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URBAN RENEWAL AND NEGRO INVOLVEMENT
(A Case Study of Negro Politics in Champaign, Illinois)

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University of Illinois
Spring, 1968

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Responding to the Urban Crisis, a seminar was devoted to the examination of Ghettos, Riots and Negro Politics. This paper was developed from that seminar, held during the Spring Semester of 1968, at the University of Illinois, Urbana.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This study of Negro Politics in a medium-sized mid-western city, describes the role residents of the city's North End ghetto played in the development of an urban renewal program.

Through passage of the 1949 Federal Housing Act, Congress took action to check the spread of slums in urban areas. Federal aid was to be provided communities for clearance of blighted areas, and the cleared sites were to be sold to private redevelopers who would agree to develop them according to the land use designated for that area in the redevelopment plan. Depending upon city size, the federal government would pay up to 75% of the cost of acquisition and clearance of land, the balance to be paid by the local community.

Provisions of the act were later expanded to cover rehabilitation and conservation measures, the program emphasis being changed from urban redevelopment meaning total clearance and redevelopment, to urban renewal, a combination of clearance, rehabilitation, and conservation.

Although the blighted areas for which these programs were intended are commonly associated with large metropolitan communities, they are also recognized to exist in smaller cities. The pressures upon our physical, social, and economic environments affect all size cities, and the common denominator of blight has proven intractable. Although city planning technology and national wealth have advanced to the point where we could remove all semblance of blight, were government policy and budgeting so directed, we could not deal effectively with the people living in these areas. Controversy has raged concerning the role to be played by site residents in the urban renewal process for nearly twenty years.

Urban renewal law requires that the citizens of a renewal area actively participate in the planning process in an attempt to determine the "public interest." Legis-

lation specifies that this enigma must be shaped through communication between officials and citizens concerning redevelopment procedures. The democratic character of this legislation is evident and practical considerations also support use of citizen participation:

public apathy might obstruct execution of a renewal program; citizen resistance could prevent political consensus where controversy deepened into conflict; and public confusion could prove costly in an already expensive undertaking. When the program is essentially one of conservation rather than of slum clearance, these possibilities become more salient, for neighborhood conservation requires residential stability and a social climate of optimism.¹

Much has been written about citizen participation and the political process, interest groups, and others who make demands upon the government, and even though cook book style manuals have been prepared by and for city planners on the topic of citizen participation, very few have yet to recognize the problem. Having caused damage in the past, this ignorance can only be expected to lead to further alienation, resentment, and rebellion from the Black Community, the usual target of urban renewal. For no reason other than their own professional survival, city planners and others dealing with minority groups in urban renewal must be aware of the desires of these groups.

Most studies undertaken to examine the involvement of site residents in urban renewal have focused upon large urban areas and minority groups. Few, if any, have focused upon smaller urban areas. As a research tool, to aid examination of Negro involvement in urban renewal, this case study was undertaken in a middle-sized urban area. Its purpose was to determine the roles played by neighborhood residents and others in the decision-making process and development of an urban renewal project.

Since a large amount of study had been done on urban renewal politics, it was used as a framework within which to analyze urban renewal in general. Combined with literature on the Negro in American life, and politics, and minority group relations, hypotheses and propositions were developed regarding Negro involvement in urban renewal

politics. These propositions were then tested against the findings of the case study to determine which applied and which were refuted, and why this was so.

The central question concerned the role played in urban renewal by the citizens, but the entire city, not only the urban renewal area was considered. This included both the residents and the organizations through which they acted; but obviously all citizens could not be studied. Only those who participated through official, or semi-official channels, or in other ways left evidence of their participation could be examined. Inactive citizens, or those whose participation was not recorded in the newspapers or minutes of the planning meetings, or was not mentioned by other participants, were considered only as their views might have been reflected through active participants.

In addition to the roles played by citizens, the study examines the factors that shaped the attitudes of the neighborhood in relation to urban renewal; the groups that became active and their stakes involved; and the tactics and strategies used by participants in the attempt to have their goals prevail.

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ACRONYMS

CAC	Citizens Advisory Committee
NNCCAC	Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizens Advisory Committee
GMRP	General Neighborhood Renewal Project
HHFA	Housing and Home Finance Agency
PHA	Public Housing Authority
CCHA or (LHA)	Champaign County Housing Authority or Local Housing Authority
C-UIA	Champaign-Urbana Improvement Association
CCI	Council for Community Integration
CHRC	Champaign Human Relations Committee
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development

INTRODUCTION

Methodology

Having developed the research method to be taken, the testing of propositions on Negro involvement in urban renewal against a case study, the literature was examined for consistent generalizations. Since only one local project was to be investigated, published case studies provided the framework for testing propositions as well as providing generalizations themselves.

After the propositions were pre-tested by exposition to the members of the seminar, they were refined and grouped into several categories: Formulation of Neighborhood Attitudes, Minority Mobilization, Strategies, and Conclusions. Questions were then developed relating to these propositions. They were to be asked of participants of the case study in an attempt to verify or refute the propositions.

During this time, the history of the local urban renewal project was compiled from local newspaper files, League of Women Voters publications, the city's applications for a Workable Program for Community Improvement, and minutes of the Citizen Advisory Committee meetings. The process by which actions were taken and decisions made was carefully reconstructed from these documents since the project was now in the implementation stage, and there was no opportunity for observation.

From the literature a list of participants was compiled, and for the project as a whole and for every major issue, the proponents and opponents listed. First to be interviewed were those individuals reported to be most active in the planning process. Selecting those who held key positions, the mayors, urban renewal director, and chairman of the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) were interviewed initially; then the other participants mentioned in the literature and referred to as influential by other respondents. Organizational leaders were included in the original list, as were individuals attending public meetings. Through personal acquaintance with North End

residents, not restricted to the renewal site because of mobility caused by the project, grass roots opinion was sampled. Although information was not obtained through structured interviews, but through casual conversations when the topic could be so directed, few people failed to recognize the reasons behind the questions.

People formally interviewed were encouraged to comment upon the project as they desired once the direction of inquiry had been indicated. The discussion was generally directed toward a specific area, based upon what was known in advance from reviewing the respondent's role in the urban renewal controversy. Only when specific questions were not answered in the conversation was the questionnaire used. An average interview lasted for at least one hour, the longest being two hours and the briefest twenty minutes.

It is believed that the people who played key roles were interviewed, even though several people refused to be interviewed or did not keep interview appointments. After three attempts, their names were dropped from the list. Participants who had moved to other cities were sent letters of inquiry, but none responded.

Attempting to obtain reliable information, the respondents were assured that their comments would be confidential. Whether this permitted a more truthful interpretation of the case, can probably not be determined. Most respondents were informative and several appeared to enjoy the opportunity to speak candidly and have recorded what they knew without their name being associated with the comment. This, of course, places upon the writer the responsibility for false statements. The interview notes have been retained for what proof they might be.

The propositions and questions may be found in the Appendix.

Principal Persons Interviewed

Following is a list of those people formally interviewed who did not object to the listing of their name. Noted is their stand in regard to the urban renewal, and the group they represented.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Stand</u>
David Gensemer	City Urban Renewal Director	Support
Emmerson Dexter	Mayor, 1959-1967	Support
Virgil Wikoff	Mayor, 1967 to present; Councilman 1963-1967	Opposed, now reluctantly supports
John Barr	Chairman CAC	Support
Rev. A.W. Bishop	President Homeowners Association and resident of neighborhood	Opposed
Kenneth O. Stratton	Councilman 1963-1967 and resident of neighborhood	Support
Roscoe Tinsley	Member of CAC and resident of neighborhood	Support
Elridge Long	Member of Neighborhood Committee and resident of neighborhood	Support
Rev. A.J. Gregory	Member of Ministerial Alliance and resident of neighborhood	Opposed, but now reluctant support
Mrs. Robert White	Member League of Women Voters	Support

Limitations

Perhaps the greatest limitation placed upon this study was that of time, not so much the brief time devoted to the study, but the long period over which the case spans. Typical of most urban renewal programs, this project took over a generation, from the time it became a viable topic, to come into being. As long as fifty years and more ago some type of redevelopment was suggested for this area.

During this period, of course, early actors in the case have died, and many of those involved during the early years of this generation as well as several recent participants have moved from this area. Although letters were sent to several participants who had moved elsewhere, none were returned.

Particular mention should be made of the problems and limitations involved in determination of community "leaders." This question relates not only to the selection of people for interviewing, but as will be seen during the development of the paper, identification of community leaders becomes an essential task. Several techniques suggested for determination of community leaders were used. Extended discussion on this point, however, seems unnecessary, and the reader is referred to the discussions of such a problem in the book by Bell, Hill, and Wright, Public Leadership, pp. 28-30, and that by Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory.

Community leaders were determined by their degree of participation in community events and decisions and references made to them by respondents. Again, time may have elevated or suppressed a past leader.

This extended time period has also led to problems of respondents recalling what exactly did happen, and the underlying reasons for actions taken. Time has caused the bitterness of some persons to grow deeper and their view of the past to become more critical, while others, who may have benefited in one manner or another from the urban renewal project, have lessened their criticism of the project and in some cases reversed their views. This problem of hindsight, associated with all case studies, is heightened by the old age and low education level of some of the neighborhood residents who were interviewed.

Time has other implications. Many of those persons interviewed are presently public officials, involved in politics, or are highly visible community members. It can hardly be held that this study has done what generally cannot be done, and it would be naive to suppose that none of them adjusted their interpretation of their involvement in the case to protect themselves.

The written record of the case at hand has presented limitations also. The newspaper accounts concern very few of the private aspects of the case; the material compiled

by the city was done so to substantiate its claim of adequate citizen participation needed to be submitted to the federal government as a prerequisite for urban renewal funds; and the minutes of the Citizens Advisory Committee, again an establishment-oriented body, cover a limited period of time.

It should be recognized also that being a non-Negro may have hampered, in those instances where the person being interviewed was Negro, the candidness with which questions were answered. In the instances where a Negro acquaintance acted as intermediary, and arranged the interview, it is felt that this possibility was lessened. It might also be suspected that those residents of the Negro community who provided information through personal acquaintances were university-related or college types. This was not the case, however, acquaintances being made through non-university activities. These persons were quite typical of the area, being workman, laborers and businessmen.

These limitations are mentioned to clarify the conditions under which these findings are presented, but do not cover the entire range of difficulty. (Discussion of additional problems can be found in The Urban Villagers, by Herbert J. Gans, pp. 346-350.)

This study should be interpreted in light of the limitations, and to represent the study as being free of complications, would not only be naive but would make the paper useless. However, having completed the analysis, it is believed, due to the range of people interviewed and the sources used, a valid case study has been compiled.

Paper Structure

As noted earlier, much of the framework for this paper is derived from other studies and presented in the form of propositions. These propositions, which the paper is intended to verify or refute, are related to specific chapters. The basic proposition is stated at the outset of the chapter and supporting propositions developed within the chapter. All the propositions are tested for compliance or refutation. A complete list is included in the appendix.

The general paper outline has been adapted from the case studies examined. However, they are not summarized within this report, but cited to illustrate specific instances of characteristic or deviant behavior.

Following a detailed and chronological description of the local urban renewal project, specific attention is focused upon the project planning period. This particular period, from early 1963 to early 1966, is presented in great detail in the description of the project history, and special attention is paid the activities of the CAC, although all their meetings are not included in detail. A chronological history was felt most desirable, although it might tend to be monotonous, since the sequence of events leading to a decision were more easily determined, and what might appear at first to be insignificant details turned out to be highly significant factors.

Following this historic account, the manner in which neighborhood attitudes were formulated is examined to establish the position and stakes of the participants. Actors, both neighborhood and non-neighborhood, are presented as their positions develop. As the conflict develops, and the opponents mobilize their resources to do battle, the paper focuses upon the difficulties encountered by the neighborhood in an attempt to block or alter the urban renewal plan. Strategies used by both sides in an attempt to have their goals prevail are viewed as the conflict moves toward its final stages. This is perhaps the most crucial stage, for the battle lines are not clear as the conflict is not strictly between city and residents.

From this study several generalizations are drawn and the unresolved problems presented.

I CASE HISTORY

Setting

Champaign and its twin city, Urbana, form the center of a 150,000 population metropolitan area located in east-central Illinois. The two cities themselves contribute approximately 94,000 people to this total; 61,000 located in Champaign and 33,000 located in Urbana, the county seat and older of the two cities.


Located in the heart of the nation's corn belt, the agricultural dominance of the surrounding area is an important factor in the local economy. However, the University of Illinois, located between the two cities, has stimulated the urban growth, and is now the largest employer in the metropolitan area.

Negro residents of both cities are concentrated in a single area located between the two cities. Lying in the northern portion of both cities, the Negro ghetto extends from northeast of Champaign's Central Business District eastward, into the city of Urbana. The specific area under study, however, is within the City of Champaign, and is bounded on the west by the Illinois Central Railroad; the east by Urbana; the south by University Avenue, a major east-west thoroughfare; and on the north by Bradley Avenue, the city's northern boundary. In addition, the area is horizontally bisected by the New York Central Railroad.


This 237 acre, 60 block area, to be referred to as the General Neighborhood Renewal Project (GNRP), contains approximately 2600 individuals in 930 families. The GNRP is subdivided into several smaller projects. Project 1, the only one undertaken to this time, contained at the outset of the program 201 families in a 47 acre, 12 block area. Of these 201 families, the homes of 143 were scheduled for demolition, a total of 75% of the total housing stock of Project 1. Among the 201 families, 160 were homeowners, and 50% of them owned homes that were to be demolished. The

homes throughout this area are not the type commonly associated with slums and blighted areas, being basically one or two story single and two-family homes: not tenements.







1. NEIGHBORHOOD LOCATION




2. EXISTING LAND USE




L E G E N D

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  SINGLE FAMILY |  INDUSTRIAL & RAILROADS |
|  MULTIPLE FAMILY |  PUBLIC AND SEMI-PUBLIC |
|  COMMERCIAL |  NEIGHBORHOOD BOUNDARIES |



3. STRUCTURAL CONDITION




LEGGEND

PER CENT OF DEFICIENT STRUCTURES PER BLOCK

	0%		36-60%
	1-20%		61-75%
	21-35%		76-100%

--- NEIGHBORHOOD BOUNDARIES



Early History

1922-1949

The poor health, sanitary and housing conditions that drew attention to Champaign's North End are not new problems, nor did they develop suddenly. As early as 1922, documentation can be found indicating poor housing conditions existed in this area of the city. At that time the League of Women Voters was organized and immediately concerned themselves with the housing conditions that existed in Champaign and Urbana. Their tactics for encouragement of improvement originally existed in the formation of minimum health and safety standards for renter and owner-occupied buildings, working to improve health centers for aid to impoverished persons, backing open occupancy provisions and supporting public housing. It was not until the 1950's that the League of Women Voters (LWV) became openly active.

Other groups recognized the poor housing conditions in the city during this period. The chairman of the City Planning and Landscape Architecture Department of the University of Illinois spoke on this topic in the late 1930's; the Champaign-Urbana Planning Commission, in August of 1938, published a study on "Sub-Standard Housing of Champaign-Urbana;" and in October of 1948 and May of 1949 the League of Women Voters published "A Community Report" on this problem. The most famous, and probably the study which drew the most attention to this situation, was the League's "Shack Study" of March 1949 and its companion, "A Report of Housing Conditions of Low Income Families in Champaign-Urbana."

All of these indicated that the greatest concentration of substandard housing and associated community problems were located in the area generally north and east of the Central Business District of Champaign, and centering upon the Illinois Central Railroad. Although the bulk of the cited housing was located within the City of Champaign, the conditions extended eastward into the City of Urbana.

1949-1959

The 1949 report by the League of Women Voters documented the existing conditions, noting that since the previous survey in 1941, the conditions had grown worse.

There has been a great increase in population but almost no construction of housing for the low-income group. As a result new substandard situations have been created by overcrowding,

conversion of attics, basements and out-buildings into dwelling space, and further deterioration of structures due to lack of repair. Social workers familiar with the area state that major repairs, found necessary in the Housing Authority study, have been made in few instances, and that many more dwellings than in 1941 are unfit for habitation. People still live in these dwellings because they find them better than no roof over their heads.²

By this time the North End had become predominantly Negro. Up until World War II the North End had housed a slowly decreasing number of white families who, as means allowed, moved to newer areas of the city, and by the War, what had once been a white community was given over to the Negro in a deteriorated state. The pressure for housing following the War, coupled with the rise in incomes and growing economy, removed all but a few of the remaining white families from the North End.

The League of Women Voters "Shack Study" documented the use of "barns and chicken coops used for dwellings, as well as some tents covering holes in the ground. Twenty-seven people were using one privy, for which each family paid a monthly \$2.00 privy rent."

One eight room dwelling housed 21 people, 15 in addition to the family of six. Eleven people (not members of the same family) occupied a six room house. A four room house was occupied by 12 people. The individual in this group known to the agency paid \$26 a month for one room. Payments by the whole group totaled \$130 a month. A one room tourist cabin renting at \$90 a month housed 12 individuals, 5 of them children. There was room for but one bed--the rest slept on the floor. . . In a four-room shack there were 14 people, including eleven children and an invalid grandmother. There was no room for tables or chairs as beds, folding and otherwise, took up nearly all the space. At that two of the children slept with the invalid and the others slept cross-wise at the foot of the beds. There was no room for the family to sit down to eat together or to have a regular meal. Poor as

the shelter was, the family had lived for two years in terror at the thought of eviction from it as they knew of no other possibility of a roof over their heads.

Other conditions were reported such as,

There is no running water; it must be brought from a neighbor's. There is no toilet, no privy, no provision for using a neighbor's. . . . In winter, because of pipes freezing in the unheated halls, water is turned on only for an hour in the morning and an hour at night. . . Five families were reported to be living in one-room tourist cabins. . . Cooking is officially prohibited in the cabins. . . Other threats to decent family life are found in the rooming houses, where parents and several children are crowded into one room or where children occupy a room in another part of the building from the parents. . .

Social workers pointed out, too, that the strain of living under such adverse conditions as have been described in this report, gradually breaks down stamina, takes the heart out of people. When a mother must set up folding beds for most of the family every night and take them down in the morning, when she must carry many pails full of water a day, cook over an inadequate coal or oil stove, shop daily because she has no proper storage space for food, perishable or staple, when she has hardly room to step, it is not surprising that she has little energy left to be patient with her children, to listen to their troubles, to see that they have a good time at home.³

It should be noted that, although the report may have over dramatized the situation, the facts and figures were provided the League of Women Voters by the Illinois Public Aid Commission, the Family Service, and the two township supervisors. As the agencies described the conditions, they emphasized the fact that most families live in such circumstances not because of low standards or because of lack of desire and effort to secure something better, but because they could not find, and in many instances could not afford, anything better in this community.⁴

The concern generated over the conditions presented in this study resulted in an application being made to the Public Housing Administration (PHA) for the construction of low-rent housing. The units were to be constructed on a basis of one new unit for each dilapidated unit destroyed. However, this stipulation was not rigidly enforced during the construction of the public housing units during the year 1950. The demand for housing units at this time caused only limited destruction of the worst units. Although housing was proposed for the neighborhood, nothing had been seriously considered to improve the neighborhood as a whole.

However, in 1950, the Comprehensive Development Plan prepared for the City of Champaign by Swanson Associates pointed out the need for redevelopment of the Northeast Neighborhood, but the suggestion went unheeded. In 1953, after two children were killed in a fire, since the structure burned so rapidly they had no means of escape, public opinion was aroused and demands made that the city do something about the housing conditions. This resulted in the formation of an official committee to develop a minimum housing code to be enforced upon rental housing. The code that was adopted was crude. It prohibited dirt floors; the space requirements counted occupants only as persons above six years of age; and the city could not find someone to administer the code.

The "Shack Study" was updated by the League of Women Voters in 1957, and showed very little sub-standard housing existed in the white segment of the community, but the conditions in the Negro community showed no significant improvement over 1948.

Urban Renewal

1959-1962

The following year Emmerson Dexter, in his first bid for the mayor, campaigned on a platform in which he proposed that an urban renewal program be carried out in the northeast sector of Champaign. He reasoned that renewal would eliminate some of the substandard housing in the community and replace it with better quality housing. After his election, in April 1960, the mayor held a meeting in which he and thirty persons listened to a representative of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) explain the municipal-federal relationships of urban renewal, and the elements of the Workable Program for Community Improvement.⁵ From this meeting was formed the Citizens Advisory Committee on Urban Renewal (CAC). Its members were appointed by Mayor Dexter

with Norval Hodges as chairman. The CAC was to carry out the necessary steps required to initiate an urban renewal project, the first being an attempt to clarify what the city must do to meet the requirements of the workable program, a prerequisite to federal funds for nearly all community improvement programs.

