforts overlook the discretion which the existing system provides local officials, the embedded cultural and political habits which support such discretion, and the vested interests in discretion. If Urbana is any example, the fears of conservatives and the hopes of liberals are equally misplaced. Federal financial contributions do not give rise to the situation described by the proverb, "He who pays the piper calls the tune." The proverb is inappropriate when the right hand does not know what allocations it receives, let alone what the left hand is receiving or for what purposes.

Ironically, in Urbana, the federal shift to revenue sharing and block grants promised an increased inflow of federal money for urban projects. The promise was, of course, relative; the absence of federal grant money in the 1960s compared with the receipt of revenue sharing money and the acquisition of a Community Development Program in the 1970s. However,
the rising costs of city government and Urbana's limited tax base limited the amount of revenue sharing money that could be allocated either to start urban redevelopment or to ameliorate the conditions of minorities and the poor.

The Urbana City Council held public hearings before determining the distribution of revenue sharing funds and listened to the presentations of various social service agencies. For the first two years of revenue sharing, Urbana did not allocate money to the agencies, but the budget for fiscal year 1976 had a small allocation of $40,000 for the social service agencies. The operating budget for that year weighed in at $3,246,207 before wage agreements were negotiated with union employees, including the $40,000 for the social agencies. The item was not requested by the administration; it was proposed by the City Council after a vigorous debate in which Republican aldermen contested the need to allocate funds for social services. The traditional virtues: thrift, economy and low taxes, were urged in opposing the allocations. Mrs. Brookens, a Republican from the Fifth Ward, argued that the council could help more people by keeping their taxes down, and urged that the $40,000 be used "to reduce the city's expected real estate increase of eight cents per $100 assessed valuation."

When the budget came up for final approval, the question of the $40,000 allocation was again debated. This time, the allocation was opposed by John Peterson, who wanted a larger appropriation. He was joined by the three Republicans who wanted to cut unnecessary spending and spoke their concern about a possible budget deficit. The Democratic majority held firm and the $40,000 allocation stayed in the budget. However, the smallness of the allocation and the heated debate suggests that health and welfare services have little if any greater priority with a Democratic majority than they had in 1968, when it was noted that "not much support was available for social welfare work, which was a primary consumer of budgetary 'leftovers'."

The picture appears brighter for ameliorating housing conditions in the north end, primarily because Urbana received HUD money for community development, $133,000 in 1975 and $295,000 in 1976, but the funds have not made a visible impact on the environment or on the attitudes and understandings of citizens. The amounts allocated appear large only because Urbana was not previously involved in federal urban redevelopment programs. Given the costs of staff and office and the pressing problems of the north end, the amounts are miniscule. In addition, there are federal restrictions on how the money can be spent. For example, there was interest in a weatherization program for older homes. Implementation of the program meant an intergovernmental project; the Regional Planning Commission (RPC) and the County Office on Aging accepted applications, Community Development allocated $10,000 for materials and Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) funds transmitted through the RPC were used to pay the workers. Supervisors were paid by the Office on Aging. Although the need for weatherstripping was widespread in the older areas of Urbana, the project could only be implemented in the area designated for Community Development. The number of homes that were to be weatherstripped was small, and their concentration in the designated area worked against widespread awareness of the federal contribution to a new initiative against urban blight.

The difficulty in evaluating Democratic approaches to urban renewal are not caused by Democratic failure to recognize the problems, but by campaigns for office which raised expectations as to what comprised an adequate level of city services. When a Democratic administration faced the task of maintaining, let alone expanding, city services with the limited resources of Urbana, they could not avail themselves of large scale federal assistance. The uncertainty as to the level of outside assistance led the Democratic administration to stress anew the expansion of Urbana's tax resources. The irony of the Democratic assumption of this task is that it did not differ from the priorities of earlier Republican administrations. But Democratic style differs from Republican, and Democratic proposals do not originate from the same circles as Republican. The contrast offers insight into the conflict between competing political cultures and suggests how Democratic objectives will be adapted to the local environment.

Downtown Redevelopment

Early in his term of office, Mayor Paley was quoted in the News Gazette as suggesting that most
asked HL.M to do good by Carle. The means to achieve a constituent called him during the height of more DL.verse groups and individuals but increased controversy. To citizen concerns. As one Urbana alderman remarked, thereon nor greatly enhanced governmental responsiveness to measure the costs and benefits of city involvement in participation that redevelopment called for greater city commitment. I support commercial and industrial ventures to Urbana. But the Democrats were also committed to greater citizen participation, and used different criteria to attract commercial and industrial ventures to Urbana. The contrasts were inevitable. Lincoln Square was primarily a private venture, although supported and subsidized by the city. The plans were not subject to intensive public scrutiny and once formal city commitment was obtained, the developers were free to proceed. The plans for downtown redevelopment called for greater city support, for example, the city was to buy land from private owners to create a package and then lease the package to private developers. A brief recapitulation of the history of Lincoln Square points up the contrast with the current difficulties of redevelopment.

The importance of increased tax resources for Urbana made the question of downtown development the focus of attention. Ironically, Democratic efforts were haunted by the success of the coup which eventuated in the construction of Lincoln Square, and the obvious contrast between the speed of construction of the former and the delays surrounding Democratic plans for downtown development. The contrasts were inevitable. Lincoln Square was primarily a private venture, although supported and subsidized by the city. The plans were not subject to intensive public scrutiny and once formal city commitment was obtained, the developers were free to proceed. The plans for downtown redevelopment called for greater city support, for example, the city was to buy land from private owners to create a package and then lease the package to private developers. A brief recapitulation of the history of Lincoln Square points up the contrast with the current difficulties of redevelopment.

Fears that the economy of Urbana was stagnant were widespread by the end of the 1950s and were given additional impetus by the decision of the J.C. Penney Company to close its stores in Urbana and open a new facility in Champaign. When a last minute plea to Penney's management was unavailing, business leaders turned to Virgil Martin, President of Carson, Pirie, Scott and Company. Martin wanted to locate a store in a central city area rather than a suburban shopping center, but he wanted an economic feasibility study before making a decision. Local businessmen raised $5,000 and a study of market potential was conducted. The results were satisfactory and during the summer of 1960, Carson's decided to locate one block south of the main shopping block in Urbana. Three realtors, pledged to secrecy about the project, to avoid inflating property values, secured options in property in the site area and, at the May 15, 1961, City Council meeting, the project was presented to the public. A resolution supporting a "plan" for Lincoln Square and proposing municipal off-street parking, revenue bonds and amendments to the zoning ordinance was presented. The city attorney explained that the issuance of revenue bonds would entail no obligation on the local taxpayers.

Urbana residents wanted the city to continue as a residential community and were willing to pay higher taxes to achieve this objective. Although Paley was careful to encourage every and all efforts to attract light industry and commercial ventures and stressed the proposals pending before the city council regarding a feasibility study of downtown redevelopment,19 he was taken to task for his remarks.

Roger Hunt, president of the Urbana Chamber of Commerce, took exception and the Urbana Association of Commerce and Industry urged the City Council and the mayor to take a leadership role in attracting commercial and industrial development to the city. A telephone survey, conducted to determine if "residents of the City of Urbana did not want any additional commercial or industrial growth in the community and were, therefore, willing to pay higher taxes, found that nearly three-fourths of the respondents disagreed."20

Mayor Paley charged that his remarks were distorted and restated his position, "I support commercial development in the City of Urbana. I support expansion of shopping facilities in Urbana, particularly the expansion of Lincoln Square. I support the development of compatible industry, especially along the lines as publicly announced by IIDC (Illini Industries Development Corporation)."21

This exchange illustrates the convergence of perspectives regarding the future development of Urbana. It also suggests the background of fears and concerns which fuels the continuing debate over downtown redevelopment. The Democrats, given the political climate and their commitment to expanded city services, could not reject, and indeed supported, private efforts to attract commercial and industrial ventures to Urbana. But the Democrats were also committed to greater citizen participation, and used different criteria to measure the costs and benefits of city involvement in redevelopment. The examples presented below suggest that Democrats opened the decision-making process to more diverse groups and individuals, but increased participation neither restricted governmental discretion nor greatly enhanced governmental responsiveness to citizen concerns. As one Urbana alderman remarked, a constituent called him during the height of the controversy over the expansion of Carle Hospital and asked him "to do good by Carle." The means to achieve this objective were not specified and the alderman remained free to choose his own course.
With a minimum of debate or independent investigation, the city went on record in support of Lincoln Square and committed itself to finance new parking lots. Republicans dominated the City Council, Democrats were just starting to rebuild, and there was no organized opposition to raise questions about the city's participation.

In a critical analysis of Lincoln Square, Professors Sheldon Plager and Joel Handler concluded that the promoters of the project effectively monopolized the available planning and political skills in the community. Although rudimentary, the apparatus of public planning (the Urbana Plan Commission and various comprehensive development plans) was bypassed. Existing zoning was changed; a R-M Multiple Family Residential High-Density category was created for the area surrounding Lincoln Square. It was suggested that the zoning change eliminated competition for the occupants of the shopping mall, yet remained sufficiently flexible to permit the establishment of noncompetitive business in the area. In other words, to the critics, zoning decisions lacked relevance for community purposes, but provided economic protection for the merchants who would locate in Lincoln Square.

In addition to protective zoning, off-street parking was provided for the mall. In the spring of 1963, the city issued revenue bonds for $3,200,000. Because interest costs added an additional $2,434,683, the cost of the parking lots totaled approximately $5,634,683. Although revenue bonds are not general obligations of the city and are paid by the revenue from the parking system, it quickly became obvious that the 1963 Feasibility Report had seriously overestimated the revenue from the lots surrounding Lincoln Square." The discrepancy between estimated and actual revenue did not affect the city's overall financial situation because revenue from meters in the campus area was used to meet obligations and to build a surplus.

By the 1970s, sales tax from Lincoln Square had become a major factor in Urbana's budget. The city was also collecting $120,000 annually in meter revenues, or an average of $10,000 per month, a figure less than the $19,630 estimated in the 1963 Feasibility Report, but adequate to retire the remaining $2,363,000 of bonded debt. Champaign retained the edge as a business center; a marketing survey in 1975 put Champaign's yearly sales at $223,600,000 and Urbana's sales at $64,200,000. Fears that Market Place, scheduled to open in March 1976, would further tilt the balance against Urbana increased the pressure on city officials to do something to maintain the competitiveness of Urbana's central shopping district.

Plans and resolutions to promote downtown redevelopment had been in the works since 1964. In order to gain support for Lincoln Square from downtown merchants who had the potential to block or delay the development, the mall was presented originally as Phase 1 of an overall plan for downtown redevelopment. It was argued that the increased flow of traffic would enhance the sales of Main Street merchants, proposed high-rise office buildings would spur activity, and within ten years Main Street would be incorporated into the mall. However, in 1976, the mayor recognized, with the vision of hindsight, "that the large amount of parking around Lincoln Square served to isolate Lincoln Square from Main Street.

Nothing that compared with Lincoln Square emerged for Main Street in twelve years of council meetings, resolutions, presentations of outside consultants, public hearings and feasibility studies. In this respect, Lincoln Square hangs like the Sword of Damocles over Democratic heads. Whatever the hidden costs of Lincoln Square, and they were many, the
The contrast in style, the swiftness of execution, the lack of complications, compared with the continuous and seemingly interminable discussions about downtown redevelopment, may become politically advantageous for the Republicans.

Lincoln Square was planned by a few insiders who had the cohesiveness and the clout to push the program through. Urbana was under Republican domination, execution was swift and there was no organized opposition. The history of downtown redevelopment is more complicated. The Broadway Development Corporation (BDC), a group of local businessmen and the two major banks in Urbana, was formed in 1964 to promote redevelopment. The BDC purchased land in the downtown area and sought a developer and city assistance. As their plans were taking shape, Democrats reached near parity with Republicans on the City Council. The Democrats, due to their commitment to more professional government and also for political advantage, insisted on close scrutiny of costs and the extent of the city’s commitment. In addition, they wanted city recognition of and assistance for the redevelopment needs of other sections, such as the north end. After intensive study and negotiation, agreement was reached on a resolution of intent which committed the city to downtown redevelopment and to the need for redevelopment in other sections of the city. A resolution was passed on September 20, 1971 which stipulated that the city agreed to vacate the 100 block of West Elm Street providing the developers (BDC and Architectural and Mechanical Systems, Inc.) began construction within eighteen months of the date of the resolution. Final development plans had to be submitted within six months.

The deadlines were not met. The BDC lacked the money for development and the AMS was heavily involved in a number of other ventures. When the Democrats became the majority in 1973, the problem of downtown redevelopment was waiting for them. On May 29, 1973, the new City Council was asked to make a commitment to Phase 2 of downtown redevelopment, with costs estimated at approximately $10,000,000. The city owned about 35,000 square feet in the redevelopment area, BDC held about 20,000 square feet and an additional 35,000 square feet was privately held. The plan called for construction of a six-to-ten-story tower complex and a multi-level parking facility beneath the complex. Representatives of the BDC and Lincoln Square, Towers, Inc. (a prospective developer) asked for a council decision by August 1, 1973, since negotiations for a major tenant to anchor the expansion could not begin without city action. Mayor Paley, newly installed, with eight new aldermen on the council, asked for time to explore the problems raised by the proposal and deferred a decision on the land purchase.

From the beginning, downtown redevelopment posed a different set of legal and political problems than the construction of Lincoln Square. BDC plans for Phase 2 called for the city to amass a land package and, if necessary, to use its powers of eminent domain to acquire privately owned land to lease to a developer. The city was also expected to make public improvements and build a parking facility for the proposed retail office complex.

In September 1973, the City Council commissioned Arthur Rubloff and Company to conduct a feasibility study which was completed and presented to the council in January 1974. The study suggested some modifications to the BDC-Rubloff plans but, held that the project was financially sound and recommended the city’s participation. National economic conditions such as the effects of the oil shortage were cited as incentives to rebuild downtown Urbana. Finally Rubloff estimated the costs of the project at approximately $4,000,000. Although the cost estimates were criticized as optimistic, the city appeared ready to go ahead with the project. Expanding the tax resources of the city was an overriding imperative and prospects for development appeared good. Busey Bank, a major force in the business of Urbana, was interested in becoming the major tenant of the new complex. Rubloff expressed interest in becoming the developer and competition for the position of developer made the project appear viable and valuable.

On February 11, 1974, despite some negative comments and a letter from the director of the RPC questioning the Rubloff estimates, the City Council by a vote of thirteen to one, authorized Mayor Hiram Paley to proceed with the recommendations of the Rubloff study. On March 20, 1974, Mayor Paley recommended the creation of a five-member Business District Development and Redevelopment Commission, and asked
for council approval of his plan to implement the Rubloff Report including a bond ordinance.

The proposed commission included the mayor, two citizens and two council members as "ex officio" officers, and was intended to control the pace of downtown development. It held diverse powers including recommending the developer, designating portions of the city as business districts, and making recommendations to the council on which tracts of land should be developed. The commission was also empowered to apply for federal and state grants, borrow necessary funds through general obligation or revenue bonds, and "expend such public funds as may be necessary for the planning, execution and implementation of business district plans." In sum, the commission was to be given carte blanche to promote downtown expansion. Formation of the commission was praised as a new approach to downtown redevelopment in Illinois, but the mayor's critics claimed that places on the new commission were awarded only to uncritical supporters of downtown redevelopment.

Efforts to establish a legal framework for redevelopment gained momentum. The Urbana Plan Commission designated the redevelopment area and won City Council approval. However, by July 1974, it became clear that the momentum was more apparent than real. The legal question of whether the city could use its powers of eminent domain to acquire land for a private developer was still unresolved. The Rubloff Company withdrew from the competition for developer but continued as consultant for the project.

A letter from Rubloff emphasized new circumstances: high interest rates, availability of funds, inflation and the energy crisis, which made it difficult if not impossible to market a downtown redevelopment project. Rubloff advised the City of Urbana to be "completely aware of the risks involved in proceeding with the land assemblage project." The city had to weigh "the possibility of providing the property for a successful development, versus the risk of the cost of land and carrying charges for a project that may simply not be marketable in the near future."38

Downtown redevelopment was a marginal project, and city support for redevelopment was a gamble. Expert advice failed to ease the dilemmas of decision makers. The costs of redevelopment were increasing geometrically even as the risk of not taking action increased politically. If redevelopment plans were not implemented, the downtown business district might be subject to blight as Main Street structures aged, followed by decline of property values which would reduce tax revenues. Eventually higher real estate taxes would be needed throughout the city to maintain downtown services and city functions. The spiral of decline without redevelopment would be difficult to stop or reverse. Downtown would lose importance as an employment focus for private business, and the result would be less activity in the downtown area. Reduced activity in turn would deter merchants from relocating or opening new stores in the downtown area.39

The scenario was a local politician's nightmare and fears were compounded by an assessment of the impact of Market Place. In June 1975, it was estimated that Market Place would draw approximately 20 percent of Lincoln Square's business, causing an estimated loss of $40,000 in sales tax and $20,000 in reduced meter revenue.40

The bind was real; the need for an expanded tax base and the fears of future decline and stagnation which had provided the impetus for the construction of Lincoln Square were still valid. But circumstances had changed; no group of insiders could function as had the promoters of Lincoln Square. Professionalism in city administration as well as Democratic electoral victory guaranteed new decision-making procedures and increased public participation. Depending on the observer's perspective, the new emphasis could be described as helpless inefficiency and red tape, or as an attempt to open up the political process and secure a measure of governmental responsiveness to the people.

City decisions are not made in a vacuum and by September 1974, it was clear that national economic difficulties had increased the obstacles to redevelopment. Developers were curtailing activity because of high construction costs, major department stores were not planning to expand and small retailers were in even tighter straits. In addition, Urbana still had not reached a decision on how to finance redevelopment. The city had some options. It could issue up to $1,000,000 in general obligation bonds without a referendum, but to undertake a project of the magni-
tude of downtown redevelopment without a referendum might have major political repercussions. If the city wanted to embark on the project immediately, a referendum could not be held for at least ten months and would increase the delay. But if the economic situation delayed the project, a successful referendum would enhance the legitimacy of the project and allay the qualms of some Democrats. The administration chose neither option and instead called for a public hearing to solicit the view of downtown merchants, civic organizations, governmental bodies and Urbana citizens.42

The public meeting was held on November 19, 1974, and a handful of people, mostly representing downtown interests, spoke. Arguments against postponement were balanced by arguments urging caution and no action was taken. In January 1975, Rubloff issued a new estimate of land costs, including an appraisal of BDC land at $227,000, a price acceptable to the BDC and to the city.43

Once the new estimate became public, BDC acceptance of the price was a foregone conclusion. In February, the shareholders agreed almost unanimously to sell at the appraised value; the BDC explained that it was willing to take a loss of $70,000 to facilitate downtown development. The shareholders also renounced any expectation of becoming the developer of the project and it seemed likely that the corporation would be liquidated when the land was sold. A month later, the shareholders took formal action to approve the sale, stipulating only that the city must agree to buy the land "within a reasonable amount of time."44 In March, the Urbana Business District Development and Redevelopment Commission recommended that the city purchase BDC land at the appraised price. The BDC hoped to receive a check within four weeks, but the mayor explained that a court test was necessary before public money could be dispersed.45

At a City Council study session on March 31, the legal ramifications of land acquisition were discussed again. Because a court test appeared necessary, it was suggested that the city buy only a small parcel of BDC land, not the whole tract. The BDC which wanted to sell its property as a whole, threatened to seek another buyer, if the city did not make a decision soon.46 The need for swift decision was again in apparent conflict with the delays occasioned by the need to arrange a friendly court suit.

The plot thickened when the City Council formally considered the commission's recommendation to purchase the BDC tracts for $227,000. During the course of a tumultuous council meeting, a majority accepted the commission recommendation. However, the vote was one short of the required two-thirds needed in such a case. Although the mayor was eligible to vote he abstained, because as he explained the next day (Republican Councilman Eighmey of the Sixth Ward blocked the mayor's efforts to explain the council session), as long as he might be the defendant in a court case, he believed he should abstain. The council then voted ten to one (Susan Bekenstein voted no) to purchase the smaller BDC tract for use as a mini-park at a cost of $40,000.47 The executive committee of the BDC had refused earlier to sell the city only the smaller tract, but by the end of April, the corporation agreed "to sell the two tracts separately to encourage downtown development."48

After these decisions, momentum stalled, waiting for the court decision on whether the city could acquire land for private development. However, the pressures for action continued to increase. Stories about the effect of Market Place on the downtowns of Champaign and Urbana appeared regularly in the newspapers and several articles urged the necessity of free parking at Lincoln Square. It was also suggested that Carson's, the owner of Lincoln Square, could become an active force for downtown redevelopment.49

However, representatives of Carson's had to consider costs and the corporation's commitment to its stockholders. Lincoln Square is bounded on the north by the Urbana Lincoln Hotel, built in 1923. In April 1975, the city ordered the hotel to make emergency fire protection repairs or vacate the premises except for the first floor, which has two restaurants and an "open air" cafe on the mall. In May, Carson's announced that the costs of renovation were prohibitive and that the hotel would close on July 20, 1975. The announcement was greeted with protests and a flurry of activity; various Urbana residents announced their sentimental attachment to the building and their determination to save it. The mayor spoke with Carson executives, who insisted that Urbana residents had to save the hotel. The News Gazette reported that
"several 'influential' individuals are interested in buying the Urbana Lincoln Hotel if a community wide effort can be organized."

By July, the flurry of activity was dissipating. Pat Miller of the Champaign County Historical Society noted that interest in the formation of a citizen's group to save the hotel was tapering off. City administration, which also sought ways to save the hotel, was stymied by the costs. Carson's justified its negative decision in terms of costs. Charles Webber, an active participant in the planning and development of Lincoln Square and once a part-owner of the hotel, summed up the impasse; he expressed regret about the hotel's fate but acquiesced. "Carson's owns it. They're entitled to do with it as they please. So I won't question any decision they make. I would say it is too bad it couldn't (be) remodeled for some present use, economically." The constraints of political culture are as obvious in this statement as the absence of innovative approaches to community problems. The hotel was a significant symbol of Urbana, but citizens were unable to overcome cultural limitations to explore ways to save the hotel.

Carson's minimal interest in local affairs as well as citizen passivity concerning the hotel, depressed the prospects for downtown redevelopment. In the summer of 1975, legal questions concerning land acquisition remained unresolved. The ambiguity of the city's position further stalled the project's momentum. In addition, there was no developer and no likely candidate in sight. However, the administration persevered, meetings continued to be held, candidates for consultant appeared before the commission and in April 1976, Angelos C. Demetriou of Washington, D.C. was hired. Demetriou was charged to develop a master plan for the downtown area with the assistance of Hammer, Siler, George Associates, Inc., economic and market consultants, also of Washington, D.C. The study was expected to take six months to complete and the cost was estimated at $30,000.

Hiring a new consultant did not materially affect the pace of downtown redevelopment, but a new initiative from Busey Bank, a local corporation and an important factor in Urbana's economy, gave the project a new impetus. On May 15, 1976, exactly fifteen years after the announcement of plans for Lincoln Square, representatives of Busey Bank and Carson's presented a plan to revitalize downtown Urbana to the City Council. The plan had something for everyone, including preservation of the Urbana Lincoln Hotel. Parking meters surrounding Lincoln Square were to be removed, Busey Bank was to be located in Lincoln Square, and some major street widening and resurfacing projects were contemplated. Carl M. Webber, representing Busey and Carson's, estimated the city's costs at $487,000; $187,000 for the larger BDC tract, $35,000 for the smaller BDC tract, $200,000 to purchase a tavern and three shops for demolition, and road improvements. These figures did not include the cost of other street improvements nor estimates of lost revenue from removed parking meters. Since Busey Bank was willing to pay the city approximately $300,000 for the Empire State Building and two parking lots at Lincoln Square, the city's investment in the project, $187,000, appeared to be minimal.

Webber and Douglas C. Mills, chairman of the board of Busey appeared before the council to present the plan and answer questions. Council members had some questions about the removal of parking meters, the benefits to Main Street, contingency plans and timetables. Busey was lauded as a good corporate citizen for its willingness to invest in Urbana and downtown redevelopment was moving again. Both Webber and Mills urged the need for quick action and the council seemed receptive.

Given the composition of the council, a quick decision was not in the cards. Some council members had reservations, and others wanted a detailed investigation of the implications of the plan. Concern was expressed about the section of downtown that Busey would vacate if it moved to Lincoln Square. Consultants were heard from in August, and the commission met to discuss the plan and the consultants' suggestions, and to make recommendations. Also in August, the first legal obstacle to downtown redevelopment was hurdled when the Circuit Court ruled that the city could use public funds to purchase the BDC tracts. Meanwhile, the BDC increased the pressure by setting a deadline--if the city did not purchase the tracts by September 21, 1976, the land would be sold to another buyer.

At this point Bernadine Stake wrote a letter to the News Gazette asking for more information and arguing against swift city action when there were so many unknowns:
A call for September action pressures the Council to take risks with city funds and property. The project sounds interesting. It should be given every consideration. Before it can be properly discussed someone must provide information on the financial and environmental feasibility of the plan.

So the saga of downtown redevelopment continues and the tale is one of delay and inconclusiveness. But delays and inconclusiveness offer an insight into the changed character of Urbana politics. Politics now resembles a tennis game, the ball goes back and forth between private interests, the City Council and the mayor but there is no player with sufficient power to obtain a decisive advantage. Urbana was ruled until the 1950s by H. I. Green, a "boss" of the old school. Urbana, in the 1960s was described as a residential community with a fairly well defined power structure, whose leadership shared a fairly good consensus on issues and means, and tended to act in concert to solve problems. The successful development of Lincoln Square was attributable in large part to a group of influential individuals working closely with a congenial mayor who had the city council well in hand. By 1968, however, it was obvious that the old patterns of informal pressure and influence were breaking down as city administration became more professional and experts, outsiders, and technicians gained influence.

The new people had new purposes but more important they lacked the ties to and the identification with the established local power structure. The tendency of individualistic norms to work against concerted action also served to fragment political initiatives.

City administration is more professional than in 1968, but elected political officials have not surrendered decision-making powers to administrators. Some of Urbana's present difficulties may well be attributed to the feistiness of the Democratic majority on the council. On vote after vote, council members have demonstrated their unwillingness to be controlled, let alone directed. They have demanded and secured a role in decision making. Thus as the political process became oriented to professional norms, Democratic electoral victory insured that Democratic values and priorities would function to open up the political process. More voices would participate, but more participation exacts a cost—the loss of the kind of cohesiveness that can develop a Lincoln Square. No individual or group has a sufficiently strong base or the power to plan and implement a project autonomously.

The current political situation contains conflicting imperatives for policy makers. The voice of the "people" is heard increasingly, which is good because control by experts is as little to the liking of democratic theory as oligarchical control. Yet the voice of the people at times gives little direction to policy makers, and municipal politicians increasingly rely on experts for definition of community needs and problems. The fun begins when expert definitions come in conflict with the expressed wishes of citizens. The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter will focus on examples of such confrontations. In this chapter, the incidents will continue to relate to development policies; in the next chapter, the incidents will relate to social policies.

Redevelopment—Carle Foundation Hospital and Vine Street

Opposing concepts of present and future needs and different assessments of the costs of planned projects are the meat of local conflict. A comparison of City Council decisions, concerning vacation of a street to facilitate the expansion of Carle Hospital with the opening of Vine Street, illustrates some patterns of Urbana politics and the shifting access and priorities which shape specific decisions. In the Carle case, accommodation was possible because hospital administrators could adjust their plans for expansion. In the case of Vine Street, the voice of the people was so fragmented and the discussions have taken so long that when the street is finally open, it will be moot whether there are winners or losers.

Carle Foundation Hospital, located on the edge of a predominantly black and working class white neighborhood, is a growing medical clinic which has "become big business for itself and for Urbana." A planned $4,000,000 six-story addition to present facilities brought hospital administrators to the City Council to seek zoning changes and vacation of a street. Carle Foundation announced its plans in November 1973 and received the city's blessing on August 19, 1974. In
the interim, the costs and consequences of vacating Park Street and rezoning for the neighborhood and Crystal Lake Park, situated just to the east and south of the hospital, were thoroughly examined.

The Urbana Park Board was first to go on record opposing the zoning changes. It was not opposed to Carle's expansion; but board policy opposed any commercial or industrial zoning adjacent to any park in the district. Carle had requested an I-1 (light industrial) classification in order to avoid the setback requirements of R-2 zoning classifications.60 The Urbana Plan Commission had approved the zoning change with a proviso that the change was not to be construed as a precedent for other zoning changes.61 But it reversed itself in March 1974, and rejected the light industrial classification. The commission recommended an R-2 classification; the proposed addition would be shortened by two feet to fit the R-2 setback requirements.62

Meanwhile, on February 12, 1974, a public hearing on the closing of one block of Park Street brought approximately 200 neighborhood residents to city hall. They were concerned that closing Park Street, the closest east-west through street north of University Avenue, would bring heavy traffic to residential streets and adversely affect their neighborhoods.63 On March 19, Mayor Paley released a report from Public Works commissioner James Glover, which estimated the cost of rerouting traffic from Park Street at $260,000. Paley suggested that Carle might have to pay some of the costs of rerouting.64 Carle's administrator, Charles Dawley, balked at the prospect and requested reconsideration of the Glover report.

The City Council's ad hoc committee on the Carle request to close one block of Park Street set an asking price of $146,000 for the property and improvements to neighboring streets, and directed Mayor Paley to negotiate with Carle officials. Dalwey insisted that Carle's highest offer was $100,00065 and the city promptly agreed to accept the offer. The money would be used for improvements to neighboring streets.66

On April 1, the City Council approved a zoning change to R-2 but voted to defer the ordinance closing the 600 block of Park Street.67 Two weeks later, the council again discussed closing Park Street. No formal vote was taken but it did not seem that the votes to close the street were available. Residents had persuaded three wavering council members that closing Park Street would have a disastrous effect on their neighborhood. Mayor Paley, who supported the closing, was reported to be shocked at the council's reversal.68

A special meeting of the Urbana Chamber of Commerce charged that the council's decision was "astounding" and "is certainly irresponsible government no matter how well intended." The chamber's declaration concluded, "there is no conceivable way that the interests of Urbana are served by this decision."69 The Carle Foundation Board of Trustees took a hard line and reaffirmed the necessity of closing Park Street as "a critical factor in the proper development and expansion of the Carle Medical complex... Failure to vacate the street at this time complicates not only the $3,000,000 expansion north of Park Street but comprises the $4,000,000 replacement addition planned on the south side of the street as well as any future expansion required to take place outside the boundaries of the present hospital block."70 Who had who move the barrel at this point was unclear. What city official, regard less of neighborhood protests, could block a project of this magnitude with its promise of jobs and economic benefits and its potential to upgrade an area of a major thoroughfare (University Avenue) primarily devoted to franchise restaurants and gasoline stations.

The City Council set a formal vote on the question for May 20, 1974. By that time, the Illini Industries Development Corporation (a nonprofit corporation which promotes business and industry in Champaign County) weighed in on Carle's side. IIIDC raised the question, "Can the City Council turn its back on this revenue producing opportunity in the face of increases in tax costs to its residents and in the face of the fact that Carle's expansion would call for little, if any increase in the costs to the city of Urbana."71

The City Council could; on May 20, five members voted against the closure of Park Street. The people of the neighborhood had won, but the episode had neither a simple nor an ideologically satisfying conclusion. Even as the council was voting no, Carle revised its plans and requested that the city vacate
the subterranean rights to Park Street. The new proposal called for construction of underground passageways as well as an underground dietary and food service facility. Confrontation with the neighborhood was avoided, the compromise looked promising and on August 19, 1974, the City Council approved vacation of a portion of ground beneath the 600 block of Park Street.72

Carle could compromise its original plans without hardship and the city, which was not required to make a large investment, could give approval. Construction began in January 1975, but the saga of Carle and the City Council was not ended. In June 1975, Carle asked the city to issue revenue bonds to help finance expansion, now estimated to cost $21,000,000. The bonds did not create any financial or credit liability for the city and would save Carle approximately $332,000 of interest annually. Issuance of the bonds, however, required City Council approval. When the question reached the council, hospital spokesman Dawley was subjected to a barrage of questions ranging from Peterson's (I-Second Ward) challenge to Carle's status as a nonprofit hospital and his suggestion that bonds be issued to finance a municipal hospital, to Hilary Moore's request for the number and social composition of Carle's employees.73

On July 7, the vote on the issuance of the bonds was deferred and Georgeanne Finch (I-Second Ward) requested that the council's committee on administration study the enabling ordinance. The city attorney had studied Carle's request and had not raised objections, but Mrs. Finch objected to "just trusting attorneys for Carle on this."74 Two weeks later, the question again reached the council and Mayor Paley cast the affirmative vote to make the two-thirds majority necessary to approve the issue of tax-exempt bonds. At this point, the council refused to pass a resolution of intent which would morally obligate the city to issue bonds to Carle. The hospital then decided to withdraw their request, turned instead to the Illinois Health Facilities for financing.75

Whether Carle's decision was attributable to slow decision making or to the council members' demands for information on affirmative action hiring and greater concern for the poor is not the point. The episode illustrates the changed political patterns in Urbana and the obstacles to the traditional practices of individualistic political culture. In Urbana, politics can no longer be described as a business, and politicians no longer automatically assume that public benefits result from governmental help to private enterprises.

The constraints of local politics, however, are so strongly ingrained that a different style of politics may not produce significantly different outcomes, and for all the changes, policy direction may remain remarkably constant. The imperatives that led elected officials to plump for economic development as the key to the future of Urbana resemble the imperatives in other small mid-western cities. When Carle decided to seek financing elsewhere, Mayor Paley chastised the council for creating difficulties that would deter other industries from coming to Urbana. Carle would proceed with expansion regardless of adverse council action but the question of public stance was crucial. A City Council which imposed stringent conditions on commercial and industrial ventures might retard future progress.76 Although dire consequences were predicted if the City Council refused to approve the vacation of Park Street, a compromise was worked out which satisfied the neighborhood and did not deter expansion. In the bond controversy, Carle went elsewhere and expansion proceeded.

Carle could proceed, in part because it had its own resources and directive force. When city development projects are considered, the absence of an outside autonomous sponsor increases the delays and reinforces the ambiguities of governmental action. The controversy over opening Vine Street illustrates the differences. Vine Street is located in the middle of a desirable residential area in southeast Urbana and is included in the Seventh Ward. Residents are predominantly middle and upper class—they vote regularly and take an interest in local affairs. The neighborhood is secure—it has relatively new homes which range from $40,000 to $90,000. There is little incentive for neighbors to organize to protect the area, in contrast to residents in the areas close to the university, who have organized the West Urbana Neighborhood Association (WUNA) to fight zoning violations and the conversion of older houses into student rooms. The lack of continuing organization materially affected the ability of opponents to block the opening of Vine Street.
The controversy over opening one block of Vine Street (the block is tree-lined and very scenic) has been simmering since the administration of Charles Zipprodt. At that time, a proposal for a graded twenty-two foot roadway was advanced, but neighborhood resistance killed the project. In the 1970s, intermittent discussion continued, there were flurries of activity by opponents and proponents, and neighborhood opinion formed, fluctuated and shifted. It was stated publicly that proponents of opening were in the majority but a survey of southeastern Urbana residents indicated an even split. In 1974, Kenneth Appel, Democrat from the Seventh Ward, tried and failed to persuade the City Council's Committee on Environment to go on record in opposition to connecting Vine Street. Appel argued that his constituents believed that opening Vine Street would reduce property values and "make the area less desirable as a place to build and result in less taxes for the city." Proponents of the connection pointed to the absence of north-south arterial streets, especially streets to lead directly to the downtown business district. They also found support in the fact that as Alderman Gene Lynch put it, "the professionals we pay all say there should be improvement on Vine Street." Opponents remained unconvinced and in April 1974, a petition opposing the connection was presented to the City Council.

The pot heated up again in April 1975, when Mayor Paley requested the Urbana Plan Commission to study the "ramifications" of opening Vine Street to traffic from George Huff Drive to Holmes Street, and to submit a report by June 15. A preliminary report from the State Division of Highways showed that traffic would be more evenly distributed if Vine was open. Pursuant to the Mayor's request, the Plan Commission held public hearings in May. A petition signed by more than 300 persons supported opening Vine Street, and favorable and adverse statements were made. Proponents argued that opening the street would ease traffic on adjacent streets and benefit Urbana. According to Craig Webber, President of the Urbana Chamber of Commerce, poor access had slowed development in South Urbana. Marion Holshauser (D-Seventh Ward) disagreed; lack of protection for good residential areas had hurt Urbana more than poor access. On May 22, 1975, the Plan Commission reached a consensus; preservation of the neighborhood had highest priority and it refused to recommend opening Vine Street. City officials rejected the commission's decision and continued to insist that Vine was the street to open.

On June 5, 1975, the Plan Commission adopted a report recommending that the 2100 block of Vine Street remain closed to traffic "at this time." Although the City Council typically accepts Plan Commission recommendations, on July 7, it voted nine to four to open Vine Street. The decision came at the end of a long meeting and was not predictable. The city administration strongly supported opening Vine Street, but the council had not been particularly amenable to administrative suggestions. The proposal that was accepted was suggested by four residents, and perhaps the council was just happy to have a compromise suggested by people in the neighborhood. The proposal attempted to minimize the ramifications of an "arterial street" for a residential neighborhood. Vine was opened on temporary blacktop, the street was not to be designated as an arterial street, and "highest priority" was to be given to improving the Windsor-Lincoln bypass.

Council approval did not immediately bring bulldozers to Vine Street. The council's Committee on Environment discussed the type of pavement and right of way throughout September and failed to reach agreement. In December, the committee finally agreed on a thirty-foot wide concrete pavement to accommodate two-lane traffic and a "stall lane." The Eighth Ward alderman opposed the decision as too short sighted while two other members expressed their preference for leaving Vine Street closed. In February, the council approved (ten to four) construction of a thirty-foot wide concrete pavement but did not appropriate money for the project. Two of the four negative votes continued to insist that Vine Street should not be opened. After the vote, the city entered negotiations with landowners to acquire the right of way and in July the proposed acquisition reached the council. Several proponents of an opened Vine Street were absent, and a motion to purchase the right of way was defeated. Mayor Paley did not interpret the vote as a "no" on the project, and predicted that the vote would be reversed. Mayor Paley was correct, one month later, the council voted eight to four to acquire the right of way.
Any assessment of this episode depends on the values and perspective of the observer. Opponents made a cogent case, placing highest priority on the preservation of an excellent residential neighborhood and suggesting improvement of the Windsor-Lincoln bypass to ameliorate the traffic problem. The latter project required state action and was not within the reach of autonomous action. Proponents offered an attractive compromise, a residential street instead of an arterial street. Who won and who lost in this drawn out discussion is moot, opponents remained unpersuaded and the compromise might prove inadequate for the future. But the many council votes illustrate Democratic factionalism and the internal divisions which prevent the Democrats from bringing a unified point of view to bear in local controversies. Democratic factionalism acquired new significance when Democrats became the majority party.

Democrats in opposition wanted a better environment and stressed quality of life issues. Expectations were raised by victory; a more liberal, more community oriented approach would prevail and decision making would be shaped by considerations of the "public" interest. The Democrats tried and continue to try, more voices are heard, citizen input is consciously sought but there is no power, persuasive or coercive, patronage or ideological, to put the inputs together to produce coherent policy. In fact, the pattern of politics is becoming more fragmented. There is little agreement on what constitutes a quality environment, and even routine proposals generate opposition. An administration proposal to construct sidewalks in a newer development was opposed by the residents who objected to the cost. New sewers were deemed necessary for the Carle Park area. According to expert testimony the sewers were sixty years old, badly deteriorated and constituted a major source of pollution. The residents of the area objected to the costs, questioned the wisdom of the plans for replacement, and in general were unimpressed by this endeavor for the common good.

On the other hand, when a child was killed by a motorist in the area of Carle Park, the neighbors organized to demand better traffic safety and an end to teen-age loitering. The city's response was less than what residents expected. Police patrols could be increased, but only to a point. Limited manpower can be spread only so thin. Some road changes such as bumps to slow the traffic, could be undertaken, but financial limitations restricted the scope of the project. Finally, the city does not have responsibility for the physical layout of the park; the Park District, which is autonomous, makes its decisions in light of its financial resources. Citizens were frustrated; seemingly simple and obvious requests could not be implemented in timely fashion.

The pattern of Urbana politics has become more complex with the addition of new voices and interests, and perhaps more democratic. But an expanded communications network does not necessarily generate action and may lead to distortion, misdirection, and confusion concerning the needs and wants of the public. Who rules is a moot question, as is a definition of the public interest, and conflicting interests compete for support in the marketplace of politics. As the process becomes more fragmented, the perception that economic development is necessary for the future progress of Urbana remains the one constant in the kaleidoscope. Political style has changed dramatically, but major policy imperatives such as the need for downtown redevelopment to attract new industrial and commercial ventures, remains unaffected by qualitatively and quantitatively different inputs into the policy-making process.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 5

6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 Ibid.
8 Source of Table 2: Urbana City Government.
12 Ibid., FY 1971.
13 Ibid., FY 1971, p. 39; and Ibid., FY 1972, p. 41.
15 News Gazette, 12 May 1975.
16 News Gazette, 1 July 1975.
18 News Gazette, 2 August 1976.
23 Ibid., p. 730.
24 Ibid., pp. 735-743, esp. p. 739.
26 News Gazette, 6 August 1975.
29 Resolution of Intent passed June 15, 1970; Resolution passed September 20, 1971, see also Champaign Urbana Courier Editorial, June 15, 1970.
34 News Gazette, 12 February 1974.
38 News Gazette, 6 October 1974.
39 Ibid.
43 News Gazette, 7 January 1975.
44 News Gazette, 14 February and 13 March 1975.
46 News Gazette, 1 April 1975.
47 News Gazette, 15 April 1975.
48 News Gazette, 26 April 1975.
49 For examples see News Gazette, 15 May and 25 June 1975.
50 News Gazette, 26 May 1975.
51 Daily Illini, 3 July 1975.
52 News Gazette, 16 April, 20 April and 21 April 1976.
54 News Gazette, 5 August, 16 August and 27 August 1976.
57 Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie.
60 News Gazette, 13 February 1974.

68 News Gazette, 16 April 1974.
70 News Gazette, 23 April 1974.
74 News Gazette, 8 July 1975.
75 News Gazette, 22 July 1975.
76 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 3.
80 Ibid.
81 News Gazette, 9 May 1975.
82 News Gazette, 23 May 1975.
83 News Gazette, 21 September 1975.
84 News Gazette, 21 September, 23 September and 1 October 1975.
85 News Gazette, 10 December 1975.
86 News Gazette, 3 February 1976.
Introduction

Increased fragmentation of Urbana politics and the continued validity of individualistic political norms continued to affect policy, for example, by increasing the difficulty of initiating and implementing new policies on urban redevelopment. The Democratic majority, however, instituted new policies on a variety of peripheral issues. A more liberal City Council opted to support the United Farm Workers when Eisner Stores were picketed by students and others urging a boycott of lettuce and grapes. A more liberal City Council discussed the problem of American involvement in Viet Nam. A more liberal City Council voted to stop reciting the pledge of allegiance at the beginning of council sessions and tried for almost two years to pass a human rights ordinance. The controversy over the pledge was self-contained and the liberals won. But the intensity of the opposition suggest the limits to a more extensive shift to liberal policies. The conflict which swirled round a human rights ordinance illustrates the process of adaptation which shapes liberal principles to fit the norms of local politics.

The conflict of new social imperatives and established political norms is illustrated by the controversies over school policies and efforts to build a new swimming pool. In the former case, integration, although implemented voluntarily, failed to satisfy the aspirations of black or white parents, and the controversies left a legacy of apathy, suspicion and bitterness. In the latter, official enthusiasm for a new swimming pool, despite widespread opposition, strengthened citizen distrust of government. In both controversies, new obstacles were raised to government action and transformation of Urbana politics was slowed accordingly.

The Pledge of Allegiance

Reciting the pledge of allegiance was not a long established tradition of the Urbana City Council. Without passage of a resolution, the council started
to recite the pledge in 1970 in reaction to Viet Nam war protestors. Several council members were uncomfortable with the pledge and on June 2, 1975, the council voted six to five to stop reciting it. Four Republicans and Hilary Moore (D-Third Ward) opposed the action. The pledge then became an issue in Urbana politics, and on June 16, approximately 100 flag waving men and women attended the council meeting. After Mayor Paley opened the meeting, the crowd stood and recited the pledge and of course, the mayor and the council joined them. Throughout the meeting, repeated efforts were made to place the issue on the agenda, only to meet defeat. However, the council agreed to discuss the pledge at their next meeting.2

Letters to the editors flew fast and thick in the next two weeks. Alderman Edward Harris (D-Fourth Ward) criticized the citizens who attended the council meeting, stating, "I believe it (the City Council) will show a profile of courage in resisting the rude demands of a threatening mob demanding it yield and bend the knee before their coercive threat."3

At the July 7 council meeting, some sixty persons rose when the meeting was opened and recited the pledge. They were joined by the mayor and the City Council members, with the exception of Alderman Harris. In the discussion that followed, Harris was invited to go to Russia, and the Urbana American Legion commander told of a petition signed by 808 persons in support of recitation of the pledge. One Democrat and one Independent, John Peterson, changed their votes but six Democrats and Mrs. Finch (I-Second Ward) held firm and the anti-pledge group rejected reinstition of the pledge by a vote of seven to six.4 The council had shown a "profile of courage," but the intensity of public feeling was signified by the announcement of the News Gazette that it was publishing the list of council members who voted for and against the pledge.5

The depth of feeling aroused by the controversy over the pledge is typical of the motion generated by certain kinds of issues in local politics. A leash law, sex education in the schools, an ordinance to prohibit the burning of leaves, zoning changes, and any issue that touches the neighborhood—these rather than abstract calculations of profit and loss, or a twenty-year master plan for development—arouse citizens and draw large turnouts at council sessions or Plan Commission meetings. Perception of threat replaces lethargy and citizens are ready to be counted.

In the past twenty-five years the issues clustering around race and educational policy have had the power to arouse the citizenry. The generalization holds for Urbana, but there was a marked difference in response to the City Council's efforts to pass a human rights ordinance and to school administration plans to effect changes in the educational program. In the former, the controversy was contained within the circles of elected and appointed officials and generated little citizen interest. In the latter, controversy concerning educational policy spilled out of official confines, citizens were intensely and passionately involved, and the end result was reduced support for the schools.

A Human Rights Ordinance

During the years of opposition, the Champaign County Democratic Central Committee often expressed its commitment to the ideals of the national Democratic party, especially the commitment to greater equality between the races. The choice of objectives was not surprising, as noted above, Democratic success was attributable in part to an influx of persons associated with the university, who brought ideals and values acquired elsewhere to the Republican heartland. In return, the Third Ward, which includes most of the black population of Urbana, consistently voted Democratic, but voter turnout in the ward, with the exception of one school board race, remained low. Democrats wholeheartedly supported a public commitment to equality such as a human rights ordinance. However, Democrats with academic backgrounds were wary of educational programs alleged to benefit blacks but which seemed to denigrate academic excellence. The commitment to equality, at times, could be conveniently compartmentalized, but the various flare-ups deepened the divisions between Democrats and aroused dormant tensions in the community. This section explores the complexities of enactment of a human rights ordinance and contrasts this action with the controversy over educational policy.

The City Council began to discuss an ordinance forbidding discrimination in 1973, and at first it seemed that including homosexuals constituted the major stumbling block to legislation. The first
attempt to pass an ordinance making discrimination illegal was defeated on September 4, 1973, by a vote of seven to six. The Urbana Human Relations Commission (HRC was established in 1968) reconsidered the ordinance and several members continued to argue for a ban against all types of discrimination, including discrimination against homosexuals. The city attorney explained the legal and logical difficulties of a too inclusive ban against discrimination, and a subcommittee was asked to rework the provisions of the proposed ordinance.7

In January 1974, a Washington, D.C. ordinance on human rights which specifically banned discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, political affiliation, matriculation, or sexual orientation, was suggested to the HRC as a possible model for the Urbana ordinance.8 In October, a human rights ordinance, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, sexual orientation, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap, source of income, place of residence or business, and applying to employment, public accommodation, public services, housing and commercial space accommodation, again reached the City Council. The proposed ordinance provided that the Human Relations Officer would receive complaints, the Human Relations Commission would investigate complaints, and three commissioners would review the evidence in a public hearing and either dismiss the complaint for lack of evidence, attempt to resolve the case by conciliation, or present it to the full commission. The full commission could send the complaint to the city attorney who was empowered to file a quasi-criminal suit to secure compliance.9

The ordinance was comprehensive and appeared ready for council action, but serious legal questions regarding constitutionality and application remained unresolved. Questions raised by the mayor as to the scope of the ordinance and amendments proposed by several Republicans merited further discussion, and the council deferred action. The committee on legislation reworked the ordinance, and on December 2, the council deferred action again, this time because it wanted clarification of whether civil service regulations were in conflict with the ordinance.10

The committee on legislation then rewrote the credit provisions,11 and on December 17, the ordinance was again considered. The council was in session for three hours, four of the seven Republican amendments were debated and defeated, and action was again postponed.12 In January 1975, when the ordinance again appeared on the City Council agenda, the mayor claimed that the HRC chairman, a consistent critic of council deferments, had requested that the ordinance be returned to the HRC for further study. The council voted nine to four to return the ordinance but the vote polarized Democrats. Four democrats including Kenneth Appel opposed the action, and in protest Appel resigned as chairman of the committee on legislation. The council, as a concession to fears about further delay, imposed a five-week deadline on the HRC for return of the measure.13

The meetings continued and the sticking points continued to be inclusion of homosexuals and definition of the city's jurisdiction in relation to federal, state and local agencies. The university, the Urbana Park District, the Urbana School District, and Cunningham Township each sent letters to the mayor claiming that the city could not enforce the ordinance against them.14 The HRC was not able to meet the five-week deadline for returning the ordinance, but a revised ordinance was ready by March. On March 3, 1975, the final version, which declared the intent of the city "to secure an end to discrimination for any reason other than individual merit" and forbid discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, political affiliation, physical handicap, or place of residence was approved. The prohibition was applicable to employment, credit transactions and public accommodations. Housing was not included because prohibition of housing discrimination was provided by the Real Estate Licensing Ordinance which became effective in May, 1968.15

The Urbana school and park boards, the township board and the university continued to deny Urbana's jurisdiction concerning their employment practices, and the mayor, who had expressed reservations throughout the long debate, vetoed the measure, terming it "ineffective" and "dubious." Council Democrats strongly supported the ordinance, but failed by one vote to override the veto. Mayor Paley cited his fear that the ordinance violated state and federal law, and expressed dissatisfaction with enforcement provisions
whose primary function was symbolic, i.e. to arouse public opinion against offenders.16

The matter rested until July, when the mayor announced that a rewritten human rights ordinance was again ready for council discussion. The new ordinance provided stronger sanctions but exempted state and federal agencies, including the University of Illinois, the largest employer in the area, from its provisions.17 The revised ordinance was discussed at a study session in August, and the county, the school and park boards, and the township continued to deny the city's jurisdiction. In September and October, there were further discussions of the categories of discrimination, especially the question of which specific categories should be included in the ordinance.18 In November, the City Council, in a special session, debated amendments to the ordinance for four and one half hours. The ordinance was amended. A hearing board was created to determine if any unlawful discriminatory practice occurred, and by a seven to six vote, pregnant women were excluded from the protections of the ordinance.19 The exemption was a small victory for opponents of government regulations of business practices.

On November 17, the council finally approved the ordinance by an eight to five margin, with one amendment. State law forbids employers of twenty-five or more people from discriminating against pregnant women, and the council by voice vote withdrew the amendment which exempted pregnant women from the provisions of the ordinance. Opponents insisted that the ordinance was naive, impractical, dehumanizing, and likely to create friction between governmental units and increase litigation. The majority affirmed their commitment to greater equality of the races.20

The ordinance has not had much impact on the lives of the citizens of Urbana, even though such impact was a major argument in support of the measure. The ordinance was probably redundant, federal and state statutes and regulations cover the problem. Nevertheless, passage of the ordinance was significant in that the long controversy, including a veto, generated little interest in the public. The first ordinance, defeated in 1973, attracted public notice for its protection of homosexuals. In the long debate over the second ordinance, relations between the mayor excoriated the attempt of city government to regulate individual action, and other governmental bodies disputed the city's jurisdiction. But there were no public demonstrations, pro or con, nor was attendance at council sessions dramatically increased. In 1960, the passage of a human rights ordinance would have appeared visionary, perhaps even utopian; in 1975, despite delays and haggling over language and coverage, the dispute was no longer over the objective but over the means to achieve it. Public indifference to government regulation in a previously taboo area is perhaps the most telling illustration of the slowly evolving transformation of attitudes in Urbana. However, this change is only half of the story; the minimal impact of the ordinance is an illustration of the continued strength of individualistic norms. It is clear that the long debate over a human rights ordinance is yet another example of the conflicts which constrain the options of a new group of decision makers, and the subtle shaping of the structure of local politics.

Educational Policy

A greater tolerance of government intervention, including legal sanctions against discrimination, illustrate the interaction of national and local attitudes concerning the proper role of government. However, this slow evolution says little as to whether Urbana citizens will accept a program to radically alter the position of minority citizens. Although there is evidence that the black was ignored, isolated and generally outside the mainstream of life in Urbana until the early 1960s,21 conflicts over race were not major factors in local politics. Nevertheless, good government groups and liberals consistently fought to improve conditions for blacks. The League of Women Voters publicized the facts of black existence in a housing study in 1953 and in separate reports on the status of blacks in 1948 and 1968.

In 1966, Urbana became the first school district in the state of Illinois to institute a desegregation program. Circumstances were uniquely fortuitous; the school board made the decision while the superintendent was in Europe. The mechanics of integration were easily arranged: 80 percent of the children from Hayes School,* previously 99 percent black, were

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* Hayes School has been renamed the Martin Luther King, Jr. School.
bussed to elementary schools throughout the district, and the children from Orchard Downs, a university owned housing project for married graduate students, foreign students and visiting faculty were bussed to Hayes School. The addition of a few black children to classrooms throughout the district seemed unlikely to incite white parents, while the transportation of the children of transients obviously had little significance for permanent residents. Nevertheless, $500 was raised to institute legal action to stop the program. When no lawyer would take the case, the money was put into a kitty to run candidates opposed to integration at the next election. The 1967 election was a hard fought campaign; school board incumbents defended the record on integration, opponents ran as a slate in opposition and the slate was baldly defeated.

Officially, segregation did not exist at the junior and senior high schools in 1966 because there was only one junior and one senior high school. The 1968 League of Women Voters' Report on the status of blacks in Champaign County noted that, while integration on the elementary level appeared to be progressing smoothly, the junior and senior high schools, "which have always been integrated, show none of the positive effects of integration. There has been, in fact, an increase in racial tension in the past two years, reflecting the increase in racial tension and black militancy felt throughout the country.\(^\text{23}\) Tension was attributed to differences in academic preparedness, lack of social integration and the black student's perception that the curriculum was irrelevant and that he was excluded from school activities.\(^\text{24}\)

The gap between the experience of black and white students was great; the black population was concentrated in the northwest part of the city and until 1966 attended a segregated elementary school. When contact was introduced at the junior high level, it resulted in harassment. "Because of difficulties in the girls' washroom in 1967-68, the students developed an unwritten law that white and Negro girls use the washroom in shifts and a guard from each group was posted at the door to insure separate use."\(^\text{25}\)

Separateness of the groups was increased by "ability grouping." Many white children came from academic families and were strongly motivated. Many blacks were in slow learner classes, and the special education classes also were mostly black. In senior high school, separation was even more striking. In 1967-68, 11 percent of a student population of 1,374 was black. However, less than 1 percent of the students who participated in nonathletic extracurricular activities were black. In athletics, black participation was greater, four of five members of the first string basketball team were black, but there were no black cheerleaders or team managers. The dropout rate for the school ranged from 17 to 20 percent, but the black rate was approximately 50 percent. This figure was a marked improvement from the early 1960s when the black dropout rate was close to 90 percent. Ten to 15 percent of the black students were in college preparatory programs as compared to 58 percent of the white students.\(^\text{26}\)

The figures graphically demonstrate the gap between white and black and suggest that busing was only the beginning of an ameliorative effort. Some activists wanted to make a more extensive effort, and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 added impetus to their activity. In addition, the new interest in local politics and increased Democratic activity spilled into school affairs. Critics of past policy ran for office and won. The new members were interested in innovation and educational experimentation, and they soon had the opportunity to translate words into action. Although Urbana was integrated in 1966, major changes were not instituted in the curriculum and the schools continued to serve primarily the white college oriented student. In June 1971, the school superintendent announced his retirement, to take effect one year later. A search committee for a new superintendent was created; it was composed of eighteen people, three from each school constituency, Citizens Advisory Committee, P.T.A., faculty, non-academic employees, students and administrators. The committee waded through dossiers, interviewed the top candidates and decided on Eugene Howard as the new superintendent. Howard took office in June 1972, amidst high expectations that he would lead the district in a progressive direction. Programs emphasizing individual needs and growth, which were already in middle-class academic neighborhood schools would be extended to schools in working-class districts and to junior and senior high schools. More adequate programs for black
students would be designed and implemented and the school district would enter a new era.

The honeymoon did not last through the first year of Howard's term. Joseph Bechard, Howard's choice as assistant superintendent, became a center of controversy. Some parents were suspicious that the new programs failed to provide the best possible academic preparation; others doubted that the programs were of benefit to black students. Discipline at the high school, a problem in the 1960s, deteriorated during the 1972-73 school year. It was rumored that on any given class day, there were 500 unexcused class absences. The difficulties at the high school increased the anxiety of middle-class parents and intensified the alienation of those parents who had been the major support of an innovative, progressive school program.

Howard was hired for a three-year term, but by the end of the second year, momentum for his termination was building among middle-class parents. Howard sought support of his programs from black parents. In February 1974, a group of black parents including Paul Hursey, former Democratic alderman, publicly praised Howard and supported his educational policies. Hursey noted the fact of desegregation in 1966, but claimed that children were resegregated immediately within the classroom by "homogenous grouping, ability grouping, tracking, testing and all the other educational mechanisms." Black parents believed that Howard had changed these policies and claimed that they saw "a positive change in the approach to educating our children."²⁷

The black community also rallied to support Evelyn Burnett, a black incumbent on the school board, who announced her intention to run for a third term. The subterranean controversy, which had agitated Urbana parents for two years, was now in the political arena and the April 1974 school board election became a referendum on the programs of Superintendent Howard. Two seats were at stake and the incumbents Burnett and Burnham were Howard supporters. Crawford and Stolz, the challengers, were critical. The result was inconclusive, Crawford was elected and Burnett was re-elected, and there were rumors that Howard would resign. However, the election was significant in that the black community turned out in record numbers to vote for Evelyn Burnett. Only 2,069 ballots were cast, a significant decline from the total of 2,687 votes in the previous school board election. But in the King School precinct, the center of the black community, 25 votes were cast in 1973 and 170 ballots were cast in 1974, an increase of almost 1700 percent. The black citizens of Urbana, despite a poor voter participation record, could be activated when the stakes were sharp and clear, in support of their perceived interests.

The issue was clear, at least to the black community. White parents and some members of the school board disputed the value of Howard's programs not only for academic reasons but because they failed to ameliorate black problems. The third year of Howard's tenure continued to be troubled, and tensions increased after the release in October of a fifty-three page report, analyzing Childrew's records for the years 1959-1974. The report confirmed black suspicions about homogeneous grouping, ability grouping, tracking, testing, and other educational mechanisms. The report failed to show positive results from interaction. The achievement of black students after desegregation as measured by standardized achievement tests did not decrease when compared to all students and achievement of non-blacks did not increase. The mean score of black five year olds was comparable to the mean scores of all five year olds and black enrollment at the high school had improved dramatically since 1966. But Anna Wall Scott, Democratic central committeewoman and unsuccessful candidate for school board in every election between 1966 and 1970, interpreted the report as a vindication of her criticisms of white, middle-class approaches to education. The pot was boiling again, and in November, Howard offered his resignation to the school board. The board concluded that it was in the best interest of the school district to accept the resignation. Evelyn Burnett, in a separate statement, reiterated the black community's support for Howard and their belief that his programs insured every student equal access to a good education.²⁹

There were no winners in the controversy, and the gap between black and white widened during Howard's tenure. Middle-class parents, originally strong supporters of the district and sympathetic towards "progressive" programs, were alienated by indifference to academic excellence. Whether black students were benefited by new programs remains a disputed matter.
It is difficult to determine what went wrong. Obviously, good intentions often are insufficient to produce intended results. But the problem is more complex, and the intensity of conflicting perceptions of the controversy was ignored by the concerned parties. Alan Peshkin analyzed the dilemma for school policy created by conflict between national ideals on equality and the local values of Mansfield, a small, rural town in Illinois. A harmonious relationship existed between school and community, in part at the expense of national ideals.

Particularism or local community good is pitted against universalism or national public good, both of which inspire activity that is essential to human dignity and well-being and, also, to national integration and survival. Since the interests of local groups are not coterminous with those of the nation, there always will be tension between these groups and the nation. What is good for Mansfield is not inevitably good for the nation. The converse is true, as well, though it is unpleasant to contemplate a society so insecure that it does not feel enriched by its subgroup enclaves which strive to maintain their identity. Yet if a subgroup mentality prevails unchecked, then national integration and social justice for all may be threatened.30

Urbana is not Mansfield, Urbana has a more heterogeneous, sophisticated population, but the analysis suggests the complex background of school-community relationships, and the feeling of proprietorship towards the schools in Urbana. Ironically, it was the more sophisticated newcomer to Urbana, who displayed the most marked signs of "ownership" of the schools, and who were not alienated by Howard's problems. During the 1960s, the schools enjoyed strong support from citizens. Although critical parents demanded excellence and an amelioration of conditions for blacks, they consistently worked for and passed school referenda. Table 6.1 illustrates the record of success from 1962 to 1969, and shows that there were no referenda from 1969 until 1975. In 1975, two tax rate referenda were defeated by close votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REFERENDUM</th>
<th>VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 10, 1962</td>
<td>To build Thomas Paine School - $479,000.</td>
<td>3,263 1,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase Educational Fund from $1.69 to $2.05.</td>
<td>3,067 2,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 11, 1964</td>
<td>Increase transportation from .02 to .05.</td>
<td>909 660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 5, 1964</td>
<td>Addition to High School - $1,120,000.</td>
<td>2,606 766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 11, 1967</td>
<td>Additions to Leal, Yankee Ridge, Webber, Prairie Schools - $945,000.</td>
<td>1,509 796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 15, 1969</td>
<td>To Build Brookens Junior High School - $1,600,000.</td>
<td>3,031 878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 15, 1975</td>
<td>Increase Educational Fund from $2.05 to $2.37</td>
<td>2,308 2,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 1975</td>
<td>Advisory Referendum on School - Park Swimming Pool</td>
<td>699 4,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 1975</td>
<td>Increase Educational Fund from $2.05 to $2.37</td>
<td>2,656 2,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is difficult to generalize about the failure to pass rate increases because complicating factors, such as general opposition to increased taxation and the controversy over a new swimming pool, also affected the results; but a residue of bitterness from the controversies during Howard's tenure, as well as the belief that the school administration was unwilling or incapable of paying sufficient attention to the real task--provision of adequate educational services--contributed to the disaffection of Urbana citizens. In March 1976, when school needs were obvious, i.e. sports were curtailed, curriculum offerings were cut, and the class day was shortened, a tax rate referendum was finally successful but by a very small margin. Grudging support for school needs is a most telling indicator of the continuing disaffection of community from school.

The Part District-School District Swimming Pool

After Howard submitted his resignation, the racial overtones of school controversy faded into the background, particularly as it suddenly became apparent that the school district was caught in the worst financial crisis of its history. The financial crisis was one factor in what came to be the most divisive public policy issue in recent Urbana history--the proposed park district--school district swimming pool. The question of the school district participation in this intergovernmental venture was resolved when the voters of Urbana overwhelmingly rejected the pool 4109-699, but the controversy in increased bitterness and distrust between the activists, who had been the architects of "new," more enlightened politics for Urbana, and the "citizenry."