With the aid of City, the CAC completed the workable program and took it to Chicago for review by HHFA. The agency recommended that the section on relocation of residents displaced by renewal efforts be expanded before submission of the program for final approval. By November of 1960 both the City Council and FFHA had approved the workable program, and the CAC looked toward the revision of the municipal housing code. Under HHFA requirements, this is one of the most important codes and one which the city must have in order to insure an effective renewal program.

The city began to investigate the various approaches to urban renewal at this time, and representatives of HHFA visited the city. From the three types of approaches, the Individual Renewal project, the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan and the Community Renewal Plan, the city decided upon the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan. Under this approach, a renewal plan is prepared for a neighborhood of the city, the plan being in sections to be implemented over a period of time.

A controversy developed at this time over what area might be taken as the first project. Against the advice of the city planning director, Shippmann, who suggested a racially integrated project where the many problems such as relocation would be less severe, the CAC recommended a racially segregated project. The members reasoned that there were many problems in this area and it needed rebuilding more than any other area of the city. Since the first project was to be an attack upon the heart of the slum, the most feasible approach to renewal would be through the GNRP, suggested by the Planning Director, to renew the entire area instead of concentrating on smaller areas surrounded by blight.

Disagreement arose when it was time to develop the GNRP concerning who was to get the contract for development of the plan. The city manager favored hiring a consultant, claiming the planning department was understaffed and could not support the CAC in its task as could a consultant. Mayor Dexter was opposed to hiring a consultant and agreed with Norval Hodges, the chairman of the CAC, that the varied

backgrounds of CAC people would allow a qualified person to work on each part of the plan, and if the planning director could supply guidance, the CAC could carry out surveys and prepare plans. In January of 1962, the city approved and signed a contract with HHFA for the survey and planning funds, and as soon as the City Council decided who would prepare the GNRP, the studies could begin.

First Public Opposition

Jan. - Dec., 1962

Mrs. Louise Bundman, of the Council for Community Integration raised for the first time, January 1962 in public an objection to the project. She asked whether or not the proposed urban renewal wouldn't reinforce the segregated residential pattern of the city. No answer was given to this question.

In July of the same year, the City Council awarded Harland Bartholomew and Associates, traffic engineers and city planners, the contract to prepare the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan. During this period, from July to November, the consultants claimed they interviewed the residents and determined their needs and desires.

When the consultants presented their preliminary findings at a public meeting in the latter part of November, 1962, the meeting did not go smoothly. Quite a few people asked questions of Thomas Campbell, of Harland Bartholomew and Associates, and Edward Schippmann, the city planning director, and apparently were not satisfied with the answers they received. The typical charge from the audience was that the planners "are just interested in buildings and not people."⁶

Although this was denied by Campbell and Schippmann who stated that in this early stage concrete answers could not be given about individual homes, the residents were not satisfied.


The consultants reported that 50% of the structures were substandard, and 90% of the residents desired to remain in the community.* A question was immediately raised by the

*See Appendix for the complete results of the survey.

residents concerning the 10% who desired to move. The audience insisted that a Negro could not move where he wanted. The consultant replied, "I don't know of anything like that,"⁷ and the planning director insisted it was too early to talk about this topic. A spokesman for the people replied "The fact is, we cannot separate the physical changes within the neighborhood from the effect upon the people. This should be considered--by some group--at the same time as the actual urban renewal planning."⁸ The residents were unconvinced, though, when the planners claimed this was of no concern to the urban renewal plans.

The attack was next directed at the defunct Citizens Advisory Committee, and the city planning director asked when did it meet? He replied that a new group was being formed.

One man summed up the feelings of the residents who attended. "What's going to happen to me and my family? Where am I going to live? Am I going to be able to pay the rent? As long as there is restricted housing in Champaign, urban renewal will do no good."⁹



4. BOUNDARY MAP


LEGEND

- GNR BOUNDARY
- EXCLUDED OR NOT TO BE ACQUIRED PARCEL BOUNDARY


NORTHEAST NEIGHBORHOOD

PREPARED FOR
CHAMPAIGN CITY COUNCIL
 CHAMPAIGN, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PREPARED BY
 HARLAND BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSOCIATES
 CITY PLANNERS CIVIL ENGINEERS LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS
 MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE





DATE: JULY 1962
 REVISIONS:



5. AREAS PROPOSED FOR
CLEARANCE AND REDEVELOPMENT


LEGEND

-  CLEARANCE AND REDEVELOPMENT
-  CONSERVATION AND REHABILITATION


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DATE: JULY 1962
REVISIONS:



6. PROPOSED LAND USE AND STREET PLAN


LEGEND

- SINGLE FAMILY
- TWO-FAMILY
- MULTI-FAMILY
- SCHOOL & PARKS
- NEIGHBORHOOD BUSINESS
- INSTITUTIONAL BUSINESS
- GENERAL BUSINESS
- INDUSTRIAL

NORTHEAST NEIGHBORHOOD

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 MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE



DATE: JULY 1962
 REVISIONS:

Issues Develop

Dec. 19, 1962 - June, 1963

A new Citizens Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of John E. Severns, partner in a local architectural firm, was formed. This committee, under much more stable leadership, was to play a large role in the upcoming dispute over the urban renewal project. Membership on the CAC consisted of three residents of the community and four persons from elsewhere in the city. Although their backgrounds differed, all but one of the members was a professional or businessman.* When the committee was being formed, the Twin City Federation of Labor refused to allow its members to participate on the Advisory Board. It felt, "The answer is not in urban renewal. . . The answer is to be found in the wage and salary levels of our low income families so they can purchase with their own money housing adequate to their needs."¹⁰

Concern for the "human side" of urban renewal was revoiced by several groups at this time, the fear being that the city was concerned only with improving the structural condition of the neighborhood. The Champaign Human Relation Commission had sent a letter to the City Council, asking it to go on record supporting open occupancy, and that the primary reason for relocation of persons displaced by urban renewal be neither geography nor existing neighborhood patterns, but the needs and the means of the persons involved. A similar concern was expressed by the Council on Community Integration who claimed, in a letter to the CAC, that an "information vacuum" now exists. "Rumors mostly inaccurate, quickly fill the vacuum." The group asked a general statement of intent assuring open occupancy policy.¹¹

Feb. 3, 1963

This lack of information appeared quite widespread, at least the people felt this was the case. As one man expressed, "I really wouldn't mind moving, if we have a choice, but we don't know. Nobody has told us one way or the other. Why can't they give us an answer?"¹² At this time the consultants were preparing their final report.

Apr. 21, 1963

When Schippmann, the city planning director, presented his findings on relocation, that 50% of the people, or 4000

*A detailed membership profile can be found in the appendix.

relocations would be required, opposition was voiced. Otto Bartholow, realtor and member of the CAC, did not feel many Negroes would be able to afford single-family housing were it to be built in quantity. Robert Bowles, executive director of the Urban League, expressed opposition to building another public housing project in northeast Champaign, saying it would only insure more segregation, and that the existing public housing was now segregated. These men stated the two issues that were to recur many times during the following months.

March 2, 1963

To prepare the residents for urban renewal, the CAC distributed a pamphlet, "Questions and Answers about Urban Renewal," throughout the neighborhood.

On March 31, 1963, after nine months of preparation, Harland Bartholomew and Associates presented its plan to the city. The General Neighborhood Renewal Plan was comprised of six projects covering 227 acres, requiring 800 families to be relocated, with 200 not to be disturbed.*

April 4, 1963

The first public hearing held by the CAC after Mr. Severns became chairman, was held on April 4, 1963. Severns described the atmosphere at this time. This meeting was attended by 250-300 persons principally from the Northeast Neighborhood. In addition to said public hearing, two earlier meetings attended by interested groups and individuals were held. At each meeting a presentation of the proposed plan was made outlining the general provisions of the plan including budget and time schedule. Following each presentation the floor was open for questions regarding the GNRP and the Urban Renewal Program in general. The questions raised clearly indicated that there exists a number of areas of concern, misunderstanding, and misconception regarding the proposed plan and its effect on the residents and businessmen of the Northeast Neighborhood.¹³

April 5, 1963

After pressure from various sources, the City Council presented its statement of Urban Renewal Policy.

The democratic principle and right of every citizen in our city to live in a residence which meets at least minimum acceptable

*A detailed description of the project is contained in the Appendix.

standards, the choice of which is only limited by the individual's means.

The Council went on to promise priority in the purchase of land to those displaced and promised that all developers in the area state in writing "that their developments will be sold, rented, or leased without prejudice as to race, color, or creed" before they will be allowed to purchase land in the area.¹⁴

April 9, 1963

Fearing that the people of the community had not been given ample time to understand the plan, the North End Ministerial Alliance, the Human Relations Commission and others asked that the final decision on the plan be held in abeyance until a subcommittee composed of residents of the area had time to study and discuss the total problem. It was suggested by Robert Bowles of the Human Relations Commission that this committee not be appointed but be formed by asking the churches, institutions, and civic groups in the area to select a person to represent them. He felt this would give the people more confidence in such a committee.

Although it is reported that the manner in which the CAC conducted the hearing helped to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding that had not existed in prior meetings, it did not dispel the fears and anxiety of the people. During the meeting people shouted such things as "Leave us alone." and "Let urban renewal go back where it came from." Bartholow of the CAC stated urban renewal would not help integration; Reverend A. T. Rowan, speaking for the North End Pastors Association, stated the thirty days suggested for review of the plan by the community was not enough; Bill Smith of the University NAACP criticized the lack of an open housing law; and Reverend A. G. Gregory said that if urban renewal has a long-range hidden purpose of segregation, they would not support it, but if not, they would investigate the proposal without passion.

The CAC, to fulfill the request, scheduled meetings in the Northeast Neighborhood as listed below:

May 28	Bethel AME Church, 401 E. Park
June 4	Grove Street Church, 501 E. Grove
June 6	St. Luke CME Church, 809 N. Fifth St.
June 11	Salem Baptist Church, 500 E. Park
June 13	Pilgrim Baptist Church, 609 N. Ash
August 5	Mt. Olive Baptist Church, 808 E. Bradley

May, 1963

Early in May, the University Television station presented a program concerning the urban renewal. Residents were able to call the participants to have their questions answered by members of the CAC.

During this time the CAC also established a Neighborhood Committee for the Northeast Neighborhood comprised of service organizations and individuals who were active in the neighborhood. It elected its own offices, and the CAC asked the group to assist in the development of a Project One Committee whose responsibility should deal solely with the problems of the first project area. Its main function was to improve the communications system between the Northeast Neighborhood and the CAC and the Planning Department, and was also to help enlist a committee from each project area with which the Urban Renewal Division and Building Inspection Department would deal directly for information and the dissemination of materials. Five sub-groups were named by Severns: housing and relocation, citizen participation and public information, codes and ordinances, comprehensive community plan and finance. All groups contained members of the CAC, the neighborhood and other professionals and businessmen who were knowledgeable of the various topics.

The meetings scheduled by the CAC were held in the North End, and attendance varied from 20 people at one of the smaller churches to approximately 100.

Mr. Severns described these meetings:

The proposed GNRP was explained in general terms, as was the Federal Renewal Program with emphasis on the safeguards of the individual builder into the Plan. Copies of the pamphlet "Questions and Answers about Urban Renewal" were available. Lengthy question and answer sessions followed each presentation with the following major areas of question:

1. What will happen to my property? Will it be acquired?
2. What will happen to persons (generally elderly) displaced by the program who are living on limited income and who may not be eligible for a loan on a new house? Those asking this question have assumed that a new property will cost more than the one they presently live in.

CPX →

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Responding to the Urban Crisis, a seminar was devoted to the examination of Ghettos, Riots and Negro Politics. This paper was developed from that seminar, held during the Spring Semester of 1968, at the University of Illinois, Urbana.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This study of Negro Politics in a medium-sized mid-western city, describes the role residents of the city's North End ghetto played in the development of an urban renewal program.

Through passage of the 1949 Federal Housing Act, Congress took action to check the spread of slums in urban areas. Federal aid was to be provided communities for clearance of blighted areas, and the cleared sites were to be sold to private redevelopers who would agree to develop them according to the land use designated for that area in the redevelopment plan. Depending upon city size, the federal government would pay up to 75% of the cost of acquisition and clearance of land, the balance to be paid by the local community.

Provisions of the act were later expanded to cover rehabilitation and conservation measures, the program emphasis being changed from urban redevelopment meaning total clearance and redevelopment, to urban renewal, a combination of clearance, rehabilitation, and conservation.

Although the blighted areas for which these programs were intended are commonly associated with large metropolitan communities, they are also recognized to exist in smaller cities. The pressures upon our physical, social, and economic environments affect all size cities, and the common denominator of blight has proven intractable. Although city planning technology and national wealth have advanced to the point where we could remove all semblance of blight, were government policy and budgeting so directed, we could not deal effectively with the people living in these areas. Controversy has raged concerning the role to be played by site residents in the urban renewal process for nearly twenty years.

Urban renewal law requires that the citizens of a renewal area actively participate in the planning process in an attempt to determine the "public interest." Legis-

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1. What will happen to my property? Will it be acquired?
2. What will happen to persons (generally elderly) displaced by the program who are living on limited income and who may not be eligible for a loan on a new house? Those asking this question have assumed that a new property will cost more than the one they presently live in.

3. Will housing elsewhere in the community (outside the Northeast Neighborhood) be available for those families who may be relocated?

Since it was the consensus of the Advisory Committee that these questions could not be appropriately answered until Project One was undertaken, and since a number in the Northeast Neighborhood seem to have a better understanding of the Program and in fact, supported the Program to the extent that they encouraged the City Council to vote favorably on the financing of Project One, the CAC recommended that the GNRP be approved and that Project One be undertaken.¹⁵

Project One

June 24, 1963 - Jan., 1964

As the city prepared to embark on its first renewal effort, it planned to locate a project office in or near the urban renewal area so persons having business with the office would find it readily accessible. The office was to have three full time employees, a project planning director, a housing relocation officer and a draftsman, but all work would pass through the central office of the Champaign Planning Department.

Little happened during that summer; the project office did not appear, no urban renewal director was hired, and there was little publicity concerning the project.

Sept. 6, 1963

By September of 1963, however, opposition from the Northeast Champaign Homeowners Association was voiced. Reverend A. W. Bishop, president of the association, invited Howard D. Roberts, inter-group relations officer for the Urban Renewal Department of HHFA, to explain the urban renewal procedure.

From the questions asked, it was evident that the audience opposed the project. They were told that at least a year of planning would be required before any properties would be acquired by the city, and the plan had not reached the stage where plans have been made for specific properties. When told that the people could not purchase housing elsewhere, the HHFA representative said this was up to the city to solve.

Dec. 1963

During December of 1963, city officials visited the results of urban renewal projects in other cities, but nothing was being done locally.

Jan. 8, 1964

Early in January of 1964 the City Council took up the subject of urban renewal, and five of the seven members voted in favor of the proposed project. The opposition, Councilman Wikoff and Smalley, were not yet convinced that the substandard housing in the North End could not be corrected without federal funds nor whether the people in the area who would be directly affected wanted urban renewal. Councilman Wikoff felt you could not give a man character and courage by taking away his incentive, and the urban renewal program was too engulfing. Of those supporting the project, Mayor Dexter, and Councilmen Schooley, Skelton, Danner and Stratton, and Ellis Danner questioned the need for urban renewal, asking if the city could not do the job without it. Mayor Dexter, however, claimed the public sentiment was in favor of urban renewal.

The Chamber of Commerce rose to oppose the use of federal funds to carry out the project. It felt that the Chamber and the City should, in close cooperation, encourage local developers to build economical single-family units as well as economical multi-family units in the proposed renewal area. They claimed that there had been no attempt made by either group to contact local builders on this matter. In addition, the Chamber criticized the lax enforcement of the building code and Council's proposal to increase the utility tax to pay their share of the cost of urban renewal. The Chamber did not continue to press its issue, and the topic subsided. The topic of financing was mentioned on several occasions, but was not the basic conflict.


7. NEIGHBORHOOD AND PROJECT
DELINEATION MAP

- PROJECT BOUNDARY
- GNRP BOUNDARY
- ③ PROJECT NUMBER

PROPOSED LAND USE
AND STREET PLAN

L E G E N D

- [Pattern] SINGLE FAMILY
- [Pattern] TWO - FAMILY
- [Pattern] MULTI - FAMILY
- [Pattern] SCHOOL & PARKS
- [Pattern] NEIGHBORHOOD BUSINESS
- [Pattern] INSTITUTIONAL BUSINESS
- [Pattern] GENERAL BUSINESS
- [Pattern] INDUSTRIAL



NORTHEAST NEIGHBORHOOD

PREPARED FOR
CHAMPAIGN CITY COUNCIL
CHAMPAIGN, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PREPARED BY
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CITY PLANNERS CIVIL ENGINEERS LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

DATE: JULY 1962
REVISIONS

Involvement of Residents

Jan. 21, 1964 - June, 1965

Personal feelings about the project began to present themselves, and there began to be evident a grouping of forces. At the same time, the residents began to become involved in the controversy. One of the groups who had previously opposed the project reversed its stand. The Champaign-Urbana Improvement Association issued a statement supporting the urban renewal, with reservations. Reverends J. E. Groves and Blaine Ramsey presented the position of the group, claiming urban renewal could not be regarded as an end in itself. They stated,

"We don't unanimously agree that urban renewal is the best thing for Champaign's North End. . . Our experience in the past is all we can go by, and we have seen it fail in other cities, at least what most of them have is not what we want. . . But we must do something to help stop a problem that could get out of hand given 10 years or more . . . so we support this with reservations."¹⁶

They supported the project because it would improve living conditions, make the community more attractive to all people regardless of ethnic or professional backgrounds, and would remove the psychological stigma of ghetto living. However, they presented to the city their list of reservations and recommendations.

1. The cost of new homes must not be beyond the ability of the average wage-earner now living in the area to purchase and maintain.
2. Profiteering on the part of private developers should be discouraged.
3. Reasonable assurance should be given and a climate established whereby displaced persons may be allowed to buy homes outside the renewal area.
4. A fair price should be paid for homes taken, and after the sale, if the occupants did not have sufficient funds to purchase other property, they would be subsidized by the government with low-interest loans to assure adequate housing.

5. Homeowners located in the renewal area whose homes are classified as sub-standard will be allowed to bring their homes up to the present code requirements.
6. Public housing should be minimal and be designed as not to take on the appearance of ghetto housing.
7. Developers in the renewal area must hire Negroes in all job categories.

Jan. 22, 1964

An increase in the city utility tax was passed on Jan. 22, 1964 by a vote of four to three of the City Council. This was to finance the City's share of the project. The two councilmen originally opposed to the project were joined by Councilman Skelton who objected to the increase in the utility tax. At this meeting the Reverend A. W. Bishop protested the urban renewal project, saying, "I hope the City can find enough people to inhabit the houses that are going to be built there, because we are not going back there."¹⁷ Following him, Robert Zachary, vice chairman of the Community Council on Integration voiced its support of the project.

Reverend Rowan, of both the CAC and the neighborhood, described the feeling of the residents.

I personally am very optimistic that the heavy majority of the people will not only favor but support the urban renewal program in its various stages. . . I think most people in Champaign's North End favor urban renewal, however, and that most of the opposition to the program comes from one source, (meaning Reverend Bishop). . . I think really the resistance is coming from a lack of understanding about what the urban renewal program actually is.¹⁸

At this time, it was anticipated that the next stage of the urban renewal program, the "Survey and Planning Phase" would begin as soon as federal approval was given to the GNRP. In the interest of insuring that needs of the residents of the northeast neighborhood would be clearly understood, and to provide closer communication, the CAC set out to establish two special committees. The first was to be

representative of the entire northeast neighborhood and interested groups. The second would represent residents of the first project area and others directly concerned with the project.

March 16, 1964

On March 16, the CAC sent invitations to all organizations, both pro and con who had expressed interest in the project or were located in or near the area, asking for representatives for the neighborhood committee.

April 5, 1964

Meanwhile, a homeowners association in the section slated for renewal, moved to block the project. Led by Reverend A. W. Bishop, they requested that the City halt the project. The group claimed that 800 residents who owned their own homes supported the movement, and having canvassed the entire area, had found only twelve or fourteen property owners who were not opposed to urban renewal. "We still don't want urban renewal, but it is being shoved down our throats."¹⁹

City Manager Warren B. Browning replied that the only means of halting the program would be for the opponents to persuade City Council to change its stand, and if it were persuaded to abandon the program, it could do so without penalty until the time that acquisition of land began. He further explained that a three man staff would be hired when final approval of the renewal program was received, but until that time the City could not determine precisely which properties would be removed or remodeled.

Summer, 1964

Neighborhood meetings were held as scheduled by the CAC during the summer of 1964, but no significant developments occurred, and only several meetings of the CAC Neighborhood Committee are reported. It was not until August 6, 1964 that the City again met with the opposition. City Manager Browning and Plan Director Gay apparently made a good impression upon the group at this time. They appeared satisfied when they were told that the good homes would not be taken; inspections would be made, and only the substandard homes would be taken if not repaired; and the people who had to be relocated would have to agree upon their new location, would choose their new site from a list, and receive individual attention.

Oct. 3, 1964

Rumors had begun to circulate through the North End concerning the location of public housing within the urban renewal area. This question was asked of Planning Director Gay at the October 3rd meeting of the Neighborhood Committee of the CAC. Mr. Gay reported that there had been no progress in obtaining additional public housing for Champaign, but that it was fairly certain that ninety units would be built at some future date. The location for these units had not been revealed, he said, but thought that they would probably be spotted in the urban renewal area.²⁰

Nov. 7, 1964

Lengthy discussion of this topic was continued at the November 7th meeting of the Neighborhood Committee. Members expressed fear that all the units would be in the area to be renewed and would be large scale projects. The consensus of the Committee was that this would be highly undesirable. Mr. Gay, however, explained that all future public housing would be scattered, and no large scale units were being considered.²¹

Nov. 11, 1964

By this time, the City had hired David D. Gensemer as urban renewal project director. When asked if urban renewal simply rebuilds the "Negro ghetto," he replied that the purpose of an urban renewal project was not to change the character of the community but to provide adequate housing for those who need it.²² He stressed that at least two adequate housing sites would be offered to any family forced to move because of the execution of the plan, that urban renewal law requires that they be equal in location, proximity to work and price. A relocation officer, James L. Williams was hired to assist Gensemer.

The hiring of the urban renewal directors and relocation officer brought the fact that there was not open occupancy in Champaign into intense discussion, due to the need for relocating the people who would be displaced by the project.

Jan. 22, 1965

When the topic of open occupancy was discussed during a meeting of the Champaign Human Relations Committee, the question was raised whether urban renewal would provide the stimulus needed to bring open occupancy to Champaign. At this meeting Reverend Bishop again renounced the program and stated that the people wanted to help themselves.

Severns, chairman of the CAC, charged that every group must recognize what they can and cannot support and must recognize their limits and be willing to cooperate wherever possible.

Feb. 1965

John Severns resigned as chairman of the CAC in February of 1965, and the committee floundered for several months until the appointment of John Barr, realtor, as chairman.

Feb. 28, 1965

Toward the latter part of February, home interviews were begun by the relocation officer to determine the preferences and situation of people within the project area. The common question of the people interviewed was, "Where can we move since there is no open occupancy in this city?"²³ The people were assured that, although this was a problem, progress was being made toward making houses available on an open occupancy basis. However, a shortage of low-cost housing both within and without the project area was the greatest single problem which faced the relocation efforts. The urban renewal director noted that this was one of the areas in which urban renewal becomes a social problem. That is, most of the people in the area are Negroes, and the agency becomes involved with open occupancy, fair housing and integration.

During this time the CAC had no chairman, and it appears as if it made no recommendations until the new chairman was appointed. The Neighborhood Committee of the CAC was concerned over this situation and sent a letter to the Mayor, urging him to appoint a chairman, fill the vacancies as soon as possible, and reactivate the committee. The plight of this committee was illustrated when it could not be determined whether there existed three or four vacancies.

April 3, 1965

The Neighborhood Committee at this time, April 3, 1965, inquired about the status of new public housing. Mr. Gensemer reported that he believed Mr. Sloan and the Housing Authority had applied for permission to build ninety units, apparently in the urban renewal area. There followed a discussion about the wisdom of this kind of decision with sharp differences of opinion concerning its effect upon segregation of Negroes in the City.

The discussions that were to follow during the next several months centered around public housing. A letter from a civil rights leader was sent to the city protesting the location of the proposed public housing units "right back in the present Negro ghetto." By this time it seemed highly likely that the public housing being discussed as possibly to be included in the project area would become a reality.

Councilman Stratton, a resident of the North End, expressed the view that it was a false economy to place this housing right back in the ghetto. Councilman Pope questioned the reasons behind the Council's recommendation to place ninety units of public housing within the urban renewal area, while Councilman Wikoff stated he understood that it was the purpose of the urban renewal program to eliminate the ghetto, not perpetuate it.

May 7, 1965

The Champaign-Urbana Improvement Association and the Council for Community Integration also expressed opposition to the possibility of locating public housing in the urban renewal area.²⁴

CAC Activity

June 2, 1965 - Dec., 1965

By the June 2nd meeting of the Neighborhood Committee of CAC, the mayor had appointed John Barr, a local realtor, as chairman of the Committee. Mr. Barr then left on a trip to Europe until the end of July. At this meeting, Mayor Dexter informed the Committee that the City Council's interest in the urban renewal program had "increased by 80% in the last eight months, and that it wants to see Project I completed." With respect to the location of the ninety units of public housing, the mayor stated: "I can tell you right now that if the units are not to be placed in the urban renewal area, all meetings on the subject might as well 'go out the window.' There will be no urban renewal unless these units are built inside Project I."²⁵

At this time, Mr. Spies, vice-chairman of the CAC, claimed that it would cost a total of \$250,000 to locate the proposed ninety units of public housing outside the area--\$100,000 of this to be borne by the City and the balance of \$150,000 to be paid by the Federal Government--and that an additional delay of one year would result. He

questioned whether insistence on locating units outside the area is worth the cost.

He was countered by Mrs. Gilmore, a member of the Neighborhood Committee, who stated that those who believe the multiple problems of people who live in the area to be the consequence of segregation would consider the delay worthwhile. Another member added that money wasn't everything, and that in the long run it might pay to try to change this decision on the part of the Council.

June 3, 1965

The Urban Renewal Department published the study which they had just completed, revealing that one-third of the families in the project area were living in poverty, but that only 19% believed they would like to move. This figure was questioned, however. It was suggested that the residents of the area did not believe they could ever move to any other part of town and thus may have adopted a fatalistic attitude about remaining there.

Major activity during this period centered about the CAC and its Neighborhood Committee. The topic was practically always concerned with the public housing proposed for the area, with the usual emphasis upon site selection. The entire question presented a tremendous problem since nearly 40% of the people living in the area did not have enough income to purchase private housing, even though they stated they desired to do so. Some of the residents would certainly have to be housed in other than private housing.

July 7, 1965

It was indicated, however, that this problem was complicated by the existing practices of the Champaign County Housing Authority (CCHA), through its director, Mr. Harold Sloan, in the assignment of housing units. It was claimed that applicants were assigned to the housing units on a racially segregated basis. This led the CAC to request that the Champaign County Housing Authority assign public housing on a first-come, first-served basis as to location.²⁶

July 29, 1965

When the question of public housing was raised at the July 29th meeting of the CAC, City Manager Browning asked, "Is integration the goal of the urban renewal program or is improved housing?"²⁷ He stated that the Federal Housing Act pertained primarily to the improvement of housing.

The CAC nevertheless forwarded a recommendation to the City Council asking that they review the situation concerning an open occupancy policy. Additionally, even though Mr. Browning stated that he felt the City Council had indicated it was reticent about putting pressure on another public body, the CAC recommended to City Council that a request be made to the Board of Directors of the County Housing Authority that all vacancies in public housing units be filled on the basis of priority without regard to the location of such units.

At the following meeting of the CAC, the Land Use Plan for Project 1 was presented by Mr. David Gay, City Planning Director. Reverend Ramsey, of the CAC stated that the question of public housing within the project area would undoubtedly arise when the plan was presented to the neighborhood. Mr. Spies, vice-chairman of the CAC, felt that public housing should not be part of the decision of the CAC concerning the plan, as the land use plan stipulated only multi-family residential use without regard to whether it was to be public or private housing, such decision being reserved for the City Council. Mr. Gay stated that he could only plan general land use and that his department could not be involved in the discussion concerning public or private housing.

August 11, 1965

The Project 1 plan was presented to the Neighborhood Committee and explained by David Gensemer on August 11, 1965. The plan presented was essentially the same plan presented to the Urban Renewal Department earlier that year, June 25, 1965. This plan originated in the City Planning Department, under the direction of Mr. Gay. The plan was said to be drawn up with two ideas in mind:

1. Save as many homes as possible.
2. Try to arrive at a plan that provides new housing in the Project 1 area for all the people displaced by all subsequent projects.

The plan as presented was almost identical to the GNRP. The change was:

The loop street was changed so that no sub-standard or rehabilitable house would be torn down.

August 16, 1965

John Barr, chairman of the CAC, stated that he thought there could be an urban renewal plan to benefit the North End if the people in the area participated in the plan, and that urban renewal could help the community of Champaign-Urbana, but that it was a grave error to have a plan without much participation from the people affected. He noted that the area had leaders who could adequately represent the people, and the suggestions from the Neighborhood Committee made sense; however, he could not say what the City Council would do with them. Mr. Barr said that urban renewal would have an effect upon integration and could possibly create more problems than it solved; it was foolish to try to separate urban renewal and integration; and the CAC was for a program that fostered integration. The CAC thus presented these points:

1. There was a need to have more parks in the multi-family area and a buffer zone along the railroad.
2. The density (dwelling units per acre) was too high.
3. There should be single family housing units within the public housing.
4. It was opposed to placing all of the ninety units of public housing in the North End.
5. All standard housing should be left standing if possible.
6. A good urban renewal plan can make the North End a better area, but further segregation would make this a bad project.²⁸

The discussion following centered about details of the plan. It was brought out that, due to financing problems, the three and four bedroom units to be developed in the area would be public housing. The average family size was 4.1 persons, much above the national average of 3.2 persons.

When City Planning Director Gay was asked whether the plans for the area considered the birth and migration rates he replied that they did not. He explained that the criteria for new development was based upon what the area was like at that time. The computations were based on data ranging

from 1926 to 1950; and they were using the plans based on these figures (and possibly the 1950 comprehensive plan) because the area has not changed.

When questioned how the plan was to help integration, Mr. Barr claimed it would improve the area so white people would move in. This point was debated, with many people questioning the truth of such an assumption. One of the points made was that the elementary school in the area (Washington School) was 100% Negro, and would make white people with young children hesitant to move into the area, including married University students.

Opposition was also voiced to the proposed enlargement of Douglass Park. Residents claimed it was not being used because of a lack of supervision. They doubted that supervision for a larger park would be provided if it was not provided for the smaller existing one.

Apparently little open criticism of the urban renewal plan was being voiced by the residents at this time. Discussions were being held by the CAC and its neighborhood and block committees at which the opposition was present. The opposition did not appear to be organized though.

City Council acted upon the recommendations of the CAC, agreeing that expansion of Douglas Park north of Eureka Street was not necessary or desirable, that Eureka Street could be retained and used for visual surveillance of Douglas Park, and that a requirement for the maintenance of a park strip along the Illinois Central Railway right-of-way could be included in the disposition documents whereby the redevelopers could be required to maintain the area as open or green spaces. Council also agreed that the higher density of families within the western half of the project area was unnecessary.

Concern over the plan was also expressed by the Neighborhood Committee, indicating that the neighborhood had long awaited the opportunity to discuss alternate proposals with the city leadership since the 1963 hearings on the Bartholomew Plan. Since alternate proposals had not been presented, the Neighborhood Committee made its own recommendations to the CAC. It criticized the unimaginativeness of the Bartholomew plan and its implications of self-containment for the area through:

- a. Over-concentration of low-income, rental families in one area.

- b. Insufficient open space and community space.
- c. No attempt to develop uses which would have community-wide drawing power.
- d. No buffer to railroad.
- e. Lack of coordination with school planning.
- f. General lack of awareness of social community with which dealing.
- g. The enlargement of Douglass Park.

The committee felt that the plan as proposed showed no attempt by the City Council to react to neighborhood consensus.

They continued by pointing out that there was insufficient information with which to analyze the plan in terms of size of families to be relocated, income by family size, development potential for various uses and controls by the Local Urban Renewal Agency over developers in requiring open and community space. The point was made that there was a need to tie this area into the balance of the community by developing some facilities or community activities in the area to counteract its isolation which they felt kept the community as a whole ignorant of the conditions, and penalized the Negro youth with lack of preparation for living in an integrated society.

Segregation of the public housing was attacked for directly affecting the discussion of new site locations, and city council was asked to use its full weight to persuade the housing authority and director to move rapidly toward integration.

Sept. 15, 1965

In mid-September, 1965, the Northeast Neighborhood Association, headed by Reverend Bishop, announced that it planned to relocate homes from the renewal area onto an Association plot in the countryside, due to opposition of the urban renewal program. This plan was criticized by the urban renewal director. He felt the home owner would not be improving himself; this would create a new ghetto; and the home owners would have to pay a higher fire insurance rate. The Association would not be permitted to move any substandard homes from the urban renewal area.

Oct. 5, 1965

Seen as a concession to those who opposed the location of all ninety units of public housing within Project 1 on the grounds that it would perpetuate racial segregation, a decision was made to locate thirty units of public housing outside the area.

Since citizen participation had again lapsed into one of its periodic low points, the CAC considered re-activation of the sub-committees to foster citizen participation in the program. The sub-committees were to consider codes and ordinances. The comprehensive community plan, finances and budgets, housing and displaced families, neighborhood analysis, and citizen participation.

Oct. 13, 1965

In response to the questions raised concerning the public housing, the CAC met with City Manager Browning who stated that it was the City's intention that all ninety of the public housing units be constructed simultaneously. He indicated that it was not the intent of the City Council to let the thirty units "hand"--that the separation of the ninety into sixty and thirty was made only for the purpose of expediting the construction of the sixty, and the Local Housing Authority Director had informed him that the construction of the sixty units within Project No. 1 would not be delayed if the Local Housing Authority (LHA) (in this instance the Champaign County Housing Authority) could reduce its existing application for ninety units to sixty.²⁹

Nov. 3, 1965

Meanwhile the members of the Neighborhood Committee were questioning whether they had failed to find out what the people in Project No. 1 really thought. Liason with Block Captains had not been maintained, usual attendance of Block Captains at Neighborhood Committee meetings was one or two captains. The Committee agreed that it had failed to follow through, since the changes recommended by the CAC to the City Council had come directly from suggestions made by the captains, and no one told the captains of their usefulness.

Also cited was the widely held belief of the residents of the neighborhood that urban renewal would not take place.³⁰

Nov. 10, 1965

A special meeting was called by Chairman Barr of the CAC to discuss mutual problems with the County Housing

Authority and the Park Board. During the meeting, it was stated that the Housing Authority was unequivocally opposed to putting applicants in units they did not want, and that if a Negro family applies and there are no vacancies at the preferred location, they are given an opportunity to accept a vacancy at a second location. He stated that to date he had only six to eight applications at the most from Negro families who had requested housing in units presently occupied by only white families, and that most of these had changed their minds or had not qualified on some other basis other than race.³¹

When fear was expressed that the thirty units of public housing proposed to be located outside of the Project Area would not come into being, City Manager Browning stated this was not true, that ninety units were still planned. He went on to say that since thirty units were to be located outside the GNRP area, the need for development of site plans would delay the approval and construction of the sixty units, so he did not insist that the thirty units be constructed with the sixty. He was reminded, however, that the CAC had recommended to the City Council that all ninety units be built concurrently. The CAC member, Mr. Zachery stated that now it was clear to the public that only sixty units were proposed. Mr. Sloan stated, however, that ninety units were still available to this project.

Douglass Park presented less of a problem, and it was agreed that it be expanded west to North Fifth Street, providing an unobstructed view of the park from its periphery.

Nov. 12, 1965

Mr. Spies, vice-chairman of the CAC, met with the Urban Renewal Administrator on November 12th, whereupon he was told it was the prevailing opinion that the program scheduled for Champaign should be disapproved, on the basis of discrimination involved in the public housing section of the Urban Renewal Program. On his personal recommendation, the City of Champaign was given three to four months to solve the racial problem in this area or there would be no approval of the Urban Renewal Project.

The Federal representatives present recognized that the City of Champaign apparently was much more advanced in their view concerning integrated housing than was the LHA, and in view of the past record of non-cooperation by the housing authority, it was suggested the City establish a housing authority.³²

Dec. 4, 1965

It should be noted that on December 4, 1965, the deadline set for the 15 month plan review period expired. Any changes in the plan at this late date would be difficult.

Public Hearings

Dec. 20, 1965 - March, 1965

Now that the plan had been brought to a somewhat final stage of development, it was to be presented to the community through public meetings. The first of these was held at the Booker T. Washington School on December 20, 1965. The plan was outlined and each aspect was presented as presently conceived. It is reported that the reaction from the audience made it clear that a great deal of misunderstanding and apprehension existed. Two spectators spoke in favor of the plan while thirty voiced opposition. Views expressed were such as:

One thing that is confusing me is that we've all had men come out and tell us one thing but when they get back to the west side they talk differently.

I've heard some people say that if this project goes through I'll make a killing off these Negroes in the North End.³³

Jan. 4, 1966

When the CAC met for the first time in 1966, January 5th, Mr. Gensemer described the Urban Renewal Department's search for thirty sites for public housing outside the GNRP area. Seven locations had been investigated, but none discussed with Mr. Sloan, due to illness.

The discussion, however, quickly switched to the activities of local civil rights groups and individuals who had written to the Housing and Urban Development Director, Mr. Weaver. Chairman Barr suggested that these people should be contacted "to see if it would be possible for another letter to be forwarded which would indicate that although they had reservations about the program, the writers felt that the urban renewal project should be approved as the first small step toward a better community."³⁴

When Mr. Zachery, who had co-signed the earlier letter with Reverend Ramsey, was asked if he would prepare such a

letter, he stated he would not since he was opposed to locating any public housing within the project area, although he was not opposed to the urban renewal project as a whole. Mr. Tinsley agreed with Mr. Zachery.

Mr. Barr urged Mr. Zachery to ponder this problem, because he felt that with the project, desegregation, as a result of the tremendous emphasis which the City through the Urban Renewal Department activities, could be achieved. During the discussion Mr. Barr pointed out that there had already been one Negro family placed in heretofore all-white public housing units, and while this could not be termed "desegregation," it was an important step on the part of the LHA, as the existing pattern had been broken, and it would be easier for other Negro families to do so in the future. Mr. Zachery stated he would write such a letter only if he included in it all of the reservations which the organizations he represented had about the program. This was desirable to Mr. Barr.³⁵

Jan. 24, 1966

Until this time, very few groups outside of the North End came in direct contact with the project. The first outside group to become vocal was the Central Illinois Friends of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which urged that the residents be given a greater opportunity to participate in the formulation of the final renewal plan. If this were not done, the SNCC group felt the plan promised to cause many residents of the area more hardship than relief. It went on to claim that the residents of Project 1 were never consulted in any meaningful way as the plan took shape, and that the Neighborhood Committee included only five actual residents of the area and the block captains had not been effectively used to learn the ideas and suggestions of the area residents.³⁶

Jan. 25, 1966

An informational meeting was held by the Neighborhood Committee in the Washington School at which many residents protested the plan, even to the point of threatening physical violence. The general theme of the opponents was that they were too old to leave their homes which they owned and purchase new ones. They felt they would be forced into renting, and replied emotionally:

I worked hard for my shack, and I intend to keep my shack till I die.

All my earnings, all my savings are in that home. My husband is sick and not able to work, and I've already got enough problems without losing my home.³⁷

Others, including the NAACP spokesman, expressed the feeling that placing any public housing in the renewal area would reinforce the existing ghetto pattern. Its location near the tracks was also opposed in that the one hundred foot buffer was not felt great enough to cut the train noise. Homes near the tracks were attacked for psychological reasons as well.

Our children, because their faces are black, feel they are inferior. Placing them back down by the tracks will strengthen this feeling.³⁸

If this were not enough, the City was notified that its Workable Program would not be recertified unless it undertook either urban renewal or a housing code enforcement program.

Jan. 28, 1966

Petitions expressing opposition to the inclusion of public housing in the project and enlargement of Douglass Park were circulated by the Northeast Homeowners Association. Reverend Bishop, whose church would be adjacent the enlarged park was president of the Homeowners Association.

Feb. 1, 1966

CAC vice-chairman Spies, attempting to illustrate the value of a particular type housing program known as 221-(d)(3) which would provide housing a step above public housing, claimed whites would be encouraged to move into the area. Neighborhood residents, however, were more interested in the possibility of Negroes moving out of the ghetto than in the possibility of Caucasians moving in. When the Urban Renewal Department was asked if it would relocate people outside the area, Mr. Gensemer replied: "We will relocate a family wherever in the City we can find a house that they can afford."³⁹

Since the urban renewal program had run into a great amount of opposition at this point, Robert C. Weaver, head of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), requested an explanation from Mr. Barr regarding alleged segregation. Mr. Barr replied:

Early in the planning period we were advised that urban renewal and race relations were two separate problems and we should not try to mix the two.

We have learned, however, that at least here in Champaign the two problems cannot be separated, and we have kept this uppermost in our minds while planning the project.

Despite this awareness by the City, some of the conflicts have not proved fully reconcilable.

The most intense and concerted "segregation" charge has involved the proposal to locate sixty units of public housing within Project 1.