As noted before, the citizen, regardless of socioeconomic status, who maintains a steady, continuing interest in local politics is a rare species. Most citizens are interested in concrete issues, for example, in the specifics of zoning changes which might affect the immediate neighborhood. Abstract plans for the future, such as a comprehensive land use plan for city or county, attract relatively little attention and fail to draw large turnouts to Plan Commission meetings or City Council sessions. The professional, especially the planner, is the actor in municipal politics, with the interest in long term development and the skills and training to order and structure such development. However, professional objectives and values in the concrete case often differ markedly from the diffuse objectives of the citizen. Professional orientation stresses the rationalization of organization as well as the rational calculation of costs and benefits, especially over the long term, as the basic determinants of public policy. The resultant policies, as the example of the swimming pool suggests, may exacerbate dormant tensions in the community. The issues raised by the conflict over the swimming pool--distrust of professional advice, distrust of officials by citizens and a heightened awareness of the utility of a fragmented political structure--will be significant factors in the continuing evolution of Urbana politics and/or the continued incumbency of the Democrats.

The Democrats, when they were the minority, strongly advocated professionalism in city departments. Once in power, they extended the sphere of professionalism introduced by Mayor Zipprodt, but they carefully defined the limits of professional influence. For example, Democrats strongly and consistently opposed any proposal to create a city manager in Urbana, believing that representatives of the people should retain decision-making power. The example of the city manager in Champaign suggested, all too vividly, that a professional manager had too much opportunity to extend his sphere of discretion and influence at the expense of local officeholders. Given this background, it is ironic that the last defense of some "democratic" officeholders in the controversy over the pool was that professionals favored the proposal.

Discussions about a swimming pool to replace the aging pool in Crystal Lake Park occurred periodically during the 1960s. The park board in certain senses had written off the Crystal Lake Park pool--the cost of modernization was greater than the anticipated return from improvement. To the park board, the question was not the need for, but the mechanics of constructing a pool, its location, and how to finance it. The latter problems appeared to be on the way to solution when Urbana established a Public Building Commission in 1973. Although the county did not join the commission, Cunningham township and the Urbana school and park districts joined the city as members of the commission. The first and only attempt, and it was not even a formal effort, to use the Urbana Public Building Commission came in November 1973, when
members of the Urbana Park Board approached the mayor about using the commission to build a swimming pool.33

Nothing came of the move, but for two years, the prospect of using this method of financing the pool gave opponents a great issue—the UPBC was described as a "sneaky" way to levy taxes without a referendum. Opponents insisted that a referendum had to be held before the project could be undertaken. Although discrediting the UPBC in the debate over financing the pool may limit significantly the options of political officeholders in the future, the immediate issue was not the method of financing the pool, but the school-park proposal to build a swimming pool.

In November 1973, the school and park boards began to work together to plan a joint pool to replace the aging Crystal Lake Pool and the ancient high school "oversized bath tub." The cost of replacement was estimated, in 1972, at approximately $800,000, but by 1973 inflation had increased the estimate substantially.34 In May 1974, a joint park district-school district committee with the advice of expert consultants agreed on a site immediately east of Urbana High School. Costs were estimated at $1,760,000, excluding the costs of land acquisition.35

By September, citizen opposition to the site (the high school is located in a middle-class, residential neighborhood with a parking problem and little, if any, open space between the school and the neighborhood) was gaining momentum. The school board, which was already in difficulties due to the controversies over Superintendent Howard and the spreading fiscal crisis, was intensively lobbied. The board, perhaps as a compromise, suggested that a referendum should be held before it made a commitment to the project. Legally the board could not initiate a referendum and citizens had to petition the board to hold one.

Petitions were circulated by proponents, opponents and neutrals, but the activity of circulating petitions provided opponents with the opportunity to work together and increase their cohesion. An ad hoc opposition coalition soon came into being, composed of neighborhood residents who objected to the "noise" of a pool and who feared it would adversely affect property values, persons concerned about the costs of the proposed facility in a time of economic stringency, and adherents of Crystal Lake Pool who enjoyed the park setting and found the contrast between the old and new pool too stark. The proposed pool was to be set between school buildings, and opponents argued that the natural site provided no amenities. In addition, opponents were united by their fear that the school and park boards were trying to pull a fast one. It was rumored that citizens were told that the project was still in the planning stages, even as the park board allegedly applied to the Regional Planning Commission for funds to buy property in the area. The reassurances of members of the Joint Swimming Pool Committee as to the openness of their proceedings and their unwillingness to proceed behind the backs of citizens did not assuage the suspicions of opponents.36 Opponents continued to insist on a full and public debate on the proposal and on the need for a referendum.37

A public information meeting to discuss costs, proposals for financing the pool, and location was held in September. The school board tried but failed to clarify their position—that they would support the pool only if the people wanted it. The pool was criticized as financially irresponsible and depicted as an attempt to "circumvent specific programmatic and financial limits which are placed on governmental districts." The benefits of the proposed pool were denigrated and it was suggested that the pool would not be as accessible to the children of low income families as Crystal Lake Pool. The hearing was a fiasco as far as proponents of the pool were concerned. If its purpose was to allay suspicion and generate support for a successful referendum, the strategy failed.38 As long as the preferred method of funding appeared to be the sale of bonds by the UPBC, an advisory referendum was the only way to test public sentiment and allay suspicion.

Opposition continued to mount as petitions circulated to call for a referendum. The moves of proponents, referring the proposal to the Urbana Plan Commission and the Regional Planning Commission for further evaluation, did not diminish the antagonism of opponents who continued to stress the potential harm to the neighborhood, the extra costs to the city for widening streets, rebuilding intersections and installing lights near the pool, and their fears of underhanded action by the park and school boards.

Such fears were strengthened when D. G.
Schumacher, editor of the Champaign-Urbana Courier, suggested editorially that school and park board members should make a decision without recourse to a referendum. Schumacher argued that board members were elected, they had the authority to make a decision, and a referendum would generate more heat than light. Opponents read the editorial as more reason to distrust the motivation and tactics of the members of the Joint School District-Park District Swimming Pool Committee, and continued to insist on holding a referendum.

In January, the school board decided to hold the referendum in October 1975, and claimed that the long interval was necessitated by the district's budget crisis. It was obvious that the board would have to ask citizens to increase the school tax rate, and the board wanted to separate the pool and budget issues. Opponents of the pool suggested that the strategy was a mistake; taxpayer resistance might doom both the pool and a school tax rate referendum. They advised the school board to take a public stand and reject participation in the pool.

Late in January, the tax rate referendum was scheduled for March 15. In the meantime, the Urbana Plan Commission gave unqualified approval to the pool, finding that the project has been "thoughtfully developed in good faith by many dedicated persons in a long process of careful study."

To proponents, the commission report appeared as vindication; to opponents, the report provided additional evidence of the hard-headedness of officialdom and the unwillingness or inability of government to respond to the concerns of citizens. The Plan Commission scheduled a public hearing on its report and opponents turned out to criticize the commission's conclusions. The commission agreed to reconsider the report and claimed that it was willing to amend it.

Meetings continued throughout February and opponents concentrated their attack on the school board. They insisted that the referendum on the pool should be held before October, arguing that the tax rate referendum was endangered. Voters were unwilling to vote a tax increase of 33 cents per $100 assessed valuation in March, with the prospect of an additional 22 cent increase for the pool. Opponents advised the board to either announce publicly and firmly that they were dropping the pool or, on March 15, put both the tax increase and the pool referendum before the public. "In this way, voters will be able to support the educational function of their school district, and at the same time will be able to kill once and for all an ill-advised pool project which has so antagonized most of the people of Urbana." Whether or not most of the people of Urbana were opposed to the pool is an open question. However, it was clear that a large number of vocal, organized, middle-class citizens, the natural constituency of the schools, were strongly opposed.

The school board did not take the advice of pool opponents and only the tax rate referendum appeared on the ballot on March 15. Turnout was heavy and the referendum failed: 1,858 to 2,308. It is impossible to estimate the significance of the pool on the negative vote. As noted above, the school board was in trouble with many voters; the policies of Superintendent Howard and poor fiscal management destroyed reserves of trust and creditability. The deficit had been building since 1971, and the school board put off the hard decisions necessary to bring the budget under control. By March 1975, such traditional supporters of the schools as the League of Women Voters were willing to offer only qualified support for the tax rate referendum. The league statement reaffirmed its traditional support for the schools, but stressed that league support was "based on the expectation that continued efforts will be made to put the district on a sound financial basis."

With the defeat of the tax rate referendum, the board quickly intensified its search for ways to cut the budget. It also reconsidered its decision to wait until October for the pool referendum. On March 23, the school board, despite opposition from the park board, rescheduled the referendum on the swimming pool for April 29. The board statement read:

But as we all know, the tax referendum failed. The board would prefer to continue to address these two questions--separately and in order of priority. We recognize a substantial amount of anxiety and confusion exists in regard to the pool. Therefore, even though it is not our first priority, but in order for the public...
The people had spoken but some officials did not hear the message. The park board president blamed the defeat on economics and timing, not site or design. The school board president expressed his surprise at the size of the vote and agreed to abide by the voters' decision, even as he noted that the referendum was not legally binding. The mayor interpreted the vote as a sign of a downward trend and stressed the need for an affirmative vote on a second tax rate increase. "People in this community value schools very highly. Poor funding of schools and such could eventually drive down property values and discourage people from moving into Urbana." The obtuseness of elected officials, as suggested by the above comments, is perhaps one factor in the increased alienation of citizens from the political activists dedicated to improving the quality of life in Urbana.

To resolve in its own mind and to advise us of their intent, we now feel it advisable to hold the public policy referendum on the swimming pool as soon as possible.45

The concession by the school board on the date of the referendum was perceived as grudging by pool opponents. In addition, the park board which continued to support the pool strongly, undertook a public information campaign to sell the pool. The school board, because of its membership on the joint pool committee, was not perceived as neutral in the contest.

For the following month, the newspapers carried articles on the advantages and disadvantages of a new pool.46 The joint pool committee charged that literature opposed to the pool, distributed by the Urbana Citizens' Pool Committee, misrepresented the facts.47

One day before the vote, proponents ran a paid advertisement supporting the pool which was signed by 140 individuals, including Democratic and Republican officeholders, the mayor, and many of the people who had been actively involved in bringing a "new" type of politics to Urbana.48 Opponents of the pool were not dismayed by the last minute "blitz." As one opponent commented, the 140 names included every supporter of the pool in Urbana. The estimate was not far off; the pool was defeated, 4,109 to 699.

The result is quite satisfactory from a democratic perspective. The people said no and officials.

shortly before the pool referendum.50 The campaign covered questions of the pool, the school deficit, and another tax rate referendum. When the campaign was over, it was observed of one of the winners, "that at least she listens." Other elected officials might take notice of the comment; they did not listen to the widely expressed concerns of citizens and suffered a crushing defeat. Whether or not school and park board officials really intended to push the pool despite vocal and widespread opposition, they appeared to be willing to do so, and the appearance served to heighten distrust and antagonism. Even after the decisive defeat of the proposed pool, statements of park board officials hinted at further efforts to get the project moving. Such statements, even if they were only attempts to put a good face on a bitter defeat, contribute to the destruction of trust between citizens and elected officials. One result in Urbana is not the downward trend that the mayor prophesized, but an upward trend in cynicism about local politics among the individuals who were the core support of a more activist government dedicated to acting for the common good.

The success of pool opponents and the opponents of Carle Foundation may be attributed to the governmental framework which derives from individualistic political culture. Cultural norms put a premium on non-cohesive action as participants seek to maximize their own interests. In these circumstances, the government finds it difficult to define communal objectives, let alone mobilize to act. But there are no restrictions on who can participate, and citizens can enter the process to protect their interests. Opposition to the pool began with residents of the neighborhood. They took the initiative, investigated the proposal, attended every park and school board meeting and closely questioned officials on pool plans. Others became alerted to the problem, and the existence of some organizations, such as the West Urbana Neighborhood Association, helped to widen the circles in which the word could be spread. The effort snowballed, people were concerned and disturbed about the project, and official reassurances did not allay suspicion. More people joined the effort and the pool project was rejected. There was no "government" that could withstand them.

The result is quite satisfactory from a democratic perspective. The people said no and officials...
were forced to drop the project. But this veto power derives from the absence of government strength and cohesion, from what could be termed a hiatus in governmental power. The hiatus is reinforced by conflicting perceptions of the common good and the absence of ideological imperatives. The power is essentially negative, and the other side of the coin is the great difficulty in effecting "needed" action since the hiatus affects the scope of leadership. A community committed to the status quo has little need for leadership, but a community which recognizes the need for change may find itself stymied for lack of leadership. To sum up this argument, it should be noted that adherence to the norms of individualistic political culture provides the openings for a diversity of voices in the political marketplace. In Urbana, particularly, since the Democrats won a majority, there is a rough equality of voices. In these circumstances, the question of who rules becomes irrelevant. The real questions instead cluster around whether a consensus on what needs to be done can be determined, and whether the process results in a consensus which offers a rough approximation of equity for diverse interests.

The pattern is visible in the conclusion of the tale of the vicissitudes of the Urbana school district. After the pool referendum, the Urbana school board returned to the task of cutting the budget, and succeeded in reducing the budget by almost $1,200,000. They also worked on generating support for a second tax rate referendum scheduled for May 16, believing that the voters now had the facts and were aware of the consequences of another rejection. The second referendum produced an additional 348 "yes" votes for the tax rate increase but the result remained negative. The school board president admitted that "the voters had spoken. In fact, they have begun to repeat themselves. The clear message is that they expect this school district to live on a reduced educational diet." Economic conditions played a major role in the rejection, "but speculation on the impact of board leadership and lack of public confidence in the board remain a factor in the eyes of some observers."

Whatever the explanation, an "era" in Urbana history was ending. Citizens supported their schools generously, and were proud of their excellence. They might criticize board policies but they generally accepted the board's right to make policy. The conflict over the superintendent, tax increases and the pool weakened support for the schools, and increased pressure on the board to make a decision on priorities. The school board was either unwilling or unable to clarify and rank priorities, and the failure exposed the hiatus in the decision making process. The controversies raised questions about the ability, competence and trustworthiness of public officials, and adversely affected voter support for a tax rate increase. The board finally succeeded in March 1976 in its quest for a tax increase, but it took a referendum effort and the margin of victory was small. The controversies over school policies illustrate the new "realities" of Urbana politics, and significantly affect attempts to bring a new, more public spirited politics into being.

Conclusion

Urbana was described in the 1960s as a more homogeneous city than Champaign. A loose alliance of influential individuals, primarily business men working with elected officials behind the scenes, could bring downtown Urbana into "the present" by the construction of Lincoln Square. Consensus on the priorities of development in practical terms meant inadequate subdivision ordinances, inadequate staff of city inspectors, and a lenient attitude toward the provision of streets, sidewalks and lights in the new residential areas. Tolerance for zoning variations and inadequate staff also made it easy to illegally convert single family residences into rooming houses. The result was an illusion of economic progress along with some citizen dissatisfaction and frustration. Public power too often appeared to be the handmaiden of business interests, and there seemed to be a too ready convergence of the developer's interest and the public interest.

Citizen dissatisfaction was channeled by opposition Democrats into electoral victory. The Democrats, as the opposition, developed their own networks of interested, active citizens, willing to devote the time to become knowledgeable and to summon the energy to do something about the city's problems. When the Democrats won a majority in 1973, hopes for a "new deal" and a government more responsive to the concerns of all citizens were high. A more representative group of citizens was appointed to the various governmental commissions, and input was sought from minorities,
especially the black community, and students, who had previously taken little part in local politics.

One consequence of Democratic victory was an expanded role for local government. The city of Urbana undertook more commitments, ranging from stricter enforcement of the housing code, to community redevelopment, to a human rights ordinance, than were dreamed of years ago. But the new commitments increased the pressure on local resources and generated new frustrations with government.

A second consequence of Democratic victory was to increase the number of groups and individuals with a voice in the political process. It is just more difficult to make a decision, any kind of decision, than it was in 1960. No "leader" has a strong enough base to act autonomously. The issues of local politics do not lend themselves to the enhancement of charisma, and individualistic norms reinforce the demands of self interest. It is hard to build consensus on policy and even more difficult to maintain cohesion. The result, however inadvertent, is increased fragmentation of interests in the marketplace, an increase which reinforces political inertia. Inertia does not pose a major problem for a community committed to the status quo, but if elites and the public recognize the need for and demand change, inertia constrains their options.

One response of Democratic officials to fragmentation is an increasing reliance on professional judgement and on the planning apparatus to provide the "factual" justification for proposed projects. The strategy is in accord with academic prescriptions, especially notions of the relationship between professional government procedures and good government, but abstract prescriptions sometimes fail to suit the "realities" of local politics. As a partial response to the heightened turmoil, confusion and fragmentation of two years of Democratic rule, Mayor Paley proposed that the Urbana Plan Commission become the central planning board for the school and park districts, as well as for the city. The proposal was presented at a joint meeting of the City Council and Plan Commission and was well received by both groups.

Such a proposal, if it could be implemented, would go a long way, at least on paper, in overcoming the chaos and confusion of local government, and perhaps would function to rationalize decisions in terms of the general good. However, for a variety of reasons, the proposal generated opposition. The school board, although it was offered the opportunity to select one member of the Plan Commission, had little inclination to surrender any of the autonomy it enjoyed under state laws. Citizens, who had become sensitive to the implicit powers of local government, also reacted with hostility to the proposal. A letter signed by members of the Urbana Citizens' Pool Committee (the core opposition to the pool) and sent to the City Council, pointed out certain disadvantages of increased "centralization."

The danger of the Urbana Plan Commission acting as planning board for the Park and School Districts is precisely this: an undesirable project may be proposed, with the main justification being that it must be good because it is a joint project. The Plan Commission's approval would then be cited as further evidence that the project is a worthy one, as if this approval represented some official certification of the desirability of the project. Citizen's objections and criticisms might then be ignored or discounted, the implication being that any proposal endorsed by the School Board and the Park Board and the Urbana Plan Commission must certainly be all right. As a result, citizens would have many fewer opportunities to analyze a proposed project, or to have serious attention given to their possible objections. Furthermore, the entire planning process would be condensed: there would be fewer public meetings on proposals, so that the review process would be endangered, and citizen opinion would have less chance of being heard.

There is the further danger that this joint approach might be used to circumvent the desires of the voters of the School and Park Districts. If these Districts wished to embark on some expensive venture, requiring
large amounts of additional tax revenues, they would ordinarily need voter approval for the increased taxes. However, if the Districts proposed a joint venture, to be funded from increased local taxes through the Public Building Commission, then voter approval would not be required. In such a situation, the Urbana Plan Commission's participation in this joint venture might convey the false impression that the proposal had voter support. In fact as pointed out earlier, the Urbana Plan Commission does not have any authority whatsoever to speak on behalf of the voters.55

The letter was a harsh indictment of the motives of elected officials as well as a recognition that the interests of citizens are not automatically safeguarded by increased coordination of government units. In fact, it appeared that joint planning might seriously weaken citizen "control" over local agencies and diminish the power of the City Council.56

In changed circumstances, traditional arguments about power, control and the rights of citizens are heard again. The Democrats placed new emphasis on government as the agent of the common good, but citizen perception of the results, especially fears concerning the consequences of professional decisions and centralization of government, generated additional obstacles to intergovernmental cooperation and cohesive action. A drawn out decision making process suddenly had great value in that it offered the interested citizen the opportunity to intervene in the specific decisions that shape the quality of life in a small community. In Urbana, the participants were roughly equal and the results were both unpredictable and spectacular. When the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing, it became relatively easy for groups and individuals to exercise a veto power which delayed or halted action.

Whether such intervention is labeled as good or bad typically depends on whose interests are benefited or harmed, as well as on the quality and intent of the interveners. Conflict and frustration result from a fragmented political process, and may strengthen the attractions of the status quo, reinforce a nostalgia for the "good old days," or produce a frustrating stalemate. Few citizens have a broad conception of the public good and many citizens have only the haziest notions about what should be done, but democratic theory assures the citizen the right to participate in the political process. The fragmented politics of Urbana provided the openings which allowed citizens to participate and to reject oligarchic and expert claims to order their future.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 6

4 News Gazette, 8 July 1975.
5 News Gazette, 10 July 1975.
6 See below, p. 162.
8 News Gazette, 10 January 1974.
9 News Gazette, 10 October 1974; See also Daily Illini, 10 October 1974.
15 News Gazette, 4 March 1975.
17 News Gazette, 3 July 1975.
18 News Gazette, 23 October 1975.
19 News Gazette, 11 November and 18 November 1975.
20 News Gazette, 18 November 1975.
23 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 6.
26 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
30 Alan Peshkin, "Whom Shall The Schools Serve? The Dilemmas of Local Control in a Rural School District," (forthcoming), 1975, p. 34.
31 Urbana School District.
35 News Gazette, 10 May 1974.
36 News Gazette, 10 September 1974.
40 News Gazette, 8 January 1975.
42 Letter to the School Board, March 4, 1975, from Irving Reiner.
44 News Gazette, 7 March 1975.
CHAPTER 7

CHAMPAIGN: THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Introduction

Despite the proximity to Urbana and the shared political culture, Champaign exhibited a markedly different pattern of political response to the problems of the 1970s. Champaign’s origins were more rational and more attuned to commercial objectives and it quickly became the dominant commercial city. Its population is more heterogeneous and there is less emphasis on communal purposes and projects. Flynn and Alexander summed up the difference.

In contrast, (to Urbana) Champaign is heterogeneous in composition and more metropolitan or cosmopolitan in outlook. Distinctions between wealthy and poor are more pronounced, and an acute problem in substandard housing exists in the North section of the city. Real estate expansion in Champaign has been much more rapid, especially over the past five years than in Urbana, with three major subdivisions growing up. The tendency has been for developers to build on land outside the city limits, where they were not constrained by city zoning and housing regulations; only after completion of construction has the land been annexed, leaving the city with the problem of supplying improved streets, sidewalks, proper lighting, and other facilities. The city has been unable to keep pace financially with these needs and at present, has a severe problem with sewers, streets and streetlights. However, because no clearly defined core leadership exists and because neighborhoods lack community spirit and a sense of unity, joint action on problems is difficult.1
In contrast to the city's minimal ability to achieve communal action is the willingness and ability to experiment with the formal structure of government. Champaign originally used the aldermanic form—the only form allowed by state law. The state authorized the use of the commission form of government in 1910, and by 1917, Champaign was willing to experiment with this alternative. Commission government remained in effect until 1959 when council-manager government was inaugurated. There was a concerted effort to abandon council-manager government in 1968, but the referendum was defeated. However in 1973, at-large representation on the City Council was modified to produce a mixed district, at-large representation.

Alterations in the structure of government appear to have had limited effect on energizing responses to communal problems. The exception may prove to be the shift to modified district, at-large representation, which will be discussed below. None of the changes, except for the failed grass-roots attempt to abandon city manager government, generated much public interest or involvement, and it is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that they were imposed on a politically passive citizenry. Constraints on participation are more evident in Champaign than in Urbana, and electoral obstacles to activation of the citizenry reinforced the natural tendencies of individualistic political culture. Elections were and remain nonpartisan. Party allegiance is obscured, and whatever assistance party labels provide in organizing confusing political data is minimized. The adoption of city manager government in 1955 and its activation in 1959 reinforced the hold of the norms and practices of individualistic political culture. The shift to more professional government was an attempt to insure better performance in the individualistic framework as illustrated by the policy outputs of council-manager government.

In contrast to aldermanic government in Urbana, at-large representation in Champaign militated against the organization and representation of parochial or minority interests. The result is not surprising; at-large representation was justified originally as a device to minimize gerrymandering and was considered to be a protection against minority or "boss" rule. In theory, it offered more opportunity for articulation of the public good and appeared to have the potential to raise government above the petty conflicts of politics. The theoretical justification has been used to advantage by politicians in Champaign, but in practice, at-large representation served to limit the introduction of new personalities and interests. The most telling argument against at-large representation was the fact that during the 1960s an overwhelming proportion of Champaign council members lived in one middle- to upper-middle-class residential area in southwest Champaign.

A heterogeneous population and structure of government combine with the preferences of individualistic cultural to reinforce the tendency to passivity. The extent of noninvolvement in Champaign stands in striking contrast to the political activity in Urbana in the late 1960s and 1970s. The ease of introducing major changes in the structure of government is not a measure of citizen activism. The changes appear to be fashionable, cosmetic changes which exaggerate the influence of individualistic culture in that they were not generated by citizen demands. The periodic declaration in public administration textbooks that a new form of government was "progressive" and would ameliorate the difficulties of local administration could have served as the major stimulus for governmental change.

The contrast between political activity in Urbana and political passivity in Champaign is one measure of the distinctiveness of political behavior in adjacent civil communities. This chapter explores selected examples of citizen passivity in Champaign, suggests an explanation for the behavior, and assesses its consequences for policy. The adoption and operation of council-manager government will receive special attention, not just because it is the government still in operation but because council-manager government was so easily adapted to the practices of individualistic culture and reinforced the tendency to passivity.

Citizen Participation

The fundamental apathy of the population is suggested by the campaign to adopt the commission form of government in 1917. It took three referenda before the people ratified the new form of government. The eventual victory enabled the Daily Champaign City News to report that "the will of the people finally tri-
umphed at the polls. . . ." The triumph was 1,308 in favor of the change to 1,023 in opposition.2

In 1955, a campaign to adopt a council-manager form of government was initiated by members of the Chamber of Commerce. An ad hoc committee was formed, composed of "individuals," including a few blacks, although there was at the time little evidence of black interest in community affairs. Representation from such established groups as the Chamber of Commerce, the university, the League of Women Voters, and the PTA was also obtained. Labor support was sought but the effort was unsuccessful. Financial support came from long-established families, particularly the Robesons (department store owners) and the Eisners (local owners of a grocery chain). The change of council-manager form was adopted by a narrow majority (4,661 to 4,319),3 but the newspapers did not present the referendum as a triumph of the people's will.

In 1968, the voters had the opportunity to reconsider the question of the council-manager form of government. On August 28, 1967, petitions calling for abandonment of council-manager government and bearing the signatures of 1,297 Champaign residents were filed in the city clerk's office. The coalitions in support of abandonment and retention, as well as the conflicts that generated the controversy over governmental form, will be discussed below. Here it is necessary only to note that the referendum was scheduled for the general election in November 1968, in part because it was believed that the vote for the council-manager government would be larger in the general election than in the primary or a special election.4 No municipal election generated a turnout of more than 10,000 voters, but council-manager government was retained by a vote of two to one (11,032-5,382).5

Although the status quo was maintained, opposition to council-manager government remained concentrated in the working-class neighborhoods of Champaign. Critics focused on the alleged unrepresentativeness of the City Council, whose members were selected at large. Democrats, university affiliated persons, and activist blacks were agreed in believing that they were shut out from decision making by the continuing concentration of council members in a small area of Champaign. Although nonpartisan, at-large elections purport to lead to the election of "individuals" whose allegiance is to the "public good," the concentration of council members in a few middle- to upper-middle-class precincts strengthened the opposite understanding in the minds of political activists. Such activists probably looked with envy at the diversity of representation on Urbana's City Council and the increasing expression of alternate policies by Urbana council members. From 1967 to 1973, Urbana enjoyed a period of genuine party and policy competition and the result was high voter interest and turnout for elections.

The dissatisfaction of critics and activists, however, did not provide the leading impetus for change in Champaign government. In 1969, Mayor Virgil Wikoff proposed a new council structure which allowed for more diverse representation, at least in theory. The plan provided hybrid representation; some councilmen would be elected from districts, some at large. State legislation was necessary before the mayor could move ahead and Wikoff secured the assistance of State Senator Everett K. Peters (R-St. Joseph). A bill allowing hybrid representation was passed in the spring of 1970. Wikoff was re-elected in 1971 and the reform was part of his platform.

On September 26, 1972, the City Council unanimously approved an ordinance creating a hybrid form of representation. The council was enlarged from seven to nine members; five members were to be elected from districts, three members and the mayor were to be elected at large. The ordinance specified that home rule as granted by the Constitution of 1970, was the justification for the ordinance, but the switch was also authorized by state law. Before the new system took effect it would be presented to the public in a referendum.

The public was generally indifferent to the implications of proposed change, but some opposition was generated by uncertainty regarding the boundaries of the new districts, and by a provision in the ordinance which stated that apportionment has to be based on the number of registered voters in a given area.

* Champaign had a five-person council until 1960. The membership of the council was increased from five to seven in 1961 when Champaign's population exceeded 50,000.
rather than on population. The local newspaper supported the change to modified district representation as a needed step towards more representative government in the city. The student newspaper, the Daily Illini noted that student and black precincts have consistently lower voter registration than other areas of the city and opposed the referendum, arguing that apportionment based on registered voters would disenfranchise blacks and students.

The referendum appeared on the ballot at the general election of November 7, 1972, and was passed easily (12,632 votes for the plan and 6,447 in opposition). Three campus precincts voted nay but little opposition developed in the black community. Precincts 1, 2 and 3 approved the plan, 429 to 208. The referendum was approved by large margins in the rest of the city.6

Public approval of the referendum, however, did not resolve the apportionment problem. Mayor Wikoff's apportionment maps, which were made public after the referendum, failed to satisfy some council members, who drew their own maps. In addition, on November 8, 1972, Professor Harry Hilton, representing the Champaign-Urbana Council for Community Integration, appeared before the council and warned that his group might seek legal action to stop apportionment based on voter registration. Hilton was willing to wait until the apportionment map was released before legal action was initiated.

At a special council session on November 15, 1972, the council agreed to a map apportioning the city into five districts. Although a dozen tentative maps were submitted, Councilman William Bland, who stressed his residence in and allegiance to the northern area of the city, and Councilman James Ransom, the only black on the council, submitted the same map which then was approved. The apportionment protected the black community but diluted the student vote by inserting two middle-class, predominantly town precincts into District II where the majority of students were concentrated. If the districts were based on voter registration rather than on population the insertion was necessary to insure equal distribution of the voters.

Hilton quickly let it be known that the map was unacceptable and revived his threat of legal action. By this time, the Champaign-Urbana Council for Community Integration had acquired allies in opposing the council map. The Champaign County League of Women Voters, the Urban League and the Coalition for Voter Registration (a predominantly student organization) announced their dissatisfaction with the map. The application of pressure resulted in a switch to a map based primarily on population. On November 21, the council approved the apportionment based on population by a vote of 4 to 2. Mayor Wikoff was not in town and Councilmen Steely Johnston and M. G. Snyder cast negative votes.7 Low student turnout in elections would not prevent the election of a student "representative" to the new council.

The new representative structure was in effect for the 1973 municipal elections and the first election, as Table 7.1 shows, generated hotly contested, close individual races. Overall turnout was moderate, only 7,241 ballots were cast. The turnout in the student precincts, where the newly enfranchised eighteen-year old was expected to make a difference was light. Nevertheless, the new council was different from previous councils; more diverse constituencies were represented. The difference in outlooks and objectives infused diversity into decision making. One result was open conflict on the City Council.

Until the election of 1973, "moderates," representing primarily business interests in the community, were in undisputed control of the City Council. Council members outside the consensus, such as James Ransom, a black moderate, Robert Pope, a conservative businessman, and William Bland, a labor leader who represented the working class neighborhoods of North Champaign, were isolated, and their effect on policy was negligible. "A group of blacks or environmentalists or anti-war students could stand before the council and against certain policies, but most council members never batted an eyelash. The councilmen rarely strayed from the middle of the road, because that was the source of their political support.8"

The city manager, Warren Browning, had an easy, implicit understanding with the council majority. Their goals were similar, and sound management practices were the hallmark of "good" city government. "Business-minded" council members recognized good management practices and Browning's way of running city government commanded their support.9 Critics
It is difficult to generalize about the failure to pass rate increases because complicating factors, such as general opposition to increased taxation and the controversy over a new swimming pool, also affected the results; but a residue of bitterness from the controversies during Howard's tenure, as well as the belief that the school administration was unwilling or incapable of paying sufficient attention to the real task—provision of adequate educational services—contributed to the disaffection of Urbana citizens. In March 1976, when school needs were obvious, i.e. sports were curtailed, curriculum offerings were cut, and the class day was shortened, a tax rate referenda was finally successful but by a very small margin. Grudging support for school needs is a most telling indicator of the continuing disaffection of community from school.

The Part District-School District Swimming Pool

After Howard submitted his resignation, the racial overtones of school controversy faded into the background, particularly as it suddenly became apparent that the school district was caught in the worst financial crisis of its history. The financial crisis was the factor in what came to be the most divisive public policy issue in recent Urbana history—the proposed park district—school district swimming pool. The question of the school district participation in this intergovernmental venture was resolved when the voters of Urbana overwhelmingly rejected the pool 4109-699, but the controversy in increased bitterness and distrust between the activists, who had been the architects of "new," more enlightened politics for Urbana, and the "citizenry."