This problem has been consistently opposed by civil rights groups and others concerned over the possible perpetuation of the ghetto pattern.⁴⁰

Feb. 6, 1966

Tactical maneuvers were not new to the CAC, and, on February 6, 1966 the Northeast Neighborhood Committee became the Urban Renewal and Public Housing Committee in an attempt to regroup to better work with the residents. The Committee was to determine the work and plans being done by the various housing and redevelopment bodies and determine the need for creating such agencies that do not exist. The Committee was also to help in the relocation efforts.

Feb. 12, 1966

Opposition to the urban renewal program began to grow. Reverend Blaine Ramsey Jr., president of the local NAACP, presented the chapter's consensus that a better neighborhood was desired but not at the expense of what he termed "human factors."

March 1, 1966

Reverend Bishop charged the program was being implemented without adequate participation of the people directly involved; it was self-containing and would produce a new ghetto; had no regard for human rights or property rights and would bring unnecessary debt and worry to the citizens; it was being forced upon the people without their consent; it would take the poor man's property and give it to the rich; and the

2. What specifically had been done to provide for relocation of low-income families;
3. The degree of racial segregation now existing in the area;

and "if public housing is to be built within the project area, the documentation must establish that all possibilities for locating elsewhere have been exhausted."⁴³

To locate all one hundred and twenty units (thirty more had been added by now to the ninety, making sixty in the project and sixty outside the area) outside the urban renewal area would be economically unfeasible, claimed Gensemer. The normal cost limit for public housing sites was \$1,000 per unit, and under special circumstances \$2,500 per unit, he said, but the four sites the city investigated outside the project area were over \$4,000 per unit. Additionally, he claimed, there was no flat ban on public housing being located within urban renewal areas, and unless this public housing were located within the project area, the City could not meet its one-fourth share of the project cost. Credit was given the City for the cost of public housing, and this amount was subtracted from the City's share of the project cost.⁴⁴

March 14, 1966

Faced by these problems, the CAC met on March 14, 1966 to determine what it could do. Rejecting the possibility of discontinuing the project, the CAC attempted to correct some of the problems. Local realtors were to be encouraged to practice open occupancy; and the Committee would document the reason for placement of sixty units of public housing within the project area since they felt the City Council would not change its position. It was not believed that the civil rights people could sufficiently document their position that the public housing within the project area would be harmful.

Blame for the discontent was placed upon Harold Sloan, the Public Housing Chief, who had not fulfilled the promises made earlier regarding integration of public housing.

General consensus among the Committee was that urban renewal should proceed, although there was growing opposition, since the opposition was due, not to urban renewal, but to the existing concentration of public housing in the area, and the irresponsibility of the Public Housing Authority.

Chairman Barr suggested the City Council shape the plan into a better form to slow the opposition; request the local Housing Authority to maintain only one list of applicants, and assign units on a first come, first served basis.

Manager Browning said that as far as the City Council was concerned, they felt the sixty units belonged inside the project area, and they would not take them out.

Mr. Zachery said the people were going to feel that the project had been rammed down their throats if it were approved as is; and Chairman Barr added that he felt the program was wrong.

After further discussion, it was finally decided that the Citizens Advisory Committee go on record as being for urban renewal and that they should make a public statement to this effect.

The CAC had done its job in the plan preparation stage. Now it was to assist in the implementation of the plan.

Final Stages

March 17, 1966 - Jan. 16, 1968

Opposition from the community was growing on several fronts in the neighborhood. Reverend Blaine Ramsey, Jr., president of the NAACP sent a letter to the regional director of HUD, Mr. Swartzel, stating that if Champaign was to obtain federal funds for an urban renewal program, it must be guaranteed that the program would not lend itself to racial containment. Reverend Ramsey suggested five actions he felt would fulfill such a guarantee:

1. Enforceable open occupancy in Champaign.
2. Enactment of an enforceable policy by the Champaign County Housing Authority of non-discrimination in housing placement.
3. Enactment of an enforceable program to desegregate all existing public housing.
4. Location of all new public housing in structures with less than ten apartments in each building, located on scattered sites outside of all present "Negro ghettos."

5. Enactment of an enforceable practical plan for the immediate desegregation of Champaign public schools.⁴⁵

A counter position to the controversy over the public housing issue was taken by a group of residents led by Louis Nash. This group called the controversy over public housing as irrelevant to the main issue, which they defined as better housing for everybody. Representing about fifteen families from the project area, the group expressed the belief that most public housing opposition to the renewal plan had been organized and led by nonresidents of the project area or those who "already had fine homes," and "those opposing urban renewal are penalizing the people that need better housing." One man in the group stated, "Urban renewal isn't supposed to be a cure-all for integration and all that other stuff. The purpose of the program is better housing. I'm for integration, but if you have to live in a ghetto, make it a nice ghetto, a place to be proud of."⁴⁶ During this meeting, the group organized a clean-up campaign.

April 7, 1966

It was now official, April 7, 1966. The Champaign Housing Authority was going to ask the federal government for an additional thirty units of public housing for Champaign's urban renewal relocation housing. This would mean sixty units were to be constructed within the project and sixty units outside the area.

Attempting to satisfactorily document the application for the urban renewal project, the City sent the federal government the requested information, including letters of cooperation and promises in writing from local real estate agents, builders and other contractors, as well as information from the Human Relations Commission and the Fair Housing Bureau to show that the City had maintained an effective liason with the Neighborhood Committee and other groups. A statement from the Unit 4 Superintendent of Education, E. H. Mellon was also included to prove the desegregation of educational activities.

May 1, 1966

While waiting to hear whether the documentation was satisfactory, City Manager Browning outlined the alternatives to urban renewal.

1. Ignore the problem.

2. Enforce the city housing code. This course of action applied to northeast Champaign will work a great hardship on a great many people due to the absence of relocation housing.
3. Undertake a locally financed urban renewal program of "extremely restricted nature" and paid for from city tax revenue.⁴⁷

June 22, 1966

Apparently the requested documentation was satisfactory to the federal government. The City's workable program was recertified on June 22, 1966. Due to the time needed to secure out-of-area public housing sites, the project was delayed.

Aug. 24, 1966

A long delay was avoided, however, when the federal officials relaxed the requirement that all public housing must be contracted before Part 1 of the urban renewal application could be approved. Champaign was permitted to gain approval of Part 1, hold the public hearing on the plan, and prepare Part 2 before the public housing contract was signed. Part 1 was to be approved when acceptable sites for public housing had been submitted to the federal officials and the County Housing Authority Board and City Council each adopted resolutions agreeing on the number and location of units.⁴⁸

Although the residents of the project area were opposed to the project, little can be found to suggest that substantial open opposition occurred during the summer of 1966.

Nov. 17, 1966

In November of that year, the City Council approved the renewal plan by a five to one vote. Seely Johnston, the lone opponent, claimed he would not vote to uproot anyone from his home. Mayor Dexter and Councilmen Kenneth Stratton, Frank Schooley, Ralph Smalley and Virgil Wikoff cast the yes votes, but Mr. Wikoff did so reluctantly. However, Kenneth Stratton, Negro Councilman from the North End, was jeered by the audience for his vote. Spectators called public housing "segregated" and a real blight, and the lack of open occupancy a "double blight," asserting that other problems, including job opportunities, improved educational opportunities and better recreation were also related.⁴⁹

During this three hour meeting, thirteen persons spoke for the project and twenty-six spoke in opposition while the bulk of an audience of three hundred reportedly booed and shouted against urban renewal. Champaign's Human Relations Commission supported the project with reservations, while the League of Women Voters spoke in favor of it.

Leading the opposition was Reverend Bishop who presented the City Council with a folder he claimed contained "850 no-votes." Representing the Homeowners Association, and claiming the support of the Champaign Chapter of the NAACP and the People's Poverty Board, he stated, we "stand together in opposition to urban renewal because of the placement of public housing in the project area and placement of the units outside the area in relatively large complexes, in several cases near railroad tracks."⁵⁰

Citizens charged the Council for actions based on economic reasons and the image of the City. Representing the Council for Community Integration, Robert Eubanks voiced support for the principles of urban renewal, but disagreement with many elements of the plan, claiming it was woefully deficient in social planning.

Mr. Gensemer again suggested that the location of new public housing sites both inside and outside the project area, would permit those who apply to select units in either location, thus encouraging desegregation of the project area.

Dec. 10, 1966

Complaints against the urban renewal project, charging segregation existed in public housing and that urban renewal would lead to further racial containment, were filed by Reverend Bishop with the U. S. Civil Rights Commission, under Title 6 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and with the American Civil Liberties Union. They found, however, no basis on which to act.

Jan. 21, 1967

As 1967 began, it was quite clear that the project was imminent. John Barr, Chairman of the CAC expressed regret over the project. If he had it to do over again, he said, the first project "would not be the one we're working on today." . . . We will "admit to charges of tokenism and everything else--but its a tough problem." . . . If the plans were changed or dropped now "the government would say, you people don't know what you're talking about.

You've been working around with that thing five years and still haven't gotten anything done."⁵¹

April-May, 1967

In April of that year the Councilmanic elections were held, and the Negro councilman from the North End defeated by a vote-splitting tactic. It would be up to this new Council to approve the loan which would finalize the urban renewal project. It did, by a four to three vote, on May 3rd.

May 21, 1967

With project implementation near, the topic for debate shifted. It now centered around the price to be paid for properties that were to be taken. Purchase prices offered by the City were determined from appraisals by two private companies, but were termed inadequate by the residents who were unable to purchase other homes for the price paid them for their project area homes. They were told, however, that the city was operating under the premise that "we should pay for what's there--the as-is condition, including all improvements on the property--but there's no need to take into account what amount is needed to replace it with similar property."⁵²

July 6, 1967

During the ensuing months, it was revealed that the scattered sites for public housing that was to serve for relocation of project area residents were no longer being considered. All sixty units were to be located outside the project area, but on one site near the Franklin Jr. High School. When the urban renewal director was asked whether this situation would meet the declared standard of ending segregation he replied, the "decision was made by the Champaign County Public Housing Authority . . . I can't answer whether one area is worse than two, because I don't know what would be meant by worse."⁵³ Nothing was done to alter the decision on location.

July 9, 1967

Shortly after this development was made known, Councilmen Seely Johnston, Robert Pope and Paul Somers revealed the prices that were to be offered for properties in the renewal area, even though the documents were of a confidential nature and not for public consumption. They justified their actions by stating it was their duty to reveal the inflated prices being payed for properties in the area.⁵⁴ Johnston, Pope and Somers were, however, the Councilmen who voted

against urban renewal and had earlier said that the people were not being adequately compensated for their property.⁵⁵

July 24, 1967

Property acquisition began on Monday, July 24, 1967, emphasizing the reality of the situation. If anyone doubted the city would carry out the project, his doubts were more than likely dispelled.

Dec. 6, 1967

A move was made before City Council early in December of 1967 that the program be dropped. Councilman Pope charged that the city was getting into deeper and deeper trouble. His motion, however was defeated. The Champaign County Public Housing Authority was requested at this time by the City Council to make the application to the federal government for public housing funds necessary to carry out development of the public housing to be located within the project area.

Jan. 16, 1968

On Tuesday, January 16, 1968, the home located at 918 N. Poplar Street was demolished, and with Renewal Director Gensemer turning the first spade of dirt, the renewal project entered the clearance phase.

II FORMULATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD ATTITUDES

Proposition: Those goals which permit the least flexibility in respect to choices among alternative means have the greatest influence in determining the direction of one's choice behavior.

Initial Determinants

When an urban renewal project is initially announced, it is often unclear to the neighborhood residents how the project will affect them. Their reactions are said to be based on "initial determinants"--their general attitude toward the urban renewal program and their opinion of the city's urban renewal department. These determinants of the neighborhood attitude are influenced by other factors such as the timing of the announcement, the coverage given by the news media, other neighborhood controversies, and the impact felt by the community of previous renewal projects.⁵⁶

This was true of the North End residents, who being unsure of the consequences of urban renewal, reacted in response to initial determinants. A level of interest developed throughout the community based upon two factors: an ongoing controversy, and the impact felt from other urban renewal projects.

For many years the Negro community had been upset by the segregationist practices of the local Public Housing Authority. The public housing projects it administered were completely segregated; two black, two white. Two lists were kept for applicants to the housing, and it was not being provided on a first-come, first-served basis. Instead, applicants were assigned to housing by race, no choice being given to the Negro in terms of location except that of preference between the two Negro projects. Few people felt that this practice would be corrected, and naturally opposed urban renewal because public housing was

proposed within the project. The widespread feeling among the North End residents was that this project would only increase the segregation which existed in the community.

If this were not enough to cause the Negro to be opposed to public housing, it was compounded by the resident's fear that high rise public housing such as they had seen in Chicago and elsewhere would be built in their neighborhood. The local examples of public housing, although not multi-story structures, were poorly designed and further alienated the residents, who feared that similar structures would be constructed in the community. Many felt there was no advantage to be gained through such a development.

One issue, then, that caused a level of interest in the neighborhood was the inclusion of public housing in the urban renewal area.

Closely related to this issue was the fear that home owners had for both the loss of their homes, which they felt they had worked for long and hard and being forced to then move into public housing. Although the residents were to be paid for their homes and property, many recognized that, due to their age, health, or economic status, they would not be able to finance another property. Even after being paid the fair market price for their homes, at least several thousand dollars additional would be needed to purchase another home. In addition to the mortgage payments they would be required to pay, which they were not presently doing, property taxes on the new home would be substantially higher. As a result, many persons envisioned the loss of their homes.

A combination of factors, including distaste, fear and general opposition to public housing, and an intense desire to retain the ownership of their homes, was so overwhelming that it was all but impossible for the residents to choose the common and overriding goal: prevent public housing from being constructed in the North End so that home ownership might be retained.

To the residents of the neighborhood the stakes, losing their homes and being forced into public housing, were so interrelated they were not able to perceive one goal alone. Choice of their goal, stop public housing, permitted very little flexibility in respect to choices among alternative ways for attainment, and therefore had the greatest influence

in determining the future decisions the residents were to make. Since in their minds public housing, urban renewal, and loss of home ownership were one in the same thing, the only means available to prevent public housing was opposition to urban renewal.

Being influenced by the initial determinants and that goal which they felt permitted the least flexibility among means of attainment (stop public housing), the direction of the residents' choice behavior was determined, and they decided to oppose urban renewal as the means to their end.

Other factors also caused the residents to oppose urban renewal. It has been suggested that many of the groups and individuals involved are alienated because of a belief that city officials concerned with urban renewal were corrupt and such projects were plots to benefit certain real estate interests. Calling for the participation of private developers who are expected to make a profit from the project and combined with the feeling that government officials do not consider any stakes other than their own, "it is but a short step to the presumption that the only reason for the proposal is the self-interest of the politicians or the renewal officials."⁵⁷

This was certainly the case in the North End, and further explains why the residents chose the goals they did. Many residents felt that their neighborhood was chosen for renewal to provide expansion space for the rapidly growing university. Being directly north of the university campus, the neighborhood offered an ideal location for university-oriented housing, if not actual institutional buildings. The campus had extended to the south almost as far as possible, and was being blocked by sheer distance and the extensive university farms. Although many faculty and staff members live in areas bounding the campus, the rapid growth of the university has caused others to locate to the southwest of the city, several miles from campus. Whether or not the city intended to turn the North End over to university-oriented housing, which would be almost totally white, can not be determined. However, the residents of the North End felt this was highly probable, and it would be to the city's advantage. Such action would rebuild the slum area, reduce the costly water and sewer expansion to the southwest; raise the tax revenue; and retain higher educated and wealthier people in the inner-city area near the business district. When redeveloped, the location would be highly desirable, located near the university, the central business district and major highways.

When it was mentioned by the city planners and others that this plan would bring whites into the community, the suspicions of many people were ratified, and they interpreted this as an indication that the neighborhood would be taken away from the Negro. If this were not enough proof, it was widely known that the mayor during this time was a close friend of one of the city's largest slum landlords, whose practice it had been to convert one and two family homes into many-family units, as well as construct poor quality new homes. It was natural for some people to feel that there was a private profit to be made from this public project.

Rumors spread rapidly through the North End, and residents were quick to accept many of these, especially when they cast doubt upon the reputation of a public official. However, this is not a trait peculiar to a particular segment of the community. As individuals began to oppose the project and this began to be reported in the newspapers, the groups opposing renewal were encouraged. Reporting of opposition in the papers tends to lower the status of the program and encourages more opposition to it.⁵⁸

Stakes

After the proposed project has been announced, the different groups within the site begin to calculate what they will win or lose if the project is approved. They consider the kinds of stakes-- economic, political, and social--they have in the area and what effect urban renewal will have on these stakes. The calculation of gain or loss is the most important determinant of their attitude toward the project.⁵⁹

Views of urban renewal will vary according to class; those persons higher on the economic scale thinking in terms of long-range benefits and those in the lower economic brackets seeing urban renewal as a threat and viewing only the short-term costs. Although all the stakes considered by residents cannot be presented, several major types are indicated, and these stakes then related to the persons involved in the controversy.

In terms of economic losses, the small businessman generally will lose more than others during urban renewal, because he cannot afford to be out of business even for a

short time, due to his small margin of profit. The North End contained few businesses, and this point never became an issue.

Institutions also have economic stakes in renewal, having investments in buildings and land. In the case of churches, the economic stakes are additionally in terms of members. If the institution is not part of a larger body, it may face financial problems in relocating. This was true in the North End, most Negro churches being independent.

Homeowners probably have the greatest stake in the renewal area, though, valuing their homes in both economic and emotional terms as illustrated previously.

It is quite widely recognized that many people will be influenced by the political effects of an urban renewal project. These effects are not limited to partisan political leaders, but to ethnic and institutional leaders as well.

The mayor obviously had to determine the political consequences of the project where he proposed it, but as the project developed, the Negro Councilman from this area also had to consider the consequences of his support for the project. He not only had to consider the desires of his constituents, but the desires of the Republican machine and the consequences this project would have upon the next election.

Since the neighborhood was completely Negro, the usual characterization of the ethnic leader did not exist; however, the institutional leaders in this case were faced with similar problems. Their congregations were based upon the particular composition of the community, and they had stakes in keeping the existing community intact. Because the churches were somewhat autonomous, a shift in population could leave them memberless if the new residents of the area were of a different faith or more particularly, a different race. Due also to the fact that at the outset of the project the ministers were the leaders in the community, their stakes in the community were compounded. A shift in population could cost them their following.

To a degree there were social stakes involved, since the neighbors did maintain contact with each other, and the bulk of the residents' friends lived within the neighborhood.

The common economic status of the neighborhood helped to reinforce the social cohesiveness of the area, but the emotional stakes were probably the greater determinants of action.

How these stakes influenced goal-choices can be best seen through examination of the participants in the controversy.

Actors

Once the plans for the proposed project were made more specific and the neighborhood groups had time to grasp the details of the proposal, the stakes of each group became the most important determinants of group attitude.⁶⁰ It is hypothesized that the particular goals chosen by both individuals and groups were done so because of what were felt to be high stakes and limited resources. As a result, the goals chosen were personal and short-range.

This proposition can be substantiated by viewing the groups that were formed, the stakes involved, and upon what lines they organized.

Neighborhood Groups

Neighborhood groups are included in renewal decision-making, although in a very indirect way, because it is a requirement of urban renewal legislation. Such participation is often criticized by those who claim this delays projects, wastes money and is ineffective. Whether or not this is true, neighborhood groups played significant roles in this renewal project.

These groups are usually criticized for being undemocratic, since few members participate actively; lacking political skills and an interest and concern for the group among the members; and an absence of significant bases for disagreement within the group. This lack of disagreement, although it indicates groups may be undemocratic, does show they are representative, and the stakes of the group leaders in the renewal controversy tend to be the same as the stakes of the people they represent. The ethnic, economic, political and social characteristics of the group leaders are said to be quite similar to the characteristics of their followers.⁶¹

Generally it has been the lower-class site residents who are most opposed to urban renewal. Opposition from these people is rational, because the program was not really designed for their benefit, even though it is argued that although the supply of low-income housing is lowered, the poor are benefited through relocation into standard housing.⁶² In the North End, the lower-class were the majority.

The major neighborhood group to oppose the project was the Northeast Neighborhood Homeowners Association, led by Reverend A. W. Bishop. Although a great portion of the members of the Homeowners Association were members of Reverend Bishop's congregation, the two activities were supposedly considered separate. Although Reverend Bishop attacked urban renewal in his preaching, it can be said that the group organized on other than a religious basis. Evidence suggests that "organized opposition is more likely to appear in areas with a high percentage of home ownership, a predominance of one- or two-family houses, and a relatively stable population."⁶³ This characterized the membership of the Homeowners Association.