As noted before, the citizen, regardless of socioeconomic status, who maintains a steady, continuing interest in local politics is a rare species. Most citizens are interested in concrete issues, for example, in the specifics of zoning changes which might affect the immediate neighborhood. Abstract plans for the future, such as a comprehensive land use plan for city or county, attract relatively little attention and fail to draw large turnouts to Plan Commission meetings or City Council sessions. The professional, especially the planner, is the actor in municipal politics, with the interest in long term development and the skills and training to order and structure such development. However, professional objectives and values in the concrete case often differ markedly from the diffuse objectives of the citizen. Professional orientation stresses the rationalization of organization as well as the rational calculation of costs and benefits, especially over the long term, as the basic determinants of public policy. The resultant policies, as the example of the swimming pool suggests, may exacerbate dormant tensions in the community. The issues raised by the conflict over the swimming pool—distrust of professional advice, distrust of officials by citizens and a heightened awareness of the utility of a fragmented political structure—will be significant factors in the continuing evolution of Urbana politics and/or the continued incumbency of the Democrats.

The Democrats, when they were the minority, strongly advocated professionalism in city departments. Once in power, they extended the sphere of professionalism introduced by Mayor Zippoldt, but they carefully defined the limits of professional influence. For example, Democrats strongly and consistently opposed any proposal to create a city manager in Urbana, believing that representatives of the people should retain decision-making power. The example of the city manager in Champaign suggested, all too vividly, that a professional manager had too much opportunity to extend his sphere of discretion and influence at the expense of local officeholders. Given this background, it is ironic that the last defense of some "democratic" officeholders in the controversy over the pool was that professionals favored the proposal.

Discussions about a swimming pool to replace the aging pool in Crystal Lake Park occurred periodically during the 1960s. The park board in certain senses had written off the Crystal Lake Park pool—the cost of modernization was greater than the anticipated return from improvement. To the park board, the question was not the need for, but the mechanics of constructing a pool, its location, and how to finance it. The latter problems appeared to be on the way to solution when Urbana established a Public Building Commission in 1973. Although the county did not join the commission, Cunningham township and the Urbana school and park districts joined the city as members of the commission. The first and only attempt, and it was not even a formal effort, to use the Urbana Public Building Commission came in November 1973, when
members of the Urbana Park Board approached the mayor about using the commission to build a swimming pool.33

Nothing came of the move, but for two years, the prospect of using this method of financing the pool gave opponents a great issue—the UPBC was described as a "sneaky" way to levy taxes without a referendum. Opponents insisted that a referendum had to be held before the project could be undertaken. Although discrediting the UPBC in the debate over financing the pool may limit significantly the options of political officeholders in the future, the immediate issue was not the method of financing the pool, but the school-park proposal to build a swimming pool.

In November 1973, the school and park boards began to work together to plan a joint pool to replace the aging Crystal Lake Pool and the ancient high school "oversized bath tub." The cost of replacement was estimated, in 1972, at approximately $800,000, but by 1973 inflation had increased the estimate substantially.34 In May 1974, a joint park district-school district committee with the advice of expert consultants agreed on a site immediately east of Urbana High School. Costs were estimated at $1,760,000, excluding the costs of land acquisition.35

By September, citizen opposition to the site (the high school is located in a middle-class, residential neighborhood with a parking problem and little, if any, open space between the school and the neighborhood) was gaining momentum. The school board, which was already in difficulties due to the controversies over Superintendent Howard and the spreading fiscal crisis, was intensively lobbied. The board, perhaps as a compromise, suggested that a referendum should be held before it made a commitment to the project. Legally the board could not initiate a referendum and citizens had to petition the board to hold one.

Petitions were circulated by proponents, opponents and neutrals, but the activity of circulating petitions provided opponents with the opportunity to work together and increased their cohesion. An ad hoc opposition coalition soon came into being, composed of neighborhood residents who objected to the "noise" of a pool and who feared it would adversely affect property values, persons concerned about the costs of the proposed facility in a time of economic stringency, and adherents of Crystal Lake Pool who enjoyed the

### TABLE 7.1
1973 ELECTION RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>By Candidate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>John Lee Johnson, Louis Nash</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>1,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(primarily black; North End Champaign)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>&quot;Bud&quot; Baker, Mary Pollack</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(primarily student dormitories, etc. around Kirby)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>Kenneth E. Dugun, Robert N. Schonert</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(primarily white working-class; Northwest Champaign)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 4</td>
<td>Ralph Council, Joan Severns</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>3,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(primarily middle- to upper-middle-class; Southwest Champaign)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 5</td>
<td>Kerry Allen, Lynn D. Sweet</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>1,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(primarily middle-class; Southwest Champaign)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
believed that the manager, not the City Council was the effective decision maker and wanted to limit the manager's role to purely administrative functions.

When the new council took office on May 1, 1973, it was immediately apparent that the old majority, Wikoff, William Kuhne, Dwyer Murphy and M. G. Snyder, would find it difficult to pick up the extra vote needed for a majority. The first issue that split the council was the election of a deputy mayor. From May until July 1973, the question was not resolved. William Bland, a council member at large and an outsider during his first two years (1971-1973) was suddenly in the running for deputy mayor. The "business coalition" could stop Bland but could not elect a candidate of their own.

Further indications of a new council orientation were apparent in the fall of 1973. Residents of a Northwest Champaign neighborhood petitioned Councilman Bland to request a stop sign. Bland proposed that a stop sign be installed. The traffic department staff ruled against installation because traffic density in the neighborhood was low. The City Council overruled the recommendation of the traffic department and voted to install the stop sign. The handwriting was on the wall and the local newspapers began to report the conflict between the new council members and the city manager.

Browning learned from the issue that the new political orientation of the council was working against sound management practices which should be the business and prerogatives of the city administration and professional staff, not the council. He started looking for a new job.

A more activist City Cmber resulted from a comparatively minor change in representative structure. The five council members elected from the districts included a black activist, a student activist, an advocate of "good government," a fireman, who, in important respects, strengthened the representation of Champaign's white working class population, and a representative of the population living in development housing in the newer and still growing sections of the city. Obviously, the new council members were not part of "the business oriented 'establishment clique' that historically has held the council majority." The new majority opened policy making to pressure from the heterogeneous population of Champaign; new demands were heard, new interests were advanced, and in the process, Warren Browning resigned as city manager. The most appropriate description of city administration at present is transitional: a new city manager, a new police chief, a new fire chief, a new director of public works and a new human relations director have been hired.

It is ironic that Mayor Wikoff, an opponent of student voting in local elections, and a mayor whose candidacy and tenure were strongly supported by local business leaders and middle-class professionals, should have led the fight for the change to mixed district-at-large representation. His leadership of the "crusade" of more diverse representation can be viewed as an effort to avert a greater threat. There was dissatisfaction with existing representation and a hybrid form was better than a switch to straight aldermanic government. At the least, three at large members and the mayor might exercise a balance of power on the council and thus moderate possible sectional conflict. If the apportionment had been based on voter registration rather than population, the opponents of "special interests" might have been in better position. Under the registered voter apportionment the student vote was diluted and the election of a student representative might have been blocked. Even with apportionment by population, the mayor and three council persons were elected at large, and a fourth council member continued to be elected from the same area that had provided so many city council members in previous years. From this perspective, Wikoff moved wisely to defuse dissatisfaction which, if ignored, might create a greater challenge to the status quo. That the scenario went awry is attributable not to poor strategy but to active election campaigns mounted and won by a new type of candidate.

However, active election campaigns did not spark increased voter participation in 1973. Although the pool of potential voters was enlarged by the enfranchisement of eighteen-year olds, only 7,241 citizens cast ballots and turnout in the student precinct was only 722 voters. The 1973 election conformed to established patterns of participation. Despite phenomenal population growth between 1910 and 1970, the number of citizens casting ballots remained relatively
constant and therefore the percentage of votes declined over the period. This decline is graphically illustrated in Table 7.2, a compilation of participation in municipal elections from 1917 to 1975 compared with population growth from 1910 to 1970. Voter participation ranged from a low of 4,063 voters in 1919 to a high of 9,702 voters in 1939. The 1939 total has not been surpassed, although in 1955 and 1959, the totals came close. In 1955, when the voters, in addition to election of municipal officers, voted on the council-manager form of government, 19,168 citizens went to the polls. In 1959, the first election after the institution of council-manager government attracted a total of 9,622 voters. The News Gazette, commenting on this election, called it a second referendum and claimed that the voters "accorded council-manager government a convincing accolade by electing a heavily 'pro-manager' slate." However, interest was not sustained and later elections show a drop in participation.

Daniel J. Elazar contends that political activity in individualistic culture is a "specialized business, essentially the province of professionals, of minimum and passing (if periodical) concern to laymen, and no place for amateurs to play an active role." The apathy of Champaign citizens is attributable to the habits and practices of individualistic culture, but the shift to council-manager government further discouraged public participation by its emphasis on a "business-like" conception of politics. In addition, nonpartisan, at-large representation minimized the opportunities for concerned citizens to organize and press for alternative points of view. The difficulties of organizing, financing and winning a city-wide campaign worked against advocates of a more energetic and responsive government with different policy orientations.

Democratic activists in Urbana argued about the issues of politics and stimulated citizen interest in alternatives. Elections between 1967 and 1973 brought new people into politics, and campaigners promised a new role of government in shaping community purposes and projects. Increased political activity resulted in record turnouts for these Urbana elections. In contrast, Champaign experienced an absolute decline in participation relative to population growth. Citizens in Champaign, although exhorted to vote, remained apathetic about the issues and seemed to prefer to

### Table 7.2
PARTICIPATION IN MUNICIPAL GENERAL ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ballots Cast</th>
<th>Population at Time of Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>5,007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919*</td>
<td>4,063</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>6,407</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>7,961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>9,382</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>9,702</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>6,552</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>9,135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,563**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>7,854</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>9,168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>9,622</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>49,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7,800***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8,555</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6,946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9,009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6,618</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>56,532</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>8,127</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>7,241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8,620</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* After 1919 elections were held at four year intervals.  
** After 1950 students included in population total.  
*** Introduction of elections every two years for part of council with mayor elected every four years. The slightly higher turnouts are during mayoral years.
leave the business of politics to professionals. The 1971 mayoral campaign is one example of the pattern. The three candidates for mayor offered clear and distinctive philosophical choices.

Mr. Mitchell ... called for an end of the domination of business interests in the community and called for changes in the city to aid the socially deprived. Mr. Wikoff, the incumbent, who walks in the middle, stressed the progressive steps taken under his administration and his knowledge of changes which can occur under the home rule provisions of our new Illinois Constitution. Mr. Pope at the right of center, opposes planning and zoning, the Human Relations Commission and urban renewal and favors a minimum number of laws, simply stated and easily enforced.16

The primary brought 37 percent of the voters to the polls and the regular election attracted 40.4 percent of the voters to the poll. Virgil Wikoff, the candidate, "who walks in the middle," was reelected.

Other indications of the difference between Champaign and Urbana are found in the results of a questionnaire which students distributed to incumbent council members in 1974.17 The answers suggest that despite the social and political controversies of the 1960's and the political activation of more marginal groups, the citizens of Champaign remain indifferent to the stimuli of politics.

1. Among the people in the city, would you say there is much interest, some interest, little interest, or no interest at all in council elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champaign</th>
<th>Urbana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answers to the questionnaire also suggest that the current crop of politicians in Urbana are less likely to be interested in a political career than the politicians in Champaign.

2. Do you expect to continue to run for councilman?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champaign</th>
<th>Urbana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Are there any other political positions (local, state or federal), which you would like to seek?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champaign</th>
<th>Urbana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes or perhaps</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A clear majority of officeholders in Urbana had intense but limited commitments to local politics. They were willing to sacrifice a certain amount of time and talent, but they showed little intention to use local office as a stepping stone in a political career. The clearly expressed preference of Democratic council members, especially those with academic or other professional careers was to return to previous occupations after a period of "service" to the community. Although the result only deals with one set of incumbents, the differences between Champaign and Urbana are sharply defined and suggest the differences in the politics of the cities.

The tendencies of individualistic culture were reinforced by governmental structure in Champaign, and the "establishment" was able to withstand the frontal challenge from activists proposing alternative policies. During the 1960s, the university spawned multiple small projects aimed at social change "but the total effect of this energy has been more or less dissipated without lasting consequence."18 The projects were staffed by university personnel on a temporary basis and were never placed on a continuing basis.

Champaign's heterogeneous population increased the difficulty of building community support for innovative projects. The network of friends and acquaintances that Democrats put together in Urbana during the period when they were challenging Republican domi-
nation did not have a counterpart in Champaign. There is no indigenous neighborhood organization to compare with the West Urbana Neighborhood Association, which watched over an older, transitional neighborhood, and was on the alert for zoning and other changes that might tip the balance.

In Champaign, Church Street was transformed into a street of predominantly apartment houses without protest or awareness of the transformation in the neighborhood. More recently, an attempt to rezone a block in the area from R-2 to R-4 in order to build condominiums generated opposition among the immediate neighbors. Signatures were gathered and opponents appeared before the Plan Commission, and were rewarded with an unanimous Plan Commission vote against the rezoning. To protect this victory, the neighbors filed a separate petition, thus mandating a two-thirds vote when the City Council considers the question. However, the question is not the success or failure of the particular strategy but whether the organization generated by an immediate threat will endure and become the nucleus of an association similar to the West Urbana Neighborhood Association. If activity does not persist, the business of politics will remain in the hands of professionals until another immediate threat is perceived.

The construction of networks was hindered by the difficulties of mounting at-large election campaigns for "dissident" or atypical political amateurs. District representation eased the problem but three members of the City Council are still elected at large, and the winners of the at-large seats in 1975 tended to conform to the mold which prevailed before the shift to district representation. Two of the three winners came from southwest Champaign, the area which has contributed so many council members. The third winner came from a Democratic background and represents an area of development housing. But a candidate who offered alternative politics and ran on a platform of "people" power, despite an active campaign, ran a poor fourth.

The absence of continuing organizations makes intervention in politics more random and sporadic in Champaign than in Urbana. As Flynn and Alexander noted, there are "more calls for change with less possibility for consensus in Champaign than in Urbana." Although there are difficulties in initiating programs and in building and maintaining support for such programs, the scope of governmental responsibility has expanded, albeit grudgingly, and the style and substance of local politics has changed. The issues that spawned conflict in the nation in the 1960s and 1970s--urban crime, affirmative action, schools, the costs and tasks of government--generated conflict and demand for action in Champaign. New political initiatives from council members coupled with changes in city administration transformed the norms of professional administration into a feasible means to attack contemporary problems. The reliance on professional administrators to initiate potentially radical and far-reaching change in the services of local government is, ironically, an example par excellence of the tendency of individualistic culture to see politics as "a specialized business, essentially the province of professionals . . . ." In addition, as chapters 7 and 8 show, expanded services continue to be manipulated locally to serve local needs in light of local values, thus reinforcing the viability of the civil community.

Urban Renewal

The constraints that individualistic culture imposes on political innovation are illustrated by the saga of urban renewal. The League of Women Voters drew the community's attention to the problem of urban blight, gathered the facts and provided the impetus to initiate a program in the late 1940s. Interest was sustained during the 1950s, but league support diminished by the end of the 1960's. Neither business nor other community groups mounted a concerted or continuous effort in support of the program.

The influx of veterans into the university after World War II placed tremendous stress on existing housing. In 1948 and 1949, the League gathered the first systematic data on housing conditions and wrote a report known as the "Shack Study" which described housing conditions in the twin cities. These were shacks with dirt floors, chicken coops converted into housing, the absence of indoor plumbing or running water, and, in many cases, families were paying from a quarter to half of their annual income for housing. The study noted but did not make an issue of the complete racial segregation in housing.
The league focused on the amelioration of housing conditions and application was made to the Public Housing Administration for the construction of housing for low-income families. In 1950, units were constructed with the stipulation that for each new construction, a dilapidated unit was to be destroyed. However, enforcement was lax and destruction of inferior housing was limited.

In addition, by 1950, there were some demands for more careful town planning, and Swanson Associates drew up a comprehensive plan for Champaign-Urbana. Although the interest in comprehensive planning was not related to the concern about housing, the comprehensive plan included a survey of neighborhoods in Champaign and Urbana and designated the Northeast neighborhood as most in need of redevelopment. The Northeast neighborhood (the North End as it is called locally) is located in both Champaign and Urbana and was an all-black residential neighborhood.176

In 1953, after a fire killed two children, Champaign enacted a housing code and set minimum standards for rental units. However, the effort was all but negated; the city had trouble hiring an inspector to enforce the code, or perhaps did not look very hard to find an inspector.

In 1957, the league updated the "Shack Study," finding that the amount of substandard housing in the white areas of the cities had diminished, but conditions in the black community showed no significant improvement from 1948.

In 1958, Emerson Dexter began a campaign for mayor, and supported the council-manager form of government and urban renewal. Dexter won and in April 1960, the first citizens Advisory Committee on Urban-Renewal (CAC) was established. The committee collected data and began work on preparing "a workable program," a prerequisite if federal funds were to be obtained. In January 1962, the city approved and signed a contract with the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) for survey and planning funds, but the City Council still had to decide who would prepare the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan (GNRP). In June 1962, Harland Bartholomew and Associates were hired to prepare a GNRP.

The thrust of the program as originally conceived was to improve substandard housing in the Northeast neighborhood, and in 1963 an expanded minimum housing standards ordinance was adopted. However, even in the preliminary stages, the Council for Community Integration raised a public objection to the project by questioning whether it served to reinforce segregated residential patterns in the city.21 A concerted effort for integration had the potential to upset the precarious coalition supporting improved housing for the poor. In addition, the residents of the neighborhood expressed increasing uneasiness about the effect of urban renewal on their lives. Another factor which delayed project momentum was the reorganization of the CAC in December 1962. The number of members was reduced to seven, three came from the neighborhood, and John E. Severns, a local architect, became chairman. Perhaps representation from the neighborhood would assuage anxiety, but, with one exception, the new members of the CAC were professionals or businessmen. The Twin City Federation of Labor refused to allow its members to serve on the committee, claiming "the answer to substandard housing was to increase wage and salary levels of low-income families so they can purchase with their own money housing adequate to their needs."22

In February 1963, the issue that was to haunt the execution of urban renewal became explicit. The city planning director presented the first survey on relocation indicating that 4,000 relocations were needed. Otto Bartholow, a realtor and member of the CAC, argued that many black families were not able to afford single-family housing and urged implicitly that public housing be built in the Northeast neighborhood. Robert Bowles, executive director of the Urban League, opposed additional units of public housing in the renewal area, arguing that it would insure the continuation of segregation and might lead to more segregated residential patterns.

The City Council formulated a policy statement in April: all citizens were guaranteed the right to live in a residence which met at least minimum acceptable standards. The statement skirted the racial issue by affirming that choice ought to be limited only by the individual's means. The council also promised the dislocated the first option on the cleared land and declared that developers would be required to state in
writing that units would be "sold, rented or leased without prejudice as to race, color or creed."23

Since whites were unlikely to buy in the area, the assurance that developers would sell, rent or lease without regard to race, color or creed did little to reassure the black community about their prospects. A series of public meetings sponsored by the CAC in the neighborhood improved the atmosphere, but fears about the project remained and black opposition to the program continued. By September 1963, black opposition to the project was becoming more organized, and misgivings in the business community surfaced, but the city council moved forward.

In January 1964, the City Council voted five to two in favor of an urban renewal project, but only four to three to increase the utility tax to finance the city's share of the project. The two negative votes were cast by Wikoff and Smalley, who were not convinced that private enterprise could not do the job or that the people in the area wanted urban renewal. Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce also opposed federal funding for the project and urged the city to encourage local developers to build economical single and multi-family units in the renewal area.24

Despite official commitment, the absence of widespread support for renewal as well as the unanswered questions—the effects of the project on the lives of the residents of the renewal area and on the patterns of residential segregation—allowed the momentum of renewal. The CAC made a determined effort to reach the neighborhood, but a homeowners association in the area slated for renewal tried to halt the project. In November, the city hired David Gensemer as project director and James L. Williams as relocation officer, but staffing for the project did not reduce concerns about segregation.25 Integration was to become a key concern in the 1960s, and as the suspicion that urban renewal implied the continuation of segregation became credible, "liberal" support for the renewal project lessened.26

The prospect of locating public housing in the renewal area appeared to reinforce local segregation patterns. Two public housing developments were already located in Champaign. They were built under the auspices of and managed by the Champaign County Housing Authority and were operated on a segregated basis: the residents of the units in Northwest Champaign were white, in Northeast Champaign, they were black. Local activists worked in the early 1960s to change the CCHA's policy, going so far as to write the Regional Office of the Public Housing Administration to obtain clarification of federal policy. The correspondence suggested that officials of the regional office were sympathetic towards integration in public housing but lacked legal power to pressure the CCHA.

"Under the existing laws, policies and procedures of the Public Housing Administration, and in the absence of court tests and applicable legislation by the State of Illinois, Local Housing Authorities were free to establish their own occupancy policies. This means they were free to integrate or to segregate by race. Your locality has chosen the latter course, the Public Housing Administration, therefore, has no legal power to override their decision, except insofar as this can be done by negotiation and persuasion."27

As conflict over locating public housing in the renewal area developed and opinions hardened, strange though temporary de facto alliances were formed. Councilman Kenneth Stratton, a resident of the North End argued against public housing in the ghetto and was joined by Councilman Robert Pope whose political position lay somewhere to the right of Barry Goldwater. Councilman Wikoff then found another reason to object to urban renewal: it perpetuated rather than eliminated the ghetto.28

The city planning department continued preparation for renewal and presented a plan for Project I. The objectives of the plan were to save as many homes as possible and provide new housing in the project area for all the people displaced by subsequent projects. The CAC, under a new chairman, John Barr, was beginning to shift from its focus on improved housing to desegregation and it presented its own plan for the project. There was need for more parks in the multifamily area and for a buffer zone along the railroad. Density was too high. Single-family housing units were needed even in public housing projects, and all
ninety units of public housing should not be placed in
the North End. In other words, a "good urban renewal
plan can make the North End a better area, but further
segregation would make this a bad project."

The CAC was criticized for its belief that the
way to eliminate segregation was to improve housing in
the North End to the point that whites would move into
the area, but a majority on the City Council continued
to follow CAC recommendations. Conflict over the
city's decision to locate ninety units in the project
area intensified, and it was finally agreed to place
thirty units outside the project.

The concession on the location of public housing
units was influenced by shifts in federal policy and
new federal efforts to promote integration. In
November 1965, the urban renewal administrator told
Harry Spies, a CAC member, that the program scheduled
for Champaign would not be approved because it was
discriminatory. However, the city was allowed a
three- to four-month grace period to resolve its posi­
tion. The CAC and Gensemer made a concerted effort to
obtain the support of civil rights activists for the
program, and Chairman Barr suggested that the project
should be approved as the first small step toward a
better community.

Community support with reservations was obtained,
but HUD was not satisfied and in March 1966, returned
the city's urban renewal application as "not accept­
able." The city was asked to supply further documen­
tation on why sixty units of public housing were to be
located in the renewal area, and to provide specifics
on proposals for public and private housing and plans
for relocation and social services for displaced
families. In addition HUD rejected the documentation,
previously submitted, on the renewal project's contri­
bution to the elimination of segregation.

HUD's rejection which stressed the location of
the housing units was interpreted as a request for
additional documentation to establish that other
possible locations were not feasible. City officials
claimed that unless sixty units were placed in the
project area, the project would not be economically
feasible. It was estimated that land and construction
costs outside the area would raise room costs to more
than $4,000, a sum well above the limit placed on
costs by the federal government. In addition, the
city needed the credit offered for public housing in
order to meet its one-fourth share of renewal costs.

Although the more activist black organizations
continued to oppose the alleged racist implications of
locating sixty units of public housing in the renewal
area, the CAC continued to support renewal. The CAC
received an unexpected boost when a group of neighbor­
hood residents led by Louis Nash* came out with a
statement that "those opposing urban renewal are
penalizing the people that need better housing."

On April 7, 1966, the CCHA asked the federal gov­
ernment for thirty additional units of public housing.
It was agreed that sixty units would be located in and
sixty units outside the project area. The city pro­
vided the documentation for the request and apparently
it was satisfactory. The workable program was recer­
tified on June 22, 1966, but recertification did not
end delay; time was needed to secure public housing
sites out of the project area. However, federal offi­
cials relaxed the requirement that all public housing
must be contracted before approval of Part I of the
Urban Renewal application. In order to maintain the
project's momentum, Part I would be approved when the
CCHA and the City Council adopted identical resolu­
tions on the number and location of units and sub­
mitted the sites to federal officials.

On November 17, 1966, the City Council approved
the renewal plan. The vote was five to one and yes
votes included Kenneth Stratton, a black council
member who was jeered by the audience for his support
of the project. Opponents of segregation were not
silenced by council approval of the renewal project.
In December complaints were filed with the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission, under Title 6 of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and the A.C.L.U., but no basis for action
was found.

In April 1967, council elections were held and
two successful candidates ran on anti-urban renewal
platforms. At a stormy meeting in May which featured

* Louis Nash continued to be active on the issue
of urban renewal. In 1973, he ran against John Lee
Johnson, a civil rights activist, for the seat in
District 1 and lost a close race. Johnson won 547 to
471 for Nash.
accusations about conflicts of interest (Councilman Wikoff was the head of a local construction company), the new council voted four to three to approve the loan which finalized the urban renewal project.36

In July, the CCHA revealed that it was not considering scattered housing sites but planned to locate all units outside the project area on North Harris Street, a working class neighborhood in Northwest Champaign, near Franklin Junior High School. The residents of the area organized to oppose the plan,* claiming that public housing units would harm their neighborhood and that the schools in the area were not adequate to absorb the influx of children. The conservatives on the City Council also continued to fight a rear-guard action. Council members Johnston, Pope and Sommers, who earlier had protested against inadequate prices for condemned properties in the renewal area, made public the prices that were offered for these same properties. The information was confidential but the councilmen claimed "it was their duty to reveal the inflated prices paid for properties in the area."37

Despite these tactics, land acquisition began on July 24, 1967. Although Councilman Pope moved again to drop the program in December 1967, in January 1968, the first home, located at 918 N. Poplar Street was demolished and the renewal project entered the clearance stage.38

As clearance proceeded, opponents continued to try to stall or halt the project. Their strategy emphasized the lack of tangible benefits to the neighborhood or the community at large from Project I. The Courier ran a series of articles in June and July 1968, which again exposed poor housing conditions in the North End. One article dealt with the obstacles to construction of housing for low-income families. Various groups set up not-for-profit corporations--Champaign-Urbana Interfaith Apartments Corporation, Mt. Olive Manors, Inc. and Champaign Homes--in order to construct or rehabilitate housing for low-income families. At the time of the article all the corporations were somewhere in the process of devising and obtaining approval for their respective projects

* Their activities and the consequences will be discussed below.

but the city's difficulties with HUD made the task more difficult. The city needed to file for recertification of its workable program. Until recertification was granted, proposals for a 221(d)3 program could not be considered, due to "difficulties with FHA over the building code and inspection procedures."39

Housing for low-income families in the project area was built in the early 1970's by non-profit corporations, but the Interfaith and Mount Olive project ran into difficulties. These projects were foreclosed by the FHA and in 1975, the question of the supervision of these units became a political issue. Six of the eight buildings of the Mt. Olive complex were vacant and vandalized, and the question of who was supposed to be supervising the buildings became a factor in allocation of responsibility for the vandalism.40 Bradley Park Apartments built by the Interfaith Housing Corporation was in receivership when its tenants appeared before the City Council to complain about conditions. Among the complaints was the allegation that neither John Walsh Miller, the manager of the project, nor his assistant, Louis Nash, could be reached by tenants. The secretary of the project denied the allegations, but the City Council decided to investigate whether action could be taken against the federal government for its failure to maintain the project.41

The default of the nonprofit corporations was symptomatic of the lack of local enthusiasm and support for either public housing or urban renewal. By 1968, 90 percent of the land in the Project I area had been cleared and 75 percent of the relocations were completed, but there was little enthusiasm for Project II, extending coverage to the area designated by the GNRP. The City Council refused to make an additional funding commitment for the project. There was some interest in applying for a Neighborhood Development Program grant, because it provided funds for planning without setting a deadline for completion of renewal.42

The possibility of entering the Neighborhood Renewal program disappeared in 1969 due to a cutback of HUD funds. Supporters of renewal returned to the original program: a plan for renewal in the larger area designated by the GNRP was drawn up and presented on October 29, 1969. The estimated cost was $20
million and completion was estimated to take five or more years. The beginnings of the project could be financed initially by a planning grant of $646,000 which could be obtained without city commitment, i.e., if the city did not undertake the project, it was not obligated to return the money. The council, in December, agreed (five to two) to ask for the planning funds. Reluctance to request the planning grant for Project II, even though the grant was without obligation, suggests the ambivalence of local politicians towards federally financed initiatives.

The reluctance of elected officials to make a commitment to urban renewal is rational in light of the minimal support for the program in the community. Disaffection with urban renewal was a factor in the effort to abandon council-manager government. The leading spirits of the campaign for abandonment, the organizers of the Committee for the Return of Representative Government, were Bernard Smith, a postal worker and Dean Lafferty, a management consultant. Both opposed urban renewal and housing inspections. According to Mr. Smith, he was "not fighting the colored—they should be brought up to the level they are willing to work for. They ought to earn their own way." Smith also was opposed to taking property by eminent domain and "socialism." Urban renewal meant housing inspections and such inspections were a violation of American liberties.

Continuing conflict over the location of public housing further diminished support for urban renewal. The roots of the conflict lay in the CCHA decision to concentrate new public housing units in the renewal area and on North Harris Street in Northwest Champaign. As early as 1965, James Cross and his wife, Linda, who lived in the area of North Harris Street in Northwest Champaign. The City Council approved the ban on North Harris Street in 1967. Cross and other members of the community split over the question of scattered site housing, and the CCHA's opposition was to be expected, particularly in an area where the traditions of individualistic culture are strong, but liberal opposition to the project increased in the 1960s, particularly as integration became the primary objective of civil rights activists.

HUD allocated $2,795,206 for the construction of public housing units in Champaign. As of June 30, 1973, the CCHA had spent $660,820 and had only a few scattered sites and two parcels of land which cost $185,000 to show for its activity. The perceptions and preferences of the community produced a mixture of opposition and apathy to public housing. Conservative opposition was to be expected, particularly in an area where the traditions of individualistic culture are strong, but liberal opposition to the project increased in the 1960s, particularly as integration became the primary objective of civil rights activists. The opposition of the people in the renewal area provided fuel for both conservative and liberal opponents, and the result was that in the end no one sup-
ported the project. Federal money for the community willing to make the effort was intended to take the financial burden of housing improvement and rehabilitation off local tax resources, but federal money, in this case, did not provide sufficient motivation to overcome established preferences and perceptions.

HUD officials were tolerant of the hesitations and delays surrounding the project. No move was made to prod the CCHA into quick action, to demand conformance, or to seriously attempt to cut off federal funds until Representative Edward Madigan intervened at the request of opponents. It was not federal red tape nor federal stringencies that killed the program; HUD carried the project for years and when the unexpended funds were returned, they were put in escrow for the development of a new program. Local delays and hesitations and the changed climate of the late 1960s transformed the project into an anomaly and led to its demise.

The saga of housing in Champaign did not end with the CCHA decision to cancel the contract. Officials of the park district were eager to acquire the land, the acquisition was supported by the CCHA and the Champaign City Council but at this point, HUD raised some objections. A news article on November 20, 1973, began:

Hopes for transferring two "abandoned" public housing sites . . . are hung up in the bureaucracy of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

It seemed that eager local officials were unable to obtain answers to their inquiries on how to close the deal for the sites. Representative Madigan was again willing to intervene, but HUD officials informed the city that the land had to be sold at the "highest market value." The Park District lacked the resources to commit itself to the purchase, and the project appeared doomed. Madigan maintained his interest and in January 1974, his office announced a concession from HUD: the Champaign park district "has unexpended funds in a federal grant it received some time ago. . . . We (Madigan's office) have assurances from HUD officials that the terms of that grant can be amended to allow it to be used for purchase of the housing sites." HUD officials also offered assurances that the department would support a new grant to the park district to be financed "with funds reclaimed from other park districts that did not spend grants they received." In addition it was implied that the land could be acquired at a reasonable price through a "closed bid." HUD assurances took some of the sting out of HUD requirements, but federal largesse was grudgingly accepted. Even $100,000 was a lot of money for the park district and its decision would depend on the actual cost of the sites.