The neighborhood, having above 70% owner-occupied homes, organized mainly upon an economic basis. The factor which made the group even more coherent was the high median age of the homeowners, this being about fifty years of age. Not only were the people elderly, but a high percentage were unemployed, unable to work, indigent, or on fixed incomes. Their immediate concern was loss of their largest asset: their homes. Due to their very limited resources in monetary terms particularly, but also in ability to understand or oppose the city's policies, the people chose short-range personal goals. Their particular goal, save their homes and avoid being placed into public housing, could be gained, they understood, only by defeating urban renewal. As mentioned, they could not understand how public housing could be defeated without defeating urban renewal. The two appeared as one and the same thing, not mutually exclusive elements.

By choosing what might be called a negative goal and not presenting a positive alternative, they were never very successful in their opposition. Due also to limited resources, they were unable to engage a professional planner, architect or lawyer to argue their position.

The position taken by this group can be better understood by viewing its leader, Reverend Bishop, who was strongly opposed to urban renewal due to an unfortunate experience his brother had under similar circumstances in St. Louis, Missouri. Since he had seen urban renewal totally clear an area and dislocate residents, Reverend Bishop developed an intense fear of urban renewal consequences.

Although part of his opposition to the project might have been based on personal reasons, the loss of his congregation through urban renewal dislocation and the development of a playground adjacent to his church, most respondents believed his motives to be based on a genuine desire to prevent homes from being taken away from the elderly or others and having them placed in public housing or burdened with a debt for the balance of their lives. He claimed that urban renewal was a sin, and people should not trust the urban renewal department.

Not as large, vocal or sustaining, there were other neighborhood groups that opposed urban renewal. Most of these groups, however, were not totally opposed to this, and in fact, their positions could at times be stated as supporting with reservations. One of these groups, the Champaign-Urbana Improvement Association was originally opposed to the project, but eventually changed its position. Although they did not unanimously agree that urban renewal was the best thing for the North End, based on what they had seen elsewhere, they felt that something needed to be done. Therefore, they supported the project with reservations, and suggested changes that they hoped would be made. They took this position because they were basically for improvement of the neighborhood. Their exact position can be found under January 24, 1966 of the case history.

Another neighborhood based group opposing the project was the Neighborhood Committee of the CAC. It opposed both segregation of public housing and its proposed location along the railroad track, suggesting the establishment of a City Housing Authority. Since this group was to assist the main body of the CAC, its membership naturally contained people basically favoring urban renewal. Therefore, its position of reluctant support is easily understood.

The final group that was basically neighborhood-based and opposed to urban renewal was the North End Pastors Association and its affiliates. Quite easily understood,

they opposed segregation and feared that urban renewal would reinforce the pattern which existed.

For the duration of the planning period, only one group from within the neighborhood appeared to support urban renewal and public housing, and it represented but fifteen families from the project area. Led by Louis Nash, the group called the controversy over public housing irrelevant to the main issue: better housing for everyone. They claimed that the opposition to the renewal plan had been organized by non-residents or those already living in fine homes.

Non-Neighborhood Groups

Other groups associated with the neighborhood and opposing some aspect of the project were those such as the Urban League, which basically opposed the construction of another public housing project in northeast Champaign. They claimed it would only insure more segregation. The Urban League's position was not surprising since it had opposed for some time the existing segregated public housing.

Supporters of open-occupancy, who deplored the lack of a freedom of residence law and questioned where people were to be relocated, joined the opposition. Among these groups were the university and local chapters of the NAACP, opposed to the racial containment which the project might cause.

One of the first groups to raise the question whether or not the project would reinforce the segregated residential pattern of the city was the Council for Community Integration. The group immediately recognized that many rumors were circulating through the community and asked the City Council for a statement of its intent regarding open occupancy policy. Although the group remained somewhat active throughout the program, its opposition to renewal was lessened when it felt that relocation and public housing was to be on an open occupancy basis.

This desire was also voiced by the Champaign Human Relations Commission, and upon seeing that the people were to be relocated on an open occupancy basis, it appeared before City Council to urge the beginning of the urban renewal program.

Among those opposing public housing and segregation was the Friends Congregation. Having members on the Neighborhood Committee as did the CCI, they dropped their opposition when they felt the relocation and segregation problems were to be handled fairly.

Several outside groups sporadically attacked the project. The Central Illinois friends of SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee) urged, in January of 1966, that the residents be given a greater opportunity to participate in the formulation of the final renewal plan, claiming the residents had not been contacted in any meaningful way. They did not press their case, however,

University students occasionally came to the neighborhood, attempting to organize the residents against urban renewal.

Few people listened, and eventually the students returned to the campus. During the summer of 1966, several students claiming the support of the Students for a Democratic Society moved into the neighborhood, occupying a Washington Street home. Led by a person from Michigan, the group went from house to house through the GNRP, trying to raise urban renewal as an issue, and holding meetings on how to protect people from urban renewal. Although some unrest resulted, the urban renewal department managed to reassure the people that they would be paid for their homes and adequately rehoused. It was, in fact, too late in the renewal process for this type of tactic to work, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation squelched the leader's activities when they arrested him on a non-associated offense.

Protest was directed at the project by the Twin City Federation of Labor who refused to allow its members to participate on the CAC since they felt the answer was not to be found in urban renewal, but in raising the wage and salary levels of the low income families, in order that they might purchase with their own money housing adequate for their needs. However, no action was taken by them.

Being against the use of federal funds to carry out urban renewal, the Chamber of Commerce suggested that local developers build economical housing in the area. Their actions remained vocal and eventually their attention shifted to a Central Business District-related problem, a fight over a one-way street system.

Although a great deal of opposition was apparent, there were few organized groups who supported the project. Other than the CAC, which was established by the City, the League of Women Voters was the only organization fully supporting urban renewal. Both the CAC and the League, though periodically voiced opposition or concern for particular elements, but their firm support did not lessen. League interest as noted, can be traced back to the 1930's.

Goals

Reviewing the positions of the various groups opposing urban renewal, it can be seen that they had an advantage in that people can be more easily mobilized to oppose a proposal than to support it. "The gains that will be brought about if the renewal project is built are often not as vivid as the potential inconveniences or penalties that may occur. The proposal introduces an element of uncertainty into the future of the neighborhood, and people are more readily organized to fight uncertainty than to embrace it."⁶⁴ The goals pursued by neighborhood groups usually tend to be status quo goals, and it is maintained that neighborhoods will almost always oppose urban renewal.⁶⁵

This was certainly true of Reverend Bishop's organization which organized around status quo goals. Excluding his group, however, the opponents from the neighborhood were not totally opposed to urban renewal, but specific aspects of the program. Even Reverend Bishop cannot be characterized as totally against urban renewal, for he was in favor of improvement of the living conditions in the North End.

Why the other opponents chose the goals they did is quite obvious. For most of the groups, goal-setting was merely the restating of their long-maintained positions. It can hardly be claimed that these groups opposed urban renewal for personal profit, other than that their organizational objectives would be fulfilled. What had appeared initially to be a constant turn-over in the groups who opposed the project was later discovered to be caused by groups dropping out of active opposition once their objectives had been fulfilled. This was true of the Council for Community Integration, the Urban League, the Friends, the NAACP, and the Champaign Human Relations Commission.

III MINORITY MOBILIZATION

Proposition: Minority mobilization is a multiplicative function of the strength of one's goals and the perceived probability of achieving these goals.

Mobilization is near zero when there is:

1. Low probability of success.
2. Complete acceptance of the system.
3. High probability of negative sanctions being applied.

Probability of Success

Access to Government

If the major concept of this proposition is correct, then the amount of action taken to defeat urban renewal would have been in proportion to the advantage to be gained from a favorable outcome and the likelihood of influencing the decision makers.

The advantages to be gained depend upon the stakes discussed earlier. The likelihood of influencing the decision makers depends upon the governmental actors, and the factors that determine "access."⁶⁸

Assuming that the goals of the various individuals and groups presented in the previous chapter were strong enough to provide a reason to mobilize individual or group resources against urban renewal, the determining factor would then be access, or the ability to place one's position before the decision makers and have serious consideration given to it. In this case it was the probability that a neighborhood opposition group could have its position seriously considered by the City Council.

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The various tactics that a neighborhood group might use to gain access to renewal administrators are considered at length in the next chapter. Here, it is enough to recognize that they are important, the main concern being the possibility of influencing any significant decision about urban renewal. Although most groups will use some type of tactic to get their wants known, the closer a group is to the power structure the fewer tactics that will be needed.

Generally neighborhood groups in themselves are not given much consideration by the administration because they do not represent either a broad base of support or opposition, and the fact that they are neighborhood groups makes them politically weak. Locally this is true for any neighborhood, but especially the Negro who has not until recently been able to use effectively his voting power. However, there are other factors that influenced the attitudes of local councilmen to the renewal program. Most important were the feelings of the councilman's constituency affected by urban renewal and the manner in which his decision might affect his political future. The tactics that can be used to cause politicians to become concerned, such as threats of rioting will be discussed later.

Of the councilmen, there was but one who was truly responsive to the feelings of the Negro community. This was Mr. Stratton, a Negro resident of the GNRP. However, Mr. Stratton had favored urban renewal for a long period of time, and felt that the majority of the people in the community supported urban renewal. The opponents, therefore, were unable to sway his opinion on renewal as he did not feel that his decision would affect his political future. Although in theory the Negro had access to other councilmen, in fact, he had none or very little.

There were other councilmen, however, who opposed urban renewal for personal reasons, ranging from the belief that urban renewal was an ineffective and slow process, to opposition to the use of federal funds or opposition because they held John Birch Society beliefs. Even racial prejudice played a part. These persons remained a minority on the Council, and it seems, were never approached by the Negro opponents as possible allies. Although there might have been other groups throughout the white community who opposed urban renewal, and would have been considered constituents of the "conservative" councilmen, they did not become known publicly. This denied the Negro the opportunity to acquire them as influential allies.

Although it would have been possible to vote into office a city council that would reject urban renewal when it faced the final vote, the opposition either did not recognize this possibility or was unable to assemble a large enough vote. An excellent opportunity was provided when the local Republican party coerced two Negro candidates to run against the incumbent Negro councilman who supported urban renewal. Although the Negro vote was split, the result being the election of no Negro councilman, a majority of pro-urban renewal candidates were elected. Mayor Dexter was also defeated at this election, but it is believed for a different reason.

Mayor Dexter, who proposed the project, was confident that it was the corrective measure to be applied to the North End, and although he assured the people he would not force upon them something they did not desire, many residents felt that repeal of the project was impossible, and that the planning decisions had been made long before the residents had been consulted.

Although the mayor established the Citizens Advisory Committee which is in theory intended to provide a significant channel of communication between the professional administrators and the general public as well as assist the planners in formulation of planning goals, it was viewed by many in a different light. Many residents, and even several members of the CAC were certain the mayor established the committee for the purpose of "pushing through" the urban renewal program and taking pressure off the City Council.

Some indication of this was embodied in the name selected for the advisory group required before federal funds are granted. Although the government sees this as a city-wide group, the mayor named it the Citizens Advisory Committee on Urban Renewal.

Whether or not this was actually the mayor's intention is less important than what the residents perceived, which was that the renewal program could neither be defeated or significantly modified. They based their belief on several factors stemming from contact with the mayor's first CAC. As its chairman, the mayor appointed a known lobbyist who he thought would be able to expedite the project through the regional urban renewal office. Mr. Hodges failed to do this, however. Many of the members of the CAC were sincere people though the group failed.

Others felt that the mayor viewed this program as a political entity, and it was rumored that he had offered fifty-dollar-a-day jobs to people he intended to use to perform the required inspection and survey work in the renewal area. This, of course, was not possible under urban renewal law. At this time some opposition groups appeared and demanded that they be placed upon the renewal committee. Mr. Dexter and Mr. Hodges obliged them, but since the only work to be done at this early stage was revising the city codes and ordinances, little progress was evident, and the opposition groups felt things were being done without their knowledge. To further alienate those residents who perceived this as a political maneuver, Mr. Hodges attended a neighborhood meeting of the CAC after drinking heavily. The people were angered and he was eventually forced to resign the position.

This series of events totally convinced some neighborhood people that there was a very low probability of having their goals prevail. Consequently they did not mobilize to oppose urban renewal.

When the second CAC was formed, this time by the City Council, its members were all highly respectable and sincere people. This may have increased some residents views of the probability of success, but many attitudes were permanently fixed.

Acceptance of System

The above, however, represents only one aspect of the situation. It has also been hypothesized that mobilization will be near zero when there is a complete acceptance of the system. This could hardly have been the case in the North End. Very few people were not highly disturbed by the existing system, but, in addition to those who mistrusted Mayor Dexter, there were Negroes who held him in high regard. It was to his advantage that he had lived in the North End up until the time he left college, for some people felt he understood the situation, and others felt he was their personal friend.

Outside of his role as mayor, Mr. Dexter represented a program that was helping the residents of the North End, being director of the local division of the State Vocational Rehabilitation Service. Through this program many of the people living in this area managed to find employment, and

felt that Mr. Dexter was sincerely interested in their problems, and placed a great deal of trust in him. In addition, Mr. Dexter is reported to have run an informal relocation program, finding low cost housing for many of the people of the North End.

To what extent these actions caused people in the North End to accept the system cannot be measured, but there certainly were those Negroes who trusted Mayor Dexter and to a degree accepted the system as it was being run. It can be said with some certainty that he understood these people, their needs, and was not afraid to speak with them.

Fear of Negative Sanctions

A final aspect of this proposition maintains that mobilization will be low when there is a fear that negative sanctions would be applied. There was no evidence to be found which would substantiate this position. One might assume that landlords, employers or a businessman's customers might apply negative sanctions upon an opponent, but this did not apparently happen. Most residents were homeowners, and when opposing the project a person could remain anonymous if he so desired.

Although the preceding explain to a degree the failure of the community to mobilize against urban renewal, it was not intended to be the total explanation.

Lack of Agreement among Leaders

It is held by several others who have studied similar topics, that the greatest constraint upon an effective mobilization of resources in the Negro community is the lack of agreement among leaders as to what they want. Although it was noted that the leaders were quite representative of their followers, they have incentives for becoming involved in the controversy in addition to the stakes of the group they represent. Among these incentives is publicity for themselves or their organization or a feeling that involvement in a controversy will maintain and strengthen their organization.⁶⁹ Leaders may feel that if they do not become involved, the members may lose interest in the organization and turn to another leader, or that the proposal will cause group members to leave the area, as mentioned might be the case with church leaders. The freedom

of the leaders to act according to their own desires varies according to the groups involved, and is typical of other cases.⁷⁰ Before this can be examined, it will be necessary to determine what makes a leader a leader.

Characteristics of a Leader

The difficulty in establishing just who is a leader of a community was mentioned to be one of the limitations imposed upon this study. Although who the leader is may be difficult to determine, the abilities that a person who is to be a leader must have are somewhat more obvious.⁷¹

The abilities of the leader who becomes involved in urban renewal may be altered somewhat since he must deal with government officials. Foremost among this list of qualities is a knowledge of the structure and basic procedures of the local government, including a recognition of the influential persons and groups. In addition, he must be able to speak publicly, recognize issues when they arise, and have contacts with other group leaders. To this list might also be added a charismatic quality. While these qualities generally apply to any leader, Negro leaders might also be characterized by the function they perform. The kinds of organizations they support and lead, the issues they support and their contribution to the community.

Wilson has described volunteer Negro civic leaders by three typologies which will be used to indicate in this instance the various leaders. We are concerned only with the volunteer leader at this point because the non-voluntary leader's function in civic life results from his formal position, while the lay leader, although his leadership may be conditioned by his formal position, is free to respond to issues as he desires. Wilson calls these voluntary leaders the prestige leaders, the token leaders and the organizer. By examining these leaders we can determine the probability of success in a renewal controversy.⁷²

The prominent Negro, characterized as the prestige leader, represent people who have attained high, for the Negro community, personal achievement, particularly in business or professional life. The most common characteristic of this leader is that they tend to avoid controversy. Although in the past they might have been active in race-related organizations, their current position confines their efforts to noncontroversial endeavors. The prestige leader

usually stays out of active politics, but there are exceptions, primarily among ministers. He is also often characterized as having the best contact with influential white leaders.

The token leader, most often selected by whites to "represent" the Negro community in civic activities and on public agencies where it is felt such representation is required, tends to have a much narrower contact with the white community. This Negro does not usually represent the most outspoken elements in the Negro community, nor is he a spokesman for those groups which are contending with the agency on a particular issue, since he represents the agency viewpoint. Thus the organizations which want to influence the public agency do not use him as a channel for such influence, feeling he is an "Uncle Tom." His moderate political style is undoubtedly the reason for his selection by the whites for this position.

The leader viewed by the bulk of Negroes as the true leader is the organizer, or the leader who raises issues and can create, direct, and sustain organizations for the attainment of civic goals. These are the people who lead and direct the action. He does, however, not necessarily form organizations, but may form an ad hoc group that can work outside the existing race-related organizations. He may attempt to goad other organizations into action or create his own. Their main contribution is time and energy where other leaders may contribute prestige or money. He may, in fact, lack the status or income he desires and feel civic involvement will eventually increase his monetary position.

North End Leaders

When the various community leaders are viewed in relation to the above categories, it is easier to understand why they could not agree upon one goal, and why they were not successful in relation to the city.

Perhaps foremost among the factors that will encourage a particular leader to oppose urban renewal is his perception of the group's strength, and many Negro leaders feel that any opposition to renewal is pointless.⁷³ Although the incentives for involvement may have been high, their low perception of success kept them from agreeing with other leaders on the approach to be taken or the goals they should

organize around: This can be seen quite clearly in the North End, the differences of opinion being extremely wide. On the one hand, there were leaders such as Reverend Bishop, who were almost totally opposed to urban renewal, and chose the goal of complete opposition to the project. On the other hand, there were ministers like Reverend Rowan who supported, almost completely, the renewal project, and became involved in the CAC. Between these extremes, there were several leaders who supported or opposed the project in varying degrees.

At no time during the controversy did the leaders come to a common agreement of their goals. This was due to several factors, not the least being the desire to maintain their congregations and position as leaders, and even a desire to be the main Negro leader. There is little doubt that the leadership in the North End was vested in the ministers during the early stages of the project. This was recognized and commented upon by almost all respondents, and it was the ministers who became involved in the major issues and represented the community.

One minister in particular, Reverend Graves, was considered at this time to be the spokesman for this entire community. He was the president of the Champaign-Urbana Improvement Association as well as president of the Ministerial Alliance. The combination of these activities, it is felt, placed him in the position of community leader. He is reported to have been a dynamic speaker and an extremely intelligent and tactful person. Perhaps what made him even more acceptable to the community was that he made decisions by gaining a consensus from other groups, rather than organizing a following of his own. He was from this view a civic organizer.

His position as minister placed him in a relatively high status, and provided him with the opportunity to concentrate his time upon those activities which permitted him to become the civic leader. Although a moderate, he did not ignore the more militant elements in the community. Since this element was limited in number at that time, he was not confronted with a militant-moderate alienation conflict. Although nationally the civic position of the Negro minister was declining, it had not yet begun locally. In fact, the local community exhibits nearly a ten-year time lag on all race-related matters it seems. Whether or not Reverend Graves would have been able to maintain his position in the community during the renewal controversy cannot be said.

Although involved in the early stages of the renewal project, he maintained a neutral position, but kept continually informed on developments. Feeling that improvement was needed in the North End, but not positive that urban renewal was the answer, he encouraged the development of alternatives to direct opposition, feeling that Reverend Bishop acted foolishly, but was assigned to another parish before the renewal controversy had proceeded very far. After he left the community, there were many aspirants to his position as leader, but the battle for leader so fragmented the community, no one person has since been able to assemble a majority of community support. This resulted in the ministers choosing renewal-related goals that would be to their advantage, and not development of a single or community position. A review of the case study shows that, although there was a general dislike for the public housing portion of the renewal project, those ministers who opposed the project were not consistent as to the manner in which it was protested, or in alternatives to its development. This is at least partially explained by the previous discussion concerning the various reasons ministers began to oppose the project, and the groups they represented.

Since the main opposition to the project came from the several ministers involved, they are the central topic. However, there were several other persons who were community leaders, to a degree at least, and they should be mentioned. Among these was Reverend Ramsey, head of the local NAACP. Felt by local Negroes to be ineffective, and showing very little visible results in terms of bringing about open occupancy and increasing job opportunities for Negroes, the NAACP was never supported by the Black community. Though not a token leader, Reverend Ramsey was viewed by his constituents as being little attuned to the Negro plight. The fact that he was moderate in style and of relatively high economic rank led him to be viewed apprehensively by some residents. It has been said that, to some degree, the grass roots Negro had difficulty in identifying with the NAACP movement and goals which seemed remote. What its goals were, however, is hard to determine.

Robert Bowles, director of the Urban League, was not able to recruit a following. In fact, the Urban League had greater support among the whites than the Negroes. His situation was not greatly different than that of the NAACP, for both were felt to be artificial organizations, not in contact with the people, typical of this type organization.⁷⁴

Before concluding that community leadership was vested in the ministry, mention must be made of a community prestige leader, Richard Edwards. To many, especially those over thirty-five, he is considered the community leader due to his education and economic situation. Many residents feel that he has, for quite some time, exercised control over many things which happen in the community, if not directly, through an allegiance of close associates. Some claim that even today the militants are kept under control by him through his followers, and the militants themselves do not realize that their advisors are part of this "machine." This, of course, may be a fable that people would like to believe. Others feel that Mr. Edwards is a has been and was the leader when the Negro was not asking for much.

It should be noted, however, that anyone in the North End who is educated, or has a business, profession or higher economic position is considered a leader or an influential, while at the same time being mistrusted for these same characteristics. Ex-Councilman Stratton is still another variation on this theme, being educated; a professional and having somewhat of a following. He is also viewed as being outspoken but conservative and rational; and having a position of prestige in the community. Although generally highly respected, he has been labeled by some as an "Uncle Tom." Other than during his position on the City Council he cannot be considered as speaking for the community, and even then he was certainly not the community leader.

Because the community felt many of the above people were subject to the Man, the Negro preacher's position as leader was strengthened. The Negro preacher is not dependent upon the establishment; he is not required to punch a time clock, or work for a person who may resent his position as leader. He is free to say what he wants, feeling he is responsible only to God, his people and his race, it has been said.

Organizational Problems

A secondary explanation for the lack of agreement among leaders was due to insufficient information from the city concerning the extent and character of the proposed redevelopment. It was not clear to the leaders, as well as the masses, what the renewal project encompassed. Throughout

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the planning stages the question was asked of the City which areas were to be cleared and what was to be left standing. Using a standard planning answer, the City maintained until the very end that it was too early to know.

This lack of information, or more accurately the inability to comprehend what information was available, hampered the leaders and the groups. Characteristic of most renewal efforts, the residents of the North End were unable to understand the process involved in the acquisition of property and plan preparation and review.⁷⁵ Not until the very end, did some of the leaders, as well as residents, feel the project would materialize.

Examination of the groups that organized to fight the project illustrates the difficulty leaders experienced in preparing to battle the project. The people of the North End were unaccustomed to organizational activity, and even those groups in which members had higher stakes in the project had difficulty in developing a common stand. At times only the threat of a common enemy kept them in existence.

Clarence Davies, in his study of neighborhood groups in urban renewal locates neighborhood interest groups along a continuum based on their cohesiveness. He places churches at the low-cohesion end, and builds up through political clubs, business groups and property-owners' groups to ad hoc groups, which he claims are the most cohesive because the attitudes of the members are centered upon the renewal question.⁷⁶

Viewing the North End in this context, it can be seen that the most vocal opposition came from not what could be called truly an ad hoc group, but a combination homeowners-church group. Following Davies' continuum, and assuming that success is related to the ability to mobilize against one's opponent and mobilization or the degree of involvement is a function of cohesiveness, a church group will be less likely to succeed. This, he claims is due to the fact that religious affiliation cuts across economic and political lines, and individuals rarely have religious stakes in renewal proposals, the organizational basis of a church not being related to the stakes of the individual members in urban renewal. Viewed as a property owners group which are felt to be more cohesive, the economic stakes of the members in the renewal proposal coincide with the shared interests that led them to organize as a group. These groups tend to be divided by a renewal proposal which proposes

demolition of the homes or businesses of some members and not others.⁷⁷

Urban renewal, being viewed as an outside conflict, may strengthen the internal cohesion of the neighborhood, and increase centralization through development of an ad hoc group. A community-wide ad hoc group is probably unattainable, but other than Reverend Bishop's group, there developed no ad hoc opposition. When it is recognized that the growing importance of voluntary associations and the centralization of political power have set a standard for Negro civic action,⁷⁸ the failure for the North End to attempt to adapt to the bipolar world of the white civic leader is significant.

This might be explained by several factors common to minority mobilization already covered, such as the probability of influencing a decision, the advantage to be gained by a successful outcome of mobilization, the availability of a leader, and the failure of leaders and residents to agree on a goal, but there seem to be additional reasons why the North End did not organize, and the group members did not respond to their leaders.

To some extent this situation can be explained by the presence of existing groups who participated in this type controversy who desired to be represented in the project area in one way or another. Such groups are common to many similar situations.⁷⁹

Even groups which are established to assist the residents may have adverse effects. They may draw neighborhood leaders to them who desire to work for the betterment of the community, but because the group is suspect, the neighborhood leader is mistrusted by his constituents, the result being that the group is ineffective. On the other hand, the appearance of such a group will cause some people to believe their efforts are not needed because the group will do what is needed to accomplish their desires.

Foremost among these groups must be placed the city renewal agency itself who wants a group in the area which will present its views, in order that they will be more acceptable to the neighborhood. For this purpose, the City established the CAC. Such a group is required to exist if a city is to enter into urban renewal to act as an intermediary between the city and residents. This group was intended to bring about citizen participation but it never

developed a program that managed to do this. Although the group expressed concern over the project, and some of its members were neighborhood residents, it did not gain active neighborhood support.

One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that the group, not only being formed by the city, was led by an outsider. In other cases, when the civic leader lived outside the area, even though he might be strongly sympathetic, the residents were aware that he was not of their class, ethnic background, or culture, nor was he at ease with the people.⁸⁰ This was true of the CAC chairmen, and many of the active members, who, although they did have leadership ability, were not of the ethnic or cultural background of the North End. Thus, they could not attract neighborhood-wide support, even though they may have shared the views of the project area residents. This, however, was related to the basic failure of the neighborhood to organize in its own behalf.

When the Neighborhood Committee of the CAC was established in an attempt to create closer contact between the CAC and the neighborhood, the problem of low attendance persisted. Had the community not trusted the chairman of the Neighborhood Committee, who was at all times a neighborhood resident selected for a limited time, they could have forced him from office and installed their own leader who they were willing to follow. Perhaps this did not occur because the people were not accustomed to organizational activity and the feeling of a low probability of success.

Conceptual Difficulty

The answer to this question, in fact, may not be so glamorous, and be explained by the failure of residents to be alarmed over the proposed urban renewal program. Very few people in the North End were aware that any type project was being considered for their neighborhood in the early planning stages of the program, and even after the program was publicly announced, few people felt threatened enough to make any response at all. This is easily understood since the City had neglected this area up until this project, and earlier promises of action had not materialized. The people, although opposed to what had been proposed, did not respond. This was also the case of the Boston West End:

Perhaps because most people were opposed to the redevelopment, they could not quite believe that it would happen. Over the years, they began to realize that the redevelopment plans were in earnest, but they were--and remained--skeptical that the plans would ever be implemented.

In both cases there were several reasons for the skepticism.

First, they had considerable difficulty in understanding the complicated parade of preliminary and final approvals, or the tortuous process by which the plans move back and forth between the . . . City Council, the Mayor, . . . the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency. Instead of realizing that each approval was one step in a tested and finite administrative procedure, the West Enders saw it as merely another decision in a seemingly purposeless, erratic, and infinite series. Thus, when the federal housing agency did give its final approval. . . most did not understand this was the last step in the process. They recalled that the same agency had approved it several times before, without any visible result. Thus, they felt certain there would be more meetings, and more decision, and that twenty-five years later, . . . would still be there.⁸¹

The failure of the residents to fully understand the developments cannot be placed entirely upon lack of information, because the proposal was given extensive coverage in the local press, and even on television, but upon the distorted information they received through rumors. Several residents had experienced urban renewal elsewhere and related their experiences to their neighbors, who for the most part, had no prior experience with urban renewal. The fact that this project was to be the City's first added to the fears and skepticism of the neighborhood.

It was mentioned earlier, that it was being rumored that there were political and other payoffs associated with this project; that certain private as well as public individuals were to personally gain from the project; and that the threat of urban renewal was an attempt to make people move from the area so that the property could be acquired

for University-related use at the lowest possible cost. This, of course, caused a distrust of the renewal program.

With the rumors of disaster ran a counter current of hope. The younger people of the community it seems, were not opposed to the idea of urban renewal. Although not highly influential with the balance of the community, they would have nonetheless been the group which would have openly protested the renewal program had they been opposed. Why they were unopposed has been suggested to relate to several factors.

This group had managed, through school and by increased mobility, to come more in contact with the balance of the local population and recognize the vast gulf which existed between the two in terms of living conditions. Those young persons who desired to entertain their friends in their own home, but were living in slum conditions, felt that urban renewal offered a chance to move into a better home. Although they recognized that this might have meant that their families would no longer be property owners, the impact upon them was not as intense as that upon their parents and other older residents.

As well as not having a financial stake in the family home, their emotional stakes in the home were less. It did not signify to them the triumph and sense of accomplishment that it did to their parents, for their frame of reference was much broader, and they recognized in many cases the inflated value of the home.

The absence of a community leader played a significant part in the failure of the community to organize to oppose renewal, but it also had its impact upon the young. This segment of the population did no longer accept unconditionally the leadership of the ministers, and were not responsive to their calls to defeat urban renewal. Although the young had not developed a leader of their own outside of the traditional gang leaders, they were not to be led by any of those people who aspired for community leader.

This cannot be held as the primary reason that the community did not mobilize to oppose renewal, but it does offer part of the explanation. When one recognizes that there was no direct action protest measures taken by the North End, the absence of the young people from the opposition becomes more significant.

Another possible explanation for the lack of concern is related to the length of time over which the project spans. Koplan, studying urban renewal in Newark suggests that crisis groups which form to oppose renewal lose their vitality after a first setback. Due to a scarcity of resources and because they are not regular participants, they do not have an opportunity to build stable relations with other participants, and by intervening in response to public announcements means that the group acts only after the major commitments to support the project have been made. The group's strategy must then be to press for a cancelation of these commitments.⁸² This was certainly the case in the North End, and will be discussed at some length later. It does contain implications for an explanation of the failure of minority groups to mobilize.

Availability of Resources

Other studies of this type have suggested a proposition concerning community resources. To this point it has been assumed that minority mobilization was possible because the community had resources, although limited, with which they could achieve their goals. These resources would include money, property, prestige, authority, and natural and super-natural resources, physical strength and the ability to bear arms, voting rights, and various rights achieved by formal education, apprenticeship, or membership in certain organizations.⁸³ It is hypothesized, however, that the power to mobilize resources for a particular goal depends upon the availability of resources for achieving other goals.

When the history of the Negro in Champaign is viewed in relation to achievements in civil rights, there are few successes to be noted. Because attempts to achieve a variety of goals had failed during the past, and were failing while the urban renewal program was being developed, it might be assumed that the local Negro possessed very few or no resources. Since he apparently did not have the necessary resources for achieving open housing, better employment and educational opportunities, this would explain why he was not able to mobilize against urban renewal. Such a hypothesis is not easily proven, but since the Negro had failed to achieve the other goals he had established, very likely he lacked resources. Many of these deficiencies have been mentioned in the preceding pages: the poor access to government decision-makers, the failure of a true leader to emerge, the failure to vote effectively, and a low economic position.

Why the community lacked these resources is not clear however.

Minority Size

It has been suggested that both the possession of resources and minority mobilization is a factor of the size of the minority. Small Negro communities simply do not have the necessary resources that come with large numbers for supporting a vigorous civic life,⁸⁴ and minority mobilization is likely to be greatest whenever the minority is intermediate in size, being neither too small to exert any influence at all nor so large as to constitute a major threat.⁸⁵ The latter proposition suggests a relationship with an earlier one which held that minority mobilization was a function of the strength of one's goals and the perceived probability of success versus the probability of the application of negative sanctions.

Numerical size is important because it reduces the resources of the Negro for civic action, making it less likely that ambitious Negroes will be content to build a career within the Negro community. Locally, this has proven true. Although there are several prosperous Negro businesses located on the fringes of the Negro community, the local Negro must look elsewhere for career successes. In sheer numbers the local Negro community can support only a limited number of businesses.

In a larger community there would be the likelihood that there would be more Negroes with a higher education and more Negroes with leadership capabilities; the mere presence of these persons may in turn encourage others to imitate their actions and become leaders. Numbers themselves are not usually considered resources. In some cases, the total available resource will be roughly proportional to numbers, as in the case of the businessman relying on the community for patronage, the total resources being equal to the population times the median income. Political resources may be a direct function of numbers, provided all groups are entitled to vote in proportion to their numbers.

However, under some conditions, numbers may be a handicap. Where the average resource decreases rapidly with increasing numbers, the total available resources may actually decrease as numbers increase.

The white community is also less likely to regard Negroes as a threat when they are few in number, and consequently more liberal legislation laws would be passed, not because they were won by Negroes, but because they are "good politics." Open occupancy laws, and other anti-discriminatory measures would satisfy the demands of other liberal groups and represent only a small threat to whites who believe there only a few Negroes who will take advantage of these opportunities. These laws also are said to reduce the motivation among would-be Negro leaders for further civic action.⁸⁶

If this were the situation locally, it seems there would have been open-occupancy laws passed prior to 1968. This, of course, suggests that in this case, the proportion of Blacks to whites is the significant measure. This question becomes more relevant when voting behavior is examined, for should we view the relative power of the black and white vote in terms of difference in voting or the ratio of the two powers? Although in determination of voting outcome, there is little problem, when attempting to assess minority gains does one measure difference or ratio?

Hubert Blalock has shown that what may be a loss under a difference measure may be a gain under a ratio measure.⁸⁷

These same measures, when applied to the local situation suggest that the Negro community, being small in numbers, lacked many of the resources necessary for mobilization. However, in proportion to total community, the Negro population presented a major threat, causing increased opposition from those whites who desired to maintain the status quo.

The most pertinent example of this situation pertains to the Negro voting power. Due to voting at large, the local Negro community, without outside support cannot elect to council a person of their choice. The Negro, even if voting as a bloc, could barely accumulate the needed votes to assure a Negro win. Examination of past election returns clearly shows that Councilman Stratton could not be elected without the full support of the Negro community plus a substantial white vote.

By 1967, the local Negro community had voiced opposition to local discrimination, and had begun to press for their civil rights. Attempting to stem the tide, the local Republican machine defeated Councilman Stratton by coercing two other Negroes to run for Council. Although only one

of the contenders opposed Mr. Stratton in the final election, the vote, both Negro and white was effectively split, neither candidate being elected. The actual reason for the defeat of Councilman Stratton may be contended, but this instance illustrates the lack of Negro resources because of numerical size and the existence of the Negro threat resulting from a power ratio, definitely limits available resources for attaining general wants. The lack of these resources thus prevented mobilization against urban renewal.

To this point it has been assumed that minority mobilization is desirable since through mobilization the minority is likely to be rewarded with increased gains. These gains are then likely to lead to increases in perceived probability of success for future mobilization, thus a cumulative process is set in motion which would accelerate minority mobilization and reduce discrimination. However, if minority mobilization causes an increase in dominant-group mobilization the result might be a reduction in minority mobilization and a return to stable equilibrium at a new level of discrimination or a further increase in minority mobilization leading to overt conflict. Conflict is more likely when the minority is powerful enough to hope for dominance or when existing negative sanctions are so great that further increases are perceived to be unlikely.⁸⁸

IV STRATEGIES

Proposition: The resources and realistic alternatives of the subordinate party were so few, and the alternatives available to the dominant party in terms of controlling the behavior of the subordinate party were so great, the Negro could do nothing to change the course of action.

In the two preceding chapters, the above proposition was suggested many times, and throughout the literature examined, this was suggested both directly and indirectly. Wilson views the Negro civic leader as standing on the periphery of power, unable, in our most critical issues, to influence markedly the course of public affairs. The Negroes themselves are far from the centers of influence, this distance giving a degree of logic to their views of the public interest, and the proper strategies for action. However, those whom they seek to influence are often powerless, that is, they have not the ability to establish binding public policy.⁸⁹

The problem of powerlessness cannot be fully understood unless it is seen in the light of the character of the ends being sought. For some ends--particularly ends related to housing and real estate--the Negro can do nothing to remedy his powerlessness. At best he can hope for a crisis which will compel others to act in an area where they have, until now, been afraid or unwilling to act.⁹⁰

It has been suggested that the Negro has difficulty acquiring power to act in this area, basically because the power to act does not exist anywhere, while it is also held that constraints exist and are enforced by the city on Negro action. In many areas these constraints are said not to have ever been tested by Negro action, that many obstacles exist merely because they have not been probed. In the North End

renewal project, the city might be viewed as the dominant party because it had a greater amount of resources and alternatives it might use to accomplish its goal. Whether or not the City's resources and the strategy it developed were of such magnitude that the residents were unable to change the course of action is examined by viewing the strategies used by the City and those used by the neighborhood. Although the controversy is then pictured as a conflict between city and neighborhood, which is not entirely the situation, the balance between alternative means of action can be evaluated.

When strategies and tactics are referred to, the impression of illicit maneuvers is often given. This discussion will consider all tactics used, both legitimate and otherwise.

City Strategies

Planning Phase

When entering a renewal program, the City holds the advantage because it is aware of the development, and the community is not. Before proceeding to any extent, however, the people must be told of the project and some semblance of citizen participation must develop to fulfill federal aid requirements. When to reveal that the City is contemplating action is one of the greatest tactical devices the City has to use. This device is not without its difficulties.

If the neighborhood group is not informed of the proposed plans until the process of gaining official approval is well advanced, the city government may be charged with trying to 'sneak something over' on the residents, and opposition will be aroused because of the suddenness of the announcement. On the other hand, if the residents are informed early in the process, there will be time for groups to calculate their stakes and for opponents of the project to mobilize. There will also eventually be charges of delay and outcries from owners and real estate men whose property has deteriorated since the project announcement.⁹¹

Some cities have followed the strategy of secrecy, giving the neighborhood as little information and advance notice as possible, even refusing to meet with them to discuss the project. The result is confusion among residents who desperately attempt to determine what is planned.

Although confusion resulted in the North End after announcement of the project, the City attempted to work with the site residents. By establishment of the CAC, the neighborhood would be able to voice its opinion on the proposal while it was in the planning stages, before a final commitment had been made to the federal government for project funds. It is quite generally agreed that the mayor was not prepared to accept a "bad report" from the CAC, its purpose being to implement a proposal already decided upon. Due to the problems mentioned regarding inability to attract residents to the CAC committees, and the skepticism of the people, the project had the same effect upon the community as it would have if it had been kept secret.

The long period of time involved in processing the renewal program should have been to the advantage of the opposition. Although the city felt that by providing information it would be able to create support for the program, the availability of both time and information is seen as a greater asset to opponents of renewal than to those who favor the program.⁹² If this case were to pattern others, the elongated time period should have cost the City its initial advantage of support, and permitted the opposition to gain in strength. Although this was the case, the opposition's gain in strength was not large enough, in the early project stages. It might be said that the City won this maneuver by default.

Planners have for some time recognized the value of "grass-roots" information, not necessarily to be used for shaping a plan to fit the community, but to test, qualify, and supplement the data already gathered from surveys and analyses. Most importantly, it has been used to place limits around the range of physical solutions to renewal problems, and when a change is proposed that is opposed to citizen recommendations, the knowledge introduces greater care into the decision-making process and provides ways for explaining the need for change in terms the residents would understand.⁹³

Such a strategy was never used by the City. It had experienced a high rate of turnover in planning directions

and, lacking an adequate staff, the planning department never came to recognize the needs or wants of the residents. The City also failed to act on a similar opportunity when it hired an outside consultant to prepare the renewal plan instead of delegating this responsibility to its own planning department or the CAC. Although this may have been technically unfeasible is not the issue. Any plan which the residents might have felt they helped create may have been more acceptable to the community. However, the types of objections raised to the plan stem from elements not directly associated with the design of the proposal. These were problems of dislocation, financing, open occupancy, and public housing. Viewed in this light, it does not seem likely, had the people prepared the plan, that it would have been better received. What it does suggest is that the consultant, or the City should have determined the community attitude before entering the design stages of the program. There are examples where widespread citizen participation produced equally widespread public acceptance of the plan.⁹⁴

To these several tactics could be added variations, but the basic strategies available to the city during the planning phase are limited, being principally timing, information releases or secrecy, and gaining support through citizen participation.

Execution

Once the project has passed through the original planning and design phase, and the plan has been agreed upon in principle by the decision makers, the tactics used by the city vary somewhat from those used during the planning stages. The city continues to hold public meetings at which it hopes to develop citizen support; the CAC and others publicize the project and try to gain support for the plan through publishing information pamphlets and sponsoring contests related to urban renewal, but it is now in the position to offer concessions to the opponents. By this time it is clear that the project will materialize, so the city has an advantageous position from which to trade concessions for support.