The CCHA remained willing to sell the properties as the first step toward the development of a new and better scattered site project. Proceeds from the sale could be added to construction funds in hand, and scattered site housing was still fully funded. Unexpended funds would be returned from Washington if and when a project was ready to proceed. However, the CCHA was not ready to proceed immediately with the new scattered site project.

In July 1974, the CCHA offered to sell the sites for $135,850, in conformance with a HUD appraisal of the property, but the park district did not have the funds. The district then asked the city for $130,000 in revenue sharing money in order to fund the Downtown Senior Citizens Center; supplement a bond referendum for construction of new facilities at Douglas Center* (sky-rocketing construction costs made it impossible to complete the project out of the proceeds of the bond referendum); and take advantage of the opportunity to purchase the abandoned housing cities. The council allocated $25,000 to fund the Senior Citizens Center and acquisition of the sites remained problematic.

At the beginning of October, the City Council was asked to allocate $100,000 of the $900,000 unappropriated funds in the city's urban renewal fund to the park district for purchase of the sites. The council agreed seven to one (the negative vote was cast by Mayor Wikoff) to the proposal, but the matter was so complex that movement on the question was not immediately perceptible. Throughout October, the council studied the implications of the proposal. They learned that because HUD appraised the parcels, HUD approval was necessary before the CCHA could take less

* These issues will be discussed in chapters 8 and 9.
than the appraised value. The council tentatively agreed to offer $136,850, but "details" remained. The city must make intergovernmental agreements with the park district to develop the sites and with the CCHA to insure that sale proceeds be spent for scattered site housing. The CCHA balked on this stipulation, claiming that some portion of the proceeds would be needed to retire outstanding debts from other projects.

It was also necessary to ask the Champaign Plan Commission to revise land use requirements in the site areas, and because Champaign was in the process of applying for a HUD Community Development Grant, the acquisition had to be incorporated into the city's community development application.55 Last but not least, the city budget had to be amended in order to allocate urban renewal funds to the park district.

Coordination of these moves was certain to be time consuming even if negotiations about price with the CCHA proceeded smoothly. It was soon apparent that there was no agreement on price. The council decided that $100,000 was its maximum offer for the two sites; the CCHA let it be known that anything less than $136,850 was unacceptable to HUD.56 In January, HUD officials rejected the city's offer. If the City Council did not raise its offer within thirty days, the land would be placed on the open market. During the next thirty days, the Champaign Plan Commission recommended that zoning of the Harris Street site be changed from residential to park and open spaces uses. The commission also recommended that one portion of the site in the urban renewal area be designated as a park and open space, and the remainder be designated for commercial development.57 On January 21, the City Council voted six to two to authorize payment of $136,850 to the CCHA and accepted Plan Commission recommendations for the Harris Street site. A commercial designation for the site in the ghetto was rejected; that land would remain under a multiple family residential classification until specific proposals were presented to the Plan Commission.58

In April, the City Council formally directed the CCHA to use the proceeds from the sale of the sites for scattered site housing. The CCHA rejected the stipulation, claiming that it had to use some of the money to retire debts incurred on other projects. In May, the City Council again authorized the purchase of

the land, deleting the stipulation concerning the uses of the money and a time limit on when the money had to be spent. Two years after the land became available, the City Council completed the arrangements for its acquisition.59

The sale of land to the park district and changes in federal policy brought new local efforts to develop some kind of renewal and rehabilitation program, but they were characterized by the same kind of delays and frustration that characterized the federally sponsored program. A Better Housing Committee (BHC) was created in March 1973, and charged with surveying blighted neighborhoods and preparing plans for their rehabilita-

In February, the City Council formally directed the CHA to develop the sites and with the CCHA city must make intergovernmental agreements with the acquisition had to be incorporated into the city's areas, and because Champaign was in the process

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In February, the BHC began its new study and found to no one's surprise that most of the land available for scattered site housing was north of University Avenue. The CAD initiated a series of neighborhood meetings to promote citizen input in the early stages of the program, and the CAD director declared that more information was needed about "what
these people want done about their own neighborhoods." The process started again and the residents of the old urban renewal neighborhood could be pardoned for the feeling of déjà vu.

The BHC met in March and April to formulate policy on setting priorities for the neighborhoods. In May, a plan for redevelopment and renovation of five neighborhoods in North Champaign was forwarded to the City Council, but in the period from November to May, council interest shifted from do-it-yourself renewal to seeking a special revenue sharing grant for community development from HUD. CAD data and BHC proposals provided part of the groundwork for the city's proposal.

The following December, the BHC agreed on 110 possible sites for scattered housing for low-income families, and forwarded the locations to the City Council. The council approved them informally, but the CCHA was uncertain about whether it had the money for the project. HUD had requested the return of the $1.9 million allocated for concentrated housing and the CCHA was not prepared to make a commitment immediately.

The housing program received new impetus when the City Council tentatively approved the first year budget for the Community Development Program. Officials expected to receive $375,000 in 1975, and a decrease in budgeted administrative costs released $80,000 making it possible to allocate $107,000 for capital improvements.

In the summer of 1975, the program finally seemed on the verge of taking off. Champaign received $375,000 as the first installment of a Community Development Grant. The money was allocated as follows:

- $133,000 capital improvements in the "target areas"
- 60,000 relocation of displaced persons
- 60,000 acquisition of dilapidated structures
- 35,000 housing rehabilitation loan and grant program
- 42,000 administration
- 34,000 local option activities
- 8,000 demolition of dilapidated structures
- 3,000 community participation.

In addition, more than $900,000 accumulated from the utility tax for urban renewal was placed in a special fund to be used as seed money to induce local banks to lend to persons who wanted to rehabilitate their homes.

Years of work, conflict and frustration were behind the headline in the News Gazette, of August 17, 1975, which read "Homes of 40 Years are Forsaken as City Development Project Begins." Once again, Champaign embarked on a project to improve housing in the North End.

Racial tensions and fears were part of the warp and woof of the conflicts of urban renewal. Fears about the racial implications of renewal, the relocation of residents of the affected neighborhood, as well as widespread indifference to the inequities of black housing are part of the explanation for the years of frustration and delay. But the matter of urban renewal was complicated by the preconceptions and preferences of citizens who live in a medium-sized city in central Illinois, an area where individualistic culture is dominant. Such attitudes underlie the suspicions about the proper job of government which are at the root of "official" ambivalence.

The community's fragmented structure reinforced ambivalence about the role of government and increased the difficulty of implementing a program. For example, during the extended discussions over urban renewal, the strategy that might have produced a successful program was systematically overlooked. The North End abuts the northern boundaries of the University of Illinois, and the 1960s were the years of university expansion. The urban renewal program offered credits for redevelopment in areas abutting public facilities, and other cities took advantage of these provisions to generate funds for more projects. Project I of Champaign's urban renewal would have been suitable for such purposes, but the opportunity was missed. Although the possibility of using proximity to the university was mentioned periodically, there was neither the capacity nor the will to pursue the initiative. An administrator, knowledgeable about the workings of federal grants was needed to successfully assemble the pieces, and the lack of expertise was one factor which minimized Champaign's chances for a successful program.
In addition, there was no political impetus for such a strategy. The university consulted minimally with the cities on its expansion plans, and business and civic organizations were indifferent to these possibilities. The League of Women Voters, the most active advocate of urban renewal, saw the problem primarily in terms of the need for better housing for the poor. In the early 1960s, the realization that the poor were primarily black had neither action nor ideological significance. Project I, a strictly pragmatic conception which affected only the black community, was completed without threatening the status quo or increasing the pressure on marginal neighborhoods. There was no individual or group in the early 1960s with the power or the foresight to push a broad conception of community redevelopment and include the university.

There was only minimal awareness of the need for integration in the early 1960s. Later as integration became significant, the threat to the status quo and challenges to the precepts of individualistic culture aroused more vehement opposition. The frustrations and delays surrounding planning for and implementation of a renewal program increased. The program was subject to fits and starts, new objections were raised, and the program stalled, to start again under the auspices of a Community Development Grant. The lack of results are attributable to the combination of cultural preference and racial antipathies which minimized the effectiveness of federal incentive for redevelopment. A broad conception of communal objectives may well be a prerequisite for efficient utilization of federal incentives but development of such a vision contradicts the modus operandi of individualistic political culture. The absence of communal purpose limited and enfeebled Champaign's urban renewal program from its inception. Racial antipathies were factors in the equation but cultural preferences and political habits were also important, as indicated by the city council's response to the federal flood insurance program.

Federal Flood Insurance

The depth of Champaign's commitment to individualistic culture is illustrated by the controversy over adoption of the Federal Flood Insurance Program. Two areas of Champaign were designated flood plain areas, and federal regulations specified that if a community with a designated flood plain area failed to join the program by July 1, 1975, no loans or grants including mortgage and disaster loans from either federal agencies or banks and savings and loan institutions with Federal Deposit Insurance would be available for construction.

Although refusal to join the program had disastrous implications for construction activity, in February 1975, two council members voted no on the resolution authorizing Champaign's participation. Councilman William Kuhne, a contractor, and William Bland, union leader and representative of the working-class neighborhoods of North Champaign, claimed their negative votes were a protest against unwarranted federal intervention in the affairs of local government. Poor attendance at the council session and two negative votes killed the resolution. The new city manager, Gene Miller, attempted to salvage what he could from the vote and hoped that the matter would be reconsidered.

It was, and on March 4, the council reversed its decision. Several members restated their beliefs that the proposal was in effect "legalized" blackmail, but council members also realized that the "city's federal Community Development application could be jeopardized by the city's refusal to join the flood insurance program." Perhaps the above incident can be dismissed as a purely rhetorical flourish in support of a lost cause; on the other hand, it may be suggested that it is one example of the cultural strengths of preconceptions and preference and their continuing influence over the political behavior of both elites and citizens.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 7


2 Daily Champaign City News, 21 February 1917.

3 Joan Z. Severns, "Portrait of a City: Mirrored by a Referendum" (unpublished manuscript), March 1966.

4 Ibid., p. 31.

5 Ibid., p. 33.


7 Ibid., pp. 6-9.

8 Sam Waltz, Courier, 10 March 1974.

9 Ibid.


11 Courier, March 10, 1974.

12 Ibid.

13 See Philip J. Downey, "Community Power in Champaign."

14 News Gazette, 6 April 1959.


19 Plan Commission members and staff in Champaign and Urbana were interviewed. The impression from these interviews is that there is more public participation in Urbana than Champaign. A partial explanation may be found in the meeting times: Urbana's Plan Commission meets in the evening, Champaign's at 4:00 p.m. But the difference may be symptomatic. Attendance at Champaign sessions consists primarily of lawyers representing clients requesting zoning changes. The League of Women Voters also sends a representative to meetings of both commissions. There are more representatives of neighborhood associations at Urbana meetings.


22 Ibid., p. 22.

23 Ibid., pp. 23-25.

24 Ibid., p. 27.

25 Ibid., p. 32.


27 Letter addressed to Jean Burkholder, April 9, 1963.

28 Patton, "Urban Renewal and Negro Involvement," p. 34.

29 Ibid., p. 37.

30 Ibid., pp. 34-40.

31 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
32 Ibid., p. 42.
33 Ibid., p. 49.
34 Ibid., p. 50.
38 Ibid., p. 53.
39 Paula Peters, Courier, 8 August 1968.
41 News Gazette, 20 August 1975.
42 Courier, 8 November 8 and 26 November 1968.
43 Courier, 29 October 1969.
44 Courier, 16 December 1969.
46 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
48 News Gazette, 1 August 1973.
54 Ibid.
56 News Gazette, 7 November and 8 November 1974. See also Daily Illini, 7 November and 9 November 1974.
57 News Gazette, 4 January 4 and 14 January 1975.
59 News Gazette, 5 May and 7 May 1975.
64 News Gazette, 2 May, 10 May and 16 May 1974.
66 News Gazette, 6 August 1975.
67 I am indebted to Hayward Saunders for his suggestions about this section.
68 News Gazette, 19 February 1975.
69 News Gazette, 5 March 1975.
CHAPTER 8
CHAMPAIGN: TOWARD RACIAL INTEGRATION

Introduction

Obstacles to urban renewal and adequate siting for low-cost public housing developed from the antipathy of citizens in an individualistic culture to coordinated and concerted government intervention in the life of civil society. Opposition was demonstrated by the heady rhetoric and defiance of conservatives and by disinclination of moderates with liberal inclinations to push for strong government action.

The minimal impact of urban renewal is not solely attributable to the preferences of individualistic culture. Latent racial tension and misunderstanding were significant factors in the long, controversial history of urban renewal. The strands of racial hostility are inextricably intertwined with the tenets of individualistic culture on the renewal question. For this reason, the question of race and culture will be discussed in this chapter and the effects of culture will be treated separately in the next chapter. Racial tensions and attempts to ameliorate racial inequities will be examined by focusing on integration in the schools, employment opportunities, and Champaign's affirmative action programs and park district programs. Chapter 9 will focus on the ways that individualistic attitudes shaped action on problems such as downtown development, planning to prevent urban sprawl, and development of a new shopping center, as well as quality of life issues such as sign control, no smoking ordinance, and regulation of massage parlors.

Racial segregation was a fundamental fact of life in Champaign in the 1940s. A study by the League of Women Voters in 1948 concluded that housing was inadequate and overcrowded in the black neighborhoods, and no new housing was under construction.

It is almost impossible for a Negro to buy or rent outside a restricted area, partly because of the device of raising the rent or sale price to a Negro applicant.
Restrictive covenants were verified in subdivisions in Champaign: Elmwood, Garden Park, Country Club Manor and Harvard, and in Greencroft just outside the city limits. *1

Education, recreation and employment were also segregated. Although public institutions were mandated by law not to discriminate, segregation was prevalent in the elementary schools. In 1948, two elementary schools, Lawhead (first and second grades) and Willard (third through sixth) were all Negro. The 44 white children living in the attendance districts of these two schools attend Columbia which has no Negro pupils. *2

Since there was only one high school, it was integrated, but two junior high schools presented a more complex picture. School officials claimed that there was a relaxed, taken-for-granted attitude in the mixed schools even as they blamed the new difficulties in the schools on the attitudes of parents.

At the time the Champaign Junior High was built there was much protest on the part of some white parents to the admission of Negroes, the principal said. There was also an unsuccessful attempt to have separate lunchroom and other facilities provided for the Negro pupils. There have been continued protests about the inclusion of the Negroes in the social life of this school, but these are lessening, according to the principal. *3

Similarly there were eight black teachers in the system who held positions at Lawhead or Willard, including two as principals. Their qualifications, education and experience were equivalent to if not higher than those of white teachers. The salary scale was the same for white and black teachers, and the black teachers were members of the Champaign Education Association. *4 In 1948, there were no black members of the school board.

* Greencroft has since been annexed to the city.

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Public employment opportunities for blacks, although concentrated in segregated schools, eventually proved to be the stepping stone of further black advancement. Black teachers were integrated throughout the Unit 4 system in the 1960s and by the school year 1975-76, there were black teachers in most schools. Table 8.1 gives 1975 enrollment figures and the number of black teachers in each school. *5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Enrollment, 1975-1976</th>
<th>Black Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottenfield</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrie Busey</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>4 + principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Howard</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Hills</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>7 + principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenwood</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquette</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robeson</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Side</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzer</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>3 + principal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were thirteen black teachers in three junior high schools; one junior high principal was black, and there were ten black teachers in two high schools. The vice principal of one high school was black. There was one black physical education teacher, eleven in special services, two in the child study program and two in central administration positions. *6 A comparison of these figures with 1948, when the predominant pattern in public employment was segregation, suggests the impressive change in the status of black professions.

In 1948, most of the elementary school facilities were old and inadequate. Willard, one of two black schools, was overcrowded, classrooms were small, halls served as recreation areas on rainy days, and a basement room was allocated for physical education. The main task facing Unit 4 in the 1950s and 1960s was construction of new facilities, necessitated by the
deteriorating conditions of school buildings and the steady increase in school enrollment. From 1947 until 1970, enrollment increased from 200 to 500 students every year. In 1970, the reverse trend began and enrollment reductions of 200 to 600 students each year became the rule. Table 8.2 gives enrollment figures.

Construction of new facilities was supported by the voters of Unit 4.* Throughout the 1950s and until 1967, the district approved thirteen bond referenda for school construction. Table 8.3 lists the referenda, their purposes and the voter totals. At present only four elementary schools still in use were constructed before 1945. However, each of the older buildings had additions during this period. New facilities were scattered around the periphery of the city where population was growing most rapidly, and most were located in Southwest Champaign. In 1951, Westview was built in Southwest Champaign, and Washington was built in the North End, on the boundary with Urbana, six blocks north of University Avenue on Wright Street. Neither "separate but equal" nor "neighborhood schools" were fashionable slogans in 1951, but the location of schools suggests that such slogans might serve as an explanation for educational policy in the period.

In the 1960s as demands of racial equality intensified, the district's decisions on school sites, teacher placement, and racial composition of schools came under scrutiny. Groups such as the Champaign-Urbana Council for Community Integration (CCI), composed primarily of academics and middle-class professionals increased their activity. The integration of Jefferson Junior High School, the only junior high school that was not geographically integrated, has been attributed to the efforts of CCI.

The push for elementary school integration gained momentum after 1964, as examples of civil rights activism and the implications of new federal law filtered down to the cities of the prairies. The most immediate pressure for integration was the decision in 1966 of the Urbana School Board to integrate Urbana elementary schools. On December 12, 1966, the Coordinating Committee on Quality Education (CCQE) was

* Unit 4 was created in 1948 by voter approval of a referendum.
### TABLE 8.3
TO RAISE EDUCATIONAL TAX RATE LIMIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rate Increase</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 1952</td>
<td>$1.00 to $1.15</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>1072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9, 1955</td>
<td>$1.15 to $1.40</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>1072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23, 1955</td>
<td>$1.15 to $1.40</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>1603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11, 1959</td>
<td>$1.40 to $1.80</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>1529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 1962</td>
<td>$1.80 to $2.05</td>
<td>4839</td>
<td>1326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BUILDING BONDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 11, 1947</td>
<td>South Side Addition</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9, 1949</td>
<td>Hensley, Washington, Switzer Addition</td>
<td>672,000</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 9, 1950</td>
<td>Westview, South Side Addition</td>
<td>544,000</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 17, 1951</td>
<td>Dr. Howard, Columbia Addition</td>
<td>346,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6, 1952</td>
<td>Franklin Junior High School, Senior High Add., Edison Junior High Add.</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 19, 1955</td>
<td>Bottenfield, Washington Addition, Westview Addition</td>
<td>755,000</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1957</td>
<td>Carrie Busey, Garden Hills, Marquette, Savoy Addition</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18, 1958</td>
<td>Washington, Dr. Howard, Bottenfield Additions</td>
<td>712,000</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18, 1958</td>
<td>Jefferson Junior High School</td>
<td>1,585,000</td>
<td>1521</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 25, 1961</td>
<td>Savoy, Garden Hills, Switzer, Columbia, Carrie Busey Additions, Administrative Office</td>
<td>944,000</td>
<td>3965</td>
<td>1259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 24, 1962</td>
<td>Kenwood</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>1179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 1962</td>
<td>Senior High (Centennial)</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>5169</td>
<td>1270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 21, 1963</td>
<td>Kenwood, Garden Hills Addition</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>3030</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 5, 1964</td>
<td>Centennial High (Second Phase)</td>
<td>2,320,000</td>
<td>3001</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 1965</td>
<td>Centennial High (Third Phase) Robeson Elementary</td>
<td>1,490,000</td>
<td>3260</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6, 1966</td>
<td>Robeson Elementary (Second Phase) E. H. Mellon Administration Building, Warehouse</td>
<td>990,000</td>
<td>2588</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
officially formed. The committee, which included several civil rights activists, declared interest in such matters as the selection of a new superintendent of Unit 4, studying integration methods in other cities, the upcoming election of school board members, school site locations and federal grants. By February 1967, the CCQE was no longer studying the problem, they were threatening a boycott of Champaign business as a spur to the school board to take action to integrate the schools. The threat was made shortly before a public board meeting, held on February 20, 1967, at Central High School, which was scheduled to discuss the feasibility of busing. The location was chosen because of widespread interest, and the audience filled the high school auditorium. Passions were high, the meeting was raucous and advocates of busing were booed. The expression of rooted opposition to integration could have been a portent of racial trouble ahead, but the momentum towards integration was not checked. Organized opposition to busing developed only in the Kenwood area where a "taxpayers association" made efforts to prevent busing of black students to Kenwood school.

In March, the school board appointed an umbrella group, the Equal Education Opportunity Committee (EEOC), to study the question of integration. CCQE remained the most visible and active citizens group and exerted consistent pressure throughout 1967. Shortly after the creation of the EEOC, CCQE sponsored a meeting to plan a boycott and picketing of Champaign business. On March 25, a rally at the Mt. Olive Baptist Church inaugurated the boycott. Pickets were setup at several large and some small businesses in downtown Champaign. CCQE made its point; there were enough concerned citizens to mount a demonstration.

In June 1967, the board accepted an interim EEOC report which pledged an end to segregation in the elementary schools, and three integrated junior high schools by September 1968. Notwithstanding the commitment to integration, the question then became by what means this could be achieved. Early suggestions, especially a plan for staged integration at Jefferson Junior High, seemed (at least to critics) to be tainted with gradualism, and proponents of integration increased the pressure. The net school board meeting was picketed and signs of protestors demanded "action not promises."
Over the next four months, advocates and opponents jockeyed for position and public attention and attempted to gain adherents, but conflict over integration was muted until the release of the final EEOC report in December. The report firmly supported an integrated school system and proposed that Washington Elementary School, located in the North End, become a model school operated jointly by Unit 4 and the College of Education of the University of Illinois. The proposal finessed the difficulty of gaining community support for busing white children into a black school. Only volunteers were to be bused and the "carrot" offered to volunteers was the promise of an innovative laboratory school with exceptional educational opportunities. Black students displaced from Washington School were to be bused throughout the district in order to obtain a racial balance in each school of no more than 93 percent or less than 74 percent white students.

The idea of a laboratory school with volunteer students was received by white citizens, at best, with enthusiasm and, at worse, with relief. For proponents of integration, the creation of an integrated school system was the fulfillment of a moral imperative. For opponents, the proposal offered minimum involvement and more important, minimum dislocation in neighborhood schools. The only opposition to the EEOC proposal came from black families in the North End, who objected to the mandatory dispersion of their children. However, this opposition was spotty and fragmented and a majority of the black community accepted the proposal plan. Widespread acceptance of the EEOC proposal suggests that social change could be implemented quietly, despite cultural preferences, as long as the "iron" fist of government intervention was disguised.

September 1968, marked the start of an integrated school system and the News Gazette and the Courier carried positive stories on busing and pupil reactions. Later in September, racial ratios were compiled and except for three schools (Marquette--35.5 percent black, Washington--34.1 percent and Westview--5.1 percent) all schools were within the guidelines established by the school board. In 1969, four schools were not in conformance with the ratio of no less than 7 percent and no more than 26 percent black students. The percentage of black students in Marquette and Washington schools declined, Westview's percentage declined to 3.6 percent and Lincoln school joined the list with a black population of 28.1 percent.

The question of racial balance became more salient after 1971 when the State Office of Education established guidelines for acceptable racial composition which permitted a variation of 15 percent above or below the black population in the district. For Champaign, with a black school population of 15.2 percent, the maximum allowable black concentration in any school was 30.2 percent. Four schools failed to conform in 1971: Columbia, Lincoln, Marquette and Washington. Lincoln School was closed in the 1972 school year, and the percentage of black students in individual schools fluctuated from year to year due to changes in neighborhoods and boundary changes. Table 8.4 gives these percentages for the years 1968 to 1975.

The figures indicate the successful implementation of the EEOC proposal of 1967. In 1975, only Columbia school, located in a neighborhood which had become predominantly black was out of conformity with state guidelines. The black population was 47.9 percent and the deviation from state guidelines was sufficiently large that the State Board of Education cited Champaign as one of 34 of the state's 1,029 school districts submitting unacceptable desegregation programs. School superintendent Marshall Berner responded with the assurance that Unit 4 intended to correct the imbalance at Columbia School by 1977 when district-wide boundary changes would be instituted. Ironically just as Unit 4 was cited as out of compliance, an Illinois Office of Education news release described and praised Champaign's approach to desegregation.

Praise and criticism, initial success and future problems were inextricably intertwined from the beginning. The Champaign program was successful in that it achieved the strongly felt purposes of local civil rights activists and was in accord with the national push to rectify inequities of past treatment of blacks. The proposal was also successful, in that these objectives could be achieved without violating individualistic tenets about the role of government. On the one hand, the decision as to which children to bus to Washington was the voluntary decision of individual families who were promised educational bene-
TABLE 8.4

TOTAL PERCENT OF BLACK PUPILS/SCHOOL AS AVAILABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>'68</th>
<th>'69</th>
<th>'70</th>
<th>'71</th>
<th>'72</th>
<th>'73</th>
<th>'74</th>
<th>'75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bondville</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottenfield</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrie-Busey</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Howard</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Hills</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensley</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenwood</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquette</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robeson</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southside</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lottie Switzer</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* All elementary school figures were September figures; all secondary school figures were June figures.

Absence of official coercion helped smooth the path to desegregation in 1967, but by 1976, it appeared that some coercion would be needed to maintain acceptable racial balances. Neighborhood racial compositions changed, especially after 1968, when the Champaign City Council passed an open housing ordinance. The opening of previously inaccessible neighborhoods to black families led, particularly in the older residential areas, to an increase in black families. Columbia School was cited in 1948 as the school to which whites were sent to avoid integration, but in 1975 was out of conformity with state guidelines. The neighborhood was changing from white to black. Garden Hills, located in an area of low-cost housing in Northwest Champaign shows a total of seventy-five residential black children in grades K to 4 in 1975 and a projection of forty-four for the next five years. Residential integration is not widespread in the more expensive residential areas of Champaign. The Bottenfield School census of 1971 shows twelve residential blacks in grades K through 4 and projects six black pupils for the next five years.17

Budget deficits and a declining school population have compounded the problem and were the basis for the school board decision to close three schools by 1979. The schools included a small suburban school, and two schools in the eastern section of the city, one north and one centrally located. The decision to close schools was hotly contested, particularly because of the alleged effect on older neighborhoods, and a resi-
due of bitterness remained in areas scheduled for closing. A headline in the News Gazette summed up this bitterness, "Some Parents Feel Sold Out." The parents felt that Superintendent Marshall Berner "sold us down the drain. . . . The Board seems to be saying let's hit poor people and the inner city."18

School closings, shifts to middle schools from junior high schools, as well as the correction of racial compositions in selected schools resulted in changes in school boundaries for 1977. The administration prepared tentative boundaries19 and proposed changes again generated parental opposition in older residential neighborhoods. It was inevitable that schools in the northern sections of the city would be most affected by boundary changes; buildings are older and population has shifted to the southwest. However, intensity of parental resistance is fed by the "facts" of the situation, particularly as boundary changes necessitated by closing schools are felt in the schools which remained open. The impression that individual choice was the basic factor in creating racial balance is dissipating, and school solutions appear less and less as the workings of Adam Smith's invisible hand and more and more as the conscious attempt either to reach state and federally mandated objectives or to minimize consequences of the southwestern areas of the city.

School closings and the shift to middle schools will not substantially change the district's budget prospects. A projected drop in state aid for the 1978-1979 school year offsets savings from school closings. The state aid formula rewards districts which tax themselves at high rates. Because Unit 4 is currently taxed at $2.59 per $100 assessed valuation,20 it does not receive extra state aid. If voters could be persuaded to support a referendum to increase the rate to the maximum, in addition to new funds, the district would receive more state aid.

Whether the tax rate could be raised was open to question. In 1967, 1968, and 1972, referenda to increase the maximum annual tax rate for educational purposes were defeated. The 1972 referendum included a proposition to increase the tax rate for building purposes which was also defeated. In 1967 the vote was five to one against the increase and the negative margins were widest in Southwest Champaign; in 1968, it was five to four and the precincts of Southwest Champaign were more supportive. In 1972, the referendum lost in all but two precincts. Table 8.5 shows voter breakdown by school precinct.21

The school board meeting of February 3, 1976, discussed the necessity of another appeal to the voters. The consensus was that hard sell was needed and that cuts must be made before a referendum was scheduled. Whether or not this strategy offsets latent dissatisfaction with the schools, the ramifications of desegregation mandates, dissatisfaction with school closings, and arguments about curriculum have eroded basic understandings between parents and school administrators. Citizen dissatisfaction will significantly affect continuing support of the educational system as well as acceptance of further governmental moves to minimize the effects of racial inequities.

Employment

Programs undertaken in Champaign to offset racial inequities in employment resemble efforts in education because similar constraints shape and limit remedial action. Before the 1960s, neither public nor private employers were required to provide equal opportunity employment, although nondiscrimination provisions were in effect in the public sector. The League of Women Voters Report of 1948 tells the story of employment in Champaign.

The opportunities in the community fall roughly into four classifications when considered in relation to Negro population.

1. Jobs in which no Negroes are employed at present--36

That is: no Negro, no matter what his training or experience, will be hired locally as a bank clerk, a movie usher, a store clerk, etc.

2. Jobs open to Negroes in certain limited instances--10

That is: one factory hires machine operators solely on a basis of skill; there is one Negro policeman, one mail carrier; one business firm employs one
Negro clerical worker, etc. Two manu-
ufacturers hire Negroes on an equal 
basis with whites, as drop forgers and 
machinists.

3. Jobs open for limited and/or 
segregated work--12

That is: employers look for Negroes 
for certain specific jobs which are 
carefully delimited from other jobs in 
the same establishment or are the only 
hired work done on the premises: diswashing, cooking, steam 
and pressing, maintenance work, etc.

4. Jobs open absolutely on a 
basis of skill--4

That is: a qualified Negro will be 
hired to work at the same jobs with 
whites in unskilled construction work, 
in street repair, on railroad mainte-
nance work and in grain processing.

Another view of the situation is 
obtained from the policy in local 
unions. There are 35 A.F. of L. trade 
unions represented in Champaign-
Urbana. None of these formally bans 
Negroes, but in actual practice only 
fourteen unions accept them. Each of 
these has some Negro members. They 
are: Bakery and Confectionary 
Workers, Blacksmiths and Drop Forgers, 
Building Service Employees, Electrical 
Workers, Grain Processors, Hod 
Carriers & Construction Workers, 
Machinists, Mail Carriers, Glove 
Workers, Municipal & Country 
Employees, Truck Drivers, Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees, and two railroad 
unions--Maintenance of Way, and Fire-
man and Oilers. The one Negro police-
man, in Champaign, is the only Negro 
working for the municipalities except 
in non-skilled work.22

The kinds of employment as well as the number of 
black employees increased dramatically between 1948

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pt.</th>
<th>Negroes</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Marquette</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Southside</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Champaign</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bloomington</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Carversville</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Savoy</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>56</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Bondville</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>56</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Consolidated</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Robeson</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
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---
and 1968. In the early 1960s, in cities North and South, increased black consciousness led to demonstrations, sit-ins and riots and there was a new black activism in Champaign. Penney's Department Store was picketed in 1962 in protest against hiring practices in downtown Champaign business. The crisis in the cities produced a spate of federal legislation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246 which provided for cancellation of contracts with firms that did $10,000 in business with the federal government and practiced discrimination in hiring were especially significant.

A 1963 amendment to the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act broadened the term "employer" to include state government and its subdivisions, and in theory, facilitated state supervision of hiring practices at the University of Illinois. The League Report of 1968 found that this legislation had little impact on the status of local black employment.

The overall unemployment rate in Champaign-Urbana in April, 1968, was 2.6% according to the Illinois State Employment Service. However, the rate of unemployment for Negroes is usually quoted at between 12% and 20% depending on the season and the results of the most recent survey.

The university is the largest employer in Champaign and Urbana. The League found that as of March 1968 only 5.9 percent of university non-academic employees were black, and black employees were concentrated at the bottom of the work ladder. On the basis of these figures, the league report concluded that the enforcement of new legislation and executive orders has been uniformly ineffectual on the local level.

Although employment appeared to be an intractable problem, local black activism received some rewards. "Marches, picketing, boycotting of stores and confrontation with city councils were not uncommon," and produced tangible concessions; the EEOC plan to desegregate Champaign schools, an open housing ordinance in 1968, and Ordinance 940 passed in 1969 which provided that contractors, subcontractors and vendors doing business with the city must provide the city with a written commitment that they did not discriminate in employment. Ordinance 940 was a significant step of but it carefully did not "infringe upon the right of the employer to determine the need for or qualifications of employees."