Due to the intense opposition to the inclusion of public housing within the renewal area, the city was able to manipulate the controversy to its advantage while appearing to concede to the neighborhood's desires. Working on the

premise that the renewal plan was needed, the city was hard pressed to finance the project, even though three-fourths of the cost of acquisition and clearance of the site would be provided by the federal government, and the rebuilding was to be done by private developers. Project money was to be raised through an increase in the utility tax, but part of the financing would be in terms of a "credit" for the public housing. This meant that if public housing were to be built within the project area, it would be considered as a needed improvement, and under current urban renewal practices, the city would be permitted to subtract a portion of the cost of this improvement from their share of the total project cost. This meant that the city would be able to reduce the amount of project cost to be paid through the increased utility tax by \$106,420. Without this credit, the city claimed it would not be able to finance the project.

Over time, the original sixty units of public housing scheduled to be developed in the project was raised to one-hundred and twenty. As a concession to those who wanted all the public housing located outside the project area on scattered sites, the city agreed to locate half of it according to their desires. Thus the city managed to lessen the opposition to those forces who wanted public housing on scattered sites by granting their desires. By a maneuver of the County Housing Authority, the units were later placed on one parcel.

Several other smaller concessions were made. Site and park boundaries were varied, a buffer zone was placed along the railroad, a small park proposed in the higher density area. The density of this area was also reduced as a concession.

Of these concessions, there were none that significantly altered the original concept of the plan.

Above and beyond these strategies, the city could exercise the power of eminent domain which would permit the city to take land for a public purpose when the owner does not want to sell. Condemnation of the property is instituted in the courts which then establish a fair price based upon testimony from witnesses representing the owner, the community, and impartial appraisers. The owner is assured of a fair price for his home, but there is no way, once the project is given final approval, that the owner can prevent his home from being taken.

It is significant to note that the action that might be taken to counter the city's strategies must develop early in the renewal process. This depends to a great extent upon the ability of the community to mobilize its resources as mentioned in the previous chapter. If viewed broadly, it may be said that one strategy the city might use to satisfy its goal would be to restrict the Negroes' resources and his ability to mobilize them. Although this may not be done specifically to increase the chance of success of a renewal project, it obviously played an important part in the local renewal program. Within this so-called strategy could be placed those actions by interest groups favoring urban renewal for personal or political gain. Such strategies are widely recognized and hardly need to be mentioned.

Neighborhood Strategies

Those strategies which might be developed by neighborhood groups are to an extent the converse of those available to the city. Again, timing plays an important factor, but the neighborhood is dependent upon the city's announcement of the program or discovery of the proposal before public announcement. It appears as if neighborhood groups will be most successful in its opposition at the initial states of development, before the city has made commitments. But as seen, low-income, low-education groups do not respond until concrete attempts at displacement are made.⁹⁵ If site-resident opposition is to be effective, it must occur during the projects earliest stages, and even before public announcement.

For the Negro to utilize the strategy of early opposition, he must be available to obtain "inside" information. Locally, this opportunity is nonexistent, there being no representative of the community in a decision-making position. To mount this strategy, the Negro must be able to use the information he acquires. Since the local renewal project was not developed in secret, the strategy of early opposition was not available merely because the Negro lacked the ability to utilize or comprehend both the information and its consequences.

When the project lapsed into occasional periods of inactivity, this should have permitted the site-residents the opportunity to regroup, and organize a stronger protest.⁹⁶

Instead of encouraging them to regroup, the lull in activity gave them a false sense of security. They perceived these breaks in momentum as indications that the project would never materialize. Again, they were not able to recognize the strategy that was available, due partially to the lack of knowledge of renewal procedures, internal organizational and goal-setting problems, and other constraints to effective mobilization.

As the renewal project is cleared, and developers begin to make commitments for the various renewal sites, the community may again be afforded the opportunity to make changes in the plan. If perhaps a disposition site cannot be sold for redevelopment according to the use suggested in the plan, or if a committed developer withdraws his proposal, the site residents could apply pressure to have the land use for the parcel changed. This would, however, depend largely on the ability of the community to agree upon a use for the property. Renewal land laying follow is not desired, so the decision makers may consider seriously proposals to change the use of a parcel to a more marketable use.

Neighborhood groups, representing the people affected by renewal, have a privileged position under the democratic ethos in discussing the proposal with city officials, and the city is likely to listen to their position.⁹⁷ In addition to presenting their position through the mass media, petitions, and parts of the official bureaucracy such as councilmen, the neighborhood group could speak at CAC meetings and other public hearings and meet with city administrators. All of these tactics were available to the local neighborhood groups, but the residents never fully utilized them. Again, it was not the unavailability of tactics, but the failure of the neighborhood to mobilize.

One area in which the local residents had a tactical advantage over the city was in relation to the HHFA. Since the HHFA felt there was no attempt being made to involve site residents in meaningful discussions with renewal administrators, and was dissatisfied with the failure to adopt a local open housing policy, the neighborhood was in the position when it could have stopped renewal proceedings. The tactic was available, but was not used.

If the HHFA feels the local situation is highly suspect, it will intervene. However, the HHFA characteristically does not investigate the situation on its own initiative.

It will, however, merely request that the local authority submit proof that it is complying with the requirements of the workable program. A city need do very little to fulfill this requirement. If the local agency is at all powerful or tactful, federal intervention can be prevented. By resubmitting the workable program with more evidence, and sending a representative to Washington, the city was able to convince the HHFA that the local situation was in compliance with its wishes.

If the neighborhood groups had known that HHFA would not very likely investigate the local situation, it could have documented its feelings, presented them in person or through their congressman or senator to HHFA, and had their position recognized. Whether or not this would have stopped the program would have depended upon how convincing had been their documentation. Nevertheless, due to their naivete, they were unable to use this tactic.

Somewhat related, but not a very successful tactic in practice, the neighborhood group may attempt to seek judicial redress for its grievance. Although it would seem that the outcome of this procedure would more likely, due to the neutrality of the courts, be to the advantage of a group like the North End which has little political power, this has not been the case. The neighborhood group must prove a difficult point: that a legal right has been violated.

When Reverend Bishop filed a Title 6 complaint under the 1964 Civil Rights Act with the American Civil Liberties Union and the U. S. Civil Rights Commission, the complaint was not upheld. It could not be proven that the city had violated a legal right. In this case, as in most, the complaint had not enough legal basis to be brought to court.

Particular mention has been made earlier to the neighborhood's inability to gain access to the decision-makers through the political arena because of citywide elections and the low level of threat felt from this area by politicians. Little more needs to be mentioned of this point, except that political tactics were unavoidable to the community. It does suggest however, the need for allies and gaining a strategic position to supplement low voting power.

After examining the alternatives available to each side, and reviewing the proposition this discussion is

based on; that the resources and realistic alternatives of the subordinate party were so few, and the alternatives available to the dominant party in terms of controlling the behavior of the subordinate party so great, the Negro could do nothing to change the course of action, it seems as if the determining factor was not that there were few alternatives available to the subordinate group, but that the Negro was unable to perceive these alternatives and subsequently mobilize to attain them. This failure to be able to mobilize was determined earlier to stem from a scarcity of resources, the size of the community, and the lack of agreement among leaders as to what they want.

This examination of neighborhood strategies suggests that there is another factor which is also highly significant: the retention by the neighborhood of a person understanding the renewal process. Many of the alternative actions that might have been taken by the neighborhood were overlooked, due to the lack of sound technical advice.

Alliances

Much of what has been mentioned to this point regarding the inability of the Negro to mobilize for action or to exert pressure upon the decision-makers suggests the need for him to form alliances and coalitions to augment the resources of a weak neighborhood group. However, from similar situations one can develop the proposition that increased minority mobilization through a coalition partner was not possible because the Negro had few rewards he could give his ally.

The value of a political ally would have been significant in this case, for the Negro would have been able to apply pressure upon the mayor and council in a magnitude that would encourage them to seriously consider the Negroes' wants. With an ally he might also have been able to elect to council in 1967 those men who opposed urban renewal, thus defeating the project.

When one asks with whom the Negro might have allied, groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, and similar organizations come to mind. Although for a time the Chamber of Commerce opposed renewal, there was not one group to be found which shared the view of the opposition. Those groups which spoke with reservation in favor of the project did not intend to ally with a group

determined to defeat the entire project. The balance of the community, including the Chamber of Commerce, came to recognize in the project elements favorable to their position.

The "conservative" element running throughout the community had at times expressed disfavor with the renewal program and one questions the failure of a coalition to develop between the Negro opponents and the "conservatives." This can be best explained by locating the source of this opposition. In part it came from several councilmen who might have been expressing the views of their constituents. There never developed, however, opposition to renewal by a conservative bloc. The main objection to renewal from this group centered about the use of federal funds to finance the program, but it is believed that this objection was not as widely held locally as some believed. There were those, of course, who recognized that urban renewal would cause Negroes to relocate outside the North End. Again, this was not perceived as a major threat since the number of Negroes who could afford to relocate in the exclusive sections of town was limited. The failure of a solid conservative opposition to develop eliminated the possibility for a alliance with the sporadic conservative opposition. The councilman who represented this view felt little need for these few Negro votes.

The failure of the opposition Negroes to acquire an ally, precluded the possibility that an anti-renewal council could be elected in 1967. Although the Negro councilman, a Republican, was deliberately defeated by his own party, the reason was not urban renewal. Since the machine was intent on defeating Mr. Stratton, and not urban renewal, there was little basis for a coalition. It is suspected that Mr. Stratton was defeated for a combination of reasons: his stand against Mr. Goldwater, which cost the local party a number of votes in a past election, combined with a general dislike for the increase in local militancy for civil rights. The Negro opponents, although violently against urban renewal, would not to take a stand which would preclude gains in civil rights.

The position maintained by Davies helps to explain the inability to form a coalition.

The groups that can more easily ally themselves with citywide groups--the churches, the political clubs, the ethnic groups--tend generally to have better access to administrators.

Those neighborhood groups which cannot turn to strong citywide organizations based on the same interest--the homeowners, the tenants, the small businessmen--have a much more difficult time securing access.

Even neighborhood groups that succeed in making alliances with outside citywide groups cannot, however, ally themselves with groups that are part of the administrator's regular base of support. The interests of the renewal administrators--slum clearance, the financial position of the city, good planning and so forth--are interests that usually do not have any group equivalent on the neighborhood level.⁹⁸

Those groups Davies say cannot turn to strong citywide organizations are the ones who were active in the North End in opposing urban renewal. If Davies is correct, then there was no possible alliance they could make. Even the groups he claims can ally themselves with citywide groups--the churches, political clubs, the ethnic groups--were not able to form alliances. The North End churches were autonomous and did not have counterparts in the white community, the political clubs of the city were not open to the North End, and besides the Negro, there was no ethnic group in the city with which to ally. If they could find an ally, according to Davies, they would still not have access to the administrator.

He is suggesting that the advantage to a neighborhood group of an alliance is not direct, but indirect access. These groups often have direct access to elected officials who transfer the desires of the citywide group to the administrator. The effectiveness of this strategy depends upon the importance to the elected officials of the citywide group. If such a group existed locally, it was not known to the Negro respondents.

When viewing the range of groups with whom alliances might have been made, it is easy to understand the failure of the North End opponents to form alliances. There was no citywide ethnic group with which to ally. Since the citywide group's power would lie in numbers, the North End would have been an asset. There was no such group, however.

Organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League were both ineffective and neighborhood based, unable to

present a significant threat. Homeowner-businessmen groups and individual property owners tended to be divided by economic interests, and there was no citywide church alliance. Finally, the only citywide group representing better housing was the League of Women Voters, and they supported urban renewal.

Since it has been substantiated that the Negro had limited resources, it can be held that increased minority mobilization through a coalition partner was not possible because the Negro had few resources he could give his ally. In addition, though, the absence of groups with which to ally is also significant.

Competitive Vs. Pressure Resources

Competitive Resources

Although recognized that competitive and pressure resources can be used simultaneously or in sequence to encourage a change in dominant group behavior, it is more widely held that competitive resources are more effective than pressure resources in inducing permanent changes in dominant group behavior.

This proposition is based upon the belief competitive resources, or those that are acquired by the minority group because it possesses something the dominant-group members positively want, are more likely to induce changes than would threat of punishment.

When this proposition is tested locally, it is difficult to evaluate, due to the small amount of change which can be noted in dominant group behavior. When focusing specifically upon the urban renewal project it appears that, due to competitive resources, Negroes were able to obtain housing in previously segregated neighborhoods. Clearly those who could afford financially to purchase the housing have been, to a great degree able to do so in fact. What are rewards to the seller may be perceived as threats by the balance of the neighbors, however, but the purchase of a home by a Negro would not be considered pressure resources.

Pressure resources are characterized by their punishment power, and are applied by a group rather than being vested in an individual. What has appeared to be a result

of competitive resources, a Negro purchasing a home in a previously segregated neighborhood, may also have been encouraged by the fear of the application of pressure resources. Perhaps the riots occurring elsewhere have permitted the Negro to utilize his competitive resources.

Pressure Resources

Since very little change in dominant-group behavior can be noted, and competitive resources have not been effective in inducing this change, one questions why pressure resources have not been used in an attempt to change dominant group behavior.

The reason for this failure relates to the degree of organization necessary to apply them. From this study, then, it could be hypothesized that the Negro could not use pressure resources because he could not cause a continuous application or threat of application of them. This can be directly related to the lack of coordination and agreement within the North End, and the inability to mobilize. To apply pressure resource tactics such as picketing, marches, sit-ins, boycotts, mass meetings, and civil disobedience, a minority must not only mobilize its resources, but maintain a continuous application of them. Because of this in many instances they require direct assistance of coalition partners.⁹⁹

Due to the above requirements, which the Negro neighborhood has not been able to develop, it can be understood why pressure resources have not been used. In addition, the application of these resources usually requires that targets be carefully selected, clearly defined, and be vulnerable to the sanction applied or threatened to be applied.¹⁰⁰

Failure to utilize pressure resources might be explained basically as resulting from the failure of the community to organize or mobilize in general. In particular, the community was not organized on a continuing basis for protest activity. To mobilize for protest activity, more is required than the mere possibility of mass action. There must be an agreed upon specific goal, and target which can grant the ends sought.

While the inability to mobilize has been cited as a basic cause for the failure of the North End to prevent urban renewal, it must be restated that the entire North End

was not opposed to the project. The bulk of the preceeding discussion, then, pertains mainly to the Negro opponent to urban renewal, for it cannot be expected that the supporters would organize to oppose the project. This is also believed to be a reason why there was no militant or direct-action tactics used. Those persons who would be most inclined to react in this manner, basically the young, did not oppose the project on a large scale. In addition, many of those persons who are now emerging as militant leaders of the Black Community were too young to be active during the early stages of the renewal process.

influence decision-makers, his failure to form coalitions was questioned. Confirming the hypothesis, was the finding that the Negro had few rewards to offer his ally and could therefore, not form coalitions. Beyond this, however, it was discovered that there were, in fact, few groups with which he could ally.

Since there has not been a significant change in dominant group behavior, it was not possible to substantiate the claim that competitive resources are more effective than pressure resources in inducing permanent changes in dominant group behavior. The failure to utilize pressure resources or direct-action tactics was questioned, and found to result from the basic inability of the local Negro community to organize under a common goal for protest activity. It could not cause a continuous application or threat of application of pressure resources. It was recognized, however, that there were other possible explanations for this failure to be able to act in a unified manner, ranging from a conflict over the position for community leader to alienation of the young.

Evaluation

"Winners"

When an attempt is made to determine the "winner" of any conflict where there is no preconceived measure of success, it is difficult. When this conflict extends for over a generation, the evaluation of the outcome must be suspect. This project, while in the execution stage is not nearly completed, and once completed, the full implication will not be known for many years, if known at all.

At present, if the local urban renewal controversy were viewed as a political contest to have one's goals prevail, there would be no single winner. The city, may in fact have won the most, for the most highly blighted section of the city will be at least physically improved. Perhaps more significant a victory, and certainly less value-laden, was the ability of the city to establish the urban renewal procedure. The city is now in the position to enter into other renewal projects, specifically the Central Business District, and the University area projects, and have some assurance of success.

The League of Women Voters was successful, if the undertaking of an improvement program in the North End can be considered as fulfilling its goals.

The Negro at large has gained to a degree from the renewal project, housing throughout the community now being more attainable.

For the present, at least, those people who were site-residents living in sub-standard housing and were relocated into second homes, can be considered as having gained from the renewal process. In future years, after they have retired or are otherwise unable to work, the financial burden placed upon them by the project might be overbearing.

"Losers"

Those persons who are considered to have failed in the attempt to obtain their goals are more numerous. Perhaps the greatest loss is occurring to those people who have not been able to be relocated, requiring public housing which is to be built where they are presently living.

Because of the extensive controversy over this project, it is believed that a project outside the GNRP will be undertaken before another North End project. For those people who were hoping to obtain better housing through urban renewal, this decision would place them in the category of those having lost.

Reverend Bishop's group might be considered to have lost since urban renewal went on as planned, and public housing will be built within the project area. Reverend Bishop may be viewed as having lost personally, having part of his congregation moved throughout the city. During this period he was coerced into running for Council against Mr. Stratton, fell sick during the campaign and later lost his church to fire. Although his personal losses cannot be attributed directly to urban renewal, some of his followers feel this happened to him because he opposed urban renewal, and have consequently left his church.

As a group, the ministers have lost much of the leadership position they had in the past. How related to urban renewal this decline may be is not known. Since nationwide, ministers have declined as community leaders, it may be assumed that their decline in the North End was not due

entirely to urban renewal. At least one congregation in the North End has reportedly increased in cohesion by being forced to relocate. This helped to strengthen the group by giving them a central goal for which to strive.

Politically, Mayor Dexter and Councilman Stratton may have been affected by urban renewal, although in each case, the failure to be reelected was related to a different issue.

The City of Urbana may have suffered a loss also. A number of families dislocated by the project moved into Urbana, and the higher land values and rents that will result in the Project Area will cause those people seeking lower rents to continue to move into Urbana. Unless Urbana attempts to improve its section of the North End, it will most certainly continue to deteriorate.

There is one final group that may feel it has lost due to urban renewal. This would be the residents of white neighborhoods in which the Negro has relocated. No one neighborhood may have yet received a great enough number of Negroes to feel threatened, however. On the other hand, a neighborhood may feel it has gained by acquiring a Negro family and becoming an "integrated" community.

Degree of Success

Viewed from this point in time, it appears as if the neighborhood opposition was successful to a degree, since it had some of its demands filled, although they may have been insignificant. The technical changes made in the plan could be seen as successes, but the overriding accomplishment was the location of a portion of the public housing to be built outside the Black community, movement of Blacks into white communities, and the desegregation of existing public housing, though quite limited.

Citizen participation, on the other hand, did not establish the public interest, and it most likely cannot. Though the federal government feels it is necessary, the value of citizen participation has been questioned. Although considered necessary in the rehabilitation phases, all that may be needed is the acquiescence of those affected by clearance. In some instances, instead of being indispensable, citizen participation may be detrimental to the program's progress.¹⁰¹ It has been accused of delaying projects, resulting in the loss of federal money, and con-

tributing to the lowering of the quality of government by encouraging the criticism of officials. Mentioned earlier, neighborhood groups may be responsible for shortening the careers of public figures, and may also be undemocratic.

Hopefully, the CAC would have created citizen participation in the process, but it failed. Good intentions were behind the selection of the reorganized committee and the acceptance by the members, and although the committee worked hard for the success of the project, it accomplished little.

This creation of a group as the CAC for the purpose of developing citizen participation is questioned because it is usually not representative, and members are selected with a specific problem in view. This encourages the appointment of people who will be sympathetic to the city's point of view. The groups usually must deal with problems that are so complex that staff assistance is necessary to gather, sort, and interpret information needed by the members. Many groups do not have this help, and when it is available, it is often biased.¹⁰²

Overall, the CAC was ineffective because of the racial and class barrier, its lack of a staff and an adequate budget, and its association with the "establishment's" point of view.

Comparison with a "Successful" Project

As presented to this point, urban renewal has been a failure. But, clearly, in some neighborhoods, the renewal process has been a success. Why do some areas succeed and others fail? The North West Hyde Park Renewal Program was highly successful and suggests reasons why the local project was basically a failure.¹⁰³

In North West Hyde Park there had been a significant degree of local initiative in neighborhood renewal before the renewal planning began. The neighborhood leaders had become familiar with planning before they were confronted by the professional planners. This did not happen in the North End.

Unlike the situation locally, the leadership of North West Hyde Park had access to the organizations and institutions of the community. The community was biracial in character and leadership, and renewal did not appear as Negro clearance.

Block groups in Hyde Park were well organized before renewal began and had made small improvements before renewal was even suggested.

The goals of the planning program in Hyde Park were such that there was little controversy over public versus private development. Practically all redevelopment was to be public and benefit the neighborhood in some manner, and the institutional stakes in the area were high, but none dominant, encouraging cooperation between them and neighborhood residents.

The Hyde Park experience differed in another respect. It was not the first renewal plan to be developed in the city, and residents of the project area were able to acquire experience in renewal procedures by viewing other projects in action. Being the trial project, the North End was again handicapped.