The ordinance also specified the powers of the community relations director, including authority to collect data, to certify whether persons covered by the ordinance were in compliance, and to inform contractors, subcontractors of vendors of noncompliance. If noncompliance persisted, measures to achieve compliance could be instituted.

The passage of the ordinance was attributed to James Ransom, a newly elected black City Council member. Ransom was elected on a "mandate from the black community," and was considered a "unity candidate," a candidate who could bridge the gap between "older progressives and younger militants" in the black community.

By 1969, an affirmative action ordinance seemed dictated by the times and national trends, but the action of the Champaign City Council was more of a symbolic gesture than an instrumental measure. In the first place, the City Council was elected at large and the majority of the members came from Southwest Champaign. In order to secure an ordinance, Ransom accepted a weakened measure. Second, Ransom wanted to make the community relations director responsible to the City Council, but the ordinance made the director responsible to the city manager. The black community's perception of the city manager's commitment to affirmative action was not reassuring and there was concern that the ordinance would not be actively enforced.

The qualifications of Howard Mitchell, the first human relations director, and his performance in office caused misgivings and he was fired in June 1971, less than two years after he was hired. The conflict that developed over the dismissal was sparked by more than questions of competence and personality clashes. In April, during discussions over the city budget for 1971-72, James Ransom attacked City Manager Warren Browning for his lack of concern for the black community. The News Gazette quoted Ransom:

You [Browning] have in this budget the closing of the Community Relations
office on North Fourth Street. You have increased the budget of just about every department except the Community Relations Department. . . . You found money to increase police training so the police department can learn how to beat people over the head better. . . . Why isn't there more money spent on prevention of problems?28

The city manager defended the budget priorities and criticized the performance of the community relations director.29

Two months later, Browning dismissed the human relations director citing erratic job performance as the reason. No single factor was specified, but the director's inaccessibility, for example, he had an unlisted phone number while all other city officials had listed numbers, and his close relations with the more activist blacks in the community created friction with the city manager. Mitchell reacted to his dismissal by asserting that there was a deplorable lack of executive leadership and a total lack of interest in his department. He claimed that James Ransom was the only City Council member who visited the department or was concerned with its objectives.30

Whatever objective reasons can be found for the ineffectualness of the human relations department during this period, the black community acted as if they knew the villain and rallied to support Mitchell. One hundred people including James Ransom, Vernon Barkstall, director of the Champaign County Urban League, and Parkland Junior College Dean Phillip Walker gathered in downtown Champaign to protest "racism in City Hall."31

Mitchell was arrested in Urbana on July 3, 1971, but his supporters attended the next City Council meeting to demand a further explanation of his dismissal. Robeson's Department Store was picketed on July 7, and the theme of the protest was "Browning must go."32 Protests over Mitchell's dismissal ended with the picketing of Robeson's, but dissatisfaction with the implementation fo Ordinance 940 continued.

The next director, Alphonso Johnson, was well qualified. After the city manager selected two finalists, the Human Relations Commission (HRC) picked Johnson and he was hired in September 1971. Johnson held the post until October 5, 1973, when he too was fired by the city manager. The dismissal notice read:

I have discharged Mr. Alphonso Johnson from his position as Director of Community Relations . . . . I have taken this action with sincere regret and only after consideration of all other alternatives. At this point I am convinced Mr. Johnson's continued employment is not in the best interests of the city of Champaign.33

The background to Johnson's dismissal was more complex than in the Mitchell case and included jurisdictional conflicts. The director worked for the city manager, but he also needed to have rapport with the Human Relations Commission, an appointive committee of the City Council which advised on matters concerning discrimination and on the police. The HRC had not been particularly effective and was in some disarray. More militant members were often stymied by lack of a quorum which prevented the official conduct of business. In September, a month before Johnson was dismissed, the HRC requested revision of Ordinance 940 because it failed to provide the tools to remedy racial inequality. George Pope, the commission chairman, requested the appointment of an HRC investigator. The human relations director was responsible to the city manager; he did not serve the commission. The HRC wanted additional staff, it did not ask for Johnson's dismissal. A year earlier, the HRC called for Johnson's resignation, but commission membership changed in the interim and tension between the HRC and Johnson was reduced.34

In response, Johnson criticized the HRC on a radio show and in October, after presenting his monthly report to the HRC, he released it to the newspapers. The nine page report laid the blame for the ineffectualness of the Human Relations Department at the door of the city manager.35 Johnson claimed that his requests for clarification of Ordinance 940 and suggestions for new procedures to handle citizen complaints were ignored. He also charged the city administration with failing to support his efforts to obtain compliance on affirmative action from city departments.36
No public demonstrations marked Johnson's dismissal, but John Lee Johnson, a black City Council member, said he planned to propose an ordinance to guarantee Johnson's successor more independence. As council member Johnson saw it, Alphonso Johnson was caught between his responsibility to rectify existing inequities and his responsibility to the city manager. The director's dismissal was evidence of "a lack of a moral social commitment on the part of the City of Champaign." 37

The HRC continued to press its demands for a revised ordinance to clarify the relationship between the city manager, the human relations director, and the HRC, while John Lee Johnson pressed the issue with the City Council. During this period the HRC's effectiveness was limited by the split between activist members and those who did not attend meetings. Neither the October nor the November 1973, meetings were able to conduct business because there was no quorum. Nevertheless, the commission unofficially developed an outline of proposed ordinance revisions, with central emphasis on a provision to provide "staff assistance at our [HRC] discretion, not at their [city administration] discretion." 38 John Lee Johnson prepared amendments to Ordinance 940 to "put teeth" into three sections and remove enforcement responsibility from the city manager. 39 Browning defended his administration and claimed that Champaign was far ahead of other cities in complying with the controversial state Fair Employment Practice Act. 40

Browning was correct. Champaign had a better affirmative action record than Urbana. Employment data gathered by the HRC and released in January 1974, showed that the city's workforce contained a higher percent of blacks than most of the firms which filed compliance statements with the city. Blacks composed 10.2 percent of 307 city employees. However, the picture was not totally rosy; most of these workers earned less than $10,000 a year, women were underutilized and the police and fire departments were predominantly white and had no women employees. 41 Yet Browning was correct when he insisted that he implemented the law correctly. The controversy developed from the weakness of Ordinance 940 and Browning's refusal to stretch the law to satisfy the expectations of the activist members of the black community.

Johnson persisted in his efforts and four months later, on April 2, 1974, Ordinance 1300 was passed to replace 940. In May 1974, Ordinance 1322 was passed as a supplement and clarification of Ordinance 1300. The revisions included more careful specifications of what constituted acts of discrimination, more concrete sanctions, and greater accountability of the city manager to the City Council.

The passage of a new ordinance turned out to be a small part of the changes that were in the offing. On March 6, 1974, a month before the City Council acted on Ordinance 1300, City Manager Warren Browning submitted his resignation, which was to take effect on April 14, 1974. In the interim, a new human relations director was selected and the HRC, because of Browning's imminent departure, had more input concerning selection. John Lee Johnson tired to secure a role for the City Council in the selection, but Browning was adamant: the City Council should not intervene in the responsibilities of the city manager. Larine Cowan, a black woman, was selected on March 20, 1974, as community relations director, and the News Gazette headlined its story, "Cowan Confronts Swinging Doors." 42 Organizational responsibility was not drastically altered by the new affirmative action ordinance, but personnel changes affected implementation. Browning, in his last news conference, discussed the responsibilities of the new human relations director and the import of the new ordinance. The new ordinance would be expensive. Adequate enforcement depended on hiring additional staff, but the director continued to be responsible to the city manager. 43

With Browning's departure, even though the responsibilities of the director remained ambiguous, the tensions that clustered around the implementation of affirmative action lessened. When Gene Miller became city manager in September 1974, he inaugurated an "open approach," for example, promising to let the council know of differences between the city manager and his staff, and to present both sides. 44 Miller's approach was one factor in ameliorating tensions between the human relations director, the HRC and the City Council. A second factor, perhaps more symbolic than instrumental but nevertheless of import, was that Miller bought a home in the northern part of the city rather than in Southwest Champaign where Browning had
resided. The final factor in amelioration of tension is that the new administration appears to be more committed to affirmative action.

A recent study of minority employment (see Tables 8.6 and 8.7) documents that minorities are well represented in the top administrative levels in Champaign government and are represented above their proportion of the city's population in all but three departments. The statistics are impressive, especially when compared with statistics that demonstrate that Urbana's workforce neither reflects minority population nor provides adequate minority representation at the higher administrative echelons. Preston's study suggests several reasons for the discrepancy, including the greater effectiveness of Champaign's affirmative action program. At the time that the data were collected (1975), Champaign's program was past the transitional period while the post of human relations director in Urbana was vacant. A more significant difference between the cities, which may account for greater minority employment in Champaign, is that Champaign had an urban renewal program and therefore had to conform more closely to federal employment requirements than Urbana, which had not received a HUD grant. Preston makes the point that minorities are well represented in the federal workforce, and that the entry point for minorities was the programs of the 1960s designed to upgrade minority status. Champaign's urban renewal program helped upgrade minority personnel who were hired for administrative posts in the urban renewal program and shifted to other departments as urban renewal was phased out. If this suggestion is correct, then the consequence of federally funded urban programs for local government were more pervasive and more subtle than is usually supposed.

The more obvious pressures of state and federal affirmative action requirements were visible in the conflict over hiring in Champaign's police and fire departments. As noted above, minorities and women were underrepresented in these departments and the reasons as well as the remedies for the situation became a focal point of conflict in city politics. The public controversy was a tug of war and resembled the complex relationship between the HRC, the city manager, the human relations director, and the City Council. The first manifestation of conflict surfaced in a dispute over the extent of home rule powers granted by the Illinois Constitution of 1970. City

<table>
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<th>Job Classifications</th>
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<td>Officials/Administrators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraprofessionals</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Craft Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service/Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Champaign.

Findings: Minorities are well represented at the top administrative level in Champaign.
Manager Browning, citing home rule powers, asked the City Council to change the authority of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners and give more power over hiring and promotion to the fire and police chiefs. Rank and file police and firemen saw the move as a power grab by the city manager, and John Hirschfeld, Representative from the 52nd district, sponsored a bill in the state legislature to preempt home rule powers over police and fire departments. As Hirschfeld's bill was making the legislative rounds, the Circuit Court decision of December 1972, that "home rule" provisions did not give cities and municipalities the power to change laws already enacted by the General Assembly, was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision appeared to have added impetus for passage of the Hirschfeld bill, but the bill died in a Senate committee.48

The following November, Browning again proposed alterations in the duties of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners and he continued to support such changes, without success, until the end of his tenure. He received unexpected support from council activists when the justification for reduction of the board's autonomy shifted. The independence of the board came to be perceived as the major obstacle so the hiring of minority and female personnel. In December 1973, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission completed the investigation of a discrimination complaint filed by Willie Jenkins, Jr. of Champaign and "dismissed the case for lack of substantial evidence,"49 but the favorable decision did not lessen criticisms of board policies. The Jenkins' complaint, originally filed in July, 1973, was the first of several attacks on board procedures for selecting and promoting personnel.

In addition there was concern among the police ranks about obstacles to promotion. The disquiet came to a head in October, 1973, when forty-eight policemen, who failed a tough exam, filed a request for an injunction to stop the certification of eleven officers who passed the exam. The effort failed,50 but the accumulation of challenges to the autonomy of the board opened the way for stronger challenges from activist members of the City Council.

The major challenge came on height and weight requirements for police and firemen. The City Council, on May 7, 1974, approved a resolution spon-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Number of Minority Employees</th>
<th>Percentage of Minority Employees</th>
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</thead>
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<td>City Manager's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>City Attorney's Office</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>291</td>
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</table>

Source: City of Champaign.

Findings: Minority workers are represented above their proportion of the city's population in all but three departments.

Findings: Minority workers are represented above their proportion of the city's population in all but three departments.
sored by Mary Pollock which asked the fire and police commissioners to ease the requirement setting 5 feet 9 inches as the minimum height and 150 pounds as the minimum weight for fire and police personnel. The board politely refused and there the matter might have ended. The board is chartered under state law, not city ordinance, and the City Council must use home rule powers if it wanted to do more than recommend policy changes. However, Mary Pollock was persistent. She prepared a stronger resolution which stated that height and weight minimums clearly discriminated against women and certain minority groups and that they were therefore, in violation of federal regulations governing disbursement of grant money. The stronger resolution was approved, six to two, although the city attorney warned that it was not binding on the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.

Within two weeks, there were new pressures on the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. A staff member of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, the state agency dispensing grant money from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, declared that a minimum height requirement "may be discriminatory." Since federal requirements prohibiting discrimination must be met, Champaign, if it was to be eligible for an ILEC grant to fight "stranger-to-stranger" crimes, must prove that it did not discriminate. Champaign's position was made more difficult in that it was the only city among four seeking an ILEC grant that maintained a strict height minimum for police. Within a week, the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners reversed its decision, but the concession was made grudgingly. A board member asserted that the "reversal was voted only so the City of Champaign may accept a federal grant through the ILEC."

The victory, due in the main to external pressure, was the first opening and created the possibility of hiring more women and blacks. Further pressure came from the city government: the board was required to submit an affirmative action plan to comply with Champaign's new ordinance. In August 1974, the board adopted a minority hiring plan, but the concession was something of a Pyrrhic victory; the plan neither set a timetable for achievement of the goals nor eased the requirement that blacks and women must qualify on the regular eligibility list.

Even this minimal concession invoked a strong response. In September, police pension board members complained that new personnel who were not physically fit were being hired. Because physically unfit persons might become a drain on pension fund reserves, the complainers requested that the board retain discretion to deny eligibility to those new employees "whom they feel do not physically qualify to be patrolmen."

Reinforcement of board autonomy in this area might discourage women and minorities from applying, but the major impediment to hiring more blacks and women remained the qualifying examination. A qualifying examination was given in October 1974, and thirty-five candidates took the exam. Fourteen persons passed, twelve white males, one black male and one woman. When the activists on the City Council saw the results, they requested a report on the validity of the exam. In addition, they moved, but the motion lost, that all hiring be halted until the report on validity was received. However, the council agreed to a public study session to be held with the board. At the session, two days later, council members Pollock and Johnson repeated their charges that the examination discriminated against women and minorities. Johnson broadened his complaint to include an attack on the procedures which governed the handling of citizen complaints against police officers. Board Chairman Chester Brownell defended the board. Although it was not their business to "recruit" candidates, the commissioners "have more than bent over backwards to conform to the state statutes under which we must operate."

The meeting was a draw; the sparring partners needed time to regroup. In late December, Local 1260 of the Illinois Association of Fire Fighters issued a statement critical of actions which appeared to lower the entrance requirements for police and fire personnel. The Champaign Exchange Club resolution was made public as the City Council received the report of the new city manager, Gene Miller, on the validity of the qualifying examination. The report stated that the testing procedures were valid and recommended that the council not take action. Activists on the City Council made their dissatisfaction with the report explicit and raised the new question of nepotism in the city's workforce. John Lee Johnson alleged that 15 percent of the city's employees were related. Miller explained...
that he had not meant to suggest that there were no problems. Minorities and women were underemployed, but he believed that the problem could be corrected under existing legislation. 58

As the argument escalated, advocates of hiring minorities defended themselves against allegations of reducing standards by challenging the qualifications of personnel presently employed and claimed that many current policemen had not taken the examination. 59 Although there were no victors, the discussion revealed that minority employment had increased since 1970. The first black police officer was not hired until December 1979. 60 After the flareup over the report, activist members of the City Council lessened the pressure. They had done what they could to educate the new city manager to the existing problems of racial and sexual discrimination. In addition, a new affirmative action ordinance was on the books, which if enforced, could significantly alter employment patterns.

Much would be determined by the attitudes and appointments of the city manager. Chief Harvey Shirley, after twenty-eight years on the force, resigned in November 1974, shortly before the public controversy over the qualifying examination. His resignation, to take effect on December 31, 1974, marked the end of an era. The era had been marred by controversial relations between black citizens and the police force. The department had been criticized for its handling of racially tense situations in the North End in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The shooting death of a black youth in 1971 led to charges of "cover-up" in the police department and resulted in a criminal charge against a police officer. The officer was acquitted, 61 but the incident seemed a symbol of the conflict between activist and police attitudes.

The selection of a new police chief was the responsibility of the new city manager, and the choice was awaited as a sign of the direction the new administration planned to take. An exhaustive screening process narrowed the finalists to six; the finalists were tested by the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and Gene Miller had the final say. 62 On March 12, 1975, Miller announced the selection of William E. Dye, police chief of East St. Louis, for the position. Dye would become the first black police chief in the history of the Champaign Police Force. The selection did much to ease the conflict over affirmative action, especially since Dye made it clear that he supported hiring women for the force. The public demonstration of Miller's willingness to implement the law satisfied militant City Council members and inaugurated a period of "wait and see" what the new administration will do.

However, outside pressures on the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners did not diminish. In July 1975, when the ILEC raised new questions about affirmative action, the board had changed. Only the chairman, Chester Brownell, carried over from the previous year. One of the two new board members was Charles Johnson, an associate director of the Urban League, and the shift in personnel produced a shift in board policy. In August, the board voted unanimously to drop the state administered aptitude test while Johnson insisted that the board had to make the effort to attract minorities and women candidates. 63 In September, the board ordered a hiring freeze for the police department, to give Chief Dye the opportunity to implement a recruitment program of blacks and women. The first five names on the eligibility list were white males. 64

A freeze was also applied to the fire department at the end of October, but the department had begun on October 1, to seek two replacements for retiring firemen. Two white firemen joined the force, but official disapproval of the fait accompli was forthcoming. Larine Cowan expressed dissatisfaction with the procedures, particularly in view of the fact that the Fire Department had not yet modified its affirmative action plan. 65

The details of the many battles over affirmative action were recounted to suggest the pattern of social change in Champaign. A 1968 study of indigenous social change voted that in Champaign, a lack of leadership as well as a lack of neighborhood community spirit made it difficult to achieve joint action on problems. 66 The assessment accurately reflects some major obstacles to action but it overlooks the impact of the resources that a committed city administration can bring to bear on social problems. A change of administrators generated new enforcement policies and the message was clear: city government will strive within the mandate of the law to insure nondiscrimination in employment.
The administration also demonstrated a new determination to clarify the meaning of affirmative action to businessmen that deal with the city. Ordinance 940 lacked specificity and enforcement measures, but in 1973, the city manager sent a compliance questionnaire to businesses. The questionnaire was criticized as too complex, the administration backed off, and John Lee Johnson publicly criticized the city manager for lack of enthusiasm in enforcing the ordinance. Although stronger ordinances were passed, City Manager Browning, to the end of his tenure, maintained that they were too difficult and expensive to enforce.

In contrast, the new city administration found it politically feasible to enforce the new ordinances; meetings were held early in 1975 to explain affirmative action requirements to vendors. In June, it became known that Stewart Oil Company of Urbana, which had supplied the city with petroleum products for two years, had not filed affirmative action statements with the city. In July, the City Council voted to terminate the agreement with Stewart as soon as a new supplier could be found. The message was clear: affirmative action ordinances would not prove as difficult or expensive to enforce as Warren Browning predicted.

The 1975 Annual Report prepared by the HRC and the Community Relations Department affirmed the progress in obtaining compliance from firms doing business with the city, and listed twenty-three firms that were not in compliance. Invitations were issued to these firms to attend a meeting with the city manager. The administration was demonstrating a commitment to affirmative action which three years earlier would have seemed beyond the realm of possibility. However, the new direction would not go unnoticed or unopposed. The News Gazette ran an editorial, "Affirmative Action Hounds Foxie," which negatively evaluated administration measures. To the News Gazette, it seemed that Max Fox and his one employee would not be able to do business with the city unless he hired "an employee he doesn't need or fire his one employee who's been with him for nine years so he can hire an untrained 'minority' person." Fox, however, decided not to do business with the city and the result was that the city would be forced to go to Springfield for welding services, thus increasing the expense for taxpayers. "The expense will be part of the mounting price of the present City Council and its growing municipal bureaucracy." Larine Cowan wrote a letter to the editor which carefully explained the incorrect statements and conclusions of the editorial. She noted the legislative basis for administration action and pointed out that the city did not advocate firing present employees to hire untrained people or the hiring of excess personnel. Mr. Fox had not been "blacklisted," he was asked to attend a meeting with the City Manager and the Human Relations Director. The "price of growing municipal bureaucracy" is "actually the price of justice and equal employment opportunity."

The News Gazette remained unconvinced; a rebuttal editorial claimed that "bureaucrats everywhere must be proud of the language, but Foxie the Welder still says the city's small amount of welding business isn't worth the hassle... We're still at a loss to understand what the City Hall bureaucracy is accomplishing."

The preferences of individualistic culture remain significant factors in evaluating the actions of government, but the impact of these preferences on governmental policy varies in relation to the perceptions and commitments of administrators and the willingness to take action to the full extent allowed by law. Changes in the affirmative action program between 1973 and 1976 are significant. In 1973, the program, in terms of the capability of meeting objectives, was essentially inoperative. The HRC often lacked a quorum and thus was thwarted as a force for effective intervention; the human relations director was controversial, and he was fired before the year ended. The City Manager appeared unwilling (at least to his critics) to implement a program. When a modified district plan of representation went into effect, new members of the council were more militant about affirmative action.

In 1974, new affirmative action ordinances were passed and new administrators took office. Larine Cowan, Gene Miller, and William Dye and the continuing support of some council members turned the program around. Implementation will continue to be a series of ups and downs, and guerilla actions will take their toll. For example, only one firm appeared at the meeting on noncompliance called by Gene Miller.
Nevertheless, the city administration demonstrated that explicitly or tacitly, it would not support obstruction.

The new commitment to enforcement emerged, ironically or perhaps appropriately for individualistic culture, against a background of minimal civil rights interest or activity in the black community. Examples of diminished interest include the 1973 election of John Lee Johnson, who won a close contest by a margin of 571-547 votes. His opponent, Louis Nash, who had the support of former council member James Ransom, was perceived as less than militant on civil rights questions. Johnson's victory was attributed to district representation; he did not appear to have wide enough appeal to win at large.75

A second example of declining activism was the attempt to establish a Champaign-Urbana Chapter of PUSH (People United to Save Humanity). PUSH was started with an appearance by Reverend Jesse Jackson at a rally,76 but folded in less than a year for lack of support.77 A more dramatic instance of decreased participation was the controversy over demolition of Douglas Center, a park district recreation center in the North End, and the construction of a new facility.

In 1972, the Champaign Park Board won voter approval of a bond referendum, including funds for a new recreation center in the North End. Public meetings were held to secure neighborhood opinions concerning the purposes of the facility, and by the end of November, a plan for a total recreational facility was in preparation. It soon became clear that the project faced financial difficulties; $400,000 had been allocated for the facility and none of the proposals would cost less than $450,000.78

The conflict intensified during the next six months as the park board wrestled with the problem of matching aspirations for the proposed center with financial limitations. The following issues were the center of the controversy:

1. A library. The Champaign Public Library operated a branch at Douglas Center. The Champaign Park District contributed the space for the library and the Urbana Free Library contributed funds for its operation. Inclusion of a library room in the proposed center increased the cost of the project and in a period of budget constraint, some park commissioners urged its elimination. The library was strongly supported by residents of the North End. In neighborhood meetings to determine the preferences of residents, the library ranked second behind improved gymnasium facilities as a priority objective.79 The problem was resolved by the donation of another building in the neighborhood for use as a library.

2. Intergovernmental cooperation. Douglas Center is situated on the boundary between Champaign and Urbana and many Urbana citizens use the facility. The Champaign Park District asked the Urbana Park District for financial assistance for the center. The discussion developed into one of the most bitter disagreements between the park districts in the history of the cities. Urbana offered cooperation, but no contributions, and there intergovernmental cooperation came to rest.80

3. Alienation of the black community. The library became a symbol of the park district's commitment to the black community. As it became less likely that there would be a library wing, several blacks expressed their anger and bitterness. At a tension-filled park district meeting, John Lee Johnson accused the board of racist attitudes, arguing that forty-nine of the sixty-five projects authorized by the 1972 referendum were completed but there was no money for improvements at Douglas Center. Johnson claimed that the board had "given the black community a slap in the face." Urban League Director Vernon Barkstall concluded that "once again we are on the short end of the stick."81

The board voted to eliminate a library from the plans for Douglas Center and award contracts for construction.82 The decision increased the anger of the black community and within five days, a Douglas Center Steering Committee was formed to lead the resistance to demolition of the old center. Committee demands focused on additional recreational space because the library controversy was resolved by the donation of a building in the neighborhood. The committee planned to picket the McCabe Company which was scheduled to demolish the old center and to ask the City Council for revenue sharing funds to build an adequate facility. The meeting attracted more than 100 people and it seemed that a fight to save Douglas Center would
strengthen the network of black activists and demonstrate the "clout" of the black community.83

The committee began its campaign; members appeared before the park board and threatened a picket of the site, and filed a request for a permanent or temporary injunction. Neither strategy yielded immediate results; a majority of the park commissioners was determined to build a new Douglas Center and was convinced that with the available funds, only limited facilities were feasible.84 Because contractors were reluctant to undertake the job while there was vocal dissatisfaction in the black community, the project was delayed. Discussion about the feasibility of changing plans continued, but proposing alterations after contracts were awarded created legal difficulties. John Lee Johnson asked the city Council to help in the effort to obtain adequate recreational facilities, for the North End,85 but the talk came to naught.

During this period, the park district continued to make contract arrangements for the project. However, there were fears of violence at the site; approximately thirty-five pickets were stationed at the office of McCabe, and McCabe asked for assurances that there would be no violence.86 The steering committee issued new, stronger statements claiming that the park district failed to provide equal park development. The commissioners were portrayed as refusing to take the necessary measures to upgrade Douglas.87

On June 7, there was a small demonstration in downtown Champaign, perhaps twelve demonstrators of whom four or five were children. Although the lack of public support placed the steering committee in a difficult position vis-à-vis the park commissioners, committee members continued to attend meetings, exchange demands, and discuss alternatives with the park commissioners. The board agreed to leave Douglas Center standing and to locate the new structure between the old building and the annex. However, when the architect drew up new plans, the compromise proved costly and impractical. The meetings continued and the park district voted $100,000 for a senior citizens wing. The concession was well received, but the steering committee still maintained that the center was not adequate for the neighborhood.88

On August 5, the steering committee agreed to construction of a new center on the site of the old. As its price, the committee demanded that 90 percent of the workers on the construction site be black.89 The park board deferred decision, while asserting that it had no power to control the composition of the work force. The commissioners also requested assurances from the committee that workmen on the site would not be harrassed.90 The committee expressed its dissatisfaction and again it appeared to be a stalemate.91

Although the steering committee was reorganized on August 20, the park board awarded the last contracts for the center.92 and on September 11, the board voted money to renovate the annex for use by senior citizens.93 By the end of September, the old center was demolished and construction of the new center had begun.94 Roy Williams, a black activist, appeared at the site to protest the absence of black workers and was arrested. Upon his release, he returned to the site to offer help in filling out job forms for black workers.95 Williams was eventually tried for a misdemeanor (resisting arrest) and the trial ended in a hung jury.96

The activities of Roy Williams were the last acts of opposition; construction proceeded and the attention of the park commissioners turned to other problems. The park board claimed that due to inflation and financial constraints, the district could not build a comprehensive recreation facility in the North End. Black activists claimed that financial reasons were not the core of the problem; the real problem was that the board refused to give priority to recreation in the North End. The steering committee, despite intensive efforts, failed either to mobilize the black community or to persuade the park board to reverse its decision. Kenneth Stratton, one of the original steering committee members, claimed that on Douglas Center "the black populace did not support us the way I felt it should."97

The failure of the steering committee may mark the end of an era in black activism. The momentum of the 1960s, the pickets and demonstrations that resulted in school integration, open housing and affirmative action ordinances has dissipated. Protest and the redress of grievances does not seem to be closely related; the appearance of protestors at City Council meetings no longer motivates immediate council
action. Further redress of black grievances appears to lie in the hands of professionals in City Hall. The shift in the locus of action should not be surprising; individualistic culture mitigates against sustained citizen intervention in the politics of civil society. Black citizens of Champaign make decisions, take action and are as constrained by the preferences and predispositions of individualistic culture as other citizens. Activism in the 1960s, demonstrations, legislation, the tentative attempts at implementation, altered the environment of the civil society so that professional execution of an affirmative action program became feasible. Acceptance, no matter how grudging, of government as the promoter of greater equality, suggests the extent of change in Champaign as well as the impact of federal policy. However, given the latent antipathy to any suggestion of government initiative or pressure to change or modify attitudes and behavior, it is only realistic to assume that Champaign will progress slowly with programs to rectify the inequities of the past.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1 League of Women Voters, A Community Report—20 Years Later: The Status of the Negro in Champaign County. 1968, p. 50.
2 Ibid., p. 43.
3 Ibid., p. 45.
4 Ibid., p. 43.
5 Unit 4 School District.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Courier, 12 December 1966.
10 Courier, 21 February 1967.
11 Courier, 26 March 1967.
12 Courier, 6 June and 13 June 1967.
13 Courier, 4 September and 17 September 1968.
15 Unit 4 School District.
16 News Gazette, 1 January 1976.
17 Unit 4 Projections of School Population.
18 News Gazette, 4 February 1975.
19 Courier, 13 January 1976.
21 Unit 4 School District.
22 League of Women Voters, A Community Report, pp. 53-54.
23 Ibid., p. 16.
24 Ibid., p. 21.
27 Ibid.
28 News Gazette, 14 April 1971.
29 Ibid.
30 Courier, 29 June and 30 June 1971.
31 Courier, 3 July 1971.
32 Courier, 6 July and 8 July 1971.
36 News Gazette, 5 October and 6 October 1973. Also see News Gazette, 7 September 1973, for the story of the compliant of James Collier, who was not hired as city housing inspector.
40 Ibid.
41 News Gazette, 4 January 1975.
43 News Gazette, 31 April 1974.
44 News Gazette, 9 October 1974. See also Daily Illini of that date.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. See also Dennis Judd and Robert Kerstein, "Restructuring Conflict in City Politics: The Legacy of Federal Programs" (Paper presented at the 1974 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, April 27-29, 1974).
51 News Gazette, 26 June 1974.
54 News Gazette, 30 July 1974.
58 News Gazette, 12 January 1975.
63 News Gazette, 19 August 1975.
64 News Gazette, 25 September 1975.


69 News Gazette, 11 June and 2 July 1975.


72 News Gazette, 26 February 1976.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.


76 News Gazette, 8 November 1974.


80 Courier, 10 February, 22 October and 23 October 1974.

81 Courier, 25 April 1975. See also News Gazette, 25 April 1975.

82 News Gazette, 25 April 1975.

83 News Gazette, 29 April 1975.

84 News Gazette, 30 April, 1 May, 2 May and 9 May 1975.

85 News Gazette, 21 May 1975.

86 Courier, 3 June 1975. See also News Gazette, 4 June 1975.

87 News Gazette, 4 June 1975.


89 News Gazette, 6 August 1975.

90 News Gazette, 15 August, 18 August, and 19 August 1975.

91 News Gazette, 20 August 1975.

92 News Gazette, 29 August 1975.

93 News Gazette, 12 September 1975.


95 News Gazette, 2 October, 3 October and 5 October 1975.

96 News Gazette, 1 January 1976.


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CHAPTER 9
CHAMPAIGN: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Introduction

Champaign, like Urbana, faces a multitude of problems, generated by new expectations of citizens and new tasks thrust upon local government in the 1960s. The specific response to new responsibilities depends upon the competence of administrators, the activity and interest of elected officials, the interests and apathy of citizens, and finally, the financial resources at hand. City government, in those halycon days when only limited services were expected, easily conformed to individualistic preferences, and government policy was shaped accordingly. Over time the expectations of Champaign's citizens have changed but the average citizen remains strangely isolated from municipal politics. Nevertheless, the norms of professional city administration are firmly established and professional norms guarantee a certain standard of performance as long as adequate financial resources are available. Although Champaign's problems resemble those facing Urbana, a more professional administration and a larger tax base offers more scope for municipal action. Table 9.1,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sales Tax Receipts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$551,595.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>590,439.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967*</td>
<td>623,361.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>792,104.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969**</td>
<td>1,053,415.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970***</td>
<td>1,017,829.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,633,350.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,673,405.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,111,147.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,031,976.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,196,520.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: City of Champaign.