Implications

Urban renewal has become politically vulnerable nationwide due to the disintegration of the coalition of liberals, planners, mayors, businessmen, and real estate interests which originally supported the program. The programs have in many cases turned out to be less than financial successes, causing the businessmen to become disillusioned, and the effect of the program on the low-income site resident has caused liberals to grow apprehensive.¹⁰⁴ This decline in support indicates that the probability of success of the opponents will rise, unless the supporters of urban renewal can gain community wide support. Even if they succeed in this, the opposition should have a proportionately better probability of success. As more groups oppose renewal, the elected officials are less inclined to support the program. The fact that there was considerable opposition to renewal locally, has led public officials both elected and appointed to indicate that it would be some while before the city undertook project two in the GNRP. Even this might be viewed as a win for the opposition.

If residents of neighborhoods such as the North End are to actively and effectively participate in urban renewal or other planning activities, and by participation is meant having a voice in the development of the plans, not merely opposing those that have been presented, there will need to be a recognition by the residents of both the planning

and political process. In this respect the future for the Negro in urban renewal politics is encouraging due to the movement toward militancy and active involvement.

In addition, it would seem that the neighborhood would profit from the talents of a city planner or other person who would not only be able to keep the leadership informed of technicalities and strategies that might be used, but also develop specific proposals for the renewal of the community based upon the desires of the residents. These would then be transmitted by the planner and the community leader to the local decision makers and planning sources.

Based upon the premise that the solutions to our urban problems cannot be merely technically solved, but must be based on social attitudes, this planner working for the community would consider a limited end, basing the plan on the desired objectives of the people affected.

This person who would represent the group in a planning issue would adopt the community position, and prepare a plan with their objectives in mind and in language they can understand. The plan might be presented as an original, suggesting a direction of action, or as an alternative, pointing out the bias in an earlier plan. A plan developed in this manner would certainly be more acceptable to the community than one prepared by an outside group or even by the city itself. The shortage of capable people and the inability of the Negro community to be able to support such a person is not encouraging. Reliance upon voluntary contributions of time and effort will be confronted with the inability to maintain a continuous operation, and often those people who would volunteer are clearly unacceptable to the neighborhood.

Perhaps a suggestion such as this could be criticized for removing the Negro from the balance of community planning, and groups such as the CAC will be able to develop the desired citizen participation. If this is ever realized it will be in the far distant future, and its realization will be difficult. The obstacles to giving the neighborhoods meaningful roles in decision-making have been discussed within this paper, and have been seen to be not only problems of housing and planning but include civil rights, poverty and the political life of our communities.

Davies says: "We must strive to incorporate groups into the political process, not exclude them. We must give them some responsibility for helping themselves, not make them totally dependent on distant and unseen forces. The result would be a better and more democratic community."¹⁰⁵

It seems that such a person who would act as described above would fulfill these requirements. He would provide the technical ability, the political prowess, become part of the community, and even fill the gap left by the failure to form alliances. Perhaps his existence will be short. When the Negro becomes part of the community and can perform those functions he is not now able, perhaps groups such as the Citizens Advisory Committee will be effective. Until then, the community's advocacy planner would fill the void by incorporating the group into the political process, transfer to the neighborhood the responsibility for helping itself and freeing it from being dependent upon distant and unforeseen forces.

EPILOGUE

January 16, 1968 - May, 1968

Since the bulldozers moved into the North End, more than forty homes have been demolished, and their residents relocated. Most of these families have been relocated throughout the city of Champaign, in decent housing. Several families have moved to Rantoul, Illinois and one or two to other states. An undetermined number of families has moved into the Urbana ghetto of their own accord. Relocation policy is such that if there is no relocation housing available to the people, their homes will not be taken. As of now, May, 1968, the families that have been relocated have been primarily those with resources that will permit them to incur a mortgage on the new property, or those who could afford private rental property.

The "problem families" have been left until now for relocation. These families, old or indigent, cannot afford housing in the private market, and must be relocated in public housing. Such housing was to be provided according to the plan presented to the neighborhood by the city, but has not come about. It is now maintained that the 120 units of public housing scheduled to be built must be constructed simultaneously in order to keep construction costs to the level required by the federal government. Therefore, the sixty units of relocation housing outside the project area cannot be built until the sixty units within the project area are constructed. The parcels of land needed to be acquired to complete the site for public housing within the project area are now occupied by persons who must be relocated in the public housing. The circularity of the problem would be amusing if its consequences were not so drastic. The renewal department is attempting to relocate these people; however, the economics are such that this is proving difficult, if not impossible.

An attempt to provide relocation housing has been undertaken by a group of approximately fifteen local women. They have formed a non-profit organization which purchases

rehabilitable homes, slated for demolition, from the city for \$1.00, moves them to lots within the area, and rehabilitates them. The homes are then sold at cost to dislocated families. Limited by finances, the group has been able to rehabilitate several homes to date.

Although most residents living in the project area who are required to relocate for one reason or another do not find the prospect very desirable, they offer little resistance, negotiate with the city, and eventually find another home. Homeowners are paid the "fair market value" for their residences, and homeowners and renters alike are paid moving expenses. Some people, however, have refused to move.

Refusal by Mr. and Mrs. Prime Thomas of 1108 North Poplar Street to negotiate with the city or allow representatives on her property to discuss plans for resettlement has caused debate in the Champaign City Council. The Council voted to institute eminent domain proceedings against the Thomas' in order to obtain the property.

Voting on this issue was typical of previous urban renewal discussions; Councilmen Robert Pope, Paul Somers and Seely Johnston opposing the use of eminent domain.

Mr. Pope stated that this issue "was an instance such as I forecast to you more than a year ago." (The city was offering \$6,500 for the Thomas' home which the owners claimed they had worked for long and hard.) Mrs. Thomas "is past the age where she can work outside the home and is now under a doctor's care for diabetes. I feel her desperation and at the same time reject the notion that it is good policy to sacrifice the few for the good of the many."¹⁰⁶ Councilmen Pope, Somers and Johnston had objected several months prior to this meeting that the residents were being overpaid for their homes.

Mr. and Mrs. Thomas will undoubtedly be moved from their home, the city having the legal power to do so under eminent domain.

Under urban renewal policy, owners of land slated for redevelopment are given first preference for development of the land, provided they abide by the renewal plan. They must, however, pay the fair market value for the land. Recently, the O. U. R. Co-op Store, desiring to purchase relocation property in the neighborhood, requested that the city council sell to the store urban renewal land for

\$1.00. The store reportedly cannot afford to pay the fair market price of \$40,000. At this time, HUD indicates that this is not possible, all land being required to be sold at fair market value. And so the problem stands, the value of land being too high to allow existing businesses to remain in the neighborhood. If the city desired, it could purchase the property and lease it to the Co-op Store for a stated period of time, after which the store would purchase the property from the city at a previously agreed upon price. What the city will do is not known. Similar problems are anticipated due to the lack of technical ability in the North End in addition to the other problems presented in this paper.

FOOTNOTES

¹Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 7.

²The Social Welfare Committee of the League of Women Voters of Champaign County, A Report of Housing Conditions of Low Income Families in Champaign-Urbana (March, 1949), p. 1.

³League of Women Voters: Report of Housing Conditions of Low Income Families in Champaign-Urbana, pp. 3-5.

⁴Ibid., p. 5.

⁵Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Workable Program for Community Improvement (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1966), p. 1.

Definition of "Workable Program:"

The workable program, carrying no direct Federal Aid in itself, is a prerequisite to loans and grants for clearing, redeveloping and rehabilitating slums and blighted areas, grants for concentrated housing code enforcement projects and for the demolition of unsafe, dilapidated buildings, plus mortgage insurance for housing construction or improvement in renewal areas. Approval would allow the community to obtain urban renewal funds.

⁶Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 28, 1962.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Champaign-Urbana Courier, December 2, 1962.

¹¹Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 30, 1963.

- ¹²Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 3, 1963.
- ¹³Letter to David Gay, City Planner, City of Champaign, Illinois from John E. Severns, June 23, 1964. (elicited from: A Review of Progress 1963-1964: Workable Program for Community Improvement).
- ¹⁴Champaign-Urbana Courier, April 5, 1963.
- ¹⁵Severn's letter to Gay.
- ¹⁶Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 21, 1964.
- ¹⁷Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 22, 1964.
- ¹⁸Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 23, 1964.
- ¹⁹Champaign-Urbana Courier, April 5, 1964.
- ²⁰Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, October 3, 1964.
- ²¹Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, November 7, 1964.
- ²²Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 17, 1964.
- ²³Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 28, 1965.
- ²⁴Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, May 7, 1965.
- ²⁵Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, June 2, 1965.
- ²⁶Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, July 7, 1965.
- ²⁷Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, July 29, 1965.
- ²⁸Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, August 16, 1965.
- ²⁹Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, October 13, 1965.
- ³⁰Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, November 3, 1965.

³¹Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, November 10, 1965.

³²Spies Report on Washington, D. C., Trip K25. (elicited from: A Review of Progress Under the Workable Program for Community Improvement, April 6, 1966).

³³Champaign-Urbana Courier, December 20, 1965.

³⁴Citizen's Advisory Commission, minutes of meeting, January 5, 1966.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 24, 1966.

³⁷Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 25, 1966.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 1, 1966.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 1, 1966.

⁴²Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 4, 1966.

⁴³Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 13, 1966.

⁴⁴Public improvements within an urban renewal area may, under certain circumstances, be used as a "credit" to be applied to the City's share of site acquisition and clearance costs. In this case, the City would be permitted to deduct from its payment to the federal government over \$100,000. This, reduced the amount of revenue that had to be collected through a proposed tax increase intended to finance the project. The advantage to the city is that it does not finance the construction of the public housing, but nevertheless receives the "credit."

⁴⁵Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 17, 1966.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Champaign-Urbana Courier, May 1, 1966.

⁴⁸Champaign-Urbana Courier, August 24, 1966.

- ⁴⁹Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 17, 1966.
- ⁵⁰Ibid.
- ⁵¹Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 21, 1967.
- ⁵²Champaign-Urbana Courier, May 21, 1967.
- ⁵³Champaign-Urbana Courier, July 6, 1967.
- ⁵⁴Champaign-Urbana Courier, July 9, 1967.
- ⁵⁵Champaign-Urbana Courier, July 10, 1967.
- ⁵⁶J. Clarence Davies, III, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 147.
- ⁵⁷Herbert J. Gans, The Urban Villagers (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 291.
- ⁵⁸Harold Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 35.
- ⁵⁹Davies, p. 154.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 147.
- ⁶¹Ibid., p. 208.
- ⁶²Ibid., p. 210.
- ⁶³Kaplan, p. 136.
- ⁶⁴Davies, p. 209.
- ⁶⁵Edward C. Banfield and Martin Meyerson, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), p. 106.
- ⁶⁶Davies, p. 211.
- ⁶⁷Gans, p. 289.
- ⁶⁸Davies, p. 168.
- ⁶⁹Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 87-88.

⁷⁰Kaplan, p. 175.

⁷¹Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), see pp. 18-36 for analysis of problems being discussed.

⁷²James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 255.

⁷³Kaplan, p. 137.

⁷⁴Wilson, pp. 296-299.

⁷⁵Gans, p. 297.

⁷⁶Davies, pp. 169-171.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 169-170.

⁷⁸Wilson, p. 111.

⁷⁹Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 268-269.

⁸⁰Gans, p. 295.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 290.

⁸²Kaplan, p. 139.

⁸³Blalock, p. 113.

⁸⁴Wilson, p. 99.

⁸⁵Blalock, p. 177.

⁸⁶Wilson, p. 99.

⁸⁷Blalock, p. 151.

For example: If a 60-10 ratio changes over time to a 100-30 ratio, by using a difference measure (60-10 compared to 100-30) the minority is losing ground. By comparing ratios, 60/10 Vs. 100/30, the minority is gaining ground.

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 220-221.

⁸⁹Wilson, pp. 286-287.

- ⁹⁰Ibid., p. 289.
- ⁹¹Davies, pp. 147-148.
- ⁹²Ibid., p. 149.
- ⁹³Rossi and Dentler, p. 135.
- ⁹⁴Ibid., p. 5.
- ⁹⁵Kaplan, p. 142.
- ⁹⁶Ibid., p. 143.
- ⁹⁷Davies, p. 194.
- ⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 192-193.
- ⁹⁹Blalock, p. 119.
- ¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 119.
- ¹⁰¹Kaplan, p. 164.
- ¹⁰²Lyle E. Schaller, "Is the Citizen Advisory Committee a Threat to Representative Government?" Public Administration Review, Vol. 24, 1964, pp. 176-177.
- ¹⁰³Rossi and Dentler, pp. 217-219.
- ¹⁰⁴James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 39, Nov. 1963, p. 242.
- ¹⁰⁵Davies, p. 214.
- ¹⁰⁶The Daily Illini. May 22, 1968.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX I

Propositions

Following are those propositions developed regarding Negro involvement in urban renewal politics. They are presented under the three broad areas of investigation; Formulation of Neighborhood Attitudes, Minority Mobilization, and Strategies. For each proposition its most authoritative source is noted, but abbreviated. A complete source follows the propositions.

I. FORMULATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD ATTITUDES

Those goals which permit the least flexibility with respect to choices among alternative means have the greatest influences in determining the direction of one's choice behavior.

Blalock, pp. 48-49.

Davies, pp. 147 and 154.

a. The particular goals chosen were done so because of limited resources and resulted in short-range personal attitudes.

II. MINORITY MOBILIZATION

Minority mobilization is a multiplicative function of the strength of one's goals and the perceived probability of achieving these goals.

Mobilization is near zero when there is:

1. Low probability of success.
2. Complete acceptance of the system.
3. High probability of negative sanctions being applied.

Blalock, pp. 142 and 188.

Clark, p. 197.

a. The greatest constraint upon an effective mobilization of resources in the Negro community is the lack of agreement among leaders as to what they want, and the sporadic nature of the participants.

Wilson, pp. 169 and 193.

Kaplan, p. 139.

b. Power to mobilize resources for a particular goal depends upon the availability of resources for achieving other goals; and, minority mobilization of resources relates to the size of the community.

Blalock, p. 139 and 188.

Wilson, p. 99.

III. STRATEGIES

The resources and realistic alternatives of the subordinate party were so few, and the alternatives available to the dominant party in terms of controlling the behavior of the subordinate party so great, the Negro could do nothing to change the course of action.

Blalock, p. 50.

Wilson, pp. 286-287; 289-290.

Wilson, in Conflict Resolution.

a. Increased minority mobilization through a coalition partner was not possible because the Negro had few rewards he could give his ally.

Blalock, p. 188.

Wilson, p. 154.

b. Competitive resources were more effective than pressure resources in inducing permanent changes in dominant group behavior.

Blalock, p. 140.

Wilson, p. 89.

and, the Negro could not use pressure resources because he could not cause a continuous application or threat of

application of them.

Blalock, p. 140.

Clark, p. 197.

Wilson in Conflict Resolution.

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APPENDIX II

Questions

For each set of propositions developed, a corresponding group of questions was prepared to investigate the implications of the propositions.

The questions asked the people who were interviewed are listed below under the three major topics. Each person interviewed was not necessarily asked all of the questions; some obviously pertaining to selected individuals, nor were they asked the question in the same form. The questions were reworded to fit the person being interviewed.

I. FORMULATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD ATTITUDES

a) What were the issues that created a level of interest? How did urban renewal become important to the various interest groups?

b) What were the stakes involved? What did the opponents have to lose?

c) What groups were formed and upon what lines? i.e., political, economic, religious, neighborhood and non-neighborhood.

d) What were the goals they organized around? Why did they choose these goals?

e) Did groups appear and disappear as issues developed, or were the same people always involved?

f) Would there have been less opposition from the residents had a better plan been prepared?

g) Did the consultant's planners really know the people and their problems?

Citizen Participation

- a) Did citizen participation establish the public interest?
- b) Were the residents aware of the project in its early stages?
- c) When did "grass roots" opposition begin?
- d) Did the residents believe urban renewal would ever come about?
- e) Did the residents fear the CAC and its intentions?

II. MINORITY MOBILIZATION

Resources

- a) Did the Negro have the power to change the course of action? What power or resources did he have? What did he lack?
- b) How did the residents make their demands felt? Did they have access to the decision-makers? Politicians?
- c) If the key to success is the possession of political resources and the utilization of them, Who had the most resources? What were they?

Leaders

- a) Was there a consensus among the leaders and residents as to what they wanted? Was the leadership unified or fragmented?
- b) Who were the leaders? What qualities did he possess to make him a leader?
- c) Was there any visible mistrust of the "successful" Negro?
- d) What did the leaders who opposed the project have to lose?

e) Why was there no militant leadership from the North End to disrupt the system?

Why were no direct-action tactics used?
Such as:

- test cases and voter registration
- pickets
- marches
- sit-ins
- boycotts
- mass meetings
- civil disobedience
- bloc voting

Why did the Negro not do this in order to gain the resources he lacked?

Mobilization

a) Why did not the residents mobilize the resources they had?

- complete acceptance of system?
- complete resignation?
- low probability of success?
- high probability of negative sanctions?

b) Were the residents organized on a continuing basis for protest activity?

c) Who make the planning decisions? Do you know of any that were made in private?

d) Would it have been possible to make any major or minor changes in the plan or program after the city had met with the residents? Had the planning decisions been made before the residents became involved?

e) From whom was the mayor most receptive of suggestions?

f) What was the basis for the dissention and disagreement in Council and other official areas in regard to this project?

g) Did the planning consultant really know the people and their problems?

h) Would there have been less opposition from the residents had a better plan been prepared?

Conclusion

a) If this were viewed as a political contest to have one's goals prevail, who won?

b) Were the residents successful to a degree? In any area? Why, why not?

III. STRATEGIES

City

a) What do you think was the role and major purpose of the Citizens Advisory Committee? Did the mayor have any personal or other reasons for establishing the Citizens Advisory Committee?

b) Did membership on the CAC exclude people from the neighborhood who could have added needed information or support?

c) Was the mayor or City Council prepared to accept a "bad report" from the CAC?

d) What tactics did the City use to deal with the pressure groups? Did the city make any concessions or compromises?

e) Could the CAC and its affiliates have done a better job in preparing a plan than the consultant?

Would such a plan, even though not as good as the consultant's, have been more acceptable to the people?

Did the consultant's planners really know and understand the situation?

Neighborhood

a) Did the Negro form alliances with other groups? Why, or why not?

b) Why were, or why were not white liberals drawn into the renewal controversy?

c) How could the minority group have acquired an ally?

d) Did the Negro have "access" to the political structure?

e) Could the Negro bargain? Did he have anything to bargain with?

f) What could the Negro have done to put himself in a bargaining position?

g) Was there a group that could switch a significant number of Negro votes?

h) To what degree were the churches successful as leaders in the past? Presently?

APPENDIX III

SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA

General

Number of Interviews	733
Number of Families in GNRP	928
Percentage of Families Contacted	78.2%
Number of Adults	1,383
Number of Minors	1,200
Average Family Size	3.53
Number Interviewed Over 65	186
Number White Families	28
Number Non-White Families	704

Income

<u>Average Income</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Less than \$1,500	122	19.3
\$1,500 - \$2,500	123	19.4
\$2,500 - \$3,500	123	19.4
\$3,500 - \$4,500	124	19.6
\$4,500 - \$5,500	72	11.4
\$5,500 - \$6,500	25	4.0
\$6,500 - \$7,500	19	3.1
\$7,500 - \$8,500	10	1.7
over \$8,500	13	2.1
	<u>631</u>	<u>100.0</u>

A number of families refused to answer or could not answer questions relating to income. It should be noted that about 39 per cent of those answering the question had incomes of \$2,500 or less, while only 11 per cent have incomes over \$5,500.

Home Ownership

<u>Present Status</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Number of Families Owning Homes	343	50.6
Number of Families Renting	<u>334</u>	<u>49.4</u>
	677	100.0

Housing PreferenceRelocation Housing Preference

	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Number indicating they would buy	283	43.5
Number indicating they would rent	194	30.5
Number indicating desire for public housing	56	8.7
Undecided	111	17.3

More than 40 per cent of the families indicated they desire to purchase a home, compared to the more than 50 per cent who now own their homes. Nearly 9 per cent indicated they would desire public housing and more than 17 per cent were undecided.

Area of Relocation

<u>Relocation Preference</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
In project area	432	73.0
Outside project area	50	8.4
Undecided	<u>110</u>	<u>18.6</u>
	592	100.0

The great majority of persons answering the questions indicated a desire to relocate within the GNRP area.

APPENDIX IV

REORGANIZED CITIZENS ADVISORY COMMITTEE

December 19, 1962

<u>Member</u>	<u>Occupation</u>
John E. Severns (Chairman)	Architect
Otho F. Bartholow	Realtor
*John Petry	Construction
*Reverend Blaine Ramsey	Minister
Jack L. Simpson	Banker
Donald M. Tennant	Attorney
*Roscoe Tinsley	Businessman

*Designates resident of northeast neighborhood.

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