* The percentage of sales tax returned was changed to 1/2% on July 1, 1967.

** The percentage became 3/4% on October 1, 1969.

*** The percentage was changed on 1% on December 8, 1970.

which gives Champaign's return from the state sales tax, is one index of Champaign's superior financial position.

The increase in sales tax revenue does not necessarily imply a significant increase in retail activity in Champaign. The change in return from the state and inflation account for much of the increased revenue. In any case, the increase only partially offsets the rising costs of municipal government. Champaign's budget for the General Operating Fund has shown a deficit for the last four years. However, cash surpluses accumulated in the more affluent past served as a buffer against financial stringencies. The General Operating Fund provides for personnel services, commodities, contractual services, and capital outlays, and personnel costs comprise the largest allocation. Table 9.2a gives expenditures and cash balance of the General Operating Fund from 1970-1971 and Table 9.2b gives Champaign's Revenue Sharing allocations from 1972-1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Cash Balance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>$2,942,005</td>
<td>$2,805,900</td>
<td>$619,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>4,305,231</td>
<td>4,020,625</td>
<td>654,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>4,176,114</td>
<td>3,921,900</td>
<td>755,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>5,125,425</td>
<td>4,766,438</td>
<td>499,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>5,422,115</td>
<td>4,922,644</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The $700,000 cash surplus was first used to offset the 1973-1974 deficit and is now almost eliminated. The budgets for 1975-1976 used revenue sharing funds to shave the deficit in the General Fund.

The possibility of a deficit attracted public attention during the discussion of the 1975-1976 budget. City employees unionized early in 1975, and increased the pressure on a budget of which approximately 80 percent was devoted to personnel costs. Attempts to minimize the deficit included the transfer of $200,000 from the surplus in the General Fund and an additional $200,000 from the Urban Renewal Fund, derived from a utility tax and originally earmarked to pay the city's share of the urban renewal project. A majority of the City Council rejected the latter, arguing that it would severely limit the city's commitment to improvements in the North End. The council then agreed to use revenue sharing funds and the transfer of some capital development funds to ease the pressure on the General Fund.

High personnel costs were criticized and the Champaign Chamber of Commerce suggested that personnel cuts were preferable to tax increases. In September, the council narrowly approved (five to four) a 20 percent increase in the municipal tax levy. The measure was a stopgap; rising personnel costs and increased claims for services underlined the need for new tax resources.

How Champaign became caught in a financial squeeze after a period of budget surplus is fairly typical. However, in Champaign's case, the nature of the civil community and its commitment to individualistic culture were also factors. The civil community's orientation stresses the servicing of local needs in
light of local values, and individualistic culture stresses the centrality of private concerns. The interaction shaped local responses to the opportunities and challenges of the 1960s. Champaign's experience with urban renewal, discussed in Chapter 6, reflects the pattern and illustrates the cultural norms and political habits that limited the role of government.

An expanded conception of the responsibilities of local government as well as the increase in number and professional qualification of city staff in the 1960s set the stage for the budget difficulties of the 1970s. Other cities faced with these prospects sought federal grants for urban programs, but Champaign, was peculiarly inept in tapping federal resources. The city's marginal involvement during the period of largesse is suggested by the contrast between the eighty-two programs listed in A Guide to Federal Programs for Illinois communities (1968) and the programs in which Champaign participated. Although the Federal Information Exchange Service totaled federal expenditures in Champaign at $16,277,803, more than $14,000,000 of this total was not dependent on the discretion of federal officials and was paid regardless of the initiative or competence of municipal officials.

Of the money that depended on the award of grants, more than half went to the school lunch program, food stamps, HEW grants for educational opportunity, and Titles III and IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The funds which indicate a city's active commitment to the amelioration of urban problems, e.g. HUD funds ($35,959) for urban renewal and rehabilitation, Department of Labor grants from the Manpower and Development Training Administration ($65,636 for training and $17,414 for research, pilot and demonstration) and an Office of Economic Opportunity Grant ($50,000) for a community action program, amounted to $169,000.10 Champaign's share of the increased federal commitment to urban improvement was not large enough to be a significant factor in changing the physical appearance of the city and the attitudes of citizens, or meeting the rising expectations of disadvantaged minorities.

In 1971, federal funds expended in Champaign amounted to $21,889,119. The amount expended for urban programs and minority needs came from HUD (Urban Renewal, $42,000, Urban Beautification and Improve-
League. The money for the program was to be transferred from $33,000 allocated for preservation of historical sites, but some council members objected and the proposal was defeated by a close vote (four to four). Preservation of historic buildings is also a sign of a city's commitment and $33,000 allocated from Community Development funds provided the only possible means to save the old Cattle Bank.15

The brief survey of Champaign's involvement in federal grant programs suggests that Champaign's relations with and dependence upon the federal government is complex and not susceptible to easy generalizations. City participation in and benefit from the highly publicized programs of the 1960s was minimal. Lack of interest in Champaign can be attributed to the predominance of individualistic culture and suspicions about federal control and governmental interference with the lives of individuals. The analysis of the urban renewal program in Chapter 6 and the discussion of downtown redevelopment in this chapter suggests that such attitudes obstruct concerted attempts to change the physical appearance of the city. Nevertheless, the steady influx of federal money, such as social security, unemployment compensation, mortgage guarantees, agricultural subsidies and grants to the university, is a crucial factor in determining general economic conditions. The city's plans and prospects are dependent on federal funds, yet there is neither awareness of dependence nor sufficient federal support to serve as the catalyst for needed solutions to the problems of this medium-sized city.

Economic Development--Downtown

If city government is to assume or execute new tasks, such as guaranteeing equal economic opportunity, the quality of life, or even the maintenance of competent professional services, new financial resources must be developed. Increasing taxes is never politically popular and Champaign, like Urbana, seeks to encourage new economic growth. Although it is not controversial for the city to seek new retail or industrial activity, the adoption of specific plans or programs generated controversy. Conflicts were exacerbated by the likelihood that new growth usually is located on the periphery of the city, and contributes to potential urban sprawl. Furthermore, growth on the periphery tends to offset public and private efforts to keep the central business district viable.

The pervasiveness of individualistic culture adds further complication in that attitudes and preferences make it likely that private rather than publicly financed solutions will be favored.

Champaign, as measured by sales tax receipts, is the dominant city in the county in retail activity. A 1959 study, Growth in the Commercial Areas of Champaign-Urbana, found that the twin cities spent over $2,000,000 on public works between 1947 and 1959. Approximately 65 percent of this money was spent in the commercial districts of Champaign to provide public parking, street improvements and lighting for North Prospect Avenue, University Avenue, South Neil Street and the central business district.16

In 1959, commercial activity in the central business district as measured by construction and remodeling was vigorous. In addition, the downtown business district received both a psychological and physical boost when J. C. Penney decided to move its operation from Urbana to Champaign. As noted in Chapter 4, Penney's decision was the catalyst that sparked Urbana's interest in the development of Lincoln Square. In Champaign, Penney's decision tended to increase the complacency of downtown merchants. Suburban shopping centers were still over the horizon and had not yet emerged as a competitive threat, and there was little physical evidence of decline.17 However, even in 1959, there was concern for the future of downtown and Mayor Emerson Dexter appointed a committee to study the problem.

During the 1960s, the continuing dominance of Champaign's central business district became more problematic. The construction of Lincoln Square in Urbana and the development of "suburban" shopping centers were portents of future difficulties. Although downtown businessmen responded by forming the Champaign Development Corporation (CDC) in 1964, it took five years until the CDC was ready to announce plans for a $3,000,000 enclosed mall. By the 1970s, the threat to downtown hegemony was clear, yet it was January 1973, before specific plans for a mall were presented to the City Council. The plans differed in cost and scope from the proposals of 1969; they called for an outdoor pedestrian mall to cost $710,000 and to be financed primarily by private businessmen. The plans were quickly approved and in October, Neil Street was closed and construction began. The mall
was completed in November 1974, and a grand opening was held in May 1975, but in the interim, Sears, Roebuck and Company announced plans to close its downtown store and open a new store in the proposed Market Place Shopping Center.

This brief sketch of events serves as background for the discussion of the conflicting attitudes and objectives which delayed action on downtown improvements until such action had little effect on downtown's competitive position. Although Mayor Dexter appointed a committee in 1959, the City Council did not take an active interest in downtown problems, in part because it was believed that downtown businessmen should take the initiative. In 1969, plans for a $3,000,000 all-weather mall elicited little positive response because of the expense. In the ten years of discussion, the only solution proposed for downtown was a commercial mall. Other alternatives such as construction of a civic center or other social and cultural facilities were not considered. In addition, although Champaign was eligible for urban renewal funds for downtown redevelopment, there was little enthusiasm for seeking such funds. One reason for the lack of interest was the belief that private business was more efficient and more cognizant of local concerns. Urban renewal funds "smacked of paternalism, big government, loss of local autonomy and decision making." These attitudes were strengthened by the city's experience with urban renewal in the North End; the controversies and delays in the program lessened the attraction of federal funding. Thus when an all-purpose, expensive mall was proposed there was no attempt to obtain public funds and the project attracted little support. Private resources were simply inadequate for grand redevelopment schemes and the options for downtown redevelopment were severely limited. This constraint on options was reinforced by the priorities of downtown businessmen, who saw redevelopment only in terms of assistance to business, not in terms of the meaning of downtown for the life of the community. Individualistic culture shaped the preferences of decision makers, federal funds were not sought, and proposals for downtown redevelopment focused on ways to help downtown businessmen.

The presentation, acceptance and implementation of mall plans spanned two city councils and both councils were willing to commit some public resources to the project. A majority of the first council was sympathetic toward business, which is one explanation for their decisions. The second council, which represented more diverse constituencies, had little choice about continuation of support for the mall. Maintenance or increased retail sales in downtown affected tax returns and adequate resources were a first prerequisite for improvements in services or the quality of community life.

The mall plans, which were formally submitted to the City Council in January 1973, did not envision a new, enclosed downtown complete with offices, motels, new retail outlets or a civic or cultural center. The plans called for an outdoor brick mall to cost an estimated $710,000, and requested that the city pay one-sixth of the cost. Given the biases of individualistic culture and the lack of outside funds, a modest proposal at moderate expense had much to commend it, but it was questionable whether the proposal was adequate to the objective.

The City Council in March 1973, voted to assume one-sixth of the cost of the mall (by March, the estimates amounted to $730,000), but in May, when bids were opened, the project seemed to be at a dead end. The only bid came in at $1,051,815 and the override was so great that new public hearings and a new call for bids were necessary. Plans were redrawn, the city agreed to spend an additional $50,000 for sewers and the additional contribution from private businessmen was estimated at $25,000. The mall was again possible, but the delay made it unlikely that the project would be completed in time for Christmas shopping in 1973. Bids were let again in August, and again the lowest bid came in over the estimate. However, this time the difference was minimal and various strategies to obtain the extra money were available. On September 11, 1973, the plans were approved; the mall would not be enclosed, it would not be finished by Christmas, 1973, it was 25 percent more expensive than sponsors originally estimated, but it would be built. Although construction took longer than anticipated, the mall was open by fall of 1974.

Despite private efforts buttressed by public funds, to change the appearance and attractiveness of downtown, it no longer holds its place as the center of retail activity. Market Place, an enclosed shopping center located just to the north of the city, was beginning construction when Sears, Roebuck and
Company, announced plans to move there in late 1973. Speculation about the future claimed that J. C. Penney and Joseph Kuhn, two anchors of the downtown district, would soon follow. Although optimists were sure that the diversity of shopping in downtown would secure the future, figures showed that downtown was becoming less of a retail center. In 1955, downtown was the major retail center of the county and boasted four major stores. Over the years, commercial construction in the area declined until by June 1975, it accounted for only 15 percent of the commercial construction activity in the city. Although Robeson's, the major downtown department store, had doubled its business in twenty years, the actual number of stores declined. 25

Completion of the mall did not alter downtown's vacancy rate. In 1975 downtown was further hurt by the failure of the Great chain 26 which created a new vacancy. To compound the difficulty, Zales, a jewelry chain, announced in April 1976, that it would close its downtown store citing the lack of business since Sears moved to Market Place as the reason. 27 A pedestrian mall, promoting the commercial interests of downtown businessmen, who bore 80 percent of the cost, was built to secure downtown's place as the center of commercial activity, but results were equivocal.

Downtown must find ways to maintain not only its commercial position, but its position as the hub of community activity. There is a strong financial base; four major banks and two loan and building associations are located in the downtown area, and all have shown every indication of staying. City offices are located on the periphery of the mall, but the city's staff is not large enough to provide a satisfactory base for downtown. Parkland College, a community college established in 1966, opened for classes in 1967 in vacant stores downtown and in churches on the periphery of downtown. The college received voter approval for a bond referendum for a new campus in August 1973. When Parkland left downtown, no commercial firms moved to occupy the again vacant stores. With hindsight, it seems obvious that an important opportunity was missed.

A civic center seems somewhat grandiose in terms of Champaign's resources and the scope and intensity of community activity. Nevertheless, supporters of downtown must increase its attractiveness in part because the mall has not brought large numbers of people to downtown. When a senior citizens center was located in an empty downtown store, efforts in this direction, almost accidentally, were given a boost. The Revenue Sharing Program, passed by Congress in December 1972, provided the impetus for the senior citizens center. Champaign, in anticipation of "new" money from revenue sharing, set July 10 and July 24, 1973 as dates for presentations by social service agencies and other groups to obtain funds for special programs. 28 Jane Bloomer, director of Tele-care (a county social service agency for the elderly) requested funding for a "drop in" senior citizens center in Champaign. The City Council was interested and requested the park district to prepare a proposal. Park board members agreed that there was a need for the center; the 1970 census showed that 5,431 persons over 60 lived in the county, 800 lived in the area around West Side Park, peripheral to downtown, and an additional 225 lived in the downtown business district. The request from the council, however, generated controversy among the park board members about the scope of the program. Provision for a drop-in center was not typically a function of the park district, which legally was a recreation not a social service agency. Some board members, therefore, insisted that recreation be a part of the program at the center. 29

The major difficulty, however, was that the City Council implied that the $25,000 allocated from revenue sharing funds for the center was a one-year experiment. Park board members were concerned about accepting funds on this basis, fearing that district sponsorship implied a commitment of park district funds after the initial allocation was spent. 30 Despite these reservations, the park district agreed to sponsor the senior citizens center, even though implementation of the project was more expensive than anticipated. 31

The center opened in January 1974, and the program ran smoothly until May 1975, when budget stringencies forced City Council reconsideration of the allocation of revenue sharing funds. The City Council rejected a $30,000 request for the center and park board members were angry and concerned. Donald Besnan, a past president of the board claimed that
It was made crystal clear to the city representatives in 1973, that when the city stopped funding the program, it would be dropped. The district could not spend one-third of the recreation tax for one special interests activity.32

A majority of the City Council believed that the park district should underwrite the program, but the park district refused to assume responsibility for continuation of the center. There was sufficient public interest in the center to continue the discussion. The Downtown Champaign Council (CDC) recognized the importance of a center which attracted sixty to eighty-five persons each day and supported its continuation. Senior citizens petitioned the City Council to continue the grant and were supported by representatives of social service agencies, Family Service, Tele-care and the Committee on the Aging. The City Council unanimously agreed to allocate $15,000 to fund the center. However, the concession did not assure the center's future, $15,000 was half the request of the park district and provided funds for only half the year. The City Council also stipulated that center representatives meet with the park district and representatives of the social service agencies to explore other sources of financial support. The City Council's major objection to continuing support for the center was the high rent ($900 per month) for the Main Street location. Objections to the high rent were raised when the center was established, but the convenient location and the size of the facility were considered sufficiently attractive to the city, without resort to a tax increase, assumed responsibility for the center.39 Neither the service the center provided for older citizens nor the value of its location in downtown Champaign was questioned; the controversy resulted from the game of "pass the buck" of financial responsibility in a period of budget stringency. The city's grudging support for the center raises questions concerning the strength, extent, and depth of the city's commitment to downtown redevelopment. Although the center has the potential to provide a firmer base for downtown, city government was reluctant to expand its responsibilities by making a long-term commitment to a program that fell outside the traditional devices to encourage economic development.

In summary, the history of downtown redevelopment is replete with missed opportunities. Limited objectives and the passivity of local elites and officials adversely affected the possibility of developing cooperative strategy to improve the position of downtown. Downtown merchants either were indifferent to the opportunities or too weak and divided to exert enough pressure on city government to obtain remedial action. Conversely, during the 1960s and early 1970s neither the mayor (there were two incumbents during the period) nor the city manager assumed leadership roles on downtown redevelopment. Local politicians were supportive but support was passive; it was sufficient to provide limited funding for projects devised by downtown business. There are some recent indications of a new approach, for example, Gene Miller has cautiously assumed more of a leadership role on the question of downtown parking lots and a housing development for elderly citizens. However, his proposals were generated by specific city concerns and were not part of an integrative approach to the overall problem of downtown. As the discussion of the senior citizens center suggests, if a larger benefit develops from the proposal, it is likely to be the result of fortuitous circumstances. The attitudes of local elites and city officials have yet to come to terms with the new realities of downtown redevelopment.40

Economic Development—Sign Control and Market Place

The response to Market Place suggests that government officials find it easier to support traditional activities associated with the quest for economic development than to embark on innovative programs. From the inception of the project in 1969, Market Place was promoted as the first and largest regional shopping center in Champaign County. Landau and Heyman, Inc., a Chicago real estate firm, acquired 150 acres on Neil Street, just outside the boundary of Champaign, and announced shortly afterwards that Sears, Roebuck and Company and P. A. Bergner, a Peoria department store, would be in the project. The potential sales and property tax revenues and the location outside the city gave the developers bargaining power in dealings with city government. The developers were eager to annex to the city; annexation meant city fire and police protection which would substantially reduce insurance rates. There were also advantages for the city in a preannexation agreement; the developers agreed to conform with the city building code, thus
avoiding the difficulties associated with the Country Fair Shopping Center, which was not constructed in conformity with city building codes and was annexed after construction as completed. A preannexation agreement was drawn in April 1973, and provided for annexation ten days prior to opening.41

The city, in anticipation of annexation, agreed to pay part of the cost of paving Market Street, a county road. City support was not over generous, the cost came to $84,000. The public works budget runs between $1,500,000 and $2,000,000 annually.

The developers also made various efforts to accommodate local concerns. Because of fears that a large shopping complex placed impossible pressures on the storm drainage system, the developers proposed a "reservoir" to catch the runoff. The concessions were attributed to the desire of the developers to minimize local conflict and "avoid anything that might delay the planned 1975 opening date... 42

Ground breaking ceremonies for Market Place were held on March 20, 1974. 43

As construction proceeded, the businessmen of the central business districts of Champaign and Urbana became concerned about the prospect of competition. Measures to cope with the threat such as free parking at Lincoln Square and in downtown Champaign were suggested as early as 1974 but were still under study by the respective city councils in 1976. Attitudes in Champaign were especially ambivalent; concern was expressed about the continuing viability of downtown but the preannexation agreement offset concern about loss of revenue of the city. However, annexation was not effected without controversy. Between the agreement in 1973 and the opening of Market Place, Champaign, after long discussion, finally passed a comprehensive sign control ordinance. The question of the size and location of signs at Market Place raised obstacles to the annexation process.

The history of the sign control ordinance is long, circuitous, and convoluted, and the signs proposed for Market Place offered a direct challenge to hard-won, tenuous governmental authority in this area. As noted earlier, Champaign's population has steadily increased in the last forty years, and population pressure placed heavy burdens on city services, schools and recreation facilities. In addition, the increase, particularly in the student population, resulted in the proliferation of apartment buildings, McDonalds, Burger Kings, Pizza Huts and other quick service franchise restaurants.

Quick food and service outlets are concentrated in the university area and along the approaches to Champaign, for example from Interstate 74 into North Prospect Avenue and from Route 10 into Springfield Avenue. Concern about the environment has been latent since the early 1960s and 1965 marked the first attempt to exert some control over the wild proliferation of neon signs. The effort gathered momentum only in the 1970s when various "good" government groups made environmental quality a priority. Sign control seemed the likely first step.

In May 1970, the Champaign Plan Commission approved a model ordinance for submission to the City Council. The ordinance required the destruction of all billboards, rooftop and projecting signs as well as all off-the-premises billboards. The opposition was led by Robert Pope, a former city councilman and an owner of the Champaign-Urbana Sign Company. Pope's first complaint was that "no one familiar with the outdoor advertising field was asked to assist in writing the ordinance."44

Control over signs was strongly advocated by the Champaign County Development Council (CCDC), a non-profit organization concerned with beautification of the environment, and also by some members of the Champaign Development Corporation (CDC), the organization of downtown businesses.45 In June, the City Council held public hearings on sign control and opponents questioned the stringency of proposed controls as well as the "city's right to regulate a businessman's right to advertise his business." The council took no action.46

In October, amendments qualifying the stringency of sign regulations were introduced,47 and in December, the City Council approved an ordinance regulating signs in areas zoned B-4 (downtown and campus business). The ordinance incorporated the amendments of October and provided that flashing signs be removed in sixty days, and other illegal signs over a period of five years. Theatre marquees were specifically exempted. Despite the concessions, opponents of control remained adament, continuing to claim the
"city was overstepping its bounds in limiting signs."48

After passage of the ordinance, questions of implementation received minimal attention; the law allowed five years for the removal of illegal signs. Controversy revived in 1973, when advocates of control requested extension of controls to areas zoned B-3 (intermediate and strip commercial). The Champaign Plan Commission again studied the question and proposed enactment of legislation similar to the controls for areas zoned B-4.49 When the proposed ordinance came before the City Council, Joan Severns, a newly elected council member and CCDC member, led the fight to extend controls to B-3 areas as well as for further reductions in the size of signs. For this go-round, representatives of sign companies were involved in drafting the new ordinance, although their inclusion brought protests from environmentalists.50

The City Council argued, rewrote and strengthened the proposed ordinance but did not enact new legislation in 1973. Instead, a moratorium was imposed on potentially illegal signs, to last until an ordinance was enacted, and the ordinance was returned to the Plan Commission for further work.51 In March 1974, the Plan Commission again held public hearings, and a story in the News Gazette was headlined, "Sign Control Hearings: 'Summer of Reruns.'" The same interests, pro and con, spoke. The Chamber of Commerce asked for further study and the attorney for Champaign's auto dealers "threatened" that the four dealers located outside the city might refuse annexation if controls were instituted. The American Institute of Architects, CCDC, Housewives Interested in Pollution Solutions (HIPS) and the League of Women Voters supported controls.52 The City Council continued to defer decision but an attempt to repeal the moratorium on potentially illegal signs was rejected.53

Sign control continued to be discussed throughout 1974, the Plan Commission held more meetings and the issues became more confused.54 The Plan Commission was faced with devising an ordinance which could reconcile the opposing demands of environmentalists for strict controls with pleas of businessmen for "reasonable" controls.55 The result was a compromise and the expectation was that if no group was entirely satisfied, at least no group would be totally opposed. The revised ordinance then went to the City Council,

which heard discussions at two sessions in September. Environmentalists continued to try for stricter controls, CCDC went so far as to reject the ordinance and propose council acceptance of its program for sign control. Business groups continued to attempt to dilute the measure and Clyde Walker, a co-owner of Champaign Signs, went so far as to argue that "there is nothing (in the proposed ordinance) for the good of the community as a whole. It is based only on the whims of a few uninformed individuals."56

In November, despite reservations about enforcement from City Manager Gene Miller, the council added amendments and edged closer to passage.57 However, final action was not taken in 1974 and in February, 1975, the City Council again discussed amendments and again tabled the measure. This time it was William Kuhne, a councilman and president of a construction company, who offered amendments. It was not until March 1975, that the City Council finally approved (five to four) a comprehensive sign control ordinance. The closeness of the vote, the opposition of Kuhne, who proclaimed the ordinance cumbersome and too restrictive, and amendments from the floor made the final product something less than a model ordinance and did not bode well for ease in implementing controls.58

It was quickly apparent that passage of an ordinance did not end controversy. Within the week, the legality of the ordinance was questioned and before March was over, Joan Severns, a strong supporter of controls, requested changes in the ordinance to correct an error in an amendment. Although the strategy necessitated a vote on the entire ordinance, Severns agreed to bring the ordinance before the council in order to correct the error. At the next council meeting, John Lee Johnson, an advocate of controls, was absent and Severns tabled the ordinance until the following council meeting.

Passage of a strong, comprehensive ordinance was finally secured in April and the preamble suggests a new direction for government. Controls were designed

in accordance with an overall plan and program for the public safety, area development, preservation of property values, and the general welfare... (and are intended to) preserve the
wholesome and attractive character of the City; and to recognize that the general welfare includes a community plan that provides for a community that shall be beautiful as well as healthful, spacious as well as clean, and well balanced in its growth and development.59

The objectives were notable, but achievement demanded concerted enforcement which was likely to run counter to ingrained preferences and biases, as well as to the economic interests of some businessmen. In addition, despite the time spent in discussing and amending provisions of the ordinance, many provisions were poorly drawn and vulnerable to legal dispute. In August 1975, the city filed suit against a new Kroger store, a construction and a sign company. The suit asked $15,000 in punitive damages for "willful violation of the sign ordinance as well as a court order to remove the two signs."60 Court battles were certain to delay implementation, the suit was not heard until April 1976, at which time the city dropped the counts requesting punitive damages.61

Legal challenges to governmental regulation were to be expected; a more severe challenge to governmental authority, which was not anticipated, developed over the annexation of Market Place. The preannexation agreement called for annexation ten days before the shopping center opened. As the time approached, Leonard Flynn, the lawyer for the developers, filed a conditional petition which requested annexation only if the new sign regulations did not apply. Flynn claimed that the preannexation agreement was drawn with the understanding that zoning alterations or other new ordinances would not affect Market Place before annexation; and that sign regulations were designed for commercial areas in the city and were not applicable to a regional shopping center.62

The challenge put the question back into the hands of the Plan Commission which again held a public hearing on proposed amendments to the sign control ordinance. The League of Women Voters, CCDC, and HIPS opposed amendments. Statements against relaxation of newly enacted standards were made as well as charges that if exceptions were made, Market Place would possess special privileges. Shortly after the public hearing, signs of compromise began to appear; the comprehensive ordinance would be amended to add a new category of regional shopping centers.63 The Plan Commission drew up an ordinance, and recommended passage by a four to two vote.

The ordinance, which formally recognized the distinctiveness of regional shopping centers,64 was passed by the City Council on December 2, 1975. Immediately thereafter Market Place was annexed. Joan Severns cast the sole dissenting vote on annexation, arguing that she would not succumb to the "coldly calculated" tactics of the developers "to get what they wanted from the city."65 Supporters of sign control on the council were caught between competing priorities, but the prospect of the revenue from Market Place could not be rejected and the compromise on sign control was approved.

Businessmen from the central business district were quick to capitalize on the exemption awarded Market Place. The previous November, Gene Miller announced that sixty-nine businesses in B-4 districts had until January 8, 1976, to comply with the standards established in the 1970 ordinance. Although Miller stressed a voluntary approach, he hinted that he was willing to enforce compliance if necessary. Following the decision on Market Place, city businessmen formally requested exemptions for their businesses. A M. Broom of the Campus Business Men's Association, asked that the city extend the "grandfather clause" of the 1970 ordinance. He claimed that if "the rules are changed to accommodate Market Place," the city should not force businesses in B-4 districts to comply with sign regulations by January 8, 1976. John J. Neils of the Champaign Chamber of Commerce made a similar argument and stressed the additional expense imposed by the replacement or removal of business signs.66 The City Council did not act on these requests and a sign company filed suits against the ordinance. In January 1976 the city attorney agreed to suspend enforcement procedures while litigation over the ordinance was in process.67

Despite or perhaps because of litigation inspired by the ordinance, the Plan Commission and the City Council continue to wrestle with the technicalities of sign control. The Comprehensive Sign Control Ordinance was amended again by the City Council in April 1976,68 and the Plan Commission continued to
discuss new and old proposals to further amend the ordinance.69

Discussion, controversy, law suits, and attempts to implement sign control are likely to be regular features of Champaign politics. There is support for sign controls as one aspect of stronger governmental regulation of the uses of environment, but the political effectiveness of advocates of control is problematic. A strong sign control ordinance was passed by a one-vote margin in 1975. Although several opponents of control relinquished their seats on the council after the 1975 municipal elections, only one advocate of greater control was elected. The majority in favor of extended controls is tenuous, but slim council support is not the major obstacle to establishing a new direction for government. The crucial determinant, when the problem is adequate government regulation of the environment, is the question of priorities. The preferences of individualistic culture shape action and encourage the quest for new economic growth. The financial imperatives of municipal government add further incentives to this question. In the case of the annexation of Market Place, environmental concerns placed second for a majority of the council. Similarly, the economic concerns of city businessmen may prove equally weighty when further attempts are made to implement or revise comprehensive sign control.

A transitional situation makes prediction difficult. The "old benign business dictatorship" ended in 1973 with the initiation of modified district representation, but some businessmen continue to remain in touch with some members of the City Council. The opening of Market Place increased fragmentation of local business power. Many stores at Market Place are locally owned, but the majority are not, and the two largest, Bergners and Sears, Roebuck and Company, are not likely to participate extensively in city politics. Thus Market Place is unlikely to increase the influence of any faction in city politics, while it may further diminish the influence once wielded by local businessmen.

Nevertheless, the pursuit of business is likely to continue to enjoy widespread support in an individualistic climate. Some advocates of environmental control greeted the prospect of Market Place with something less than enthusiasm, and criticized the elimination of good agricultural land, the effect on downtown business districts, and the increased use of gasoline.70 A boycott was called and anti-Market Place handbills were distributed to shoppers in downtown Champaign and Lincoln Square. These activities are unlikely to greatly affect business at Market Place. One downtown Champaign merchant remarked as the handbills were being distributed that "it might be a better idea not to mention Market Place in the handbills."71 Crowds of people were attracted to the grand opening of Market Place and the regional center has many defenders. Defenders attribute the problematic future of downtown to the failure of the city fathers to renovate and modernize the central business district, and view Market Place as "solid proof of renewed faith in the marketing potential of the of the community."72

The controversy over the value of Market Place is another example of the constraints which shape governmental action in individualistic culture. Opponents of the shopping mall did not demand restrictive zoning to limit growth. Concerned environmental groups relied on voluntary action, primarily a boycott,73 to minimize the impact of new development. The community split over whether new economic development was in the public interest and zoning restrictions were easily perceived as a tyrannical infringement on individual rights. Advocates of controls to preserve the environment were forced on the defensive; they fought to maintain newly won governmental authority. The continuing conflict over governmental initiatives severely limits the potential of government as promoter of the "public interest." In the competition between economic development and innovative action to ameliorate or prevent abuses of the environment, growth is likely to win. The benefits of new industry and retail development continue to be taken as axiomatic while the preferences and biases of individualistic culture continue to constrain alternative conceptions of the problems of community growth.

Public Health, Welfare and Safety

Individualistic attitudes, for the most part, create suspicions about regulations which might limit individual freedom. However, with respect to regulation of "vices," attitudes are more ambiguous. Citizens of Champaign tend to approve curbs on "individual freedom," to protect public health and safety, as long as enforcement is neither costly nor steady. Ironi-
cally, Champaign in contrast to Urbana, from the 1930s through the 1950s, was relatively lax in enforcing restrictions on illicit activities. There was open prostitution until 1939 and evidence of payoffs. By the 1950s, enforcement was tighter but there was still occasional prostitution. A limit on liquor licenses was maintained but during the 1950s, licenses were transferred on a favor basis. Gambling was kept down by strict enforcement, but there were always grey areas such as private clubs. Allegedly, enforcement of gambling restrictions against the Elks was a major factor in the campaign to abandon the city manager form of government. The police raid on the Elks Club authorized by the city manager in February 1967, and the confiscation and destruction of newly installed slot machines, generated strong antagonism to Warren Browning.75

The new mores of the 1960s and the new morality of the 1970s have had little visible impact on the policy decisions of officials. When the Supreme Court decided in June 1973, in Miller v. California (413 U.S. 15, 1973) that "community standards" should be used in determining obscenity, a Champaign-Urbana committee on obscenity was formed to set guidelines. Discussions and debates over community standards eventually produced a resolution which was presented to the respective city councils. The Champaign City Council passed the resolution in April 1974, by a seven to two vote. One negative vote was cast for moral reasons, the other was cast by the mayor, who argued that the measure was neither enforceable nor appropriate. The resolution protected the right of consenting adults to partake of whatever activities they wished and protected nonconsenting adults from prurient displays and minors from explicitly sexual displays. Enforcement powers were given to the State's Attorney. Fundamentalists objected to the resolution as too liberal and libertarians complained that it was too restrictive.76

Passage had little effect on policy and enforcement by the State's Attorney suffered a setback when a local theatre operator was acquitted of the charge of showing an obscene movie. The jury rejected the prosecution's contention that showing "Deep Throat" violated existing community standards.77 However, the battle lines were drawn and the next issue to attract public attention was the question of massage parlors.

Two massage parlors were located in Urbana, but one closed and the second moved to Champaign. Champaign, then had a total of three massage parlors and the number as well as the absence of parlors in Urbana generated interest in regulation. A proposed ordinance to license and regulate parlors was presented to the City Council in September 1974. Provisions included a fee of $10.00. Each masseuse or masseur would have to furnish information about past criminal activity as well as wear specified clothing which covered certain parts of the body. Sexual massages were prohibited.78

The proposed ordinance was discussed during September and October. City Council members did not question the regulatory or licensing aspects of the ordinance, but three members raised questions about the limitations on individual liberty. Mary Pollock, the student representative, particularly questioned the city's right to regulate activities between consenting adults. Mayor Bland and council members Ralph Council and Kenneth Dugan pushed for a vote, but action was delayed until the next council meeting.79

As the vote drew close, Steven Beckett, the lawyer for the massage parlors, argued that the ordinance violated the rights of parlor owners and that what happened between consenting adults was not a legitimate concern of the city. City Manager Gene Miller stated that the ordinance was intended to regulate "health" rather than morals but Police Chief Thomas Dye expressed his concern with "the proliferation of prostitution." City Council member Ralph Council objected to allowing sexual acts to be performed in a business context while Joan Severns argued that the "police should have better things to do than police massage parlors. . . ."80 The City Council voted six to three in favor of regulation of the parlors including the prohibition of sexual massages. Reservations about governmental interference with individual liberty obviously took second place to concerns about public health and welfare.

A suit against the ordinance was filed immediately and an injunction prohibiting enforcement was

* Two massage parlors have since opened in Urbana, perhaps as a consequence of regulation in Champaign.
The city delayed enforcement of the licensing provisions until the case came before the court but the ban against sexual massages went into effect immediately. The court denied the injunction and the decisions stated "that the ordinance is not arbitrary and unreasonable and that it is a proper exercise of the police powers of the City of Champaign." The licensing provisions then went into effect.

However, judicial approval did not resolve the dilemma of enforcement. How was the ban on sexual massages to be enforced? If plainclothes policemen were assigned to check activity in the parlors, questions of entrapment might arise. Although expectations were not made explicit, it seemed that city officials hoped for voluntary compliance from the parlor owners and workers. Dependence on voluntary compliance is the unspoken assumption which underlies the exercise of the police powers. Sanctions can and have been applied but they function primarily as deterrents and warnings to others. The pattern is evident particularly with respect to liquor regulation. Liquor licensing, drinking age, and bar hours are the devices that the community uses to regulate the habits of a large student population. State policy has an impact on regulation, for example, the legislature lowered the legal age for drinking wine and beer to nineteen. However, state action neither solved the enforcement problem in Champaign nor satisfied Mary Pollock.

Soon after Pollock became a council member, she proposed liberalization of liquor regulations; including the extension of weekend closing hours and allowing nineteen and twenty-year-olds to purchase hard liquor as well as wine and beer. The City Council voted on the measures in December 1973, and both were defeated, extension of hours by a vote of eight to one, allowing nineteen-year-olds to purchase hard liquor by a vote of five to four. The difference in support was attributed to the council's cognizance of the difficulty of enforcing the current regulations. Nineteen and twenty-year-olds could purchase wine and beer, and the double standard of drinking placed "an unnecessary hardship" on tavern owners.

Pollock continued to press the council on behalf of her constituents and in 1974 and 1975, the proposals were considered again. Although closing time for bars was extended from 1 a.m. to 1:30 a.m., Pollock's proposals to further liberalize the regulations by extending bar hours past 1:30 a.m. and allowing nineteen and twenty-year-olds to purchase hard liquor were again defeated. After the defeat, Pollock called for the establishment of a committee to consider the possibility of secession of campus town from Champaign.

Nothing came of Pollock's request but the question of drinking age continued to claim the attention of the City Council. The Urbana city council, using home rule powers, adopted eighteen as the legal age to drink wine and beer. Although legal questions about Urbana's ability to make this step were raised, the pressure was on Champaign to follow suit. This time, liberalization appeared to have a slim majority. However, when the ordinance came before the council, it was tabled by a five to four vote to obtain a legal opinion as to whether home rule powers could be used to lower the drinking age.

City Attorney Albert Tuxhorn rendered a negative judgment on this use of home rule power, and his opinion was buttressed by a letter from Thomas J. Murphy, Executive Director of the State Liquor Control Commission, which stated the commission's "opposition to local modifications of state regulations." The council then defeated by a five to four vote the ordinance to reduce the drinking age to eighteen. Urbana's switch to eighteen as the drinking age has not been challenged and the ironies and difficulties of enforcement of contradictory ordinances by two governments in a small geographic space were vividly displayed. An eighteen-year-old would be arrested for drinking beer in Champaign, but if he crossed Wright Street to Urbana he would be a respectable citizen.

Grave social and health problems may result from the excessive use of alcohol, city government possesses police powers to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, but exercise of these powers generate controversy and reveal conflicting priorities. The controversy over liquor regulation does not excite optimism over the community's ability to find a resolution of the problem or to enforce its regulations. Enforcement lies primarily with the tavern owner who must distinguish between hard drinking twenty-one-year-olds and beer and wine drinking nineteen-year-olds while excluding eighteen-
year-olds from any alcohol. The tavern owner faces sanctions, including suspension and even revocation of the liquor license, if the correct determination is not made, but the complexity of regulation and the odds of a visit from the police may work against voluntary compliance. Sanctions are enforced, there are periodic stories in the newspapers of the suspension of liquor licenses, but consistent steady enforcement remains a goal rather than the reality.

The difficulty of dependence on voluntary compliance to regulate behavior is also evident in a new governmental initiative—passage of a no smoking ordinance. The City Council on September 2, 1975, with little discussion or controversy, passed an ordinance forbidding smoking in public areas of hospitals, sanatoriums, nursing homes, cafeterias, hotels, motels or any enclosed space in which twenty-five or more persons gather for religious, recreational, educational or civic purposes. Even before passage, questions concerning enforcement of the ordinance were raised. According to Gene Miller, compliance, at least at the outset, would have to be voluntary.89

The ordinance posed the most difficulties for restaurants, and Miller advised that until guidelines were drawn, restaurants might place placards on tables designating some for smokers and some for non-smokers. Dissatisfaction with the suggestion was quickly voiced by some restaurant managers.90 A spot survey in December showed little compliance with the ordinance, "in fact, the City Council chambers may be the only place where the law is enforced. It did not appear that voluntary compliance was forthcoming, yet Gene Miller made it clear that the no smoking ordinance was not "a high priority enforcement item."91

Guidelines were drawn by March 1976, and distributed to businesses. The guidelines called for the designation of smoking and nonsmoking areas in public places and were sweetened with a promise of flexibility to assist businesses to comply. However, the city manager stressed that the ordinance would be enforced. The only remaining difficulty was to determine which city office was responsible for enforcement, the Police Department or the Environmental Development Department. As long as jurisdictional questions were unclear, the problem of enforcement remained open.92 A spot check by a Courier reporter in late April and May revealed little progress in securing compliance.93

Problems of implementation and enforcement have been often and graphically described in the analysis of government action.94 When legislation seeks to enforce morality, the complexity of the problem increases and government action is often controversial.95 In Champaign, there is an extra dimension to the problem in that city government has only recently exerted authority in areas from which it traditionally remained aloof. There have been a wide range of initiatives including sign control, affirmative action, a ban on leaf burning, as well as the no smoking ordinance.

New demands, raised expectations, and a new range of tasks have increased the burdens on city administrators. As the range of activity expands, administrators must make choices as to what should be done first and how much of the city's resources should be expended on any effort. If the Environmental Development Department enforces the no smoking bans, does it have the staff to enforce the ban against leaf burning? If the police check the massage parlors, is there sufficient staff to check the taverns? The business of setting priorities, a traditional task of the City Council, becomes more urgent as government acquires new responsibilities, and the City Council has directed the city manager to draw up a list of priorities for consideration.

A solution which avoids the political difficulties of setting priorities is the expansion of administrative staff. However, the biases and preferences of individualistic culture mitigate against this solution in Champaign. Dissatisfaction with certain government initiatives as well as with the extent of government regulation has been regularly expressed in newspaper editorials and City Council debates. As the examples in this study suggest, attitudes which favor constraints on government are pervasive and specific actions serve as catalysts which activate latent prejudices. For example, opposition to urban renewal and the housing inspections required by the "workable program" culminated in an attempt to abandon the city manager form of government.96

Opposition usually does not result in such forceful action, but the potential is present and the
message is clear. Elected officials, given the widespread indifference to politics, are unlikely to risk political capital to obtain "utopian" goals, such as a limitation on growth, public housing sites in middle-class neighborhoods, or a tax increase to support a senior citizens center. Despite the far-reaching changes in official attitudes and policy described above, innovation is undertaken with qualms and caution. Opposition to new responsibilities and tasks as well as the fear about governmental interference with the lives of citizens comprise the major obstacles to consistent, or concerted governmental intervention in the affairs of the community.

FOOTNOTES – CHAPTER 9

1 City of Champaign, Sales Tax Receipts.
2 City of Champaign, Finance Director (Table 9.2a General Operating Fund Expenditures and Revenue, 1971-1976; Table 9.2b Revenue Sharing 1972-1977).
4 News Gazette, 28 May 1975.
5 News Gazette, 30 May, 4 June and 5 June 1975.
6 News Gazette, 13 May 1975.
8 News Gazette, 27 August 1975.
9 News Gazette, 3 September 1975.
13 News Gazette, 6 February 1976.
14 Ibid.
15 News Gazette, 18 February 1976.
17 Ibid., pp. 95-97.
19 Ibid., p. 5.
20 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
26 News Gazette, 1 November 1975.
27 News Gazette, 22 April 1976.
34 See Chapter 7 for details.
35 News Gazette, 2 July 1975.
40 I am indebted to Hayward Sanders for his suggestions for this section.
44 Courier, 6 May 1970.

45 Courier, 1 June 1970.
46 Courier, 11 June 1970.
47 Courier, 14 October 1970.
51 News Gazette, 2 February 1974.
52 News Gazette, 1 March, 3 March and 5 March 1974.
54 News Gazette, 22 March, 27 March, 10 April and 28 April 1974.
55 News Gazette, 10 July and 24 July 1974.
58 News Gazette, 19 March 1975.
59 Ordinance Amending Ordinance 530 by Adding Article VIII for Comprehensive Sign Regulation, April 15, 1975.
60 News Gazette, 20 September 1975.
61 News Gazette, 30 April 1976.
63 News Gazette, 8 October and 14 October 1975.
64 Section 7a, An Ordinance Concerning Signs for Planned Shopping Centers, December 2, 1975.
65 News Gazette, 3 December 1975.
66 News Gazette, 28 November, 2 December and 5 December 1975.


68 Council Bill No. 75, Passed April 4, 1976.

69 News Gazette, 23 April 1976.

70 News Gazette, Letter to the Editor from Students for Environmental Concerns, 29 October 1975.

71 News Gazette, 18 April 1976.


74 Daniel J. Blazar, Cities of the Prairie, p. 226.


76 News Gazette, 3 April 1974.


78 News Gazette, 8 September 1975; See also Daily Illini, 18 July 1975 for background.

79 News Gazette, 15 September, 17 September and 19 October 1975.

80 News Gazette, 19 October, 20 October and 21 October 1975.

81 News Gazette, 1 November and 21 November 1975; 20 January, 6 February, 4 March and 2 April 1976.


84 News Gazette, 3 March, 5 March, 17 March and 19 March 1975.


86 News Gazette, 10 December and 15 December 1975.

87 News Gazette, 10 December, 15 December and 17 December 1975.

88 News Gazette, 2 February 1976.


90 News Gazette, 4 September 1975.

91 Courier, 14 December 1975.


93 Courier, 5 May 1976.


A concluding chapter ought to balance conflicts and divergencies, and perhaps draw up a neat list of assets and liabilities which will determine significantly the shape of things to come. Such a conclusion could condone if not applaud a number of specific endeavors to improve the quality of life, it could lament the placid days of the past or it could condemn the constraints on a new group of enlightened administrators and officials. This type of conclusion to the saga of Champaign and Urbana would be unrealistic at best and inaccurate at worst. The data suggest cities in transition and governmental officials who are subject to new and perhaps increasingly contradictory pressures. There are also new opportunities to dramatically or incrementally transform the environment and the politics of the respective communities.

Champaign County

Change is in the atmosphere—for example, county reapportionment resulted in the election of more activist County Board members. However, the limits of change imposed from the outside, such as reapportionment, are illustrated by the 1976 election results. The new type of board member was supported by an amorphous constituency and support from this source is unpredictable. An article in the Courier which summed up the 1976 results was headlined, "County Voting Patterns Hard to Understand." Two incumbent Democrats, Don Nelson and Paul Quinlan, from the Seventh District were defeated. The Courier noted that "big student majorities had resulted in their 'upset' victories in 1972," and suggested that the disappearance of these majorities contributed to their defeat in 1976.1 The News Gazette reported that Nelson attributed his defeat to the Republican character of the district. His victory in 1972 was due to the "fact that balloting for the board that year was not at a general election and there was a lower voter turnout."2

The Republicans also gained a seat in the Democratic Ninth District, where a well-known coach from Urbana High School won the seat formerly held by
Laurel Prussing. Two Republicans won close elections and one Democrat picked up a seat long held by a Republican who did not choose to run again. There were post-mortems, but the results were sufficiently contradictory that it can be assumed that voter motivation was equally complex. Nevertheless, it seemed clear that Democratic momentum in the county had slowed. The Republican margin on the County Board, which stood at fourteen to thirteen increased to sixteen to eleven. Since two Democrats from rural areas customarily voted with the Republicans, the margin was more like eighteen to nine. Nine seats or one-third of the County Board probably represented more seats than the Democrats could hope to win under the old system, but there is the possibility that Democrats may become a "permanent" minority. In such circumstances, democratic board members might work to educate the public and to generate publicity for proposed reforms, but the likelihood of substantial reform or even a Democratic cast to policy would be severely reduced.

After the election, newspaper speculation about the new board focused on its more conservative policy orientation. Newly elected board members campaigned, for example, on the need for a referendum before the board made a commitment to a proposed new jail-courthouse complex. For many liberals and "populists," it is an ironic commentary that county politics that resort to the people generate a more conservative response to communal problems, yet the comment may be a realistic assessment of the present situation.

Results from the contests for county office also produced some surprises. James Burgess, the only black, and only Democratic county officer was defeated when students did not support his candidacy. Equally unpredictable was the narrow victory of Laurel Prussing, a Democratic activist, who was elected county auditor. She defeated Donald Harry, who had held the office since it was established. Mrs. Prussing received strong support in the campus areas and in precincts dominated by university faculty. Her victory gave the Democrats a strategic opportunity; a Democrat was in a position to criticize the expenditures and management policies of Republican county officials and the Republican controlled County Board. Given Mrs. Prussing's political style, the Democratic task of educating the public to the inadequacies of county government will assume new importance.

The wins and losses, however, do not add up to a definite pattern, rather they suggest the present inconclusiveness of county politics. Straight party voting declined: on the Republican side from 13,316 in 1972 to 9,602 in 1976; and on the Democratic side from 5,153 in 1972 to 4,070 in 1976. The Republicans regained or retained their dominance in the county. Gerald Ford defeated Jimmy Carter in the presidential race by approximately two to one, James R. Thompson, Republican candidate for governor, received 76 percent of the vote and Republican candidates for state office and the U.S. Congress were strongly supported. The county also produced the majorities which restored the fifty-second District to pristine purity and a two to one Republican representation in the Illinois House.

But the new wave of Republican victories were based neither on a coherent, explicit ideology nor on a cohesive constituency. The motivations of voters remain ambiguous and it is unrealistic to predict a return to the "good old days." There is a functioning Democratic party and activist Democrats, who campaign for communal initiatives, even win office. The fragmentation of the political arena magnifies the impact of idiosyncratic objectives, needs, and concerns of constituents and candidates on the electoral process. No one of the competing political assessments of what needs to be done has the support of a majority and no working reconciliation of diverse and competing perspectives has been effected. In this situation, the paradigm of individualistic culture, the marketplace, remains the most apt metaphor for county politics. The many transactions reflect a diversity of interests and some may be attributed to the compulsions of expediency. It is as if the voters decided to categorize the candidates and issues so that they offset each other, with interest balanced against interest, private juxtaposed to public and activism to passivity. The result is a pervasive inconclusiveness and the conclusion is that politics is in transition. It may appear paradoxical, but the patterns of transitional behavior may become a permanent feature of county politics.

Urbana

The patterns are visible also in Urbana politics. The Democrats won a spectacular victory and then
proved unable to develop coherent and cohesive policies. Perhaps this inability led to factionalization or perhaps incipient factionalization defeated efforts to build a base for action. Whatever the cause and effect relationship, the striking fact about Urbana politics is that there is no dominant person or group that can initiate, make and implement policy.

When the Democrats first won a majority, much seemed possible; there was interest in federal grants for urban redevelopment which reflected a new commitment to the positive use of governmental power, and a new tool, a more professional administration, to change commitment to visible result. But Democratic momentum stalled on downtown redevelopment. Democratic efforts began auspiciously. They insisted, with heady confidence, that before the city made a commitment to redevelop downtown, it make a commitment to redevelop other sections of the city such as the North End. In contrast to this beginning, the most recent political infighting features a Democratic challenger criticizing the mayor because "developers look at Urbana like it has the plague." The intervening years between these points saw stops and starts, meetings, consultant reports and studies, and the process has left its mark. When Busey Bank appeared in the role of "deus ex machina" with its offer to redevelop downtown, it seemed that there was a second chance. However, the momentum died as the administration and the bank became embroiled in a dispute over who needed to own what land. In addition, there was a contingent on the City Council which remained skeptical of Busey's figures and motives. In November 1976, after a month of bickering, Busey withdrew its offer to buy the Urbana Lincoln Hotel and downtown redevelopment was back to perhaps square one and a half.

Although the participants were different as were their motives, the same power hiatus is seen in the controversy over the construction of a joint park district/school district swimming pool. The usual difficulties of intergovernmental cooperation were not obstacles here, instead the obstacles were created by an ad hoc organization of citizens who objected to the official definition of community needs. The utility of individualistic norms was demonstrated during the controversy; the fragmented structure of government enabled citizens to veto a project that they did not want. For better or worse, citizens who take the time and expend the energy can make a difference. The power may be negative but it remains a significant resource.

There are limits, however, to "citizen" effectiveness, primarily the inability to initiate programs. Some of the people who were involved in the fight to stop the swimming pool, were interested in legislation to preserve the older neighborhoods of Urbana and pushed for a neighborhood preservation ordinance. The City Council's committee on legislation discussed an ordinance, modeled on one enacted in Berkeley, California, but no action was taken. The need for tighter controls on the construction and demolition of housing became apparent every time a developer, despite opposition from the neighbors, proceeds to build an apartment complex in an older residential area. But the impetus behind construction is strong enough to delay and perhaps stop regulatory action. Real estate brokers as well as contractors have an interest in continued apartment development, and given the large number of transients in the population the need for new apartments is apparent. Interest balances interest, no politician, developer, activist or citizen has the power to act autonomously, and the situation, at least superficially appears to verge on stalemate.

Three years of Democratic governance produced mixed results; there were some visible monuments to a new style of politics as well as some blocked initiatives. A major new undertaking, a human rights ordinance was debated and enacted. Although debate was heated and at times, acrimonious, the fact of enactment provides the strongest statement of the strength of the reform impulse in Urbana. Urbana officials also met with members of the black community in a public accountability session. The meeting, which was arranged by the mayor and the Human Relations Commission, was the first occasion of its kind and was intended to open lines of communication between the administration and the black community.

There is stricter enforcement of city codes and the Urbana enforcement officer at times has been severely criticized by irate citizens who were certain he should be enforcing the code on someone else's property. Legal action was initiated against landlords who ignored citations for code violations. When the county filed criminal charges against an Urbana pro-
property owner for allowing a rental property to become a danger to the health and safety of the occupants, the city also filed charges alleging that the realtor violated the Urbana Minimum Housing Code.13

Urbana also moved to condemn dilapidated property, but a Champaign Circuit judge dismissed a condemnation suit on a technicality, citing a conflict between Urbana's home rule status and its use of state law to condemn unsafe property. The city planned to appeal the ruling, but in the meantime, Urbana was unable to proceed with other condemnation proceedings.14

Adverse responses to new responsibilities delay implementation and increase the stress on an administration which seeks to demonstrate what communal efforts can accomplish.

Examples of the alternation between accomplishment and frustration are prevalent. New initiatives, such as the discussion concerning a building security ordinance, which student organizations have demanded because of the rising crime rate, face an obstacle course of political and legal delays. The major obstacle, presented in diverse shapes and forms, remains the difficulty of reconciling divergent perceptions of individual interests and goals with an amorphous conception of communal needs.

In summary, then, Democratic control of city hall resulted in a wide range of new governmental endeavors. City government assumed more responsibilities and a more diverse range of tasks than under Republican administrations. But positive government has been something less than a success story in Urbana and the Democratic record is spotty, especially when contrasted with the expectations aroused by a vigorous reform movement. Despite dependence on state and federal governments, the belief in the individual's right to control his property, a right supported by law and political norms, runs deep and counters efforts undertaken in the name of the communal good.

Citizen dissatisfaction with many of the new initiatives is minimized by the peripheral status of government. For many of Urbana's citizens, city hall is remote and rarely impinges on routine activities. If government fails to respond to a strongly felt need or conversely intrudes, the citizen has options: attend a public hearing, organize with neighbors, vote no on a referendum, or vote against an incumbent.

In Champaign, individualistic norms are pervasive and the political process shares certain characteristics with Urbana. Voluntarism has been the mainspring of action in both cities. "Individualistic political culture emphasizes the centrality of private concerns, it places a premium on limiting community intervention--whether governmental or non-governmental--into private activities to the minimum necessary to keep the market place in proper working order."16 Individuals or private groups typically were the prime movers for new projects, and if necessary, they would seek governmental assistance to promote these projects. But the governmental role tended to be supportive rather than leading. There are many similarities between the cultures of the cities but the manifestations of cultural norms differ and the differences are magnified by contrasting political structures. Champaign's founding was more rational and more commercially determined than Urbana's in that it was attributable to the decision of the Illinois Central Railroad to lay its track two miles west of Urbana.

The community, which clustered around the train depot, was in prime position to develop as a commercial center. In addition, the railroad deposited a heterogeneous collection of individuals at the depot; some were transient, others settled, but population mobility was and is more significant and has had greater impact on political style in Champaign. For most of Urbana's history, "old" families were influential and dominated politics while Champaign's politics were more attuned to "new" wealth and "new" people. The roots of Champaign citizens were not as deep; they were more transient and in more of a hurry. And more importantly, they were open to a certain kind of
change as illustrated in Champaign's flirtation with different forms of government.

Urbana has used aldermanic government since the 1860s. The commitment to this form provided a framework for citizen intervention, although for most of the period, citizens did not actively seek to use the opportunity. In contrast, Champaign in the same period tried aldermanic, commission and city manager governments. Champaign's willingness to experiment with governmental form is perhaps the most telling indication of the superficiality of political commitment in the city. Each of the changes in political structure was initiated by elites who advocated the new form as "progressive." It is almost as if these elites were seeking a magic formula to create a perfect government that would work automatically and perhaps eliminate the need for further citizen involvement.

Citizen apathy was not lessened by innovations in governmental form and each failed to arouse widespread or continuing public interest. The "people" seemed willing to let the politicians play their games as long as these games did not impinge on ordinary routines or interfere with customary business practices. Public support was solicited to legitimate the proposed innovation, when, for example, approval of a referendum was needed. The single instance of citizen initiative concerning governmental form was the movement to abandon the city manager form of government. The referendum was defeated badly in 1968, in part because it was scheduled at the general election when more voters go to the polls.

The heterogeneity of Champaign's population and its lack of roots works against the continuity of neighborhood or citizen organizations, and this absence enhances the isolation of the ordinary citizen. The general lack of interest in politics, at least until the middle 1960s, resulted in increased discretion for the city manager. When Warren Browning became city manager in 1962, he created an administration which provided efficient services according to good management practices. However, the services were those within the traditional tasks of government: police, and fire protection, streets, lighting and parking. Little was done to expand the scope of governmental responsibility, with one exception—Champaign's request for and receipt of an urban renewal grant. Receipt of the grant meant that Champaign cleared land in the urban renewal project area, but schemes for redevelopment quickly stalled as did efforts to improve the conditions of black citizens. An ordinary citizen mobilized his neighbors and carried his case to U.S. Representative Edward Madigan and was able to stop construction of a low-income housing project in a working class neighborhood outside the ghetto.

The complexity of the politics of urban renewal revealed pressures for and obstacles to change. As long as only minimal services were expected from local government, customary patterns of operation could be maintained, but citizens in the 1960s demanded new services. Once the scope of governmental responsibility expanded, as for example with the need for redevelopment, the absence of the power to initiate and implement a program was revealed. In example after example, a power hiatus was revealed in Urbana and Champaign. These manifestations were more surprising in Champaign in part because the city had a functioning professional administration, which performed efficiently according to the norms of individualistic culture but proved unable to utilize the resources of government to assist a new clientele.

The tensions were present in the late 1960s and were intensified when Champaign shifted to a scheme of combined district, at-large representation. City Council members, elected from districts, were more heterogeneous and represented more diverse constituencies, and included several activists who were committed to bringing the powers of government to bear on the intractable problems of their constituents. Their demands enlivened City Council sessions and it appeared that there was new momentum and the votes to make some changes in city policy. The shift in Council focus and the loudly proclaimed intention to serve a broader constituency than the local business community seemed to auger a larger council role in the allocation of resources. Warren Browning, for most purposes, had had the last word on allocation and a transformed council meant a mounting challenge to his authority. Although Browning's constituency was still in place, the new council made it clear that this was not the only constituency that mattered. The conflicts and tensions produced by new demands on city resources and the overt and implied challenges to Browning's authority led to antipathy between some
council members and the city manager, and Browning resigned.17

After a careful search by the council, Eugene Miller was selected as the next city manager. Miller appeared to be more accessible to the newcomers on the council as well as more receptive to their constituents. But Miller is a professional who has to balance conflicting demands on city resources. He asked the City Council to specify their list of priorities as a guide to determining which problems should be attacked first. The commitment to a broadened constituency does not eliminate the need for decisions concerning the allocation of resources, but a new city manager selects different criteria and finds new supporters and the policy process assumes new contours.

A transitional administration and a new council would appear to magnify the obstacles to positive government action but this was not the case. Champaign's council was less constrained in acting to promote economic development than Urbana's, in part because the council members were not as suspicious of business motives and Champaign businesses did not need as much assistance. Attempts to introduce affirmative action procedures to the police and fire departments were fought but there was progress. A series of rear guard actions have delayed full implementation and the arguments are continuing over appointments to the Champaign Fire and Police Commission,18 hiring women and blacks for police and fire positions,19 and strengthening city control over the Fire and Police Commission.20 However, Champaign's record on affirmative action in city employment is good and affirmative action procedures are applied to companies that trade with the city. Stronger sanctions to implement the human rights ordinance have been considered.21

As new council members gained experience, the reach of government was extended to areas such as sign control and the allocation of revenue sharing funds to social agencies. The process was slow and characterized by stops and starts, and a defensive battle continues to be waged to maintain the hard won authority of government. The fight became more difficult in the 1970s, in part, due to federal, state and local budgetary stringencies. There seems to be a built-in bias against spending money on the infrastructure of government, and such proposals are likely to evoke editorials in the News Gazette, opposing increased costs of government. This bias is perhaps the fundamental defense of individualistic culture, insofar as the major obstacle to new governmental initiatives lies in the limits of administration. Demands on government resources increased dramatically between 1973 and 1975, the administration has swamped with new projects, a backlog accumulated and the council set the task of drawing up a list of its priorities.22 There is progress, but of necessity, the pace is slow.

Miller, when he submitted the budget for fiscal year 1976-1977, proposed administrative reorganization as a means to increase governmental productivity. The council criticized the budget allocations for salaries, and there were complaints that Champaign led the state in this field.23 However, the council was, on the whole, favorably disposed to reorganization plans, calling for consolidation of twelve departments into six. The call for consolidation, not expansion was probably sufficient to win support. In addition, the council was disposed to accept the city manager's dominion over administration and appeared reluctant to interfere. The only area in which there was criticism was the proposed loss of independent status for the Community Relations Department, which was to become a division in the Administration Department.24 Miller insisted the reorganization was not intended to downgrade community relations, and reorganization and the budget were approved.25 However, debate over the budget, particularly over salaries, provided warnings as to the limits of the council's tolerance of administrative autonomy. The council hinted that it would scrutinize the budget more thoroughly in the future and requested more time to study and more information at the earlier stages of budget formulation. In these ways then, council criticism served as a signal of its intention to exert greater control over that most crucial of policy decisions, the budget.26

In summary, Champaign politics are as subject to the pervasive effects and the power fluctuations of individualistic culture as Urbana politics. But the communities are different and the differences are reinforced by the respective formal political structures. Champaign went professional in 1958 and in the 1960s, when Warren Browning was city manager, professional norms were adapted to the imperatives of individualistic culture and a modus vivendi was achieved. Although the inadequacies of adaptation become obvious
when attempts were made to use governmental power and resources to aid minorities or to extend the reach of regulation, professional routine and competence provided a bridge over some divisive aspects of conflict. Even when City Council members became more activist and more intent on introducing new programs, they continued to defer to the expertise of the city manager. When Gene Miller became city manager, council members attempted to educate him to their specific concerns, but he retained discretion particularly over the allocation of resources and the timetable of projects. Structural differences and stronger professional norms and routines produced a politics of accommodation and a process of incremental change in Champaign.

In contrast, Democratic victory in Urbana was enveloped in the atmosphere of "Camelot." Great alterations were expected in the power and objectives of government. The confrontation of these expectations with the realities of local resources, political habits and individualistic norms, as well as the sheer number of divergent perceptions of what was needed, was the source of the developing antipathies between Democratic factions. Differences were magnified and the ability of government to act as a positive force in the life of citizens was probably the first casualty of the battle. At the most elementary level, long council sessions, bickering, and the inability of the council and administration to agree on a program did not enhance the public image of government.

So the saga continues, the back and forth movements of local politics create frustration and conflict but prepare the ground for accommodation by socializing new participants to the implications of individualistic culture, the nuances of compromise, and the necessity of accepting "half a loaf." At times, the chasm between oldtimer and newcomer seem unbridgeable, but the more typical outcome is a kind of innovation, delayed and modified by controversy, to look like accommodation. Change introduced in incremental fashion, whatever its liabilities, is more likely to have an enduring impact on policy. Change introduced from the outside, for example the RPC and reapportionment, has natural limits due to local indifference and inadequate support for new purposes. Incremental change implies reciprocity. Newly accepted purposes included established limits on government scope and operation, even as the limits were subtly reshaped to promote new objectives, tasks and responsibilities.

In summary, this tale of Champaign and Urbana concludes where it began— in the midst of transition. The role of local government has expanded but motivation continues to emerge from the matrix of self-interest, and no single purpose receives the undivided commitment of that amorphous collection of interests and individuals composing the civil community. Individualistic political culture precludes the single-minded pursuit of one purpose, and the metaphor of the marketplace remains the most appropriate metaphor for the politics of Champaign and Urbana. Culture and the nature of the civil community offer "neither more or less of a communal character than that which stems from (their existence for political or public purposes. The result is a political response that suggests the full gamut of conflicting motivation and contradictory pressures, yet serve the purposes of accommodation.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid. See also News Gazette, 3 November 1976.
9. See Chapter 4.
10. See Courier, 1 October, 2 October and 15 October 1976; News Gazette, 5 October, 8 October, 22 October, and 9 November 1976; Daily Illini, 4 November 1976.
17. See Chapter 6.
27. Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, p. 5.